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Preface
‘How did you become so interested in doing research among fisherfolk?’
This has been a recurring question ever since I began developing an
anthropological interest in the occupational world of commercial fishing
in the early 1980s. The answer is ‘by sheer coincidence’. Before enrolling
as an anthropology student at the University of Amsterdam in 1982, I
knew little about ‘fishing cultures’. For one of the courses I took, I hap-
pened to read a fascinating study on folk religion in a North Yorkshire fish-
ing village (Clark 1982). It captured my imagination and I started to read
more ethnographic literature on fishing and fishing villages. That got me
hooked, to use an appropriate metaphor. I decided that I would eventually
conduct research in a fishing community somewhere in Europe. Through
a series of contingencies, I ended up doing so in 1986, close to home in
the Netherlands. An ongoing conflict in an occupational community of
shellfish planters attracted my attention and drew me to the village of Yer-
seke to conduct fieldwork. While working on my MA thesis, it struck me
that maritime anthropologists did not have a journal of their own, which
meant that their publications were widely scattered in scholarly journals.
Perhaps naïvely, I thought that this void should be filled. With Jojada Ver-
rips, I founded and edited the journal Maritime Anthropological Studies
(MAST), the first issue of which appeared in 1988. By then, I was firmly
committed to the field of fishing cultures. After graduation, I conducted
research for my PhD thesis in the fishing villages of the Dutch island of
Texel from late 1989 until early 1991, obtaining my degree with a disserta-
tion that was published in 1993. It focuses on the local fishermen’s long-
term adaptive strategies in view of ongoing debates concerning common
pool resource use. Although I subsequently ended up doing mostly non-
fisheries-related scholarly work, I also continued to occupy myself with
maritime studies and taught undergraduate courses in maritime anthro-
pology. When the occasion arose, I returned to Texel in August 2005 for a
second stint of prolonged fieldwork in the local community of fishermen
with the aim of examining their occupational culture and practice or what
the French dub ‘métier’. This notion refers to much more than just a job or
an occupation. It conjures up an image of an activity at which one excels, a
vocation, an encompassing and existential way of life and making a living.
This ethnography details Texel fisherfolk’s engagements with erratic
marine living resources, capricious markets and the vicissitudes of politi-
cal interventions in the fishing industry from the early 18th century until
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the present day, with an emphasis on post-war developments. The book is
empirically grounded, historically specific and theoretically informed. It
attempts to situate the occupational community at the interface of local
and (supra-)national processes and shows how the latter affect the socio-
cultural fabric of the island’s fishing villages and prompt particular re-
sponses in the fishermen’s perceptions and modes of action. Thus,
although this is a community study, I will occasionally wander off to events
occurring at other levels of integration that impinged upon the local fish-
ing industry. Nevertheless, the book’s proponents are Texel’s owner-opera-
tors, deckhands and others involved in the island’s fishing arena past and
present. Even though women often play important roles in family firms,
fishing per se is a male world. I do devote attention to fishermen’s wives,
but I am aware that there is a gender bias in this book. In my defence, I
can only say that women are conspicuously absent from the official meet-
ings in which fishing and fishing politics are discussed and that they tend
to strongly underplay their own contributions to the firms and to the run-
ning of households. Despite this lacuna, I am confident that the present
book illuminates the building blocks of fishing as an occupation.
Many people have supported my work and helped me in various ways.
To the fisherfolk of Texel, I owe much gratitude. They generously shared
their knowledge with me and made me feel welcome in their midst. I felt
at ease, which made it easy to empathize with them. Many of them sup-
plied me with published and unpublished documents, photographs, video-
tapes and other materials. Special thanks are due to the skipper-owners
who were kind enough to take me aboard their beam trawlers for four fish-
ing trips. These occasions provided invaluable information on work, fish-
ing tactics and relations and the atmosphere on board ship. I was per-
mitted unrestricted access to the archives of the local fishermen’s
association, the Fishery Cooperative, the local Producer Organization and
the Texel co-management group. This is indicative of their leadership’s
open-mindedness. Additional support came from a number of local insti-
tutions, including the municipal archive in Den Burg and the Maritime
and Beachcombers Museum in Oudeschild, which gave freely of their in-
formation, facilities and coffee. Librarians, archivists and museum staff
elsewhere were also helpful. The Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO) enabled the conducting of research on Texel (project
numbers 500-276-202 and 400-04-702), and the Amsterdam School for
Social Science Research co-sponsored my fieldwork. NWO also provided a
publication grant. I gratefully acknowledge their generous financial sup-
port. Two anonymous peer reviewers, and the series editors Maarten Ba-
vinck and Svein Jentoft, made it very clear that I needed to reduce the
length of the original manuscript considerably to dispose of excess detail.
Although this involved the loss of many a darling paragraph, I must admit
that they were right. I am also indebted to Harriet Impey, who cheerfully
fashioned my English.
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Zeewijk, our residence during my second stint of research, provided a sti-
mulating environment for writing and simultaneously conducting field-
work. My partner Margreeth and I, and our daughters Emma and Mette,
thoroughly enjoyed living on the island and making new friends. We truly
felt at home. Owing to a stroke of good luck, we were able to extend our
stay on Texel for another year, and, subsequently, we decided to ‘go native’
completely. This book is a tribute to the island, its inhabitants and particu-
larly its fisherfolk, who for generations have been braving troubled waters.
Preface 9

Introduction
From the late 18th century until fairly recently, Dutch fisherfolk were cul-
ture heroes in the national self-image. Braving treacherous seas with frail
boats to eke out a frugal living for themselves and their families, fisher-
men were romantically portrayed in the visual arts and in works of litera-
ture and scholarship as embodying ‘inner civilization’ and national vir-
tues.1 They were believed to be the epitome of authenticity, uncorrupted
by modernity, living austere and pious lives in close-knit communities,
preserving in customs and costumes what had disappeared elsewhere in
the Netherlands, and maintaining norms and values that simultaneously
mirrored and provided a model for the country’s ‘national character’. In
the iconography of how the Dutch presented themselves to the outside
world, the archetypical fisherman and fisherwoman – usually depicted in
traditional local dress – figured prominently. Highly distinctive and hetero-
geneous local cultures were thus conflated with nationhood and national
identity. The emblematic coastal Arcadia of folkloristic exoticism was given
pride of place for purposes of nostalgic cultural nationalism, while in rea-
lity fishing communities were rather peripheral – one might even say out-
landish – in a highly urbanized country. Through a whim of history, fisher-
folk were therefore in the limelight of positive cultural attention. Over the
past few decades, however, the mythical image of the pastoral good life has
changed rapidly and radically. Fishermen are currently stigmatized as un-
scrupulous marauders of the sea, knowingly and systematically depleting
its resources with a highly industrialized fishing fleet. Their alleged inim-
ical greed is believed to be unequalled, and, according to fisheries critics,
had it not been for draconian measures and their strict enforcement, the
last fish would already have been captured. The more militant environ-
mental activists even feel that the fishermen’s pernicious practices ought
to be banned altogether. The shift in imagery speaks volumes about the
changed position of fisherfolk in Dutch society.
To be a commercial fisherman in the Netherlands today means to be
under the continual scrutiny of national and supranational policymakers,
regulators, law enforcers, environmentalists, the media and public opin-
ion. According to fisherfolk, the occupation has lost much of the freedom
that arguably characterized it until the mid-1970s. In their own opinion,
inshore and offshore fishermen have for centuries been used to deciding
how to go about their business: what kinds of boats and equipment to use,
when and where to cast their nets, which species of fish, shellfish and
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crustaceans to pursue, what quantities to catch, where and when to land
catches and so on. Currently, among many other things, they have to abide
by strictly enforced landing limitations and a myriad of other rules and
regulations, make a careful planning of fishing time and keep an extensive
logbook administration, whilst being constantly supervised by a satellite
vessel-monitoring system. Although the perceived watershed between a
time of unmitigated liberty and a time of stifling restrictions and red tape
is to some extent a myth, there can be no doubt that the incorporation into
the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy has impacted upon the
world of Dutch offshore fishing in several major ways. It has thoroughly
altered the occupational praxis and culture of Dutch fishermen, and the
same goes for fishermen elsewhere in Europe. Along with ecological, en-
forcement and compliance problems, the external perception of the fishing
industry and the public esteem for fisherfolk has changed radically. Yet
surprisingly few social science monographs have been devoted to the ques-
tion of how fishermen have perceived, responded and adjusted to increas-
ingly tight management regimes and changing images of and opinions
about the fishing industry, and the ways in which these have transformed
the everyday lives and livelihoods of fishermen and their impact upon fish-
er families and fishing communities. The present book therefore aims to
fill a void in exploring, understanding and analyzing these issues in the
fishing villages of Texel, a Dutch island facing the Wadden Sea and the
North Sea. However, I will not restrict myself to Texel alone, but will on
occasion cast my nets wider, and deal with the fisheries and fishermen of
the Netherlands as a whole. In addition, I have used a long-term perspec-
tive to show that, among many other things, external intervention in the
fishing industry occurred early on.
The Dutch fishing industry is relatively small in terms of number of
vessels and employees. In 2007, the fishing fleet comprised 345 cutters,
14 large pelagic freezer trawlers and 83 shellfish fishing boats (Taal et al.
2008). Total employment in the fishing and shellfish-farming industry is
approximately 2,100 jobs, excluding related sectors such as the processing
industry, the fish auctions, the supply sector and the retail trade. Employ-
ment in these fisheries-dependent branches amounts to another 15,500
full-time jobs, about half of which are in fish processing and wholesale
companies and a third in the retail industry (Task Force 2006; Smit and
Taal 2007). The number of jobs in the fishing industry only constitutes a
tiny fraction of total employment in the Netherlands. Although these fig-
ures are rather modest, the Dutch fish trade occupies an important posi-
tion in Europe. The value of aggregate fish and shellfish landings in the
Netherlands amounted to €476 million in 2007; that of exports of fish and
fish products exceeds two billion euros. The most important sector of the
fishing industry is the capital-intensive beam trawl fleet, which operates
mostly in the southern and south-eastern North Sea to catch sole and
plaice and associated flatfish stocks on four- to five-day trips, usually start-
ing at midnight on Sunday or early Monday morning. Together, these spe-
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cies contribute approximately eighty per cent of the total revenues of beam
trawling, a fishing technique that is applied by about half of the cutter fleet.
The Netherlands holds a significant share of the European Union’s total
allowable catch for sole (seventy-five per cent) and plaice (thirty-eight per
cent). The bigger boats – that is, those with an engine power exceeding
1,500 hp, with a length of forty to forty-five metres, a width of eight to
eight-and-a-half metres and a crew of six or more – land over ninety per
cent of the total market supply of flatfish (Rijnsdorp, Daan and Dekker
2006:557). The majority of beam trawlers are family-owned and operated.
Most flatfish-fishing firms own one vessel; thirty-four own two or more
beamers. Important concentrations of beam-trawl fishermen can be found
in the towns of Urk, Goedereede, Arnemuiden, Vlissingen, Den Helder
and on the island of Texel.
Currently (July 2008), Texel’s fishing fleet boasts eleven offshore cutters
and sixteen inshore cutters (including several vessels that are on the Fish-
ery Register but not used in commercial fishing). In addition, two boats
are foreign-registered but Texel-owned and operated. Although the Texel-
registered fleet is rather small, in terms of landing rights it still occupies
an important position nationally. The turnover of the Texel fishing industry
amounted to €25 million in 2006. About 125 fishermen currently crew the
local fishing fleet, while in addition there are a dozen or so co-owners who
have terminated their active fishing careers. The local Fishery Co-op em-
ploys another dozen people, most firms hire at least one man to mend the
nets, and indirectly the fishing industry provides work for many more is-
landers in ship’s maintenance and repair, provision, administration, book-
keeping and so on. For two villages in particular, the fisheries are highly
important: Oudeschild – where the harbour is situated – and Oosterend –
home to most of the offshore family firms. Generally, the islanders take
pride in ‘their’ fishing industry, which used to be much larger than it is at
present. Selecting Texel as a research site was linked with my desire to
study a community with a long fishing tradition. Moreover, Texel had once
had an oyster industry that combined fishing with semi-cultivation. As I
had already conducted research elsewhere into the transformation from
open-access oyster fishing to oyster farming, opting for Texel facilitated a
comparison.
During my first stint of fieldwork (from late 1989 to early 1991), the
Dutch offshore fishing industry was in great turmoil. Fishermen often
made headline news for overshooting individual quotas and conflicting
with law enforcement officers. Fishing opportunities were frequently
closed prematurely as the national share of total allowable catches – allo-
cated by the European Community – was exhausted. I collected a great deal
of data about contemporary events. However, for my PhD thesis, I failed to
cover sufficient ground to include the recent history of the Texel fishing
industry and communities. My dissertation pertained to the 1813-1932 era.
I was nagged by the thought that I had not really completed the project I
had initially envisioned, but I hoped and expected that I would be able to
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deal with the post-1932 period at some stage in the future. A co-manage-
ment regime was introduced when I had just become involved in research
and teaching unrelated to maritime studies. I attempted to keep informed
about the vicissitudes of the occupational world of fishing and I learned of
the alleged successes of the new management system. In the social science
fisheries literature, co-management had meanwhile turned into a buzz-
word signifying something of a panacea, which allegedly provided a solu-
tion to the failures of top-down modes of managing fisheries. The impres-
sion I gained was that in the Netherlands cooperative governance had been
a tremendous success. No longer did fishermen make headline news for
flouting the rules and regulations and overshooting their individual quo-
tas. Compliance was almost complete, early closures of fishing were his-
tory and fishermen still earned good incomes. The Dutch and the Euro-
pean authorities acknowledged their satisfaction with the new system and
the fishermen’s conduct. Fishermen appreciated the increased stability,
flexibility and certainty that group management of individual transferable
quotas facilitated. Thus, all seemed quiet on the fisheries front. However,
impressions can be deceptive indeed.
When the opportunity arose to continue where I had left off, the pro-
found shift in the fisheries management regime necessitated the updating
of my data. Upon my return to Texel in August 2005 to conduct a second
round of research, it was immediately evident that the local fishing fleet
was considerably smaller than during my first stint of fieldwork. Fifteen
Texel registration numbers were no longer on the Fishery Register, while
only four new ones had been added. I found two of these newly registered
boats – company-owned cockle cutters operated by a father and his two
sons from Texel – tied up in the harbour and floating idly on their mooring
ropes. Six shrimp-fishing boats, three mid-size stern trawlers and two
other vessels that had specialized in herring or round-fish fishing were
gone, and a shellfish fishing boat was no longer being used. There were
fifteen big-beam trawl cutters compared to eighteen previously. Three
more were decommissioned within a few months of my arrival. None of
the beamers was equipped to combine flatfish fishing with herring fish-
ing, as had been the case with many boats earlier on. A new type of multi-
purpose vessel – a smaller version of the beamer adapted to beam trawling
and twin rigging in the inshore zone – had made its appearance in the
fleet. While several family firms had given up fishing, only one new family
firm had meanwhile been founded or, rather, re-established. Generally, the
vessels were much older, the composition of the fleet had changed and the
engine power of the big beamers had diminished significantly. Apparently,
the skipper-owners had been faring less well than I had assumed, and the
same applied to the co-venturing crewmembers, whose number had de-
creased by about seventy-five. Soon I learned that owner-operators faced
difficulties in breaking even and that recruitment of deckhands was a se-
rious problem: many were abandoning ship for non-fisheries-related occu-
pations. The situation I encountered only boosted my curiosity as to what
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had been happening in the local fishing industry since my departure in the
spring of 1991 and how the fishermen and fisher families had been experi-
encing and responding to the recent developments.
The issues that are pivotal to this historical ethnography pertain to fish-
erfolk’s individual and collective adaptations to changing ecological, tech-
nological, economic, social and political conditions and legal and regula-
tory frameworks, their modes of production, and their socio-political
organization and worldviews. Briefly, the question regards how fishermen
perceive and understand their natural and social environments, how they
relate and adapt to them and how they attempt to control them. I will not
portray fishermen as one-dimensional human beings who are constantly
motivated by, for example, either greed and selfishness or altruism and
generosity. Instead, I will attempt to show how not only increasing state
interventions and growing social differentiation have influenced their mo-
tivations and actions, but also ecological or resource fluctuations and eco-
nomic cycles of boom and bust in the fishing industry. Throughout the
book, I will devote attention to a basic ambivalence of fishermen vis-à-vis
each other, dealers and processors, and towards the environment they ex-
ploit and the state interventions in their industry. The relationships of
power and dependency in the fishing industry have changed with every
transformation of the configuration of entry and use rights. However, this
has not rendered the fishermen powerless victims of decisions made at
higher levels of integration. Every mode of access to resources and every
method of allocation creates winners and losers, and those with stakes will
seek to defend the status quo while those who expect to suffer may revolt
or attempt to dodge the new rules and beat the system. Hence, shifting
management regimes often lead to adversarial relations and tensions. As
Gary Libecap contends:
Negotiations in the political arena among competing private interests, poli-
ticians, and bureaucrats determine how and when the society will respond
to common pool pressures by assigning or adjusting property rights. An
examination of the political contracting underlying ownership institutions
is necessary to understand how property rights are established and modi-
fied and why such a diversity of arrangements exists (1989:28).
What do such regime shifts do to fishermen and fisher families; how do
they respond to them; what do they mean to them? Who stands to gain and
who stands to lose from specific management measures? This book is
about the fisherfolk’s understanding of the world as they confront it and
as it confronts them. By focusing on their actions, their routines, their stor-
ies and their views, I will put the fishermen and the fisher families – whose
opinions are rarely heard and reflected in policy reports or are muffled in
the cacophony of dominant voices – centre stage.
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Structures and Contingencies, Strategies and Constraints
I conducted my research with an actor-centred approach, focusing on the
strictures fishermen face because of the policy and management regimes
in which they are encapsulated, and the ways in which they accept, con-
form to and comply with or, alternatively, reject, circumvent and counter-
act such structural constraints or the institutional ‘rules of the game’.
Choices and actions are moulded in a socio-cultural context, but with cer-
tain restrictions fishermen have various options available from which they
can choose. Choices are not made by rational, self-interested motives
alone; in addition, social demands, cultural and moral conventions and
the enactment of routine behaviour play an important role (Jentoft, McCay
and Wilson 1998:426). For these reasons, fishermen are not passive reci-
pients of policies or ciphers that can be instilled with rules, standards and
norms, bringing about a switch of conduct overnight. Nor do fishermen
merely respond to environmental, economic and social change. They also
actively act upon their natural and social worlds to create new opportu-
nities and new meanings. The present ethnography is about the fisher-
men’s lived experience of being embedded in the wider society and relat-
ing to forces from without. The focus will be on ‘how actors “enact,”
“resist,” or “negotiate” the world as given, and in so doing “make” the
world’ (Ortner 1996:1). Such a perspective demands listening to and ob-
serving ‘real people doing real things in a given historical moment, past or
present, and trying to figure out how what they are doing or have done will
or will not reconfigure the world they live in’ (ibid.:2). Yet these actors are
not autonomous ‘agents’. They are embedded structurally in larger social
configurations that act upon them as much as they act upon encompassing
systems, or at least attempt to do so. Consequently, there is human agency,
and we should study ‘the impact of the system on practice, and the impact
of practice on the system’ (Ortner 1984:148).
Arguably, human conduct, including intentional behavioural strategies,
can have profound unanticipated, unintended and undesirable conse-
quences. For generations, social scientists have been stressing this point.
Indeed, ‘the combination of intentional and unintentional actions of differ-
ent social actors may culminate in significant shifts in environments and
ecological dynamics’ (Scoones 1999:493). Nevertheless, the question of
how ‘to relate the unintended consequences of conscious decisions based
on the specific ends of competing management units to the patterned out-
come and some goals posited for a whole system remains an ill-defined
but crucial problem in ecological and economic anthropology’ (Rutz
1977:157). It is therefore pertinent to contextualize marine resource exploi-
tation. However, as Bonnie McCay observes, ‘It is widely appreciated that
context is important to the choices and behavior of people, but the theore-
tical and empirical underpinning for that observation is woefully lacking’
(2002:392). Consequently, the chief objective of this section is to arrive at a
sensitizing framework that incorporates a contextual dimension and takes
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into account complexity, diversity and dynamics. Complexity refers to phe-
nomena that exhibit nonlinear behaviour: that is, positive feedback in
which endogenous or exogenous changes to a socio-cultural entity produce
amplifying effects (Elliott and Keel 1997:66). Diversity relates to the vari-
ety of technological, economic, social and cultural coping responses hu-
mans exhibit in exploiting natural resources. Dynamics pertains to the
trial-and-error character of adaptation in which human–nature interactions
give rise to emergent phenomena that may prove to be resilient in the face
of environmental perturbations (T.A. Smith 1997:55), lead to negative or
positive externalities or bring about non-equilibrium change (Scoones
1999:482).
We must not incorporate context merely as a background to research
data, but focus much more rigorously on it. Context does not necessarily
refer to an ‘entity’ such as an ecosystem or a culture, society or community,
which are often defined as relatively autonomous, clearly bounded, stable
and balanced for analytical purposes. This insular view obstructs an under-
standing of the myriad of forces working upon such analytically demar-
cated but in fact permeable wholes. They are embedded in the surround-
ing world and a host of remote factors affects them. These include macro-
economic variables such as global fuel prices and commodities costs; inter-
est, exchange and inflation rates; technological developments; food safety,
food preferences and availability of alternative foodstuffs. The socio-eco-
nomic context in which common pool resource users or petty commodity
producers operate influences the modes of adaptation available to them.
Externally induced changes may be so swift as to allow them insufficient
time and opportunity to adjust their socio-economic structures to avoid
suboptimal outcomes (Ostrom 1990:21). Due attention to context in the
elucidation of actions and consequences may mean dealing with loose,
transient and contingent interactions and disarticulating processes from
within and from outside predetermined units. The same goes for ‘the
movements of people, resources, and ideas across whatever boundaries
that ecosystems, societies, and cultures are thought to have’ (Vayda
1986:310; see also Agrawal 2003:250-254). In a globalizing world, ecologi-
cal, economic, social and political interdependencies just reinforce the im-
pact of external forces on socio-cultural entities defined as geographically
bounded wholes. Consequently, fishing cannot merely be understood in
terms of autonomous fishermen, crews, fleets or communities, as I will
attempt to make clear. It is thus necessary to show how remote and local
interferential factors influence fisheries and fisheries management, and,
additionally, how they cause or reinforce resource management problems.
Since this procedure involves focusing on the internal–external interface, it
is also a restatement of the perennial social science problem of how to
relate micro and macro scales. Zooming in on contextual factors may pro-
vide precisely the locus where the micro–macro interface can be discerned
and studied most advantageously. Such a context-dependent position
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means ‘an open-ended, contingent relation between contexts and interpre-
tations’ (Flyvbjerg 2003:43).
Focusing on a particular level of analysis might have important implica-
tions. Moran writes that if ‘we focus on the impact of state or national
forces on local communities, we may find that these wider forces shape
the life of local communities in relatively similar ways. However, if we
focus on the community, we see “individuals responding actively to actu-
ally subvert or alter these external forces, not passively accepting them”’
(1990:283). Ideally, we should look at the problem from both angles. How-
ever, it is more feasible to use a mode of analysis Andrew Vayda dubs ‘pro-
gressive contextualization’. It involves a procedure that focuses ‘on signifi-
cant human activities or people–environment interactions by placing them
within progressively wider or denser contexts’ (1983:265). The researcher
can depart from studying specific activities, performed by specific people
in specific locales at specific times, and then trace the causes and effects of
these activities outwards including the factors impinging on them without
a priori defining the boundaries of a system. I will therefore be switching
perspectives from the individual to the local and from the local to the na-
tional and supranational levels, occasionally zooming in on micro events
or panning to macro structures and processes. For analytical purposes, it is
appropriate to distinguish several levels of exogenous contextual factors,
each of which has their own particular impact, although they can also mu-
tually reinforce each other through knock-on or multiplier effects. It is
here that micro and macro forces intersect and interact. Researchers may
better comprehend and appreciate the often complex origin of the selec-
tion of different strategies by focusing on ‘the choice sets available to indi-
vidual users of the resource, the different decision-making arrangements
possible and different action strategies; and tracing back the derivation of
these choice sets to contextual factors’ (Edwards and Steins 1998:367).
This requires using a diachronic perspective and retrospective analysis to
discern the variety of coping mechanisms to certain types of change in
remote variables and to map short-term and long-term processes including
feedback responses. Again, responses to external forces and structural
pressures are not just a state of mind, but turn fishermen into active
agents of change themselves (Butler 2005:253).
Rejecting the assumption of ecological and socio-cultural homogeneity
and stability, the present approach focuses on variation and dynamics and
looks at how different individual actors and social formations operate in
and adjust to their total environments through a variety of behaviours,
technologies, organizations, structures, worldviews and beliefs (Poggie
1992:51). A useful concept in this connection is adaptation. People adapt
to the natural world that surrounds them and of which they themselves are
part. The nonhuman environment evolves partly on its own and partly in
response to what people do to it. Adaptive strategies and processes result
from cybernetics or positive and negative feedback loops. Adaptive strate-
gies involve conscious decision-making. Adaptive processes are feedback
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loops operating outside of cognitive awareness. Adaptive dynamics are the
total of coping strategies and processes (J.W. Bennett 1976). Individual and
collective adaptive strategies sometimes crosscut each other, giving rise to
tensions that may develop into conflicts. Deliberate human adaptations de-
part to a greater or lesser extent from people’s particular views of the world
and their place in it. Nevertheless, the effects of people’s behaviour upon
the natural environment and the constraints that the physical world im-
poses upon the realization of their goals and aspirations may not be part
of the notions that are basic to their actions (Vayda 1986:297). Generally,
the properties of people’s relationships with nature and with each other
‘derive neither from their will nor their consciousness’ (Godelier 1986:6).
By its very nature, resource utilization is dynamic and adaptations can be
either functional or dysfunctional. In the short term, socio-natural regimes
may seem to be adaptive, but in the long term, they may turn out to be
maladaptive. The ways in which human beings act upon the surrounding
world transforms the natural and social environments. In turn, the change
influences their social organization, interactions, behaviour and thinking
(Wolf 1982:73 74). Nature is thus ‘elaborately entangled and fundamentally
bound up with social practices and their characteristic modes of cultural
representations’ (McNaghten and Urry 1998:30).
On the face of it, fishermen across the globe must adjust to similar en-
vironments and face corresponding problems, including the vicissitudes
in exploiting common pool resources and the economic uncertainties and
physical dangers inherent in fishing (Acheson 1981; McGoodwin 1990).
Several maritime anthropologists argue that the exploitation of marine eco-
systems requires specific economic, social, cultural and psychological
adaptations (see, for instance, Andersen and Wadel 1972; Smith 1977; An-
dersen 1979; Knipe 1984; McGoodwin 1990; Vestergaard 1996). Owing to
this fact, geographically disparate fishing communities would seem to
share a number of socio-cultural patterns and characteristics. Indeed, in
strikingly different settings, one may encounter in fishing communities
distinctive identities based on occupational practices, a sharply gendered
division of labour, strong kin and family involvement in work, a share sys-
tem of remuneration, remarkably similar ideas concerning work ethos, an
egalitarian ideology, a rhetoric and concepts of independence, individual-
ism, freedom and so on. In early maritime anthropological publications,
such feats were often viewed as being ingrained in fisherfolk’s adaptations.
Some of these studies fit rather well within the cultural ecology tradition in
anthropology, including its functionalist or teleological tenets (McCay
1978). What they usually show is that certain modes of behaviour and so-
cial organization and specific worldviews prove to be ‘ecologically adap-
tive’. In this sense, the environment is seen to generate particular relation-
ships of work that in turn shape social structure and mark culture (McCay
2001:257).
Other anthropologists reject such ecological-functionalist explanations
and point out that despite similarities, there are vast differences among
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fishermen with different social and cultural backgrounds. Among many
other things, this is due to the distinct ways in which they are embedded
in and relate to encompassing socio-economic systems and cultures (see,
for example, Löfgren 1989; Pálsson 1991; McCay 2001; van Ginkel 2001).
Dependence upon marine living resources does indeed influence the fish-
erman’s belief and behaviour, but how it is ‘structured into cultural forms
depends upon the economic and social structure within which the fisher-
man is operating’ (Löfgren 1977:235). Different modes of production entail
different social relationships, rationales and motivations. Factors such as
occupational and fleet structure, ownership patterns, degree of indebted-
ness, boat size, number of crewmembers, division of labour, system of
remuneration, degree of specialization, seasonal variation in fish species
and species pursued, technology and gear bring along differences in social
practices, mental maps, cultural rules, styles, goals and aspirations. Simi-
larly, there is diversity with respect to preferred modes of regulation, insti-
tutional arrangements, organizations, management regimes and enforce-
ment. Even spatially and socio-economically proximate fishing
communities and the specialist subdivisions within them can exhibit con-
siderable social and cultural differences. It is therefore imperative to de-
vote attention to the social relations of production: that is, differential
modes of access to resources, their appropriation, allocation and redistri-
bution, control over the means of production, and the division and organi-
zation of labour. Such an approach places actors at the core and avoids the
pitfalls of ‘systems ecology’, which sees man’s dealings with nature as an
undifferentiated, homeostatic and balanced system where equilibrium is
automatically restored. This view should be dismissed as teleology (McCay
1978; Scoones 1999). Human agency is in nature and people and environ-
ment are mutually constitutive components of the same world (Pálsson
1996). In short, nature acts upon people, and people act upon nature
through interactions and social relationships and the mental universe pro-
duced, reproduced and transformed in these relations – including their
comprehensions and images of nature (Rappaport 1979; J.W. Bennett
1990; Ingold 1992).
This brings us to the intersection of social systems and the fragmentary,
heterogeneous, contradictory and ambivalent realm of knowledge, ideas,
interpretations, goals, ambitions, values, norms, representations, mean-
ings, beliefs and so on. Human action is always negotiated culturally and
effectuated in social relationships (Keesing 1981:169). This is important to
understand the shaping and constraining forces of ecological adaptations.
In all relations of people with nature and with each other, this mental uni-
verse consciously or unconsciously fulfils interpretive, ordering and legiti-
mizing functions (Godelier 1986:11,131ff.). Thus, ‘processes of adaptation
imply from the outset the development of representations and interpreta-
tions of nature shared by the members of a particular society, and the orga-
nization of various forms of individual and collective interventions in na-
ture which depend upon these representations and interpretations’
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(ibid.:6). Actors confront nature through social interactions and social rela-
tions and the systems of knowledge, symbols, meanings and values
formed and embedded in them, including conflicts, contradictions and
ambivalences (J.W. Bennett 1976:40). As Benjamin Orlove states, ‘culture
and ideology are not ... epiphenomena but ... proximate causes which
shape human action. They influence the options among which individuals
select and in turn are influenced by the cumulative consequences of such
choices’ (Orlove 1980:257). Therefore, if worldviews change, human action
changes, in turn affecting the environment. These dynamics are infinite;
people must continually adapt anew to their natural and social environ-
ments (Vayda 1986:297; McEvoy 1988:229). This approach makes it possi-
ble to contextually situate the attitudes, actions and conceptions of fisher-
men, devoting attention to structures and strategies as well as
conjunctures and contingencies.
Fishing is an evolving socio-natural regime that must be understood in
terms of its wider ecological, economic, social, political and cultural con-
text, ‘the actions of other segments of the population, near or distant, that
affect any aspect of the fishing industry, fishermen, the waters they fish, or
the fish in them’ (Durrenberger 1988:196). Like other modes of natural
resource exploitation, fishing is a complex, heterogeneous and dynamic
system of interaction between humans and the natural environment (Ha-
milton et al. 1998; Kooiman, van Vliet and Jentoft 1999; van Ginkel
1999a, 1999b; Low et al. 1999). Embedded as they are in encompassing
political-economic and cultural structures and processes, many forces act
upon or interfere with fisheries and fishing industries – at the same time
affecting fisherfolk and fishing communities and the resources they uti-
lize. Consequently, it would be misleading to regard fishermen as autono-
mous actors in marine resource exploitation (Pálsson 1991). A ‘natural
model’ of fishing that focuses mainly on material contexts, technical activ-
ities and ecological relations is inadequate as it fails ‘to appreciate the ways
in which production systems are differentiated with respect to their social
relations’ (Pálsson 1989:13). Ample attention must be devoted to the wider
ecological and social configurations in which fishermen operate, the un-
sought and unanticipated consequences of their and other people’s con-
duct, the anticipated as well as the unintended and unforeseen outcomes
of fisheries policy and management, and feedback processes that give rise
to new coping responses. Such adaptations refer to the modes of adjust-
ment of fishermen to natural and social milieus, or of the natural and so-
cial milieus to their lives, needs, wants and goals (J.W. Bennett 1976:246).
The intertwined processes of remote influences on resources and resource
exploitation – processes that are usually beyond the control of individual
actors and communities (Edwards and Steins 1999) – and human adapta-
tions often lead to transformations in socio-natural regimes. These transi-
tions are structural societal changes that occur because of interlinked eco-
logical, technological, demographic, economic, social, political and cultural
developments that often mutually reinforce one another. It is therefore
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pertinent to pay ample attention to macro socio-political forces that operate
beyond local communities of resource users but which can and do affect
them. Hence, social science research agendas should include interferential
factors and feedback loops that affect fisheries, fisheries management,
fishing communities and fishermen. I will depart from the idea that there
is no straightforward relationship between people and environment in pro-
cesses of environmental change:
Environments are dynamically and recursively created in a nonlinear, non-
deterministic, and contingent fashion. Social, political, economic, and eco-
logical processes interact dynamically, requiring analysis to be sensitive to
the interaction of structural features and human agency across a range of
scales from the local to the global (Scoones 1999:492).
However, modernist models of common pool resource management gen-
erally devote little attention to external factors impinging upon resource
exploitation. Usually, policy and management schemes focus on single
species exploited by specific user groups as if they are autonomous sys-
tems, instead of being embedded in and thus influenced by wider ecologi-
cal, economic and socio-political forces. For the sake of such a model’s
applicability, contextual factors making for complexity, heterogeneity and
dynamics are reduced, simplified or ignored altogether. The question of
how such factors affect marine resource exploitation or interfere with
management objectives and desired outcomes is rarely made explicit. At
best, they are considered ‘nasty complications’. In their linear view, scien-
tists usually start with the assumption that without human intervention
fish stocks are ‘ordered, balanced and in dynamic equilibrium’ (Smith
1990:5) and any disturbance of this static ‘natural balance’must be anthro-
pogenic (Scoones 1999). Consequently, fishermen will inexorably be
blamed for overexploitation and it is believed that their behaviour should
be checked through more or less draconian management regimes. Many
biologists, ecologists, economists, politicians, policymakers, bureaucrats
and environmentalists perceive fishermen as a greedy and unruly lot with
innate rapacious mentalities, who seek to extract the greatest piece of the
common wealth in the shortest time possible. Such a stereotypical and
grim view leads to reductionism, obstructing an understanding of what
really makes fishermen tick. Fishermen, on the other hand, usually view
natural processes as dynamic, unpredictable, complicated, disordered,
chaotic and in perpetual flux (Smith 1990:5). Increasingly, ecologists have
abandoned the assumption of a natural balance. Instead, they see nature as
being in a state of flux, calling for adaptive resource management systems
that are responsive to the ‘variability, contingency, and openness of ecolo-
gical systems’ (Pickett and Ostfeld 1995:275; see also Klug 2002:702). Nat-
ural fluctuations can indeed be quite sharp and fisheries ‘are ecologically
volatile and vulnerable to any number of external influences’ (McEvoy
1988:215). For example, fluctuations of ocean temperatures and salinity,
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periodic changes in weather patterns, global warming and other environ-
mental shifts have an impact on recruitment and mortality of fish stocks,
while diseases and predator–prey interactions can have devastating effects
on certain species. Nonetheless, many management models – such as the
ones based on the Gordon–Schaefer curve – are ‘committed to a simplistic
image of marine ecosystems, and a faith in the human capacity to predict
and control them’ (Holm 1996:178).
Some argue that multi-species fisheries are chaotic systems, with simply
too many uncertainties for any kind of predictability and long-term con-
trol. This has important implications for policy and management: ‘If the
dynamics of a fisheries ecosystem are predominantly nonlinear, then all
fisheries management strategies based on linear cause-and-effect models,
single-species assessments, predictions and quotas are profoundly flawed
and unlikely to achieve their intended results’ (Finlayson 1991:93). They
can even have perverse outcomes that are incurred at great expense. Re-
source management regimes are usually simplified tools to tackle compli-
cated issues. Dealing with ecological, economic and socio-political situa-
tions and developments as if they were simple, homogeneous and static
provides for easier management tools. However, simple policy is not ne-
cessarily good policy, as many policymakers, bureaucrats and scientists
seem to believe. Forgetting that simplification has been used for resource
management purposes can result in serious complications. For example,
models focusing on single-species stock size and fishing effort are inade-
quate simplifications, but the problem is that ‘the realism of multi-species
model creates unmanageable complexities’ (Holm 1996:184). Nonethe-
less, simplistic solutions may temporarily alleviate symptoms yet deepen
long-term adverse consequences and cause a loss of ecosystem resilience,
a problem known as ‘the pathology of natural resource management’ (Hol-
ling and Meffe 1996:330). Against this background, one of the most press-
ing needs of social science investigations is to determine the ways people
understand and relate to their natural and social environments and how
they bring about and respond to ecological, economic, political and social
change. However, understanding complex and dynamic fisheries systems
‘as a whole presents great challenges, and is rarely if ever attempted’ (Ha-
milton et al. 1998:17, emphasis in original).
Most linear models that assume that a tragedy is inevitable in common
pool resource use unless government intervention or privatization is intro-
duced – a view popularized by Garrett Hardin – fail to incorporate contex-
tual factors. Hardin states that without some form of coercion, common
pool resources will inevitably be overexploited, a viewpoint he summarized
in his famous dictum: ‘Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all’
(1968:1244). It has led to considerable confusion, as Hardin seems to
equate commons with free access. Looking back on his original article
after three decades, he concludes that he should have used the adjective
‘unmanaged’; in an unmanaged commons, ‘overuse of resources reduces
carrying capacity [and] ruin is inevitable’ (Hardin 1998:683). The homoge-
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nizing view of people’s rationale and behaviour inherent in ‘tragedy of the
commons’ scenarios grossly underestimates the importance of usufruct,
informal rights of access and use, communal management, collective ac-
tion, socio-cultural heterogeneity and dynamics (McCay and Acheson
1987b). Besides being an oversimplification, the social consequences of
departing from such a scenario for policy and management purposes may
be enormous and irreversible (see McGuire 1991). The dilemmas inherent
in the exploitation of marine resources should be understood ‘in terms of
the dynamics of conflict and competition between different social groups
located in history and culture rather than between the rational economis-
ing individual – unspecified – and the group – also unspecified’ (McCay
and Creed 1989:19). Nevertheless, tensions between the common interest,
group interests and private interests do exist. Whether and how these ten-
sions become manifest demands a meticulous contextual inquiry.
The simplicity and range of the ‘tragedy’ metaphor have contributed to
its popularity, particularly among policymakers and state agencies regulat-
ing the fisheries (Matthews 1993:239). However, the introduction of new
legislation and regulations can disrupt precariously balanced complex
adaptive systems based on usufruct and informal distributive rights of en-
try and use. Extant indigenous management of marine living resources,
such as systems of territoriality, is often undermined. Top-down manage-
ment systems have failed to resolve resource management problems, have
led to compliance problems, and have impacted the fishermen’s status,
cognition, skills, prestige and identity, their interrelationships and the so-
cial fabric of fishing communities. It has taken fisheries policymakers, reg-
ulators and scientists a long time to realize that there are more than simple
cause–effect relations in biology and economy that affect the fishing indus-
try. Although often hesitatingly and firmly based on a means-to-an-end ap-
proach, they currently show a willingness to arrive at devolved manage-
ment systems. In many places, fishermen still feel that their worldviews
and practices are misunderstood and misrepresented. They are not neces-
sarily greedy and narrow-minded profit-maximizing automatons, con-
sciously extracting common pool resources to the brink of tragedy. Of
course, these remarks should not lead one to think that over-fishing does
not occur or that fishermen are continually and necessarily acting wisely
from an ecological viewpoint. What I deem important, however, is that
social scientists seek to explain why social actors do what they do, how
they represent, rationalize and legitimize what they do and what doing so
does to them and to their natural and social environments.
The present book’s aim is to cast light on the ways in which Texel fisher-
men – as individual actors and as an occupational community – have ac-
tively adjusted to their changing natural and social environments and how,
in an interlinked process, their modes of thinking, worldviews and beha-
vioural repertoires have changed. It asks how the articulation of internal
and external dynamics has produced specific outcomes for fishing at the
local level. This requires devoting attention to how policies emanating
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from national and European institutions impinge upon local-level social
organization, practices, worldviews and motivations, and focusing on the
intractable ‘real world’ and the decision-making processes and interactions
of social actors who may not always behave ‘rationally’. That is, their ac-
tions do not necessarily conform to what policymakers, regulators or econ-
omists expect. Socio-cultural considerations as much as economic ones,
including the range of choices available to them, guide their quotidian
practices. In explaining the ‘evolution’ of the local fishing industry, it is
necessary to take into account a host of important variables to avoid reduc-
tionism. There is not a single causal factor that can explain the events and
processes that shaped Texel’s fishing communities. Nor are developments
necessarily one-directional. We can only understand how individuals and
social configurations are embedded in particular situations and develop-
ments by investigating the gamut of ecological, demographic, social, poli-
tical and cultural dynamics and structures (McCay 2002:361). What fisher-
men do is informed and influenced by, inter alia, ecological possibilities
and restrictions, demographic variables (including age, composition of the
nuclear family, and stage of the family cycle), economic incentives (reve-
nues, remuneration), diversification and specialization options, alternative
employment opportunities, strictures and loopholes of fisheries manage-
ment, vested (property) interests and ease of exit decisions. Social factors
such as the social organization of the fishing industry and the fishing firm,
the behaviour of fellow fishermen at the local level and beyond, peer pres-
sure and social control, heterogeneous interests and multiple actors, and
modes of interaction between owner-operators and between skipper and
crew are important. Significant cultural vectors include job satisfaction,
past experiences and perceived future prospects, perception of risks and
uncertainties, acquired skills, knowledge and images of the seascape and
its resources, status considerations, and self and public image and esteem
of fishing as an occupation. In a broader sense, religious convictions, com-
munity norms, values and morale, trust or distrust, sentiments, and inter-
pretations and meanings attributed to particular circumstances and ac-
tions influence strategies and decisions.
On Being There: Notes on Methodology
At the time of the ‘repatriation’ of their discipline, anthropologists ac-
knowledged that the study of kindred societies and cultures is both com-
pelling and legitimate. They admitted to being ignorant about many social
and cultural configurations that at face value appeared to be more or less
familiar. This recognition led to reflections on the usefulness of anthropol-
ogy’s theoretical, methodological and conceptual repertoires in settings
about which they believed themselves to have an a priori intimate knowl-
edge and comprehensive view, as well as on the pros and cons of field
research at home (van Ginkel 1994, 1998). Without going into the details
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of the epistemological debates on this issue, ‘anthropology at home’ to me
does not seem to be much different from anthropology in remote places,
apart perhaps from some practical implications. The crucial point is not
where anthropologists hail from, but how they perceive and interpret the
reality they confront. Knowledge of the cultural variety of and within hu-
man societies will help us to see what is taken for granted as well as what
is not so obvious. In doing field research, all ethnographers are ‘positioned
subjects’ (Okely 1992:14), regardless of whether they conduct it at home or
abroad. Ultimately, in the generation of knowledge, class, ethnic, religious,
gender and other differences between researchers and interlocutors may
be more important than place of birth. Besides, given the heterogeneous
character of all cultures, it is not easy to find the locus in which any anthro-
pologist would be a genuine insider. In most cases, anthropology at home
‘is infested with difference, diversity and division to the same extent as
anthropology of other cultures and societies’ (Ryang 1997:13). Thus, the
island society of Texel and its fishing communities were familiar yet
strange to me. I was cognizant of various matters, but ignorant of many
others, and I had to get outside and inside the local social and cultural
context simultaneously in order to gain a measure of both detachment and
involvement. The first such ‘familiar yet strange’ experience was that I
found myself on – not in – Texel. The Netherlands being a flat country, you
are on, and not in, any settlement built on an elevation in the landscape. In
this book, I will follow the vernacular.
I conducted field research on Texel from December 1989 to March 1991
and from August 2005 to September 2006. During both stints of field-
work, I collected data through archival and literature research, interviews
and participant observation. I had full access to the archives of the local
Fishery Coop, the fishermen’s association, the Texel co-management
group and the local Producer Organization. I have scrutinized a fairly large
number of serial publications. These have been important for establishing
the nature of transformations in the national and local fishing industries
over the past decades and the kinds of issues and controversies that fisher-
men have had to relate to. I read through all the issues of the local news-
paper, the Texelse Courant, that have appeared since its beginning in 1887,
and several other regionally or locally important newspapers. Ever since I
became interested in fisheries and fishing communities in 1985, I have
kept an expanding file of relevant reports in newspapers and weekly or
monthly magazines. I also conducted an electronic search for fisheries
and Texel-related news in the LexisNexis Academic database, which ex-
haustively covers national and many regional newspapers from 1995 on-
wards. In addition, I consulted specialist fisheries publications. Since the
Second World War, the Fisheries Department of the Agricultural Econom-
ics Research Institute in The Hague has published scores of serial reports,
including an annual statistical overview (Visserij in Cijfers, 1961-2008), all
of which I perused. These sources provide a wealth of information con-
cerning key issues and changes in the Texel and Dutch fishing industries
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and communities. However, they cannot make up for the experiences and
perceptions of real people doing real things. Finding out about the vagaries
and vicissitudes of the fishing industry requires talking to fisherfolk.
Hardly ever did I encounter problems arranging interviews, save for
practical reasons: it has not always been easy to get hold of crewmembers
who work at sea most of the time and cherish their weekends. My interlo-
cutors obviously enjoyed telling me about the past and present of the local
fishing industry, shipboard relationships and life in their communities.
They take pride in their occupation and do not hesitate to emphasize their
fisher identities. During the first stint of fieldwork, I held in-depth, tape-
recorded interviews with thirty-six men and nineteen women. I had multi-
ple interviews with eight of them. Interview sessions lasted about two-and-
a-half hours on average. Although I used a list of topical questions, I did
not straitjacket my interlocutors if they wandered off onto subjects that
they deemed important. This enabled the discovery of what mattered to
them, what attracted them about the occupation and what bothered them.
Occasionally, new key issues turned up, which I would then address in
subsequent interviews. Photo eliciting was sometimes part of interview
sessions and often yielded direct and indirect information on the impor-
tance of social and vessel genealogies, particularly in owner-operator fami-
lies. During the second spell of field research, I formally interviewed eigh-
teen men and seven women (five of whom I interviewed a second time). A
few had been among my earlier informants, but nearly all of the interlocu-
tors who had been septuagenarians or octogenarians during my first re-
search venture had meanwhile passed away. I did not record the conversa-
tions on tape this time but instead took notes only. Both tape recording and
note taking had pros and cons. Recording and transcription meant no de-
tails of the conversation were lost. Transcribing tapes was time consuming,
and some interlocutors were perhaps more careful about what they said.
Taking notes implied less work but also less detail. Moreover, I noticed that
a few informants had problems when I jotted down controversial facts.
‘You had better not write this down,’ they sometimes said. When refrain-
ing from doing so, of course, I could add such facts later on. In general,
women were more careful with what they said than men, and some wo-
men would on occasion tell their husbands not to volunteer so much in-
formation. Luckily, the men did not usually heed such advice. Although
perhaps avoiding subjects that might compromise themselves or others, I
had the distinct impression that they did not withhold their views on parti-
cular matters or adjust them in a more favourable direction. On the con-
trary, in general they seemed frank and open. In addition to formal inter-
views, during both rounds of fieldwork I talked to a total of about eighty
people in less formal ways, for example at the quayside, in the Fishery Co-
operative or aboard ship. Such exchanges ranged from brief casual conver-
sations to in-depth discussions.
The fishermen invited me to their informal Monday morning meetings
during both the first and the second spell of fieldwork. Here, retired own-
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er-operators, ‘shore captains’ – that is, owners, mostly in their forties, fif-
ties or sixties, who no longer join fishing trips but are otherwise fully in-
volved in running the family firm – and skipper-owners staying ashore for
a week got together. They openly spoke their minds about current fisheries
affairs – exchanging news, reminiscing about bygone times and speculat-
ing about the future with all its inherent uncertainties. The mood was
usually amicable although at times heated discussions developed. After ex-
plaining the goal of my research, my presence did not seem to bother the
attendants of these gatherings. Usually they numbered about fifteen, with
some nearly always being present and others dropping in infrequently or
only once or twice. On occasion, they would ask my opinion about certain
matters but in general, I just listened in. For me, the meetings provided an
illuminating window on the owners’ interactions and concerns. In addi-
tion to this functional element, I thoroughly enjoyed being there and lis-
tening to the protagonists of my research. During the first fieldwork term,
Texel fishermen would sometimes teasingly address me as ‘Mister assis-
tant-professor’. They said they would tolerate my presence as long as I did
not attempt to write anything that would harm their business. In thinking
that I could influence it, they grossly overestimated whatever impact my
writings could or would have on the local fishing industry. Some shore
captains would occasionally question my inquisitive forages. After nine
months of fieldwork, one of them asked, ‘Don’t you know everything by
now? You are always asking loads of questions and things such as “do you
have this or do you have that for me?” You’re spying on us continually and
you’re becoming a pain in the ass.’ He said it in jest and when I riposted
that it would not make sense to fabricate data, he smiled, saying, ‘No, that’s
true.’ He proved to be a prolific informant. During the second round of
research, especially, Texel fisherfolk had come to know me as ‘that guy
who wrote those books’. Since ‘those books’ had been received favourably
locally, I think they were confident that I would not shake the trust I had
gained. As proof of this, I was again welcome to attend their informal
meetings when I had returned to the island.
There were several other social occasions when I observed what was
going on: at official meetings, funerals, festivals and so on, always slightly
reluctant and embarrassed as I felt a bit like a Peeping Tom. I was on a
committee of the maritime museum with a retired fisherman and an own-
er-operator’s wife, providing an opportunity to discover how they perceived
the history of the local fishing industry and how it should be represented
to both local visitors and holidaymakers. I was also frequently present at
the quayside on Friday, when the fishing fleet arrives home from a week’s
fishing trip. Here I could observe the fishermen’s work for the upcoming
fishing week, hear about how that trip had been and sometimes listen to
their stories and tall tales over a cup of coffee in the accommodation on
board a cutter. Usually, however, the men wanted to return to the tasks on
hand quickly, as they longed for the weekend. The best opportunity to
learn about the crewmembers’ work world was to join them on a fishing
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trip. I did so on three occasions during the first stint of fieldwork and once
during the second round of research. I noticed that the fishermen appre-
ciated my interest in their way of life and that I gained some esteem by
participating in their work and routines aboard. Above all, they were great
experiences that unequivocally brought home to me that the everyday life
and toils of the fishermen are far removed from the realities of politicians,
policymakers, enforcers and academics.
The Structure of the Book
The book’s structure is chronological. Each chapter deals with significant
trends and developments in the era it covers – whether ecological, techno-
logical, economical, sociological, political or cultural in nature. Their em-
phases therefore vary somewhat. However, there are several recurring
themes, of which the primary ones relate to the fishermen’s métier, the
socio-economic consequences of specific management regimes, and the
fishermen’s ambivalent views and attitudes concerning collective action
and state intervention. In addition, in various chapters I will devote atten-
tion to the relations of competition and cooperation among skipper-own-
ers, and the share system of remuneration and its socio-economic dimen-
sions. One of the focuses of this book is on the social dynamic and
economic logic of the family firm (including fisherwomen’s roles). As Da-
vid Symes rightly remarks, with respect to fisheries and in contrast to agri-
culture ‘there has been relatively little emphasis on the internal social
structures of the “family firm” and its external linkages or on the socially
and culturally constrained decision making within these important micro-
institutions’ (1999:142). As we progress in time, the descriptions will be-
come increasingly dense. That is, the first chapter dealing exclusively with
the fisheries spans more than two centuries, while the last chapter covers a
time-span of about fifteen years only. This is not due to a paucity of data on
Texel’s early fishing economy (see van Ginkel 1993), but for the purpose of
showing how increasing intervention has intruded on the local fishing
communities and the livelihood of fisherfolk, and how they in turn have
sought to maintain a grip on their lives.
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the setting, describing some of the
characteristic features of the island and its population. It devotes particular
attention to the cultural singularities of Texel as perceived and expressed
by the islanders themselves. This auto-image came about in dialectic re-
sponse to increasing integration into the orbit of the Dutch nation state.
The island’s two fishing villages, Oosterend and Oudeschild, are depicted
briefly. The chapter also includes a concise history of the island, with spe-
cial reference to its maritime aspects. Situating events and processes in the
fishing communities within the wider island history, a bird’s eye view of
geophysical, demographic, economic, socio-political and religious develop-
ments is presented. From archaeological and historical records, it is evi-
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dent that maritime activities have occupied a prominent place in Texel’s
economy for centuries. Early on, fishing and shellfish gathering were an
integral part of the islanders’ subsistence economy, while commercial fish-
ing probably developed as of the 13th century. Due to sand erosion, silting,
inundations and other ecological changes, this fishery declined in the sec-
ond part of the 16th century. At about the same time, Holland emerged as
a mercantile world power and the concomitant rise of shipping provided
new opportunities. Many Texel fishermen became pilots or seafarers,
while other islanders started selling victuals to the Dutch East India Com-
pany fleet. In the mid-18th century, nearly half Texel’s occupational popula-
tion directly depended on the sea for a living. Scores of islanders still
earned an income as fishermen. By the 19th century, Texel’s prominence
in maritime traffic was reduced considerably and agriculture gradually sur-
passed it in significance. This was linked to large-scale land reclamations
that more than doubled the island’s size. What seafaring subsequently lost
in importance, fishing would gain in importance, although times of pros-
perity and poverty continued to succeed each other. Increasingly, however,
tourism turned into the mainstay of the island’s economy.
Chapter 2 portrays long-term trends and developments in the local fish-
ing industry from the onset of the 18th century until 1932. It details var-
ious forms of Texel fishermen’s individual and collective adaptations to
ecological and economic change and pays ample attention to the ideational
realm. From the early 1700s, Texel fishermen harvested oysters in public
waters, replanting young bivalves on plots they claimed in an inlet near
their island. For quite some time, the system of fishing and quasi-cultiva-
tion proved to be successful. However, myriad problems assailed the oys-
termen and in the mid-1840s oyster yields diminished dramatically. Sev-
eral factors contributed to the decline, over-fishing being one of them.
There were other causes, too, and the oystermen did not continue their
destructive activities until they had caught the very last oyster. They could
no longer earn a living from oyster fishing alone. They broadened their
economic horizon and shifted to other ventures, including the exploitation
of eelgrass, shells and various species of fish, shellfish and crustaceans.
Subsequently, oyster fishing turned into a marginal and short-term activity
in a varied seasonal cycle in which the islanders utilized a wide range of
marine living resources. Diversification, specialization, withdrawal and co-
operation were the main strategies used to cope with natural resource
problems, while the fishermen also had to adjust to shifting management
regimes, especially in the oyster and eelgrass industries. The adaptive flex-
ibility and heterogeneity of the local fishermen made for versatility and
resilience. The island’s fishing industry – which now included fisherfolk
from Oudeschild and other villages – began prospering again, enabled by
a growing infrastructure, new means of transportation and the concomi-
tant expansion of markets. The number of fishing boats grew rapidly.
However, a prolonged decline of the fishing economy followed its boom
times.
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Chapter 3 deals with a triple crisis in the local fishing industry, covering
the 1932-1960 era. Firstly, the Texel inshore fishermen faced an ecological
crisis that was caused by the completion of a dam that shut off the Zuider
Sea as a North Sea inlet. In addition to closing an important fishing area,
the closure also had a devastating impact on the ecology of what is cur-
rently known as the Wadden Sea. The crisis was compounded by the global
economic depression of the 1930s, which hit the island’s inshore fishing
industry particularly hard. Against all odds, one category – the offshore
fishermen – was doing well. The owner-operators modernized with alacrity
and with their steel-hulled and motorized cutters, they rose to prosperity,
whereas the petty inshore fishermen bore the brunt of the crises. The for-
mer mainly hailed from Oosterend, while the latter resided predominantly
in Oudeschild. The chapter compares the diverging courses taken by the
fishermen of the two village communities with respect to their economic,
social and political strategies and ideologies to seek an explanation for dif-
ferential success. The political crisis of the Second World War impinged
upon the offshore segment of the Texel fishing fleet as fishing in the North
Sea was impossible and the occupying German armed forces impounded
the best boats. Inshore fishing flourished temporarily. After the conclusion
of the war, the Oosterend skipper-owners succeeded in swiftly picking up
the pieces and rising to prominence again. The differences between the
owner-operators of the two fishing villages seemed to intensify in the post-
war years, in which the position of the local fishing industry’s inshore seg-
ment deteriorated rapidly. The reasons why one segment thrived while an-
other languished were manifold, the one appearing to amplify the other. In
the emic view, however, an ideational element – summarized as ‘mentality’
– was the key to understanding the divergence. I will attempt to show that
the explanation must be sought in the articulation of particular forms of
capital that were mainly of an economic and socio-cultural nature.
Chapter 4 chronicles the rapid development of the fishing industry in
the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. The reinvention of the beam
trawl – a centuries-old gear type that had fallen into disuse in the early
20th century – led to an astonishing improvement in catching efficiency.
Requiring the use of powerful engines, its application initiated a relentless
‘horsepower race’. Owner-operators called on external authorities to inter-
vene and limit engine power, but the state did not heed their plea and, on
the contrary, subsidized modernization. Although they believed it to be
devastating, skipper-owners participated in and contributed to the race,
and thus to the exceeding of capacity. The chapter questions this beha-
viour. The expansive momentum of the fishing industry was also evident
in the multiplication of the number of production units. Fissions of family
firms and crewmembers that turned independent made for many newco-
mers in the fishing arena, not only on Texel, but also elsewhere in the
Netherlands. The chapter therefore devotes special attention to the family
firm and the share system of remuneration and their roles in the rapid
upsurge of the local and national fishing industries. Family involvement
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and co-adventuring made for considerable versatility and resilience, and
hence were important for adaptive performance, but the intensification of
exploitation in conditions of easy entry to the fishing industry had adverse
consequences for the sustainability of fish stocks.
Chapter 5 examines the introduction of quota regimes in the mid-1970s
and the impact it had on fishermen and fishing until the early 1990s.
Rather than containing the race for fish, the quota management system
exacerbated it. Rules and regulations multiplied but were haphazardly en-
forced, making for uncertainties that contributed to speedy quota uptake
until national quotas were exhausted, which was usually the case well be-
fore the end of the year. With the introduction of Europe’s Common Fish-
eries Policy in 1983, policing and enforcement increased. A lively trade in
quotas – which were individually transferable –made for commodification
of landing rights. However, quota busting was still widespread and compli-
ance with the rules was suboptimal. It was a time of considerable turmoil
in the Dutch fishing industry. It even led to the downfall of a minister who
failed to harness the disobedient fishermen. The management regime had
profound economic, social and cultural consequences for owner-operators
and crewmembers alike. The chapter attempts to show how Texel fisher-
men tried to steer their course in an era that was replete with social dilem-
mas and why they were ambiguous about the regulatory regimes. To un-
derstand their active pursuit to achieve a position as ‘catch king’, it also
addresses the socio-cultural issues of rivalry, hierarchy and respect. The
troubles in the fishing industry that went along with the top-down efforts
to manage it made it abundantly clear that the management scheme
needed a fundamental transition.
Chapter 6 outlines developments and events following the introduction
of a co-management system in 1993. The state devolved certain responsi-
bilities for quota management to owner-operators who had to cooperate in
groups. The system restored peace and quiet in the fishing industry. It
enhanced stability, mutual trust and compliance with the regulations. Gen-
erally, it was applauded as a model of good fisheries governance by the
government, observers and fishermen alike. There were, however, various
adverse or unforeseen consequences, including rights hoarding, slipper
skippering and quota hopping. Moreover, power balances between owner-
operators and co-adventuring crewmembers became increasingly skewed.
However, the major threat that endangered the rather well-adapted system
was the flow of new rules emanating from the European Union. Although
the fishermen still fully support the co-management regime, their support
for the European fisheries policy is lukewarm, to put it mildly. In fact, it
lacks legitimacy. The chapter addresses the issue of why, from the fisher-
men’s point of view, this is comprehensible. However, the most imminent
peril assailing the Texel and Dutch fishing industry is the current econom-
ic situation. Overcapacity has been reduced considerably, the fishermen
generally work within the rules and they cooperate to arrive at sustainable
fisheries, but many are simply muddling through while being deeply pes-
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simistic and wondering how to navigate the current and future seas of
trouble.
When examining a time-span of approximately three centuries, it is per-
haps easier to see rifts and ruptures, structural evolution and far-reaching
transformations than reproduction and socio-cultural continuities and
consistencies. Of course, there is both change and reproduction and the
emphasis on either the one or the other depends largely on the research-
er’s focus. It is important to remember, then, that in ‘the dynamic inter-
play among external forces, structural ambiguities, and chronic misfit be-
tween the appropriate and the possible, the ultimate agent is neither
“structure” nor “history,” but the individuals acting within and upon them’
(Rodgers 1991:44). This book therefore attempts to unravel the threads
from which the socio-cultural fabric of fishing and fishing communities is
woven. Influenced by internal and external forces, fisherfolk continually
make and remake cultural forms and conventions. Their attitudes, strata-
gems, behaviour and perceptions can only be comprehended in the context
of, inter alia, ecological, demographic, economic, social, political, legal and
cultural dynamics in a much wider field. Today, anthropologists widely re-
cognize that a community is the locus not necessarily the focus of fieldwork.
We must go beyond it and connect it with structures and processes in the
wider society to grasp the economic, political and socio-cultural complex-
ities, contingencies, heterogeneities and dynamics at the local level. This
requires looking at the intersection of history, individual and collective ex-
periences and actions, and societal relationships. As outlined above, to un-
derstand human-environment interactions, researchers should specify the
conditions and institutions that are relevant to people’s perceptions, moti-
vations, decisions and actions, and attempt to explain their causes and con-
sequences (see also McCay 2002:393). To do so, we must cast our nets
widely. Formulating such programmatic advice is one thing, heeding it is
quite another. Nonetheless, I have attempted to take on this formidable
task. Drawing upon an extensive body of historical, economic and ethno-
graphic data, I will point to the structures, patterns and interplays of insti-
tutional opportunities and constraints and human agency, and the particu-
lar articulations of macro and micro events and processes. I will
continually shift my perspective to see power in culture and culture in
power as people confront the world in which they are embedded and as
the world confronts them.
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Chapter 1
The Golden Knoll: People, Place and
History
The Island and the Islanders
The Dutch island of Texel is the southern- and westernmost of the Wadden
Islands, an archipelago extending along the northern coasts of the Nether-
lands and Germany and the Danish west coast. It is approximately twenty-
five kilometres long and on average eight kilometres wide. The Marsdiep
Strait separates it from the mainland of the Dutch province of North Hol-
land. Two ferries maintain an hourly connection with the naval port of Den
Helder, with a half-hourly schedule during the holiday season. Due to its
moderate climate, Texel is a lush, green oval of land with rich and varied
vegetation, interspersed with slightly hilly landscapes, dunes, heaths and
woods and speckled with seven small villages and a score of hamlets. Until
the early 17th century, the island was less than half its current size. Recla-
mation of marine sediments began in the late Middle Ages, with most land
gained during the 19th century. About fifty-five per cent of Texel’s surface
is farmland, predominantly for dairy farming, flower-bulb growing and
arable agriculture. The island’s core consists of boulder clay and wind-
borne sand deposits from the Pleistocene Age. The highest part is dubbed
‘The High Mountain’ (De Hoge Berg), even though the hummock’s top is
only about fifteen metres above sea level. Small tracts of land with grazing
sheep characterize this area. Sandy beaches and sand dunes defend the
island from the North Sea on its western side. On the eastern side, dykes
protect it from the Wadden Sea. The sea continually affects the island’s
morphology, and its encroachment necessitates ceaseless protection. Wes-
terly storms often cause large sections of beaches and dunes to disappear
into the sea. To counter this development, dredging vessels frequently
suck up sand from the sea and spray it onto the beaches.
The sea is not just a foe, however, as it has been providing many inhab-
itants with a livelihood in seafaring and fishing for centuries. The Wadden
Sea, Europe’s largest wetland ecosystem, is an intertidal sea consisting of
shoals, sandbars, mudflats and salt marshes intersected by continually
shifting channels and gullies. Until 1932, the Dutch part of the Wadden
Sea used to be called the Northern Zuider Sea, but the name was changed
following the construction of a Closure Dam. A fresh-water lake developed
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south of the dam. The dam also had far-reaching consequences for the
Wadden Sea’s ecology (see Chapter 3). The Wadden Sea is rich in nutri-
ents, but due to its high turbulence and tidal movement, it is currently not
an attractive habitat for marine living resources: only about a hundred dif-
ferent species of fish, shellfish and crustaceans can be found there. Never-
theless, it produces approximately fifteen per cent of the value of the Dutch
fishing fleet’s landings. For Texel’s inshore fishermen, brown shrimps are
an important target species. Several national, international and suprana-
tional laws and treaties protect the Wadden area. West of Texel is the North
Sea. With a mean depth of ninety metres, it is rather shallow. The southern
North Sea is only forty metres deep on average and constitutes an impor-
tant fishing ground for a variety of species. It is one of the world’s most
productive seas. The island’s offshore fishermen predominantly pursue
several species of flatfish, in particular sole and plaice. Today, the local fish-
ing fleet is relatively modest, but it once used to provide a living for many
islanders.
Texel is a municipality and boasts approximately 13,450 inhabitants, who
fondly refer to their island as ‘The Golden Knoll’ (Het Gouden Boltje). Its
largest village is Den Burg, the administrative, economic and service cen-
tre, which comprises a population of approximately 6,900. The other vil-
lages are Oosterend (1,400 inhabitants), Oudeschild (1,275), De Cocksdorp
(1,250), De Koog (1,220), Den Hoorn (965) and De Waal (400). The popu-
lation figures include inhabitants of nearby hamlets. The remainder of the
population lives in the countryside. A dense network of roads and bicycle
lanes connect the settlements. The island is currently on the mainland grid
for electricity, natural gas and water. Until the mid-1990s, it had its own
municipal power plant and fresh-water-making factory. Texel is distinctly
rural. Traditionally, agriculture and fisheries have been important sectors
of the local economy. Agriculture covers half of Texel’s area, with a gross
turnover of over €35 million as compared to €25 million in the fisheries
(2006). There has never been any large-scale industry on the island. Since
the Second World War, tourism has assumed enormous proportions and
presently dominates the island economy with a gross turnover of €250
million (2006). Annually, about one million tourists visit the island. Dur-
ing the peak season, the holidaymaker to islander ratio is approximately
four to one. Sandy beaches and the island’s nature and culture attract
many tourists from the Dutch mainland and Germany. The villages on the
North Sea coast (De Koog, De Cocksdorp and Den Hoorn) are especially
popular and geared to the tourist industry with a host of facilities including
campsites, villa parks, playgrounds, an indoor swimming pool, and scores
of shops, hotels, bars and restaurants. The island also boasts six museums.
Tourism employs more than a quarter of the occupational population di-
rectly. The overall impact of and dependency on tourism are much higher,
however, with direct and indirect employment amounting to no less than
seventy-five per cent. Agriculture accounts for nearly ten per cent of em-
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ployment, while municipal and state institutions provide another ten per
cent.
Thus, Texel predominantly depends on tourism. Holidaymakers began
invading the island after 1948, when all Dutch employees acquired the
right to a paid holiday. In the summer months, holidaymakers invade the
island and island life is geared towards catering for the tourist industry. To
some extent, the social fabric of local relationships is temporarily untied.
This changes when the tourists have left. In the winter months, the tempo
of local life is quite agreeable, although it would be wrong to assume that
the islanders go into a winter sleep. They re-establish old ties, get together
more often; organizational activities that have been on hold for months are
resumed, and several festivals and other social occasions are exclusively
celebrated for and by the Texelians (Texelaars). As in so many tourist-de-
pendent places, they perceive tourism as both a blessing and a blight. The
islanders are ambivalent about holidaymakers, who provide an important
source of income to many yet are also perceived as exacting voyeurs, whose
presence leads to more traffic, more congestion by cars (and bicycles),
soaring property prices, absentee ownership of houses and generally more
turmoil. At the same time, largely owing to tourism, Texel is a relatively
wealthy society with a well-developed infrastructure of shops and services.
On the negative side, due to the dependency on tourism, seasonal unem-
ployment is rather high. Without a doubt, the growth of tourism and the
holiday season’s extension have had a major impact on the island’s society
and material and immaterial culture. However, to contain negative impacts
the municipality in 1974 adopted a policy of capping the number of tourist
beds at 47,000.
It was with the rise of tourism after the Second World War, the immigra-
tion to the island of hundreds of mainlanders and the growing impact of
outside interference and regulation that an awareness and articulation of
local identity gained momentum. Through revitalization and invention or
reinvention of traditions, the islanders began recovering their cultural
heritage. They apparently realized that adaptation to and ongoing integra-
tion within the wider society implied at the same time a ‘loss’ of their own
culture and identity. Once this dawned upon them, they began asserting
their right to their own distinctiveness. The islanders currently even in-
dulge in local chauvinism, which arose as a dialectical response to integra-
tion processes (see van Ginkel 1995b). The strong sense of localness is also
evident in local politics. While in parliamentary elections the islanders
more or less follow the national trends, in municipal elections the local
political party, Texels Belang (Texel’s Interest), has invariably won elections
since 1966. In the past two decades, the party gained between twenty-five
and thirty-seven per cent of the votes. Local interests are indeed central to
the party programme and its vision on Texel’s future clearly emphasizes
this localism.
The islanders, especially those from old Texel lineages, take pride in
their island. Material cultural heritage is now meticulously preserved.
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With tourism being the local economy’s mainstay, many islanders have to
make a living by selling ‘uniqueness’ and ‘authenticity’: for example ‘genu-
ine’ Texel products. Many islanders fly the green-and-black island flag and
have ‘Texel’ bumper stickers on their car. Another source of pride is the
ferry corporation named TESO, an acronym for Texels Eigen Stoomboot On-
derneming (Texel’s Own Steamship Enterprise). The vast majority of its
shareholders are islanders. Local people, ousting a private firm owned by a
mainlander who allegedly demanded exorbitant ferry rates and used an-
cient and untrustworthy steamships, founded it in 1907. Being so proud
of it, they continually assess everything related to it rather critically. An
institution that is also of considerable cultural significance is the local
newspaper: the Texelse Courant, established in 1887. It covers the island’s
news in detail and constitutes an important platform for local discussion.
Furthermore, the islanders have an eye for the immaterial elements of Tex-
el culture such as the dialect, local history and folklore. There is a folklore
association that organizes various events and a thriving local history asso-
ciation that currently comprises approximately 950 members. Cultural tra-
ditions such as the burning of bonfires (meierblissen) on 30 April and the
celebration of a local festival, Ouwe Sunderklaas, on 12 December, are alive
and kicking. These calendar fêtes occur outside the tourist season and are
inwardly directed (see van Ginkel 1995b, 2007b).
On the face of it, Texel currently seems to be not only a geographic and
administrative unity, but also a socio-cultural homogeneous one; a place
where all inhabitants reckon themselves to be members of a ‘we group’
versus a generalized ‘they group’ consisting of ‘other-siders’ (overkanters),
as Texelians call them. The term ‘other-siders’ evidences a Texel-centric
worldview: from the perspective of mainlanders, Texel’s location is periph-
eral and on the other side of the Marsdiep. However, the idea that Texel
constitutes a homogeneous socio-cultural unity is a myth carefully main-
tained for the outside world. Relative to other-siders Texelians regard
themselves as a unity, but within the island society a plethora of social and
symbolic boundaries are drawn. One important distinction is between
‘genuine Texelians’, ‘Texelians’ and ‘incomers’ (import), at least by the first
category. The ‘incomer’ category consists of newcomers who have settled
on the island fairly recently. When I interviewed them in 1990, many se-
nior Oudeschilders complained about the fact that because of the influx of
people, they hardly knew who was who in the village. They often remi-
nisced about ‘the good old times’ when all villagers still knew each other
inside out and neighbourliness was a matter of course. Although such
stories are not devoid of exaggeration and nostalgia, many newcomers
have indeed settled in the village. Older islanders especially, but certainly
not exclusively, experience this as a loss of community and view the inco-
mers as intruders in their insular world. I heard no such complaints in
Oosterend, where the influx of newcomers has been relatively modest.
‘Texelians’ are usually those who have been born and bred on the island,
but whose parents or grandparents were not born there. ‘Genuine Texe-
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lians’ are those who pride themselves in having many generations of an-
cestors who have lived on the island. The notion of being ‘genuinely Tex-
elian’ has only been able to develop because there has been considerable
immigration to the island. It is a relational concept that presupposes differ-
entiated social knowledge of who can be ascribed to which category. The
term refers to being deeply rooted locally. It also has symbolic value, be-
cause those who reckon themselves as such take pride in it and feel that
they belong to an in-group that gives them the opportunity to distinguish
themselves from others. In addition to the differentiation between ‘genu-
ine Texelians’, ‘Texelians’ and ‘incomers’, the members of the first two ca-
tegories sharply distinguish among the villages’ inhabitants. They say that
each village has its own character and that the mentality of the inhabitants
of the respective villages differs markedly.
Of course, within villages there are several other domains of distinction,
for instance based on residence in a neighbourhood, class, occupation,
age, gender, and religious affiliation. Villages are small and relatively egali-
tarian, however, and these distinctions are rather diffuse and not articu-
lated strongly, with – until a few decades ago at least – the exception of
religion. There is no recent census data concerning religious denomina-
tions. In 1981, the number of islanders without religious affiliation was
about thirty per cent. Twenty-eight per cent of the population was Roman
Catholic, twenty-seven per cent Dutch Reformed (Hervormd), nine per cent
Calvinist Reformed (Gereformeerd) and five per cent Mennonite. The re-
maining one per cent belonged to other denominations. In line with gen-
eral developments, the number of people without religious affiliation has
probably grown considerably over the past quarter of a century. There are
also marked differences between the villages. Whereas Oosterend is nick-
named ‘Jerusalem of the North’ for its rather orthodox Calvinist inclina-
tion, Oudeschild is locally renowned as a predominantly secular and ‘Red’
village. Here, support for the Social Democratic movement has tradition-
ally been considerable. It is with the communities of Oudeschild and Oos-
terend, whose inhabitants refer to their respective villages as ‘Skil’ and
‘Strend’, that I will be most concerned in this book.
‘Skil’ and ‘Strend’: Two Distinct Fishing Communities
Oudeschild and Oosterend are designated ‘scenic’ villages, meaning that
their picturesque centres must remain intact. The rustic heritage of nar-
row streets and old gabled cottages with wooden fronts painted in a dark-
ish green is considered worth preserving. Both villages are close-knit com-
munities. Many inhabitants are members of more than one voluntary
association – of which there are plenty at the local level. Being well-inte-
grated communities, in both villages social control is rather tight. The con-
struction of space into place is important and despite having a lot in com-
mon, the villagers claim that Oosterend and Oudeschild are ‘worlds apart’.
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In tourist brochures and other representations of the island, the villages
are invariably portrayed as fishing communities and this also holds true
for the image most islanders – including the respective villagers them-
selves – have of them. The vast majority of local fishermen reside in Oos-
terend and Oudeschild. In the Texel telephone directory, many fishermen
have included a reference to their occupation (for example, ‘North Sea fish-
erman’) whereas this is rather unusual for other occupations. They still
take pride in their métier. Even though the occupational community has
become rather small over the past decade or so, fishing continues to occu-
py an important economic and symbolic position at the local level. Scores
of inhabitants are fishermen or have been on a crew for a number of years,
and most Oosterenders and Oudeschilders have relatives, neighbours,
friends or former schoolmates who are working in the island’s fishing in-
dustry. Emphasizing their fishermen identities, Oudeschild has a fisher-
men’s choir that regularly performs on the island and Oosterend features
an annual fish-smoking contest.
With its harbour and Fishery Cooperative, marinas, a Sailors’ Chapel, a
Maritime and Beachcombers Museum, nautical shops, a sail-loft and fish
restaurants, Oudeschild definitely has a maritime touch. Several street
names refer to the village’s maritime past – for instance Pilot’s Crescent
(Loodssingel), Commodore’s Crescent (Commandeurssingel) – or bear the
names of renowned 17th-century navy commanders (for example, de Ruy-
ter, Tromp, Heemskerck). The village proper currently boasts about 475
houses, with a population of approximately 1200. Approaching the village
from the south, we pass a late-16th-century fortress and a pumping station
with a sluice, whilst having a clear view of the High Mountain to the left.
On the hummock’s southern slope are a war cemetery and the village
graveyard. The village’s southwestern part is called ‘the little neighbour-
hood’ (’t Buurtje). This peripheral area used to be the village’s Catholic sec-
tion and there is a Roman Catholic church and a vicarage that is presently
in use as a B&B. This is one of the village’s oldest parts. From here, two
parallel roads, intersected by a few alleys, run in a southwest–northeast
direction. The easternmost road faces the Wadden Sea dyke, while the
other one soon bifurcates in yet another parallel road. Making our way
north along the easternmost road, we come across a community centre, a
hotel-restaurant annex bar with a terrace, a small supermarket and a hair-
dresser’s. There once used to be many shops and artisan workshops along
this stretch of the road, but today most buildings are family homes. This
also goes for the buildings to the west, where we meet the Sailors’ Chapel
dating from 1650 and, a stone-throw away, a secular primary school and
kindergarten. The village has been expanding in a northerly direction ever
since its establishment in the early 1600s and particularly after the har-
bour’s construction in 1780. Thus, the further north we get, the newer the
houses. In a bend of the road, facing the dyke, we meet the Maritime and
Beachcombers Museum, which was established in 1980. It focuses on Tex-
el’s copious maritime history and heritage and harbours much flotsam and
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jetsam. There is also a windmill on the premises. Slightly to the north is
the road to Den Burg, where we encounter several shops that mostly cater
for tourists. It runs in an east–west direction. Going west, we find a new
housing project with detached and semi-detached houses on its southern
side, and on its northern side an area for houses and small industries that
has also been developed recently. Returning east, we hit the dyke that em-
braces the harbour.
The harbour comprises three sections: the Northern Harbour, the
Southern Harbour and the New Harbour. Three boats taking tourists on
seal-watching and shrimp-fishing trips and some charter boats for sports
fishing operate from the Northern and Southern Harbour quays. The
Southern Harbour is used for visiting fishing vessels, commercial barges
and the ‘brown fleet’ of sailing barges now used as charter boats. At the
quay are ticket boxes and public lavatories, a few tourist shops, a snack
bar, a café, two restaurants and a hotel annex restaurant and bar. To the
north is the spacious New Harbour, where most of the Texel-registered
fishing boats are moored over the weekend. There is a floating dock for
repairs. On the quay is an oblong building: the Fishery Cooperative, with a
monument for fishermen who have died at sea. The Co-op contains several
compartments for storage of nets, lubricants, chains, cables and other
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Figure 1. The island of Texel and the villages of Oudeschild and Oosterend.
equipment, a workshop and a ship chandlery. The attic is used for net
making. The Co-op owns a small oil tanker that takes fuel from three sto-
rage tanks. Opposite the Co-op building, across the water, is an industrial
site. Northeast of the quay is a marina with a port building and extended
facilities, a playground and another restaurant. Four huge wind turbines
generate electricity. The quay with the Co-op premises is an ambivalent
space, partly embraced by a dyke and symbolically located between the on-
shore and inshore physical and social domains. Squeezed in between land,
sea, and two tourist sites, the quay belongs to the fishermen, yet Texelians
and holidaymakers like to observe what is going on there, particularly on
Fridays when the fleet has returned from a week’s fishing. During the
summer weekends, many come to admire the mighty vessels. On summer
weekdays, however, old sailing barges converted into charter boats occupy
the mooring berths. Oudeschild has clearly benefited from the tourist in-
dustry. It is a popular destination for an outing on the island, but the vil-
lage does not have many tourist beds. Once the tourist season’s hustle and
bustle is over, it turns into a rather quiet place. The same applies to Ooster-
end, situated about six kilometres north of Oudeschild’s harbour.
Approaching Oosterend from the south, a massive bell tower com-
mands the village’s silhouette. It belongs to the island’s oldest place of wor-
ship, parts of which date back to the 12th century. Originally dedicated to
St. Martin, it was converted into a Protestant (Dutch Reformed) church
following the late-16th-century Reformation. A neatly kept graveyard,
where headstones bear the names of deeply rooted families that have been
living here for many generations, surrounds it. The church square is in the
village’s southwest part, with narrow streets extending in all directions.
The plan of the village lends it an atmosphere of intimacy. In the vicinity
are a few shops, a small supermarket, a pub, an off-licence, a bank, two
restaurants, a butcher’s shop and a hairdresser’s. Oosterend is the com-
mercial hub for the island’s northeastern area. Since the war, the village
has expanded predominantly in a northern direction. Here, housing es-
tates and recently built detached and semi-detached houses dominate the
scene. Moving further north, we come across two small business sites, a
tennis court and, on the northern perimeter, a villa park for holiday-
makers. Entering the village from the west, there is a petrol station with a
garage. Another garage annex shop is located on Oosterend’s eastern side.
Situated in a leafy environment, a rather new cemetery sits to the south-
east.
In all, the village comprises about 400 houses. Oosterend proper has
approximately 1,000 inhabitants. For a community this size, there is a sur-
prising range of local institutions. There is a community centre with a
kindergarten. In addition to the ‘old church’, there are several other
churches. A beautiful Mennonite (Doopsgezinde) church dates from 1775,
but is no longer used for worshipping. A Calvinist Reformed (Gerefor-
meerde) church was built in 1897. It became defunct when various Protes-
tant denominations recently merged into the Protestant Church in the
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Netherlands (Protestantse Kerk in Nederland) and began using the ‘old
church’ for Sunday services. A small ultra-orthodox Calvinist Reformed
Community (Gereformeerde Gemeente), who deems the Protestant Church
much too lenient in terms of religious dogma, also uses the building. A
Roman Catholic church dates from 1907. There is a Protestant school in
the northeast, while the secular school is in the opposite direction with
sports grounds across the street. Although at first glance the villagers
would seem divided in religious matters, several voluntary associations
serve as vehicles for local social integration. Moreover, every fifth year
since 1959, the villagers celebrate a three-day festival in July called Ooster-
end Present, in which nearly all Oosterenders participate. Its focal point is
a historical play: an open-air theatre in which the villagers themselves fig-
ure as actors. Begun on the initiative of local entrepreneurs to put the vil-
lage – which was suffering from an image of devout and dour religious
orthodoxy – on the island’s map, the fête has meanwhile burgeoned into a
spectacular event attracting many onlookers. Its organization and perfor-
mance tie the villagers close together.
Superficially, little indicates that Oosterend is a fishing community. The
Wadden Sea dyke is at a distance of almost two kilometres due east, but
there is no harbour. Neither are there any fishing boats. On closer inspec-
tion, however, several symbols provide clues to its maritime heritage. For
example, the village recently erected two small statues that honour its fish-
ermen and fisherwomen, respectively. They occupy a central place in the
village. One statue, unveiled in 2003, depicts three old fishermen talking.
The other one, located a short distance away and unveiled two years later,
represents two fishermen’s wives. In addition, several street names refer to
the local importance of fishing past and present, for instance Oyster Street
(Oesterstraat), Whelk Walk (Wulkpad), Eelgrass Street (Wierstraat), Cutter
Street (Kotterstraat), Anchor Street (Ankerstraat) and so on. Moreover,
many ornaments and paraphernalia are fisheries related, for example
weathervanes in the shape of a cutter, or boat names on wooden planks
attached to houses. In the local pub, fisheries paraphernalia decorate the
walls: old photographs of fishing boats, outdated radio equipment and so
on. Paintings and pictures of vessels that are – or used to be – family
owned and operated are rather common in the homes of (retired) fisher-
men. More importantly, in the villagers’ self-image, Oosterend is definitely
a fishing community.
As mentioned above, in matters of creed Oosterend and Oudeschild dif-
fer markedly. The image of the former is that of a pious Protestant com-
munity, whereas Oudeschild’s is that of a predominantly nonreligious vil-
lage. Oudeschild’s Dutch Reformed congregation merged with
Oosterend’s in 1950, but when asked how his work was progressing in
Oudeschild, the minister allegedly answered: ‘I am ploughing on rocks
there.’ However, in recent decades there have been striking changes in the
political and religious ideologies of the two fishing villages. The impor-
tance of traditional politico-religious models for living seems to have been
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on the decline, which was to some extent reflected in the shifting and di-
minishing support for political and religious institutions. In Oudeschild,
forty per cent registered as having no religious affiliation in the 1981 cen-
sus, while slightly over a quarter were Roman Catholic and another quarter
Dutch Reformed. Votes for the Labour Party in parliamentary elections
gradually dwindled from sixty-four per cent in 1963 to around forty per
cent in 1986 and to slightly less than twenty-eight per cent in 2003. Inter-
estingly, the Christian Democrats – a confessional party including Protes-
tants and Catholics that was established in 1980 – has been on the rise and
obtained nearly twenty-nine per cent in 1986 and almost thirty per cent in
2003. In these two years, the Liberal Party got slightly more than twenty
per cent and over twenty-three per cent, respectively. Support for the La-
bour Party thus diminished markedly, whereas other parties, including a
confessional one, gained influence. However, this does not mirror a grow-
ing religious allegiance of Oudeschilders. Apart from the Catholic minor-
ity, most villagers are still nonreligious or nominally Protestant. In Ooster-
end, the Protestant political parties have continued to gain many ballots.
After the Christian Democratic Party’s formation, it gained around forty-
six per cent of the local votes in the 1986 parliamentary election and al-
most forty per cent in 2003. Both Labour and the Liberal Party obtained
almost eighteen per cent in 1986, the former getting nearly nineteen per
cent in 2003 and the latter almost eleven per cent.
In Oosterend, the roaring Sixties affected church attendance, with
younger villagers becoming less and less strict with regard to Sunday wor-
shiping. The sharp symbolic boundaries between the religious congrega-
tions in general and between latitudinarian and orthodox Protestants in
particular would grow more and more diffuse until they finally lost signifi-
cance for most people, particularly for young church members. The Men-
nonite church held its last regular Sunday service in 1972. In 1981, a third
of the local population was Dutch Reformed, another third Calvinist Re-
formed. About twenty per cent had no religious affiliation. In his recollec-
tion of the 1980s, a Dutch Reformed minister was of the following opin-
ion, ‘You either believe or you do not. It does not matter whether you are
Catholic or Calvinist Reformed’ (Texelse Courant, 8 December 1989). Such
a view would have been anathema to the villagers only a generation earlier.
Church attendance was on the decrease, secularization on the rise. Fishing
on Sundays or Christian holidays such as Good Friday or Ascension Day
was no longer taboo. Increasingly, church membership was predominantly
nominal. Ministers began cooperating more and more, and at national and
local levels, Dutch Reformed, Calvinist Reformed and some smaller Pro-
testant congregations participated in a programme called ‘On Our Way
Together’ (Samen op Weg) that envisioned a merger. To a degree, the fusion
was stimulated by problems of scale that were due to earlier secularization
and by a greater emphasis on similarities rather than differences. Mean-
while, most Protestant churches have united as the Protestant Church in
the Netherlands. In 2001, this was also the case in Oosterend. The Calvi-
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nist Reformed church was closed and today the Protestants use the Dutch
Reformed church as their place of worship.
Some churchgoers refused to accept the current of liberalization. Along
with the Reformed Church becoming increasingly latitudinarian, in 1967 a
small segment of ultra-orthodox believers hived off and established an ex-
tremely dogmatic and reformatory congregation of the Calvinist Reformed
Community (Gereformeerde Gemeente). Currently, it numbers three score
members whose core mainly hails from one family and its in-laws. From
2000 until his valediction in 2005, the congregation had its own minister.
It even established a school, as it deemed the extant Christian school too
lax. Strikingly, the majority of the Oosterenders are rather compassionate
about the congregation, volunteering opinions such as ‘they still pray hell
and doom’ or ‘they are not allowed much, but, well, as long as they don’t
bother us it’s fine with me’. Such opinions are indicative of the villagers’
changed views on religious matters. Latitudinarianism is currently cus-
tomary, while orthodoxy is regarded with indifference. One might have
surmised that the politico-religious convergence between Oosterend and
Oudeschild would have led to a blurring of symbolic boundaries between
the villages, but this is certainly not the case. Although there is inter-village
cooperation, for example in the occupational community of fisherfolk, geo-
graphic space still matters in making a community of place. The predomi-
nant view on a symbolical level would seem to be: Skil is Skil and Strend is
Strend, and never the twain shall meet. There are thus considerable differ-
ences between the two villages, even though they share a long trajectory as
fishing communities. Maritime ventures have also made a mark on the
island’s history.
History in a Nutshell: Sundry Facts and Figures
Archaeological excavations on the island have uncovered evidence of occu-
pation reaching back to the Iron Age (800-50 BC), while implements from
the Mid-Stone Age (8000-4500 BC) were also found, although they may
have belonged to itinerant hunters. Fishing and shellfish gathering for sus-
tenance were undoubtedly an integral part of the subsistence economy of
early inhabitants. To protect themselves from the sea, they settled in sev-
eral settlements on the higher parts of the land: boulder clay emergences
that developed in the Pleistocene Ice Age, the High Mountain being the
prime location. The lower areas between the emergences gradually filled
up with wind-borne sand deposits and marine clay. Small agricultural
communities began settling these areas. However, by 250 AD, climate
changes of the Post-Roman Transgression caused the sea level to rise,
making habitation on Texel increasingly difficult, whereupon people
settled on higher ground again. The lower areas were unprotected from
the influences of sea and wind, and pastures occasionally flooded. Incur-
sions of the sea eroded large areas of peat to the south of Texel, turning the
The Golden Knoll: People, Place and History 45
area into an island. A 9th-century document refers to it as insula Texla and
also provides proof to Christianization. The diocese of Utrecht owned ex-
tensive territory on Texel to which the communities had communal use
rights. The villages had wooden churches that were replaced by tuff stone
ones in the 11th and 12th centuries. With the rise of urban centres and
trade networks in the Netherlands and beyond, commercial North Sea fish-
ing became important on Texel from the 11th century onwards. The island
was thus increasingly embedded within the wider world. In the same era,
marine incursions led to the formation of the Marsdiep Strait and the Zui-
der Sea, which would gradually develop into an important fishing area and
trade route. At approximately the same time, young dunes began forming.
Even today, it is clearly visible that old villages such as Den Hoorn, Den
Burg, De Waal and Oosterend are built on elevations in the landscape.
This was also the case with De Westen, Texel’s most important village in
the 13th century, which was mainly inhabited by fishermen, who could
reach the North Sea through a channel. Eroding sand dunes – probably
caused by deforestation, intensive grazing and the introduction of rabbits
for hunting purposes – silted up the channel in the 14th century, where-
upon the inhabitants pulled down their houses and moved to Den Hoorn
and to what would become the village of De Koog.
It was in the 13th and 14th centuries that Texel’s inhabitants began ma-
nipulating the landscape to reduce their vulnerability to the sea and extend
the island’s territory. They started to construct small dykes connecting
higher areas, embanked coastal marshes and drained little polders. Initi-
ally, the Church was important in coordinating the work. For centuries, the
islanders have also planted marram grass to fight large-scale sand drift in
the dunes. By the end of the 13th century, Texel was subjected to the Count
of Holland. Without the centralized authority of the Church and noble-
men, dyke building and maintenance would probably not have been possi-
ble. Thus, Christianization, pacification and land reclamation were closely
intertwined. However, the Counts’ powers were actually limited. They had
to extend many privileges and feudalism was weakly developed. For exam-
ple, in 1415 the island received privileges as a town (stadsrechten) with Den
Burg as its centre. Among other things, the Counts issued rules and duties
concerning proper dyke maintenance, which a bailiff enforced. He was an
outsider who leased the office and earned an income from fines, making
him extremely unpopular. He had to cooperate with ‘native’ mayors and
aldermen, who were prone to frustrating the bailiff’s judicial tasks (van
der Kooi 2005). Nonetheless, some progress was made in defending the
island against the sea. Land reclamations meant that agriculture gained in
importance. Texel sheep cheese and wool became important export prod-
ucts as early as the 15th century. However, reclaimed land was sometimes
lost to the sea again.
In the 15th and 16th centuries, impoverishment due to an extremely
high tax burden led to a negligence of dyke maintenance. Dyke breaches,
inundations, eroding dune sand, epidemics, privateers and pillaging gangs
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caused many problems. By 1500, Texel’s size was approximately sixty-eight
square kilometres, but due to major flood disasters declined to fifty square
kilometres in 1559. Between 1494 and 1514, the number of houses on the
island declined from 750 to 648, diminishing further to 601 by mid-cen-
tury. In a rough estimate, the island’s population fell from around 4,000 to
approximately 3,000 inhabitants. Geophysical and political-economic de-
velopments thus affected the island’s settlement patterns and demography.
I have already mentioned the example of De Westen, whose inhabitants
moved to Den Hoorn and established De Koog in the 14th century. De
Koog developed into an important fishing village with 140 houses in 1514,
the same number as Den Hoorn. These two villages alone contained about
500 fishermen who targeted cod, haddock, plaice and herring, sailing as
far away as the North Sea’s Dogger Bank. However, once again a process
of silting up of channels in the early 16th century prevented fishing boats’
access to De Koog. This was partly due to the seagoing men neglecting to
plant marram grass in the dunes, which led to sand erosion. Along with
the process of silting, De Koog’s fishing fleet declined rapidly. Still, a mid-
16th century map shows various coastal activities, such as beach seining,
fishing with small rowing boats, sailing vessels, ships anchored at the Tex-
el Roads and nets drying on the beach. The fish was mostly sold in Dutch
Hansa towns. The churches levied taxes on the proceeds of fish sales to
maintain their places of worship. However, the situation in De Koog dete-
riorated to such an extent that the villagers requested to be exempt. The
village turned into the poorest community on the island. Heavy storms
and floods – which demolished forty-nine houses in 1559 and another sev-
enty houses in 1570 – forced many inhabitants to leave for Den Hoorn.
Subsequently, De Koog lost its importance as a fishing community, and to
a lesser extent, this also applied to Den Hoorn. Increasingly, the male in-
habitants of the latter village turned to piloting and sheep farming.
The devastating floods also led to huge losses in land, crops and cattle,
and inundations rendered part of the soil useless. Two more storm surges
followed in 1578 and 1590. By the end of the 16th century, the Estates of
Holland intervened in dyke maintenance, levying taxes on all islanders and
introducing new regulations pertaining to hydraulic engineering. This
centralization partly alleviated the difficulties, although dyke breaches
would occasionally reoccur. As agriculture gained in importance, privatiza-
tion of common grazing grounds began as of the late 16th century. To pre-
vent cattle and sheep from wandering off onto someone else’s property, the
sod banks that would become typical of Texel hedged the pastures. The
enclosure, which created a patchwork of tiny fields, was beneficial for ara-
ble farming. In addition, it contributed to preventing wind erosion as
sheep and cattle could not wander off freely into the dunes and eat vegeta-
tion that was important for stabilizing the sand. In the wake of geopolitical
developments and the rise of Holland as a mercantile nation, the island
started to prosper. In a sense, Texel rose as a hub of international traffic
and trade. Ships departing from the Zuider Sea for trade in the Baltic re-
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gion often cast anchor at the Texel Roads situated off the island’s east coast.
There, they took shelter from the strong westerly breeze and awaited fa-
vourable winds. It was therefore also strategically important, and for pur-
poses of defence, a redoubt was constructed on its southeastern coast in
the early 1570s. It was a time of considerable upheaval. Spain had declared
war on the Low Countries in 1568, and the Reformation and its iconoclast
movement made Protestantism the official religion. Until this time, com-
modities from the Far East were imported via Spain and Portugal. How-
ever, when Spanish troops conquered the port of Antwerp in 1585, the
Dutch developed their own Far East trade with the assistance of wealthy
Flemish merchants who had fled their country. In 1602, the Dutch East
India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) was established and
soon turned into a successful enterprise, shipping merchandise such as
herbs, spices, cotton, silk and china to Europe. Many of its vessels departed
from the Texel Roads, linking the island with the sinews of maritime com-
merce.
The island’s economy benefited, and a prolonged period of unprece-
dented stability and prosperity ensued. The village of Schilt (currently
Oudeschild) owes its existence to seafaring and the East India Company. It
began as a small group of dwellings for the Admiralty, but by 1630 there
were already more than sixty houses. In the course of the 17th century,
Schilt rapidly developed into a lively small town with the hustle and bustle
of arriving and departing sailors. A well in its proximity supplied the mer-
chant fleet with fresh water for its lengthy overseas voyages. As the water’s
iron content was high, it could be preserved for months and was in high
demand. With occasionally more than a hundred vessels weighing anchor,
Oudeschild attracted many artisans and traders, including shipwrights,
chandlers, sail makers and rope makers. A Protestant Sailors’ Chapel was
erected in 1650. Another new settlement, Nieuweschild (New Schild), situ-
ated about six kilometres to the northeast, came into existence a short time
later, whereupon Schilt was renamed Oudeschild (Old Schild). Pilots, who
mostly lived in the villages of Oudeschild, Nieuweschild and particularly
Den Hoorn, guided the incoming and outgoing vessels on their way to
and from the North Sea and the Zuider Sea. As early as 1615, piloting had
tight regulations pertaining to tasks and duties, and fixed tariffs. In slack
times, pilots often combined their work with fishing. Fishing and whaling
also provided a livelihood for scores of islanders, with Oosterend and its
satellite hamlet of Oost meanwhile becoming an important farming-fish-
ing community. The island’s coat of arms symbolized its dependence on
the sea: a golden shield with two red lions facing each other, standing on
the stock of an upturned black anchor. The island prospered and its popu-
lation increased from 4,663 inhabitants in 1622 to 5,420 only ten years
later. The booming maritime economy stimulated population growth, but
agriculture was also flourishing. The island’s territory had been declining
due to inundations for a long time, but now land was gained from the sea
again. This was mainly because Texel was connected to a small dune island
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to the north. Between this islet of Eierland (Egg Land) and Texel extended
an area of wetlands with large sandbars and creeks. In 1629-1630, the is-
landers built a sand dyke across the sandbanks’ highest part. They also
planted marram grass and deployed reed mats to trap sand. Gradually,
more and more sediment built up there. In 1633, the island’s area com-
prised sixty-two square kilometres of land. In the course of time, an ever
more complex and centralized social organization arose to defend the land
against the sea.
During the entire 17th century and a considerable part of the 18th cen-
tury, Texel benefited from the upsurge of mercantile seafaring. By 1700,
about thirty Texel captains skippered merchant ships and many more is-
landers – some contend up to 400 – crewed on them. By this time, Oude-
schild boasted eleven inns ‘where kings and princes might be lodged’ and
many more to cater for sailors. The population continued to expand and so
did the number of houses. In the mid-18th century, approximately 6,000
islanders inhabited more than 1,200 houses, nearly a third of them in Den
Burg. It was and would continue to be the island’s administrative and eco-
nomic centre. A 1742 census indicated that nearly half the island’s occupa-
tional population earned a living in maritime ventures as captains, helms-
men, sailors, pilots, whalers, barge skippers or fishermen. Less than a
quarter of the occupational population were farmers. The wealthiest sea-
men generally lived in the island’s capital, while the 145 pilots – whose
number would rise to 266 less than four decades later – lived predomi-
nantly in Oudeschild, Den Hoorn and Nieuweschild. Oudeschild had 132
men who earned a living in a maritime occupation, while Oosterend – in-
cluding Oost and Nieuweschild – had 136. Traditionally, the inhabitants of
Oosterend and environs earned a living in agriculture, which many com-
bined with fishing. Along with the emergence of oyster fishing in the early
18th century, maritime pursuits grew in importance. Most of the 136 mar-
iners were therefore probably fishermen. The census mentioned 151 Den
Hoorn men in maritime occupations, mainly pilots-cum-fishermen. How-
ever, Den Hoorn began facing the problem that a bay near the village,
where they moored their boats, was silting up, whereupon the local pilots
started to move to Oudeschild.
Following repeated requests, in 1780 a harbour, including a shipyard
and a slipway, was constructed in Oudeschild. Previously, ships anchored
at the Texel Roads while smaller vessels moored near the dyke or in inlets.
Storms had occasionally caused heavy damage as craft broke from their
anchors and sank, often taking a heavy toll of human lives. Although the
harbour satisfied the need for a safe haven, the decline of the East India
Company in the second half of the 18th century and its subsequent bank-
ruptcy in 1799, adverse political and economic times and shifts in mari-
time traffic implied that the village’s heyday was over. In addition, neigh-
bouring Den Helder – situated on the mainland – rose as a naval port. It
obtained a harbour in 1782 that seriously competed with Oudeschild’s.
More devastating yet was the Batavian and French Era (1795-1813), when
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warfare and the British blockade of commercial ports, privateers and the
trade barrier of Napoleon’s Continental System virtually blocked overseas
trade. The island’s economy suffered profoundly, as did the Dutch econo-
my as a whole. To add to the misery, taxes increased, prices rose and the
French began impounding commodities, sapping the island’s resources. It
also standardized and centralized the administration, the law and the judi-
cial system, taxlevies and so on. With no mercantile traffic at sea, piloting
became redundant and the pilots rapidly impoverished. They earned a
meagre income of five guilders per month and most consigned with the
navy, where they earned four times that amount. By the turn of the century,
only thirty-three pilot vessels were left of a once considerably larger fleet.
In addition, there were forty-two barges, thirty-one oyster boats and thirty
small fishing craft. Oudeschilders, who previously had not occupied them-
selves with fishing, owned nine of the smaller vessels. The number of sail-
ors dropped to less than a hundred. The French were expelled from the
island in 1813, but Texel’s misery was not over yet. Piloting suffered when
the North Holland Canal was opened in 1825. Vessels destined for Amster-
dam no longer needed to navigate the shallow Zuider Sea and the Texel
Roads swiftly lost its function. By the end of the decade, the number of
Texel pilot boats had dwindled to fifteen. Moreover, a state reorganization
of the pilot service in 1835 demanded that all pilots should be stationed on
the mainland. The villages of Den Hoorn, Oudeschild and Nieuweschild
thereupon rapidly declined. Nearly all of Nieuweschild’s fifty houses were
torn down. Many residents of Oudeschild and Den Hoorn moved away,
scores of buildings were broken down and those who hung on in Den
Hoorn predominantly turned to agriculture. Along with the decline of mar-
itime trade and piloting, the wealthiest inhabitants of Oudeschild – includ-
ing many of those who directly or indirectly earned a living as artisans or
suppliers of the merchant fleet – migrated to the mainland. Oudeschild
rapidly became impoverished and many inhabitants depended on poor re-
lief from the church and the municipality. The remaining male villagers
mainly opted for inshore fishing and eelgrass harvesting, while Oosterend
and Oost reinforced their positions as fishing communities. Thus, over the
centuries we can observe a relocation of fishing villages from the North
Sea coast (De Westen, De Koog and Den Hoorn) to the Wadden Sea coast
(Oosterend and neighbouring hamlets, Oudeschild). With about 300 fish-
ermen, fishing turned into a dominant maritime pursuit, while in turn
agriculture surpassed maritime ventures in importance. Despite the eco-
nomic malaise, as of 1829 the island’s population increased again and
would continue to expand for several decades, not least because of land
gains (see figure 1). The demographic fluctuations were mainly due to mi-
gration.
New land reclamations were the main cause for agriculture to begin to
dominate the island economy. In 1835 it became possible to embank and
drain the coastal marshes east of the sand dyke that had been built two
centuries earlier and connected Eierland with Texel. At almost thirty-two
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square kilometres, it still is the island’s largest polder. The affluent Flem-
ish ship-owner and trader Nicolas Joseph de Cock initiated the reclama-
tion, which attracted scores of new settlers from the mainland. Texel’s sev-
enth village, for obvious reasons dubbed De Cocksdorp (De Cock’s
Village), was built at its northern extremity a year after the reclamation.
Although to a large extent populated by farmhands, it would also gain
some importance as a fishing village. By 1841, it had Dutch Reformed and
Catholic churches, a school, and twenty dwellings accommodating 120 in-
habitants. Being relative newcomers from non-Texel lineages, the villagers
occupied a special position on the island. The vast new territory was turned
into farmland and could be rationally exploited according to the latest
knowledge and technology. As early as the mid-19th century, a degree of
agricultural mechanization came about there. Initially, farming proved to
be difficult since the soil was rather poor and required intensive fertilizing
and drainage. However, three more polders were reclaimed in the 19th
century. Along with some minor land reclamations, these hydraulic works
added another fifteen square kilometres to Texel’s land mass. There have
been no such major coastal engineering projects since.
For several decades, agriculture thrived. Towards the end of the century,
however, a severe agricultural crisis made many decide to leave the island,
among them several of the settlers of the new polders. Relatively cheap
corn and mutton from overseas were dumped on European markets and
the effects were felt on Texel. Hundreds of islanders migrated to the Uni-
ted States. While farmers suffered, the fishermen were still doing well.
Their numbers rose from 390 in 1875 to 534 in 1891. The fishing fleet’s
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Figure 2. Demographic development of Texel and the villages of Oosterend and Oude-
schild.
growth necessitated enlargement of the Oudeschild harbour in 1890, but
subsequently the fisheries headed towards a prolonged depression. In the
early 20th century, agriculture began prospering again and many fisher-
men chose to become farmhands. Push-and-pull factors in various eco-
nomic sectors affected the fishing industry. By the early 20th century, tour-
ism was on the rise. The establishment of a new ferry company in 1907
facilitated this development. From the mid-19th century, a daily steamboat
service had been sailing between Oudeschild and Den Helder, but out of
discontent with its owner’s policy, the islanders inaugurated TESO, which
gradually expanded the daily schedule of crossings. The company also op-
erated buses on the island. When cars and motorcycles made their appear-
ance, the ferry company adapted to the development by launching a new
vessel in 1926 that could transport vehicles. Roads were improved, the is-
land got electricity, telegraph and telephone, public lighting, sewerage,
banks, more schools and general practitioners, and so on. In short, the
infrastructure improved considerably as did education and health care,
while contact with the mainland intensified. It became much easier for
mainlanders to pay a visit to the island. Meanwhile, a local tourist informa-
tion office opened and De Koog had several seaside hotels. The former
fishing village gradually developed into a thriving seaside resort completely
geared to catering for holidaymakers. Later on, De Cocksdorp underwent a
similar development and became a tourist resort too.
Despite the upsurge of the tourist industry, agriculture still held pride of
place in the local economy. For various reasons, fishing was not doing well
(see Chapter 2). When the global economic crisis began affecting the is-
land, it was compounded for the fishermen by the profound consequences
of the construction of a Closure Dam (Afsluitdijk) that closed off the Zuider
Sea from the North Sea in 1932. The dam caused an ecological disaster and
threw many skippers and deckhands out of employment, while alternative
jobs were scarce due to the depression. By the 1930s, agriculture also suf-
fered an economic decline and could not absorb extra hands. Scores and
scores of Texelians ended up on the dole or in work relief projects. By the
time the economic depression began to wane, war had broken out. In May
1940, German troops invaded the Netherlands, including Texel. The fish-
ermen suffered: their boats were impounded, fuel was soon in short sup-
ply, and several able-bodied men were forced to work in the Arbeitseinsatz.
Nonetheless, few lives were lost and the islanders seemed to be escaping
atrocious hostilities. However, in the spring of 1945 this changed dramati-
cally. In February 1944, an infantry battalion consisting of approximately
800 Georgians who had been enlisted by the Germans was stationed on
the island. By this time, the German army had suffered heavy losses in
Western Europe and needed to deploy ancillary troops. The Georgians,
who had served in the Red Army, were in a difficult situation. They could
choose between becoming prisoners-of-war or lending themselves as the
Germans’ auxiliaries. They opted for collaboration, but when it became
abundantly clear that the German Army’s defeat was imminent and that
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the Georgians would be assigned to the front, they decided to rise up
against the Germans. They feared that as ‘defectors’, they would probably
not receive a warm welcome upon return to the Soviet Union, while the
allied forces would be likely to treat them as if they were German soldiers.
In early April 1945, they killed nearly 400 of their German overseers in a
surprise action, but German officers succeeded in calling in reinforce-
ments from the mainland. Heavy fighting ensued. It took five weeks to
suppress the revolt, turning Texel into one of the Second World War’s last
combat zones. This so-called ‘Russians’ War’ (Russenoorlog) took the lives
of 565 Georgians and an unknown number of Germans (estimates of their
death toll vary between 420 and 800). The civilians on the island, who
were caught in the crossfire, suffered 117 casualties. Damages were enor-
mous. Texel was liberated on 20 May 1945 – a fortnight after the German
occupying force had officially surrendered to the allied forces.
As elsewhere in the Netherlands, the post-war era was primarily devoted
to economic reconstruction. Heavily damaged buildings and scores of
farmsteads needed repairs or had to be rebuilt. The majority of money
and effort went into making things work again. In Oudeschild and Ooster-
end housing left much to be desired, with buildings being quite small,
damp and lacking plumbing and piped water. This would change only
slowly, as economic reconstruction had priority. Rapid modernization of
agriculture ensued in the 1950s. Land re-allotment schemes and rationa-
lized production changed the landscape made up of small plots into a pat-
tern of larger ones, tractors replaced horses, and ongoing mechanization
in general made many farmhands redundant. Along with these develop-
ments, agriculture stopped functioning as a seasonal escape route for petty
fishermen. Increasingly, the Texel fishing industry was divided into a
growing section of modern cutters and a rapidly declining segment of old
wooden-hulled sailing vessels with auxiliary engines. By 1960, employ-
ment in the agricultural sector had diminished to almost thirty-eight per
cent, while fishing accounted for slightly less than four per cent. The is-
land’s growing tourist industry provided new jobs – albeit with high sea-
sonal unemployment in the winter. Until 1964, the ferry’s home base was
Oudeschild, but with the increasing number of cars that needed to be
transported – a consequence of growing wealth, the extension of leisure
and holidaymaking and democratization of car ownership – relocation was
deemed necessary to enable the operation of a roll-on-roll-off vessel. Two
score Oudeschilders worked for the ferry company. Fearing that many vil-
lagers would become unemployed and their village depopulated, the locals
put up a formidable fight to maintain the ferry terminal, to no avail, how-
ever. It was relocated to the hamlet of Horntje, and soon a second ferry was
launched. Contrary to expectations, however, Oudeschild began to thrive
following the upsurge of tourism and aquatic sports and the rapid expan-
sion of the North Sea fishing fleet from 1960 onwards. Particularly after
the harbour’s enlargement in 1973, which provided more quay space and a
marina, Oudeschild turned into a popular port of call for yachts. With the
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establishment of a local museum in 1980, the village boasted another tour-
ist attraction. By then the harbour had a floating dry-dock for vessel main-
tenance and repair, owned and operated by two brothers whose siblings
were skipper-owners of fishing boats. Oosterenders still owned most of
the fishing vessels, and the fishing industry made their village prosper. In
the next chapters, we shall see how this wealth came about.
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Chapter 2
Trimming the Sails to the Wind
Under conditions of common pool resource use, fishermen rarely exploit
one single species or a single ecological niche. It is precisely this aspect of
the utilization of commons that is often neglected by theorists who regard
enforcement of rules by external agencies or privatization as solutions to
tragedies of the commons. If not tied to a single resource – for example
when one ‘owns’ this resource as a tenant or as a person with specific enti-
tlements – fishermen tend to take optimal advantage of the variety of mar-
ine ecosystems, choosing to use specific niches as they deem fit. Switching
and diversification may not necessarily be rational choices, but they are
certainly reasonable strategies in view of declining stock abundance and
environmental uncertainty. Under common pool conditions, such flexibil-
ity may be greatly enhanced through institutions that emphasize the right
to include rather than the right to exclude users from the streams of com-
mon or communal benefits (Runge 1986:625). Returning to the question
of the unplanned, unintended and unforeseen consequences of adaptive
behaviour outlined in the introduction of this book, we should distinguish
between on the one hand the intentional strategies of actors, what they
lead to, how these results produce outcomes that are partly undesirable
and how actors respond to them, and on the other hand types of behaviour
that are unintentional and in the long run may have either favourable or
unfavourable consequences. Put differently, we should be aware of the
simple fact that human adaptations are dynamic and involve continual
feedback loops: ‘Humans can assert control over environmental deteriora-
tion by conscious discipline or planning, ritual regulations, social interac-
tion, or cultural precedents, and/or by very occasional automatic feedback
mechanisms operating outside of cognitive awareness’ (J.W. Bennett
1976:148). However, the sum total of conscious adaptations can turn into
a long-term process that slips from human awareness and may ultimately
prove to be maladaptive. People manipulate their natural and social envir-
onments, but the properties of their relations with nature and with one
another are often contradictory and derive from neither intention nor
awareness (Godelier 1986:6).
In this connection, a common but ill-understood adaptive pattern of
fishermen is important; they tend to turn away from declining resources
(Townsend and Wilson 1987:323). In capitalist societies fishermen have al-
ways had to acquire new markets as part of their coping responses to eco-
logical variations, natural resource and price fluctuations, and to adjust to
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state interventions in the fishing industry, the supply of alternative food-
stuffs, changing consumer preferences, fluctuating exchange rates and
overt and covert trade barriers. Combined with local demographic and
other factors, these have generated a variety of adaptations among fisher-
folk (Löfgren 1979:85 86). Social and political processes constrain or en-
hance the ability of actors to grapple with problems they face adequately,
whether these problems are of an ecological, economic, political, or social
nature. Adaptive responses to resource deterioration, trade-cycles, rules
and regulations, the vicissitudes of a market economy, and social con-
straints often include diversification, intensification, specialization or
withdrawal. Diversification refers to spreading risks and increasing alter-
native modes of exploitation and employment. Intensification – or expan-
sion – refers to a growing commitment to invest in one or another mode of
resource utilization. Specialization means restricting one’s activities to a
particular niche in the ecological or economic system. Withdrawal implies
leaving the specific mode of resource exploitation altogether to find alter-
native sources of income, such as wage labour or social welfare payments
(McCay 1978; Pettersen 1996). Another mode of coping with the uncer-
tainties of resources and markets is cooperation, which may take on var-
ious guises from informal and occasional to institutionalized and structur-
al. How such adaptations operate in practice is fully comprehensible only
by taking into account contextual factors in a diachronic perspective and by
devoting attention to the economic, social and cultural embedment of hu-
man behaviour. It is therefore my explicit aim to describe and analyze the
adaptive strategies of Texel fishermen in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th
centuries within this wider context.1 More specifically, I will focus on diver-
sification, intensification, specialization, withdrawal and cooperation as
modes of adapting to the uncertainties of natural resource availability, mar-
ket fluctuations and state interference. These forms of adaptation can be
considered ‘ecological regimes’: that is, systems of regulation and sanc-
tioning to which people submit collectively and individually in their at-
tempts to adapt to and control their natural and – by extension – their
economic and social environments.
Usually, changes in ecological regimes come about because of resource
decline or economic perturbations. Often, a pattern of real or mimicked
ownership is instituted or altered to counter resource and/or price dete-
riorations. Underlying such an adaptive strategy is a process of political
manoeuvring and bargaining, involving various competing interest
groups. Although the participants in the game of formal and informal con-
tracting – the efforts of individuals or groups ‘to assign or to modify prop-
erty rights’ (Libecap 1989:4) – may agree on a given strategy at some point
in time, the outcome is never certain. As Klug rightly maintains:
In order to understand how and why particular property regimes are ap-
plied to particular resources at particular times, it is important to under-
stand the historical development and shifts within these property regimes,
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as well as their ‘social construction’ through the community of users, man-
agers, and policymakers … who shape them in the context of both domestic
and international legal frameworks (Klug 2002:698).
The relationships of power and dependency in the fishing industry change
with every transformation of the system of access and use rights: ‘Differ-
ent bundles of property rights, whether they are de facto or de jure, affect
the incentives individuals face, the types of actions they take, and the out-
comes they achieve’ (Schlager and Ostrom 1992:256). Specific forms of
labour organization and (re)-distribution of (the revenues of) goods pro-
duced accompany specific territorial forms of property. It is thus pertinent
to identify the actors and social formations that are involved in political
contracting, their relative bargaining positions and their power bases.
Political decisions concerning access to and use of the marine domain
are bound to have intended and unanticipated social and environmental
consequences (Hamilton et al. 1998:17). They also set in motion political
processes in which individual actors and configurations of actors try to
secure their respective interests. New regulations affect different cate-
gories of fishermen in different ways. Moreover, such transformations can
bring about new cooperative or competitive forms of resource use. There
will be political bargaining among competing interest groups and contract-
ing for property rights: ‘All things equal, those interest groups with greater
wealth, size, and homogeneity will have more resources to influence poli-
ticians regarding the assignment of property rights’ (Libecap 1989:17).
Economic and socio-cultural heterogeneity and a concomitant lack of trust
among fishermen will render collective action more difficult, exacerbating
the problem of free riding (Ruttan 2006:843). If actors succeed in convin-
cing the state that entry to and appropriation and (re)-allocation of renew-
able marine resources should be restricted to a greater extent than the ex-
isting situation, then a number of fishermen are likely to be barred from
extractive resource use. It follows that ‘[d]istributional conflicts inherent in
any new property rights arrangement, even one that offers important effi-
ciency implications, can block or critically constrain the institutions that
can be adopted’ (Libecap 1989:121). Stakeholders with more leverage are
prone to win in the process of political bargaining. Those who lose under
a new resource management system will try to alter it, sometimes by
changing, ignoring or transgressing the rules of the game, while those
who benefit will attempt to maintain it and consolidate their interests. By
definition, each shift in property allocations has distributional implications
that are potentially divisive and may bring about multiple-use problems
and conflicts. In what follows, I will explore the reasons why new institu-
tional arrangements and ecological regimes in the fishing industry came
about, how specific configurations of rights affected allocation and distri-
bution, how fishermen responded, the ways in which they attempted to
maintain control over what they perceived as ‘their’ domain, and the
means they used in this process.
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Oystermen and Nature’s Nemesis
Oyster fishing began to flourish in the early decades of the 18th century
and gained a prominent place in the island economy. The inhabitants of
the village of Oosterend and the neighbouring hamlets of Oost and Nieu-
weschild used about fifty flat-bottomed boats to harvest the bivalves south
of the islands of Texel, Vlieland and Terschelling and around the island of
Wieringen, situated approximately sixteen kilometres southeast of Texel.
The Texelians caught or gathered considerable amounts of European flat
oysters (Ostrea edulis), using dredge nets or small rakes when the receding
tides left the flats exposed. Fishermen hailing from the other islands also
pursued oysters, as did some of the inhabitants of Zoutkamp, a town situ-
ated on the mainland coast. The Texel oystermen marketed their catch in
the country’s capital of Amsterdam and in the German port of Hamburg.
Frequently, they arrived with ‘shiploads of oysters’ (le Long 1727:581) and
their revenues were so considerable that the Estates of Holland intended to
levy a tax on the oystermen. In 1727, they held an inquiry, from which it
appears that the oystermen believed that the oyster banks ‘sprouted from
nature through God’s blessing and were not planted by man’ (quoted in
Dijt 1961:100). They further stated that the oyster banks ‘are not owned by
anyone, nor has anyone ever had a privilege to them. Anyone from East or
West who wished to do so, could fish these banks freely and unhindered’
(ibid.). British and French sailors, whose vessels were anchored at the
Texel Roads, indeed took the opportunity to catch oysters without having
to pay any kind of tax or tribute. Thus, in principle, entry to these waters
was open to all and so was the exploitation of the resources in them. It was
only by catching or gathering the oysters – in other words through their
labour – that the fishermen could appropriate the bivalves. Once har-
vested, they were considered their property.
Texel oystermen resented the situation of res nullius. In 1754, they sub-
mitted a petition to the Estates of Holland, asking to terminate the free
right of foreigners to harvest oysters (van der Vlis 1977:196). Their plea
was ignored. However, their intimate knowledge of the marine domain
enabled them to use tactics of secrecy to prevent outsiders from using par-
ticularly lucrative locations. Whenever they had spotted a productive oyster
bank, they attempted to monopolize this niche. Although access was legal-
ly unrestricted, systems of territoriality and usufruct existed that mitigated
unbridled exploitation. Texel fishermen claimed special use rights to a
shallow cove indenting the island’s northeast. Here, they replanted mature
and immature oysters they had harvested in the public domain. Each oys-
terman staked out a plot, demarcated with branches on the corners, where
the oysters were tended and cared for until they could be marketed (Palu-
danus 1776:252). The islanders considered these waters res communes and
they carried on a form of oyster cultivation. Even if the fishery was free in a
formal sense, informal regulations arranged for access and use of these
plots by Texelians and for the exclusion of outsiders: each plot was ‘habi-
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tually respected as someone’s property’ (Verslag zeevisserijen. 1860:36).
The area was guarded on the oystermen’s common account. Their aim of
claiming access and use of certain locations for themselves was to exclude
outsiders, not so much to protect or conserve the resource.
However, with its forty-one square kilometres of shallow, relatively
warm sea water shielded from the westerly winds and its firm seafloor, the
cove where these nursery beds were located provided excellent conditions
for oyster reproduction and growth. Moreover, the technological means
available to fishermen were rather simple; gear efficiency was concomi-
tantly low; the vessels’ radius of action was but small; the oystermen often
could not sail due to storms and ice-drift; they did not market oysters be-
tween April and October; and they refrained from sailing on Sundays. In
addition, certain practices and arrangements prevented unbridled fishing
of oysters. For example, without the pressure of any external authority,
Schiermonnikoog fishermen limited their fishing season and the size of
marketable oysters. They returned immature oysters to the sea. Although
a striking example of self-management, the arrival of newcomers who did
not abide by these informal agreements led to violations while Texel fisher-
men did not feel obliged by the arrangements of their Schiermonnikoog
compatriots who, unlike Texelians, never replanted oysters. This meant
that the fisherfolk of these islands had opposed interests, ‘and the interests
of Schiermonnikoog fishermen compel them to also begin fishing earlier
than has been arranged’ (Paludanus 1776:251). Nonetheless, the commu-
nal use and management of the nursery beds near Texel probably advanced
oyster reproduction. Each vessel had to land approximately 100,000 oy-
sters annually to provide a living for all its crewmembers (ibid.:257). Since
sixty oyster boats sailed from Texel, it is safe to assume that the local fish-
ermen shipped approximately six million oysters per year. In the autumn,
they began shipping the bivalves to the markets, of which Hamburg was
still an important destination. The oyster traders were among Oosterend’s
most affluent villagers.
Both catches and revenues fluctuated sharply. For instance, between
1794 and 1798 the Texelians sold between 1.4 and 2.4 million oysters an-
nually to Amsterdam merchants and approximately 1.5 to 5 million to
Hamburg dealers. However, these amounts declined during a number of
consecutive years and in 1805 they marketed only a total of about 150,000
oysters in both cities. Harsh winters and ice-drift brought about serious
damage to the oyster stocks and several cold summers hampered the oy-
sters’ reproduction. Fluctuations in demand and supply led to price fluc-
tuations, and trade barriers during the Batavian and the French Era (1795-
1813) impeded oyster shipments. Shipments to Hamburg (whose market
used to be their ‘gold mine’) practically came to a standstill. Taxes rocketed
and fishermen were severely restricted in their operations. Declining oy-
ster shipments after 1799 were a consequence of the introduction of per-
mits for oystermen and the French blockade of the British merchant fleet –
Napoleon’s Continental System – thwarting overseas trade from the Neth-
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erlands to other countries. Oyster sales in Amsterdam, which had become
poverty-stricken under the French occupation, diminished not only be-
cause of the citizens’ decreasing purchasing power, but also because of a
tax levied on fish and shellfish by the city government. When the French
were finally expelled from the island and the Netherlands, the Texel oyster-
men found themselves in dire straits. Their deplorable state had serious
ramifications in the wider community: ‘The oyster fisherman has bought
on tick from the baker and the shopkeeper, but is incapable of paying his
debt, so that the baker and the shopkeeper also suffer because they lose
their credit.’2
The tide did finally seem to turn. From 1815 until 1840, the oyster banks
were very productive and the oystermen shipped from one to eight million
oysters annually (Anonymous 1852:363). In 1839, they estimated their ag-
gregate annual revenues at 60,000 guilders. Largely, the complex system
of capture-and-culture fisheries worked out well. Nevertheless, after 1840,
catches declined year after year and the oyster banks became less and less
productive until they were nearly exhausted. As early as 1841, the governor
of the province of North-Holland asked the mayor of Texel whether it
would be expedient to limit the oyster fishery. However, the mayor deemed
any limitation ‘detrimental to both the society and the fishery itself’.3 Nor
were the Texel oystermen in favour of intervention. To keep their trade
going, they began to import oysters from France and England and addi-
tionally, they fished oysters in Zeeland waters to replant on their plots. In-
itially, they did not worry seriously about diminishing catches. They had
encountered these before and the ‘experience of previous years has shown
that adversity is not lasting but has always yielded to better times’.4 How-
ever, their misplaced confidence would soon vanish. Catches near the is-
land declined from several million oysters to a few hundred thousand. The
image of the sea as a cornucopia with an inexhaustible supply of oysters
faded rapidly when the crisis persisted in the following years and even-
tually turned out to be an irreversible tragedy.
What caused this tragedy? It seems to have been brought about by a
number of factors, one reinforcing the other. Firstly, land reclamation in
1835 had meant that more than three-quarters of the cove situated on Tex-
el’s northeast side was lost as a location for replanting and tending oysters
(see Chapter 1). Texel fishermen could henceforth only re-lay their oysters
in what was left of the cove, which, to make things worse, silted up. Thus,
the nursery grounds vanished and the natural milieu for the reproduction
of oysters deteriorated. This ecological deterioration is important, since the
increasing scarcity implied that the level of exploitation of the oyster stocks
rose relatively, because initially catching efforts did not decrease. Secondly,
natural circumstances also contributed to the tragedy. Oysters are very sen-
sitive to changes in the ecosystem. Even slight fluctuations in water tem-
perature, salinity, seabed morphology and food supply (phytoplankton) can
cause considerable mortality. Severe winters caused marked oyster mortal-
ity, and cold summers had a negative impact on reproduction. Moreover,
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storms and changing currents also affected the oyster stocks. It is further
conceivable that the imported oysters did not adapt well to local conditions
and that along with them micro-organisms were introduced that were
harmful to oysters. Thirdly, developments in infrastructure and transporta-
tion were important and the peaceful and prosperous times stimulated de-
mand. Oysters could be distributed to remote markets with the advent of
steam navigation and railroads. Prior to the steam era, catches were at-
tuned to the demand in markets that could be reached by sailing vessels
within a few days. However, the advent of steam-powered vessels and rail-
ways implied an enormous expansion of the distribution network. ‘Never
before,’ the fishermen remarked in 1839, ‘has it been possible to ship Texel
oysters with sufficient speed and certainty at such distances.’5 Oyster runs
to Hamburg increased in number and Texel oysters were even landed in
Russia’s St. Petersburg. Fourthly, catching efforts and techniques changed
in connection with what seemed an insatiable consumer demand. The lo-
cal oyster-fishing fleet expanded between 1836 and 1846: from sixty to
eighty boats (a crew of three manned each boat).6 In the same era, the
catching technology also changed. Dredge nets were improved and used
more widely and more often, virtually replacing small hand-operated
rakes. Each vessel would use three such dredges, towing them across the
seafloor. Although the Texel oystermen still practised a kind of quasi-culti-
vation, the exploitation of public waters with a growing number of vessels
and more efficient gear possibly undermined the oyster banks’ carrying
capacity. Aggregate catches increased initially, but per boat catches de-
clined – a fair indication of excessive fishing. Moreover, increased catches
at the same time implied lower prices and falling incomes. To keep their
earnings at an acceptable level, the Texelians were forced to harvest even
more oysters.
State officials began to be concerned and pondered on measures to pro-
tect the oyster banks. They were of the opinion that ‘to permit that some
annihilate this prosperous and important industry to find a scanty means
of subsistence is not in compliance with the well-understood interests and
duties of the State’ (Anonymous 1854:142). However, fearing that regulat-
ing one fishery would disadvantage another, the state refrained from inter-
vening. In the 1850s, it had appointed a committee to investigate the state
of the fisheries, and this committee proposed to leave all fisheries unregu-
lated. Previously, measures to protect the offshore fishing fleet’s interests
had been in place. Tariffs and taxes, and prohibitions on landing certain
species, had restricted possibilities in the inshore fishing industry. It was
therefore decided to liberalize the Fisheries Act in 1857. The Texel oyster-
men themselves were opposed to any kind of regulation because oyster
prices, which had risen again due to the scarcity, initially kept their income
up to the desired level. It was precisely because of these high oyster prices
that the fishermen marketed all the oysters – mature and immature – that
they were able to harvest. However, higher prices could not make up for
lower catches, and eventually the income of Texel oystermen fell. Although
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the fishermen’s behaviour was damaging to themselves as a collective, it
was perfectly rational for each individual to catch as many oysters as he
could. The mechanism of subtractability applied: almost all of the gain
would go to each individual fisherman, whereas the costs (over-fishing
and ultimately exhaustion of the oyster banks) were passed on to the col-
lective of users. The fishermen were also caught in a zero-sum game: if a
fisherman were to throw immature oysters back into the sea, another
would probably catch and market them.
From the mid-1840s onwards, many oystermen began harvesting eel-
grass in the summer and autumn, and shells (the raw material for the
production of lime) in the spring and winter to make up for their declining
incomes (see below). Consequently, in the 1850s and 1860s only thirty to
forty vessels were active in the oyster fishery for a short season (mostly
October and November). Probably because of these adaptive strategies, the
oyster stocks recovered somewhat, and from 1858 until 1862 the annual
catch averaged approximately two million oysters. Due to this slight recov-
ery, some fishermen were re-attracted to oyster fishing, which again led to
declining catches. In 1864 it was stated that the oyster banks were once
more ‘fished dead’.7 A few years later, what was left of the cove where they
used to plant the bivalves was reclaimed, so that the fishermen completely
lost the communal underwater grounds in which to deposit immature oy-
sters. Henceforth, the fishermen were compelled to deliver their catch to
the oyster dealers immediately. They also did so in the summer – the time
of reproduction (spat-fall). The fishermen were aware of the harmful con-
sequences of their behaviour, but they maintained that they were not in a
position to act differently. It was hard to earn money with other fisheries
during the summer season and not all fishermen could – or desired to – be
active in the eelgrass industry. For this reason, ‘the poor fishermen, to eke
out a living – a living that is getting increasingly meagre – slight and de-
stroy their future capital’ (Verslag zeevisserijen 1880:67). The fishermen’s
impoverishment thus contributed to excessive exploitation.
The oyster tragedy was not a strictly local phenomenon. In many coastal
waters of Europe and the United States, stocks were depleted by the mid-
19th century (Berghahn and Ruth 2005). Being immobile and thriving in
shallow waters, oysters could be harvested rather easily and were particu-
larly prone to overexploitation. In addition, the supply of oysters initially
seemed inexhaustible, an image that faded swiftly when the crisis per-
sisted. With the rising consumer demand and the concomitant intensified
commercial exploitation of the species, the ingredients for covetous antics
would seem to have been present. This view resonates in a state report
deeming oystermen ‘not in the least the sort of persons to be able to act
with judgment in the exploitation of the fisheries; their short-sightedness,
their greed, and also their lack of funds, make them care only for the mo-
ment and not for the future’ (Verslag zeevisserijen 1863:24). In the Nether-
lands, the stereotype of the selfish fisherman who passes on the costs of
his behaviour to nature and the collective of users was conventional wis-
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dom early on. In the Texel case, however, the decline of oyster fishing can-
not be attributed to the fishermen’s conduct alone. Coastal engineering,
ecological changes, development of infrastructure and transportation were
also important. The report rightly points to the fishermen’s lack of funds.
To make a living, they simply had to catch as great a share as possible from
the declining stocks. This mode of behaviour had little to do with an innate
rapacious mentality, but everything to do with the fact that the fishermen’s
economic existence was endangered. Debts to shopkeepers and suppliers
had to be discharged and the costs of living had to be met. The fishermen’s
short-term interests did indeed prevail, not because they were purblind
and greedy per se, but because other options were as yet lacking. As we
shall see, however, many turned away from oyster fishing. In addition, ef-
forts were made to counter the oyster crisis by changing the mode of ex-
ploitation.
Copying the example of French oyster planters, attempts were made to
farm oysters on leased plots near the islands of Texel and Wieringen. The
Board of Sea Fisheries (Collegie voor de Zeevisscherijen) took the initiative in
1859, and later three private individuals hailing from Amsterdam followed
suit. This form of oyster farming differed from the Texel system of quasi-
cultivation in that the lessees tried to catch oyster spat using ‘collectors’
(usually shells) to which the spat could attach and grow, whereas pre-
viously the Texelians had only gathered or fished young bivalves and re-
planted them on plots they had staked out. A few Texel oyster traders per-
ceived advantages in oyster farming, but they never were very successful.
The oyster farming experiments failed signally for several reasons. Severe
winters, storms and deteriorated ecological conditions caused poor results,
and on top of that, oysters were frequently stolen from the plots because
there was insufficient policing. Most Texel fishermen deemed privatization
unattractive and despite their frequently destitute situation, they remained
opposed to government intervention. When the Board of Sea Fisheries
asked their opinion about oyster farming, they replied: ‘The Texel oyster-
men are very satisfied with the destiny that is afforded them by nature, and
they also think that nobody is powerful enough to lay down the law for
nature in this respect.’8 In their Protestant worldview, they perceived na-
ture as a God-given entity in which earthlings should not intervene except
through investing labour. The Oosterend fishermen embraced the Protes-
tant ethic of working hard and living frugally – or what Max Weber (1969
[1920]) dubbed innerweltliche Askese (this-worldly asceticism). In a cascade
of petitions and letters, they depicted themselves as belonging to the ‘hum-
ble but industrious lower classes’, as diligent folk who were always looking
for ways to make a living. They perceived nature as an entity that was there
to be exploited. Whosoever would be successful in his earthly work would
also be rewarded in the hereafter. This disposition implied that the fisher-
men could hardly be considered stewards of the marine commons. How-
ever, as we shall see below, they used several adaptive strategies that –
albeit unintentionally – prevented complete exhaustion of a single species.
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By 1880, the Board of Sea Fisheries insisted on government intervention
in the inshore fisheries, to wit regulations concerning seasons and meth-
ods of fishing, and the enforcement of these measures. It regarded poli-
cing necessary,
because due to practices existing since time immemorial, the Zuider Sea
fisherman has become used to the idea that everything he finds in the sea
is his property. Therefore, it will demand a profound effort to dissuade him
from this view, and this task will surely be accomplished only slowly (Ver-
slag zeevisserijen 1880:67).
A legal season was introduced in 1884; oyster fishing was prohibited from
April until October. Gradually, it dawned upon Texel fishermen – who be-
gan to complain louder and louder about the oyster stocks’ deterioration –
that the government should indeed regulate the fishery. However, their
attitude towards state intervention continued to be ambivalent. They some-
times urged the state to open the legal season earlier, while at other times
they wanted tighter surveillance to enforce the rules. In hindsight, the state
regretted its earlier policy of non-intervention in the fisheries:
The government, which supposed wisdom where it was in fact lacking, left
the care for the prosperity of this fishery in the fishermen’s hands. The
disastrous consequences of this policy were imminent. It is easy to fish in
most gullies, and thus fishing could be continued until the oysters were
completely, or almost completely, extinct (Verslag zeevisserijen 1893:114-
115).
The measures taken in the early 1880s proved to be too little, too late. The
state was obliged to look assiduously for other solutions.
The idea that the productivity of tenure-based oyster farming could ex-
ceed that of unrestricted common pool resource exploitation gradually
gained acceptance. The state fishery advisor, biologist P.P.C. Hoek, main-
tained that owners would take better care of their resources than com-
moners (1878:390 391). In the southern province of Zeeland, the introduc-
tion of oyster farming as of 1870 was – at least initially – hugely successful
(see van Ginkel 1989). Some of the Texel oyster traders who had previously
attempted to farm oysters near the island were among the pioneers.
Although their efforts had not been particularly fruitful, they had re-
mained convinced of the privatized system’s advantages. They had there-
fore migrated to Zeeland, where ecological conditions were much better.
The Zeeland successes led to renewed efforts to stimulate oyster farming
near Texel. In 1884, the state expropriated oyster grounds to the island’s
south and introduced a lease by public auction. Texel fishermen vehe-
mently opposed the enclosure of the commons for fear of being ousted
from business. They favoured what they termed ‘free labour’. The Board
of Sea Fisheries supported them, in part at least. It was not so much op-
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posed to the lease system as such, but to the system of auctioning the
rights to the highest bidders. It preferred a system in which the fishermen
themselves would gain control over the plots as lessees without having to
pay huge rents. The Board deemed it unacceptable that only a few wealthy
leaseholders would gain access and that the less affluent fishermen would
be excluded from entry. It also feared opposition from the fisherfolk. The
Secretary of the Treasury, who had jurisdiction over the public waters, ig-
nored the Board’s advice, probably because the system it proposed would
not line the state’s coffers. The state perceived the lease system as in its
‘rational’ economic interest, granting many opportunities to the forces of
capital to capture the commons. The fears of fishermen and the Board of
Sea Fisheries proved to be right. Nearly all the lessees were successful and
wealthy Zeeland oyster planters and shippers. They could easily afford to
outbid the islanders. Obviously, the political process of defining and enfor-
cing property rights was socially divisive because of its distributional im-
plications (Libecap 1989:4; van Ginkel 1989; McCay 1998). Capitalist en-
trepreneurs from without became the captors of the locations that had
until the lease system’s introduction been a communal good.
Nevertheless, oyster farming near Texel never really took off. Within two
years after the introduction of the lease by public auction, most Zeeland
lessees had given up their attempts to farm oysters in the Zuider Sea. The
sums of money offered for the lease of a plot fell dramatically. What seems
to have caused this failure is an irreversible ecological deterioration due to
changing currents and water temperatures, reclamations and silting up of
some locations that had also hampered oyster fishing. In addition, the
leaseholders did not give sufficient care to the plots, and policing and
supervision were inadequate, so that poaching and theft were rife. The
severe winter of 1890-91, which also caused serious problems in Zeeland,
dealt a deathblow to oyster cultivation. This gave rise to fishermen’s at-
tempts to reclaim the commons. In 1893, for example, Texelians sent a
petition to the government in which they stated that the lease ‘is very da-
maging to the free pursuit of various fisheries, and does not appear to be
profitable to the lessees’ (Texelsche Courant, 26 March 1893). Under
mounting pressure from Texel fishermen and their compatriots from
neighbouring islands and communities, the privatized plots were returned
to the public domain two years later. Consequently, several fishermen were
able to earn a meagre living for a few weeks after the opening of the legal
oyster season. Oystering never regained its prominent place in the local
economy. Once constituting the ‘gold from the water’, the bivalves increas-
ingly turned into a by-catch in whelk fishing, particularly following an oy-
ster disease in the early 1920s. A dwindling number of fishermen contin-
ued to dredge oysters, until after the building of a dam in the Zuider Sea in
the early 1930s they disappeared completely (see Chapter 3). By then, most
Texelians had long since converted to other fisheries.
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Eelgrass Mowers, Monopoly and Machinations
Initially, harvesting eelgrass (Zostera marina) in the summer and autumn
seemed to offer a supplement to the dwindling importance of oyster fish-
ing in the 1840s. Combining both meant that the Texel fishermen could
augment their declining incomes from oyster dredging. In contrast to oy-
ster fishing, which constituted an example of common pool resource use
in which the state only intervened through input measures and a tempo-
rary enclosure after an irreversible deterioration part of the eelgrass indus-
try was regulated and privatized early on. This intervention had nothing to
do with overexploitation (as in the case of oyster fishing), but was closely
linked to an attempt to arrive at the control of market forces. Like the ex-
ploitation and appropriation of natural resources, production for the mar-
ket brought about a number of uncertainties that could potentially be
checked through limited access and limited production schemes.
For centuries, eelgrass had been used in the construction and mainte-
nance of dykes, as roofing material, and to stop leaks in vessels. It
abounded in the shallows around the island of Wieringen and south of the
Wadden Islands, where tidal currents were weak. Texelians were involved
in its exploitation to only a small extent. Demand dwindled in the second
half of the 18th century, when stones and clay replaced eelgrass as building
materials for dykes, but in the early part of the 19th century it regained
some economic importance as packing and insulating material, as stuffing
for mattresses and chair seats, and as fertilizer. Eelgrass began growing in
April and ‘ripened’ in August or September, which meant that it broke
loose from its roots and stem and started to float. Texelians and their
southern neighbours from Wieringen gathered the washed-up or floating
eelgrass using rakes, hooks and nets. As long as it was not harvested with
its roots, this salt-water vegetation would grow again the next season. An
improvement was the introduction of eelgrass mowing in the 1830s, which
enabled harvesting a better quality. From June to September, the islanders
used scythes to cut off the eelgrass when the receding tide left the flats
near to exposed. The eelgrass was brought ashore, put in fresh ditch-water
for some time to get rid of the salt and then spread out on the side of the
ditches to dry. When dry, the eelgrass was transported to sheds, where it
was pressed into bales and prepared for marketing.
It was the mayor of Wieringen, Jacobus van Hengel, who played an im-
portant role in this development. He also contracted some skippers to
transport the eelgrass to Amsterdam and Rotterdam, where dealers bought
the dried material for fixed prices. Increased competition soon led to a
flooding of the market and a concomitant fall in prices. In years of abun-
dant harvests, the market was soon saturated. The excess stocks could be
stored and preserved for several years, but this meant that the traders
needed little if any new supplies in the next year(s). In the early 1840s,
about 80,000 kilos of dried eelgrass were annually shipped from Wierin-
gen, while Texel’s market share was probably less, though attempts were
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made to expand marketing opportunities. To keep the increasingly impo-
verished Wieringers at work and away from the poor-relief funds, van
Hengel successfully requested the government to grant the municipality a
concession on the eelgrass fields. As of January 1845, the mayor privately
leased the exploitation rights of a number of eelgrass fields. He aimed to
gain control over production to adapt it to the inelastic demand, expand the
market, guarantee the quality, and maintain a fixed price of six guilders per
bale of a hundred kilo of dried eelgrass. He licensed Wieringers to mow
eelgrass, stipulating that they pay a small charge per bale so that he could
settle the lease fee. He further demanded that the islanders sold the eel-
grass to the skippers who had a monopoly on the trade of eelgrass mown
on the leased beds. Policing aimed to prevent unlicensed mowers from
cutting eelgrass on the leased grounds.
When later that year Texelians were mowing eelgrass near their island,
some Wieringers summoned them to cease doing so, since they believed
that only they held licenses to do so. The Texelians thought that they had
‘equal rights’ and demanded similar permits from the provincial governor.
The governor turned to the mayor of Texel, Pieter Keijser, for advice, and
the latter wrote to him saying that he did not support his fellow islanders
and that he acknowledged the concession given to his Wieringen counter-
part. At the same time, he requested the governor not to renew the lease
term, since he was an advocate of free exploitation. However, the Wierin-
gers incorrectly regarded themselves concessionaries of all eelgrass
grounds. Access to several locations was still open, and this proved to be
the Wieringen consortium’s weak point, since it did not in fact have a
monopoly after all. Moreover, the trade in gathered eelgrass was still free,
and Texel fishermen tried to lease some eelgrass fields. They had noticed
that the Wieringen system of exploitation and trade was advantageous.
Though their attempt failed, they could still mow eelgrass in the public
domain, and they voluntarily arranged a deal with two Texel traders who
were prepared to also pay them six guilders per bale and give them cash
advances if the fishermen delivered exclusively to them. These two traders
then consulted their Wieringen competitors to prevent the market from
being flooded; they concentrated on different areas of distribution. Under
this management arrangement, the poor fishermen-cum-eelgrass mowers
were integrated into a capitalistic mode of production and lost a great deal
of their independence.
When the first lease term was about to expire, van Hengel requested a
renewal, this time supported by Keijser, who had meanwhile become an
advocate of privatization. Keijser thought that price fixing could continue,
as he deemed it necessary for the Texel fishermen to earn a living. He
feared that if prices fell, given the prevailing crisis in oyster fishing, they
would abandon fishing altogether, and many would have to apply for poor-
relief funds. Both mayors agreed that the eelgrass beds near Texel had to
be leased to Texelians and those in the environs of Wieringen to Wierin-
gers to preclude ‘envious people’ from becoming involved in the eelgrass
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trade. The state and the provincial administration heeded their advice and
as of 1850, the privately leased rights to mow eelgrass were assigned to
four Wieringen skippers and three Texel oystermen – Gerrit Vlaming,
Hendrik Timmer and Pieter Wuis – for six years. The lessees had to give
concessions to those wishing to mow eelgrass on the leased grounds in
exchange for a small remuneration, earmarked to settle the lease sum.
The Texel eelgrass mowers followed the Wieringen model and entered
into a voluntary contract with the lessees. They had to deliver all the eel-
grass they mowed and dried to the lessees, who would pay them a fixed
price and buy all the eelgrass before the beginning of the new season.
Unexpectedly, the mowers supplied such large quantities that the deal-
ers could not entirely sell their stocks. This was also a consequence of the
fixed prices, which – given the small demand – made the eelgrass too ex-
pensive on the market. Therefore, the traders only bought dried eelgrass in
small batches, leaving the mowers with the lion’s share of the harvest.
Although they occasionally received small advances from the lessees,
mostly in the form of groceries, cash earnings lagged behind. They badly
needed the money, but their contract with the lessees prevented them from
selling to others at lower prices. When the new season’s eelgrass could be
harvested, the mowers still had a large supply from the previous year. Feel-
ing that the dealers had not kept their word of buying all the eelgrass, they
finally decided to breach the contract and sell their eelgrass at lower prices
to traders who were not involved in the Wieringen–Texel lease arrange-
ment. This behaviour not only outraged the Texel lessees, but also went
against the grain of the Wieringers, who apprehended that they would be
unable to sell their eelgrass. As a consequence, van Hengel decided to in-
troduce free trade for a few weeks. His plan was to saturate the market,
resulting in a fifty per cent drop of prices in 1851. He wanted to make it
perfectly clear that market regulation was necessary, since unbridled com-
petition would inexorably lead to overproduction. He was convinced that
his Texel neighbours would now understand the importance of concerted
action. They did indeed, since the proceeds of the 1851 harvest were negli-
gible.
This state of affairs dealt a serious blow to the Texel eelgrass industry,
which was further undermined by mutual competition, conflicts and jea-
lousy. The three Texel lessees attempted to prevent persons who were not
supplying eelgrass to them from exploiting ‘their’ eelgrass beds. However,
some Texelians entered the leased beds without permission, and sold the
eelgrass to other merchants. They were caught and fined, but this in-
furiated scores of islanders. Although the state had leased the eelgrass
beds to the trio, it was understood that all Texel fishermen would have the
right of access and exploitation. The three lessees requested several times
to be exempted from the obligation to permit entry to those who asked
access for a small charge, while several mowers demanded the state to
undo the lease contract with the lessees. Keijser advised the state to ignore
both requests. He merely pointed out that the contract was meant to en-
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sure the Texel eelgrass mowers’ rights so that they would not suffer from
any possible arbitrariness of and exclusion by the lessees. Although the
mowers remained dissatisfied, most of them renewed their agreement
with the lessees and accepted a new price of five guilders per bale.
Some mowers did not want to commit themselves, opted for free trade,
and supplied the eelgrass to merchants who paid slightly more. This lack
of unity was furthered by the fishermen’s ambivalent attitude: one mo-
ment, they were strongly in favour of a monopolistic organization; another
moment, they vigorously supported free trade. In this regard, mayor Keij-
ser spoke of ‘the incomprehensible contradictions and sudden changes in
the way of thinking’ of the fishermen, who would ‘pray and beg in the
deepest of plaintive tones to repeal the lease contract’ one day, and then
argue for its renewal the next.9 This opportunism was inextricably con-
nected with the trade cycles in the eelgrass industry. If demand was high,
the mowers only perceived advantages in fixed prices, whereas if trade was
slow and stocks piled up, they preferred lower prices so that they would at
least have some income. Thus, short-term interests prevailed. The mowers
had little choice. They belonged to the ‘poor class’ and in the summer had
few alternatives to eelgrass harvesting. In 1854, for example, 140 Ooster-
end fishermen with seventy vessels and eighteen Oudeschild men with
nine boats participated in the mowing, transportation and drying of eel-
grass. The eelgrass industry provided an important source of income for
the fishermen in their precarious métier. If they experienced their agree-
ments with the lessees as too restrictive, they opted for freedom so that
they could at least earn some money. At times, this worked well, but when
remunerations tumbled, partly because of their behaviour, they were quick
to turn to the lessees again.
Nevertheless, the lessees became fed up with the mowers’ volatile beha-
viour. They repeatedly tried to evade the rule of having to permit access to
whoever chose to mow eelgrass. Two Texel merchants, Dalmeijer and
Voigt, protested the lessees’ wheeling and dealing. In July 1855, they in-
formed the local administration that the lessees misused their position by
demanding that the mowers should exclusively deliver to them. Dalmeijer
and Voigt wished to buy more eelgrass, but could not because of the
mowers’ contract with the lessees. They asked the local administration
and the Minister of Finance to repeal the contract, since in their opinion it
had been wrested from the mowers. Their request stemmed from inter-
ested motives. Upon its rejection, they offered a higher lease sum but de-
manded expunction of the rule to permit access to the mowers for a small
charge. Other merchants who were not lessees argued in favour of a lease
by public bidding. They maintained that a private lease hindered fair com-
petition, impaired state income, and led to a truck system and other usur-
ious practices. These renewed frictions were linked to the lease term’s ex-
piration. Local and state administrations consulted each other as to the
future arrangement. Texel’s mayor stated that the Texel eelgrass mowers
were dissatisfied with the monopolistic system, but even more so with
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free trade. Therefore, they had aligned again with the lessees. Wieringen’s
mayor was a proponent of the status quo, and the state deemed a return to
free exploitation and trade undesirable because it would be prejudicial to
the mowers’ interests. They perceived them as poor fishermen who in or-
der to survive needed to sell their harvest for almost any price. Competi-
tion would be unbridled and to the fishermen’s detriment. Therefore, it
was decided in 1856 to renew the lease contract with the same Wieringen
and Texel lessees for another six-year term. Again, this led to myriad peti-
tions for and especially against the lease system. Nonetheless, the efforts of
Wieringen’s mayor brought about a more or less regulated production, ex-
pansion of markets and stability of prices.
Despite recurring discontent, the eelgrass industry was an important
link in Texel’s fisheries cycle. The fishermen badly needed the money
earned in eelgrass harvesting to tide over the winter season when storms
and ice-drift often impeded sailing. Moreover, the eelgrass served as a
security for buying goods and groceries on tick. In this era, the lessees
imposed quotas on the mowers’ eelgrass landings. Each mower was al-
lowed to land approximately 400 kilos per month. With the extant prices,
this meant that during the eelgrass-harvesting season the mowers earned
twenty-four guilders per month. The gathering of floating and washed-up
eelgrass also continued to be important. Scores of Texelians earned a small
income exploiting it, even though its quality was poorer and its price less
than half that of mown eelgrass. Access was free and huge harvests could
compensate for low prices. Since the eelgrass began to wash up after the
mowing season, many fishermen participated in both modes of exploita-
tion. By the end of the 1850s, they could earn a maximum of 300 guilders
per person with eelgrass mowing and gathering. They nevertheless re-
mained discontented and whenever fishing was more lucrative, many re-
frained altogether from the arduous work of the eelgrass harvest.
Repeatedly, mowers and merchants submitted petitions to alter the
monopolistic system of organization. Shortly before the lease term ex-
pired, the state consulted provincial and local administrations about the
lease system’s renewal. It was decided to introduce a lease by public bid-
ding. This would line the state’s coffers and give interested parties an op-
portunity to become lessees. The first lease by public bidding was held in
1861. The eelgrass fields had been divided into three large plots, so that
only a few persons or associations could become lessees. Wieringen’s
mayor and his partners succeeded in leasing the two largest plots, while
the wealthy Oosterend oyster trader Gerrit Vlaming rented the remaining
plot. The total annual lease sums amounted to 4,000 guilders. Soon the
disadvantages for the mowers became clear. Almost immediately, they re-
ceived fifty cents less per bale than previously. The lessees needed higher
margins to pay the lease fee. However, the mowers were allowed to supply
more, so that their income was levelled. Nevertheless, they had become
more dependent upon the lessees, who now decided who would gain or be
denied access to the eelgrass grounds. The lessees still needed the mowers’
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labour, so that they were interdependent, but the power balance was
skewed. The lessees’ dominance implied a further corrosion of the fisher-
men’s independence. The small entrepreneurs were forced into a tempo-
rary role as wage labourers and the capitalistic relations of production
brought about class antagonisms.
Again, the Texel fishermen – whose financial position deteriorated – de-
sired a return to free access. In 1863 they argued that the public lease was
incompatible with their interests, because they could not mow as much
eelgrass as they liked, some were excluded from entry, and the prices had
fallen. They also criticized the fact that the eelgrass was not shipped imme-
diately and that they did not receive payment upon delivery. They sus-
pected that the lessees wanted to encourage a truck system. Some lease-
holders were shopkeepers and the mowers could buy their groceries in
their stores on credit, albeit more expensively than in others. For these
reasons, the mowers requested nullification of the lease contract. The op-
position to the public lease was primarily a resistance against the altered
power relations, which gave the fishermen the feeling that they were en-
slaved. They formed an interest coalition that had, however, little other
power means than the relatively weak weapon of petitioning. Despite the
torrent of requests to return to freedom in eelgrass mowing, the Minister
of Finance decided to continue public leasing. With growing competition
to become a leaseholder and concomitant outbidding, the lease fees rose.
The Texel and Wieringen municipal councils had anticipated this and filed
a joint protest. They stated that they preferred free access in eelgrass mow-
ing to a public lease, taking for granted intensified competition and lower
prices. The mowers would ‘most certainly experience more benefits than
under continued public leasing with its inflation of the lease fee. Under no
condition will they then be forced to accept the lowest wages from a lessee
who has to pay a high lease fee or find himself excluded’.10 Their request
was to no avail.
The Texel entrepreneur Pieter Koning and two outside business associ-
ates leased two plots. Oosterend oyster and eelgrass trader Gerrit Vlaming
and a Wieringer leased the other plot. The new lessees had to count in the
risen fees, but the market price of eelgrass could not be raised, since
French eelgrass and alternative products such as wood-wool, moss and ka-
pok had saturated the market. Moreover, during the last year of its lease,
the Wieringen combination had built up huge stocks and tried to compete
with the new lessees, a strategy that would also be used later on. The result
was that in 1868 almost 900,000 kilos of eelgrass were marketed, while
the extra costs of the lease fee were passed on to the mowers. They only
received four instead of five or six guilders per bale. In the late 1860s,
Texel fishermen rarely earned more than ten guilders per week with the
mowing of eelgrass, while the truck system was maintained; they had to
buy Koning’s goods and groceries.
Following continual complaints, a government committee that had to
investigate the lease system’s pros and cons was inaugurated in 1869. It
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concluded: ‘The problem with both the private and the public lease is that
it delivers the eelgrass mower to the lessees’ arbitrariness. The lessee de-
termines how many bales the mower can harvest and fixes the wage. The
eelgrass mower is powerless and cannot resist the decisions of his princi-
pal’ (Anonymous 1870:227). In the mowers’ interest, the committee
deemed it unwise to continue the public lease system. Should the govern-
ment decide to continue with it despite their opinion, it was advisable to
lease smaller plots so that competition would be enhanced. Another option
was to let the municipalities regulate and supervise the eelgrass fields’ ex-
ploitation to prevent overproduction. For a small charge, they could hand
out permits to the mowers who would be free to deliver to a dealer of their
choice. The committee considered this important because in that way ‘the
local eelgrass mowers will find work and will not have to be supported by
poor-relief funds’ (ibid.:229). The state opted for the eelgrass fields’ divi-
sion into smaller plots but continued the public lease system for the higher
state revenues.
The next public lease of fourteen plots in May 1871 yielded a total lease
fee of 30,000 guilders. The prices for the mowers were maintained at the
level of four guilders per bale. For some time, the industry prospered, har-
vests were good and at least the merchants benefited. This was partly due
to an expansion of the market through improved communication and
transportation. However, in 1873 the harvest was small and the mowing
wages weighed heavily upon the lessees’ exploitation bill, while trade
prices had decreased. For this reason, the lessees – who had gained the
rights of exploitation for the duration of twelve years – could not pay the
lease fee and terminated the lease contract (which was possible after three
years). In 1874 and 1877 new public leases followed, resulting in an annual
lease fee of 18,610 guilders. AWieringen man leased most of the plots. He
raised the mowing wages but often deducted money for alleged poor qual-
ity of the eelgrass. Therefore, he often paid less than his predecessors.
There were also other ways to pass on the trade’s risks to the mowers.
Koning, who still leased some small plots, invited Texel eelgrass mowers
to mention the wage they were willing to work for. Although it would be to
their advantage to bargain collectively, they were hopelessly divided and
Koning benefited. By the end of the 1870s, the eelgrass industry had lost
its attraction for many fishermen. Scores of Oosterenders turned to North
Sea fishing in the summer. It was one of the few alternatives in this sea-
son. However, Oudeschilders were financially less strong and could not
afford to buy seaworthy boats. To eke out a living, they had to continue
working in the eelgrass industry.
In 1882, a new public lease was imminent. Koning sent a petition to the
Minister of Finance, pointing out that a coalition of lessees had been
formed that would keep wages low, while cashing considerable profits. He
thought it more correct that these advantages should be passed on to the
mowers, which was possible if the Minister granted permits to the fisher-
men for a small charge. The fishermen themselves also demanded ‘free
72 Braving Troubled Waters
labour and free trade’.11 Texel’s municipal council supported Koning and
the eelgrass workers and deemed it pernicious that one lessee should have
a monopoly. Again, the request was ignored. At the next public lease, the
bids almost doubled; one lessee even paid a fee of 31,000 guilders. How-
ever, he soon had to terminate the contract, and subsequent leases yielded
considerably smaller lease fees. The demand for eelgrass had decreased
dramatically and competition was fierce. Repeatedly, the costs were passed
on to the mowers, who took the brunt of the industry’s crisis. Not only did
they have to accept lower prices for the eelgrass they supplied, they also
had to pay for transport, the rent of ditches, and the storing and pressing
of eelgrass. Although the amounts of money for these services were fairly
small, they could not really be missed. Small wonder, then, that the enthu-
siasm for participation in eelgrass mowing continued to dwindle in the
second part of the 1880s. In 1886, for instance, only thirty Texel boats
(mostly from Oudeschild) were involved in the work. The mowers landed
so much eelgrass that the sheds were still stocked in the next two seasons
and the lessees did not need new supplies. The price of eelgrass declined
so sharply that the exploitation costs were hardly covered. The Texel fisher-
men, especially those whose vessels were unfit to be used for North Sea
fishing, again experienced the lease system’s disadvantages and begged
the appropriate state institutions to end the lease system. As of the first
private lease they and their Wieringen colleagues had regularly com-
plained about the low wages and wage cuts, the small advances upon deliv-
ery, and the late final account, their dependency on the lessee and the truck
system. The fishermen, who despite their ambivalent attitude in this res-
pect valued economic liberty, often experienced the interdependency be-
tween themselves and the lessees as a burden. Nonetheless, they contin-
ued to be opportunists.
Following the crisis in the eelgrass industry, the municipal council of
Wieringen began to urge the Minister of Finance to withdraw public leas-
ing. Its aim was to regain control of eelgrass exploitation, so that it could
once again act as buyer and trader. The mayor wrote to the Minister: ‘Pub-
lic leasing is an immoral system based on extortion, swindle and theft vis-
à-vis the mowers’ (quoted in Hoekstra 1939:VI-17/18). These complaints
and the diminishing lease fees led to the Minister’s proposal in 1895 that
municipalities should lease the eelgrass beds privately. Texel refrained
from doing so, but Wieringen grasped the opportunity with both hands,
leased the eelgrass beds and established the Gemeentelijke Zeegras-Exploita-
tie (Municipal Eelgrass Exploitation), a not-for-profit enterprise. Hence-
forth, the Wieringen administration distributed the concessions to mow
eelgrass. It also determined the maximum quantity that could be har-
vested. Partly because of limited production, the season was shortened
from June to mid-July. The Minister demanded that the mowers earn a
fixed price per bale, part of which had to be paid in cash upon delivery and
the remainder within a set term. A municipal inspector supervised the
quality, and if it did not meet the standards, the price could be decreased.
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The mowers were de facto on the payroll of Wieringen municipality. It
supplied some large dealers who paid predetermined prices. These dealers
often bought large quantities in years when prices were low and speculated
that they would benefit if market prices rose. However, if they thought the
prices set by the Municipal Eelgrass Exploitation were too high, they
bought only a little, leaving Wieringen stuck with huge stocks.
It was not to the Texelians’ liking that Wieringen had gained almost
complete control of the eelgrass industry. They insisted on a lease by pub-
lic bidding and did so not because they were in favour of such a lease
system, but because it appeared to be the only way to improve access to
the industry. Texel’s mayor met with the Oudeschild eelgrass workers,
who told him that Wieringen preferred to hand out mowing concessions
to its own fishermen. The mayor judged the situation no better than be-
fore. Changing his mind, he tried to lease eelgrass fields in Texel’s vicinity.
The Minister was susceptible to his arguments and publicly leased some
extra eelgrass plots. Still, the municipality of Wieringen, eager to maintain
its monopoly, turned out to be the highest bidder and acquired the exploi-
tation rights. Henceforth, it even succeeded in leasing these beds privately,
so that it could set the amounts that could be mown in order to prevent
overproduction. This went against the grain of Texel’s eelgrass mowers,
who had to ask for permits through the local agent of Wieringen’s munici-
pal eelgrass enterprise, Albert Dros, a dealer in washed-up eelgrass, shells
and cockles. Dros was an important Texel merchant and like so many
others before him, he also used the truck system. Fewer and fewer Texe-
lians applied for permits, the reason also being that the Wieringen enter-
prise only paid a small amount upon delivery, settling the final accounts
the following summer. Many could not wait that long for their money and
gave up eelgrass mowing. In most years between 1895 and 1915, no more
than twenty Texelians worked in the eelgrass industry.
The Texel fishermen’s struggle to ameliorate their destitute situation
continued. Occasionally, they obtained minor successes as when they were
allowed to mow more bales of eelgrass and the state reduced the lease fees,
but wages remained low and final accounts came irregularly and usually
were long overdue. Whenever there was a surplus stock, they could supply
less and when all costs were subtracted, their net incomes were very small
indeed. They repeatedly requested the local and state governments to come
up with solutions, to no avail. When in 1912 Wieringen again leased the
eelgrass fields for a six-year term, all efforts to improve the situation
seemed wasted. The next year, the Texel and Wieringen mowers applied a
new strategy: they refused to work for the wages offered, called a strike and
under this threat the Wieringen eelgrass enterprise raised the wages from
4.50 to 5.50 guilders and in 1918 even to seven guilders per bale. The eel-
grass workers’ bargaining position had slightly improved through the es-
tablishment of associations and because some fishermen had become re-
presentatives in the municipal councils of Texel and Wieringen. Especially
in Oudeschild, where the Labour Party had recruited a large following, the
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inhabitants attempted to amend their situation through political and eco-
nomic organization. This increased leverage was of little use when the
fishermen had to cope with the consequences of geopolitical forces. Dur-
ing and after the Great War, the demand for eelgrass declined and the
industry languished. The most important markets, Belgium and France,
which used to buy three-quarters of the eelgrass harvest, could not be sup-
plied due to the hostilities. Following the war, trade limitations and unfa-
vourable exchange rates deepened the recession.
It was only in the mid-1920s that the market recovered. Subsequently,
the eelgrass mowers received a share of the profits Wieringen municipality
gained with the eelgrass trade. On Texel, eelgrass gathering had become
even more important than eelgrass mowing. The amount gathered ex-
ceeded the amount mown by approximately three to four times, but net
returns were low because prices were bad and many intermediaries were
involved in the trade of washed-up eelgrass. Nonetheless, entry was free
and gathering eelgrass enabled scores of islanders to weather the winter
season. By the end of the 1920s, the islanders earned an annual sum of
between 68,000 and 70,000 guilders on aggregate with the gathering of
eelgrass and another 10,000 to 11,000 guilders with the mowing of the
sea-plant. Besides gatherers and mowers, many others were involved in
the trade, transportation, drying and pressing of eelgrass. The exploitation
of eelgrass constituted an important link in the annual fisheries cycle. It
also provided an income during the summer for fishermen with insuffi-
cient capital to buy a seaworthy vessel. In the 1930 season, most reapers
who owned a small vessel earned fifty to eighty guilders during the eel-
grass campaign; un-propertied fishermen received slightly less. The mow-
ing wages were increased to eight guilders per bale, but soon serious prob-
lems assailed the eelgrass industry, as harvests diminished sharply.
According to biologists, a mysterious disease – the wasting disease that
struck the entire Atlantic coastal area – caused this decline. Yet fishermen
maintained that the main cause of the decline was the Closure Dam, the
construction of which was completed in 1932. Currents and salinity chan-
ged and within a few years the eelgrass vanished not only from the Zuider
Sea, but also from the waters north of the dam, currently known as the
Wadden Sea. Whatever the exact cause, the events ended the industry and
left many dependent on eelgrass harvesting in dire poverty (see Chapter 3).
Casting the Nets Far and Wide
The various management regimes in eelgrass harvesting led to recurring
resistance of eelgrass mowers against their concomitant restrictions and
the distribution of exploitation rights to private persons or corporate orga-
nizations. These regimes were not related to ecological problems but to
economic ones. The sustainable use of eelgrass would probably not have
been endangered in an unlimited entry situation, for despite growing ex-
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ploitation the quantity of eelgrass did not diminish, on the contrary, it in-
creased. In 1870, the eelgrass fields in the northern Zuider Sea measured
over sixty-five square kilometres, while half a century later this area had
more than doubled. Yet complete freedom would probably have resulted
in the fishermen not showing self-restraint in the commodity’s appropria-
tion. In a situation of unbridled competition, the market would have been
flooded, and the eelgrass workers’ remuneration would have dropped dras-
tically. It is clear that the regulations were primarily intended to control the
distributive channels through restrictions of production. In the oyster in-
dustry, by way of contrast, the privatization of plots was closely connected
to overexploitation. Despite the enclosure of some underwater grounds for
eelgrass exploitation and oyster cultivation, access to a large proportion of
waters near Texel remained free, while North Sea fishing was hardly re-
stricted at all. The fishermen thus had many opportunities to switch target
species and exploit other ecological niches.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, offshore fishing has been an important
venture on the island for centuries. Initially concentrated on the island’s
western – North Sea – coast, by the early 19th century the fishing commu-
nities were located on the eastern coast. With the demise of piloting, many
poor Oudeschild men switched to inshore fishing. Their fishing fleet com-
prised only nine vessels by 1800, but it would gradually expand. Several
inhabitants of the new village of De Cocksdorp, established in 1836, also
turned to fishing. The former initially targeted herring and later also sev-
eral other species; the latter fished cockleshells that were processed into
lime in mainland kilns. In 1839, the island’s fishing fleet boasted 111 boats;
a decade later there were 130. By this time, most fishermen combined har-
vesting oysters, eelgrass and shells to earn a living, occasionally targeting
other species depending on such factors as weather conditions, availability
of resources, equipment and market prices. For many, fishing constituted
an escape route in adverse economic times even though external author-
ities did not stimulate this development. For a long time, the state had
been favouring the large-scale offshore herring and cod fisheries, taking
protective measures to ensure that the fishing companies (rederijen) had a
monopoly on providing markets. However, the rules and regulations
turned into a straitjacket and obstructed fair competition by the petty fish-
ermen. The near-shore and inshore fisheries were pretty much ignored by
state institutions. In 1854, a government committee was installed to look
into the state of affairs in the fisheries. It concluded that the restrictions
led to unjust relationships. Three years later, a new Fisheries Order was
launched that withdrew the protective measures with regard to the large-
scale fishing industry and opted for a laissez-faire policy concerning the
petty fishing trade. The inshore fishermen would benefit considerably
from this change of affairs, as there were very few obstacles for anyone
wishing to enter the fishing industry.
The cultural ideal was self-employment and independence, to be
achieved through the ethos of entrepreneurialism, thrift and diligence.
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Many fishermen therefore wanted to own their own vessel. A considerable
investment of between 1,500 and 4,000 guilders was required for a new
boat, so the fishermen often had to rely on creditors to achieve the aim of
becoming an owner, at best giving them limited freedom. Most creditors
were suppliers of fisheries goods and services, dealers or processors. For
this reason, a truck system could easily develop, leading to higher fisher-
men expenditures. Even if fishermen redeemed their debts, they usually
felt morally obliged to continue the relationship with their former cred-
itors. Some suppliers used their position to acquire boats that were oper-
ated by a hired crew. For example, an Oudeschild sail-maker owned six
vessels. Creditors ran limited risks, as they were usually suppliers of goods
and services and knew their customers would return to them. Heavily in-
debted as they were, the fishermen generally had to match high produc-
tion with low consumption. Even second-hand vessels could often only be
acquired through loans. Being free of debt was symbolized by gilding the
masthead, a sign of pride most fishermen could not afford themselves.
Those in the best position to break free of disadvantageous ties with
moneylenders and middlemen were the fishermen operating in family
firms. Young boys not even in their teens joined their fathers aboard,
usually got paid nothing or only some spending money, received on-the-
job training and gradually learned the ropes of the occupation, in particu-
lar to grasp the clues provided by the seascape for navigation and fishing
proper. Having a son could thus save on money that otherwise had to be
spent on paying a non-related deckhand. Pooling their resources, agnatic
kinsmen were able to maintain flexibility and, with a bit of luck and ardent
labour, accumulate capital. Often, a skipper’s wife or his daughters would
also contribute money they earned to the firm. In many cases, fishermen’s
spouses for example ran a small shop, did the laundry for well-to-do fami-
lies, sewed clothes or worked as cleaning ladies. Young girls would usually
also contribute to a household’s revenues by running errands or working
as a maidservant. As family firms were units of production and units of
consumption, economizing on household expenditures was an oft-used
strategy to weather adverse times. Ideally, each son of a skipper-owner
would have his own boat, while aspiring deckhands often attempted to
become independent. Using the share system of remuneration, owners
and crewmembers alike bore the risks of production and benefited from
capital investments, making them co-adventurers with overlapping inter-
ests in keeping costs low and proceeds high. The system became wide-
spread in the last quarter of the 19th century. It was based on a division of
proceeds – after subtracting costs – between the owner and the deckhands.
A boy would begin as an apprentice ‘third man’, gaining a smaller percen-
tage than a full-blown deckhand did. Crewmembers were hired from
Christmas until Christmas the next year. The social distance between skip-
per and crew was mitigated by the fact that they were often related and
shared the risks of the trade. The emphasis was on cooperation and equal-
ity, and the skipper was a primus inter pares (Löfgren 1972:99). Moreover,
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when the fishing economy boomed, many deckhands succeeded in setting
up their own businesses.
The fishing fleet continued to expand – not just on Texel, but on the
entire Zuider Sea coast. Because of infrastructure and market develop-
ments, there was a growing demand for fish and fish products and more
opportunities for Texel fishermen to land a variety of species. Previously,
the island’s relatively remote location and the perishable nature of all fish
species proved to be an obstacle to market what was available. It is no coin-
cidence that the fishermen focused on shells and dried eelgrass, which did
not go off, and on oysters, which could be kept alive fairly easily during
market runs. As of the 1870s, Texel catches could be transported further
away by rail and by a regular steamboat connection between Harlingen
and Hull. They began supplying markets at home and in Belgium, France
and England. According to various reports in the local newspaper, the is-
land fishermen could sell whatever they caught or harvested at sea. Since
access to a large proportion of waters near Texel remained free, the island
fishermen had ample opportunities to switch target species. Actually,
many began pursuing species they had previously disregarded either be-
cause it was difficult to find market outlets, or because of the rapid dete-
rioration of fish. With faster and more regular transport and new conserva-
tion methods, these problems were overcome. For example, the boiling
and salting of shrimp and cockles was introduced on the island in the
mid-1870s. The preserved seafood was shipped mainly to England and,
after the turn of the century, to France.
In addition to oysters, eelgrass and shells, Texel fishermen began catch-
ing periwinkles, cockles, whelks and mussels, starfish, shrimp, flounder,
sole and plaice, rays, anchovy, garfish, eels and several other species of
fish. Depending on the season and the economic situation, Texel fisher-
men sailed the Zuider Sea and/or the North Sea, taking optimal advantage
of the variety of ecosystems in these marine environments and utilizing
the niches and species they deemed most profitable. A boom in coastal
fisheries characterized the period 1870-1895. Deckhands began earning
considerably more than farmhands. In Oudeschild, where until mid-cen-
tury there had only been a small fishing fleet, scores of inhabitants entered
the fishing industry and the Oosterend fleet expanded and modernized. At
the peak of the fishing fleet’s expansion in 1895, the island counted ap-
proximately 175 boats, crewed by over 500 skippers and deckhands. Along
with this development went a degree of functional differentiation. The
owner of the local shipyard, two sail-makers, a few tanners and black-
smiths, and several fish processors and traders benefited from this expan-
sion. Together, they hired scores of labourers and the fishing industry thus
provided work for many hands directly and indirectly. Near the harbour
were two warehouses for the storage of ice that was cut from canals in the
winter and several warehouses for the storage of dried eelgrass. Elsewhere
on the island, there were dozens of eelgrass storage sheds. By the mid-
1890s, Oudeschild boasted six plants where shrimps were boiled and
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salted and there was another one in De Cocksdorp that preserved cockles
in a similar way. The fishermen could still buy commodities and services
on tick with artisans and shopkeepers – some of whom were also fish deal-
ers and processors – on the understanding that they would be loyal custo-
mers in future. Occasionally, the processors would introduce quotas to bal-
ance supply with demand and keep prices at levels that made exploitation
worthwhile. However, self-restraint was usually short-lived as fishermen
from other communities also operated on the market for shrimps and
cockles, making control of supply and prices impossible as long as supra-
local agreements were lacking.
Some fishermen were part-timers, including those who beach-seined for
herring in the spring. A score used small flats (vletten), operating hoop nets
(fykes). A number of Texel fishermen specialized in mussel fishing or tem-
porarily caught mussels as a part of their annual fisheries cycle, switching
to other species when these fetched comparatively better prices. Mussel
fishing took flight between 1873 and 1890, when Texel fishermen landed
between 3.5 and 13 million kilograms of mussels annually. They exported
mussels to England, where they were used as bait in the offshore fisheries.
Although some Texelians attempted to establish market outlets for con-
sumption mussels in Belgium, they were unsuccessful as Zeelanders al-
ready operated there. After 1890, the demand for ‘bait mussels’ dimin-
ished sharply. Most Texelians gave up mussel fishing for the time being.
In addition, prices of shells fell when mechanized harvesting with steam-
powered vessels was introduced in the 1880s. The approximately sixty-five
fishermen who were involved in shell fishing could not compete with
mass production. This turning of the tides forced fishermen to diversify
even more, but most of the fishermen from De Cocksdorp, who had been
focusing on shell fishing for a long time, either opted for a job ashore or
emigrated (see below).
Texel fishermen behaved as veritable opportunists. They worked as
farmhands when fishery activities slackened, as was usually the case in
the summer. Several fishermen owned some plots of land, but farmers
never worked for fishermen. In general, occupational pluralism was parti-
cularly practised in the ranks of the poorer fishermen, who lived mainly in
Oudeschild, De Cocksdorp and the hamlet of Oost. The Oosterenders
mostly concentrated on plying the dangerous North Sea, but they, too, oc-
casionally picked up other pursuits, especially during the winter when in-
clement weather forbade offshore fishing. From figure 1 it is clear that only
flatfish fishing was feasible throughout the year, but that a rather small
number of Texel fishermen continued during the winter season. The rea-
son for this was that few vessels were fit to sail the North Sea in rough
weather. A considerable portion of this segment of the Texel fishing fleet
converted to shrimp fishing from November until March. North Sea flat-
fish fishing yielded particularly good results during the times of boom.
Weekly gross revenues of 150 to 200 guilders were not exceptional. Scores
of fishermen combined shrimp fishing with eelgrass harvesting. Others
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switched between pursuing several species over the annual cycle of fish-
ing. From April until October, several fishermen had to find temporary
employment outside the fisheries, mainly as farmhands. Seasons for
some species were rather short, for example in the herring, anchovy, eel,
garfish, and ray fisheries (see Appendix A for images of the main species
Texel fishermen landed). Herring and anchovy migrated to the Zuider Sea
in early and late spring, respectively. In some years, catches were so abun-
dant that they made for an excellent grossing that surpassed the proceeds
of all other fish the fishermen landed during the remainder of the year.
This was the case in 1890, for example, when the gross revenues during
the brief anchovy season amounted to between 1,000 and 1,700 guilders
per crew. However, rich catches did not necessarily imply good proceeds.
Looking back on his fishing career, a 73-year-old fisherman told a news
reporter in 1939: ‘I can hardly think of any other occupation that is so pre-
carious. If you had a fine catch and returned home early in a good mood,
the mood would change when you learned that others also had many fish.
For a large supply implied such low prices that you would have made even
more money with half the amount of fish landed’ (Texelsche Courant, 30
September 1939).
A short-term orientation made for flexibility with respect to deciding
which niches and species could be exploited best. Decisions on fishery
cycles and gear switching were largely made on the basis of resource avail-
ability and accessibility, fish prices, fishing knowledge and expertise, vessel
size, personal preferences, and alternative sources of income. For most,
these strategies implied success. By the end of the 19th century, Texel fish-
ermen utilized a wide spectrum of marine resources, and oysters were
caught during a short season only. More and more, the fishermen alter-
nated their catches. Thus, after a short spell of intensification, the Texel-
ians opted for diversification, a strategy fishermen elsewhere also applied
if the catches of any one species declined (McCay 1978:409ff.). The unin-
tended and unforeseen consequence of the fishermen’s adaptive strategies
was that the pressure on resources was dispersed, alleviating pressure on
any single species. Therefore, the carrying capacity of these species was
not undermined, which could have been the case if all the fishermen had
concentrated their efforts on one or only a few resources. There were brief
spells when many people focused their endeavours on a single resource
because prices were high, the catches of other species proved disappoint-
ing, or inclement weather prohibited sailing the open sea. Some migratory
species – in particular herring and anchovy – were available during a brief
season and did not always show up, and if they did, many fishermen from
around the Zuider Sea coasts competed for a share of the catch. This
would sometimes lead to crowding, especially when initially prices were
high. As the number of competitors increased, prices usually dropped and
if better proceeds could be obtained in other fisheries, many fishermen
would switch to other species. Pluri-activity had obvious merits as an effec-
tive insurance against resource decline and market fluctuations, although
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it required greater capital outlays. Their strategy of diversification required
the fishermen to have various sets of gear and to acquire the necessary
knowledge and skills to pursue specific species. In addition, it was a pre-
requisite that fishing grounds were freely accessible.
It was the fact that marine resources were held in common that en-
hanced the fishermen’s versatility and shock-absorbing capacity. However,
multiple use of the inshore zone could lead to gear conflicts between var-
ious groups of fishermen using the same locations. For example, applying
mobile gear such as trawls or dredge nets was incompatible with using
stationary gear such as hoop nets, set nets or fish traps. A limiting factor
on gear and niche switching were the claims some fishermen made on
exclusive entry and use of certain locations, especially if they used fixed
gear. Initially this was done on a first-come, first-serve basis, but as of
1907 the Fisheries Inspection handed out permits. In addition, leased
beds for shellfish cultivation were inaccessible for non-lessees. Disputes
over space were usually zero-sum games in which there were winners and
losers. As we have seen, Texel fishermen generally opposed the enclosure
of the commons. Even in circumstances where natural resources are not
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Figure 1. Seasonal cycle of the Texel fisheries, ca. 1890. The vertical axis represents the
number of vessels in specific fisheries. The arrows indicate species switching and seasonal
exit or entry. From April until October several boats were idle as fishermen preferred tak-
ing on seasonal land-based work. Flatfish include sole, plaice, flounder, turbot, brills and
dab. Shellfish include oysters, mussels, cockles, periwinkles, whelks and (from April until
October) shells. The category ‘Other’ includes rays, garfish, eel and starfish.
the de jure property of anyone, there may be rules regarding access to and
use and control of these resources. These claims can turn into regimes of
appropriation and control. Yet rules and practice are not always in accor-
dance with each other, exclusion of outsiders may constitute a problem,
and under certain conditions the pressure on natural resources may in-
crease strongly. Repeatedly, the ambivalent attitude of Texel fishermen to-
wards territoriality was a problem, as there were competing rights and
claims to legitimate use. Although they claimed the exclusive use of certain
fishing grounds, they rarely acknowledged the rights of others who
claimed fishing grounds elsewhere. This phenomenon, widespread all
across the globe, is known as the ‘tragedy of incursion’ (McCay and Ache-
son 1987a). More importantly, territoriality should not be seen as a form of
resource management. Rather, it is based on the motive of privileged
space. Exclusion of outsiders is highly problematic; whereas some individ-
uals or groupings abide by customary practices, others may not. In this
respect, the fishermen did indeed consider the marine domain a com-
mons they could freely exploit. Although some fishermen were sometimes
able to exercise informal use rights, entry into the fishing industry was
relatively easy. This freedom also had a darker side, in that competition
was fierce and on occasion, the fishermen themselves called for measures
restricting their liberty.
Reluctant Competition, Ambiguous Cooperation
Partly on the insistence of fishermen, and partly because of the onset of
biological investigations of fisheries, the state increasingly intervened in
the fisheries as of the late 19th century. Through the establishment of or-
ganizations, fishermen attempted to achieve political participation, gain
leverage and increase their bargaining power. They frequently resorted to
informal contracting and institutionalized solidarity to mitigate open-ac-
cess conditions. However, diverging interests of specific categories of fish-
ermen led to disagreements on the kinds of measures to be taken and,
generally speaking, their attitude towards state intervention was ambiva-
lent. With a keen eye for the fishing industry’s sociological dimensions,
the fisheries biologist Hoek pointed out ‘how much the social position of
fishermen differs internally and how difficult it is to bring about coopera-
tion in such diverging social units’ (1902:115). A rift existed between small-
scale fishermen and capitalist boat owners, lessees of fishing grounds and
adherents of mare liberum, and between producers and dealers, because
each of these categories cherished its own wishes and posed its own de-
mands. These remarks regarding the diverging interests in the Dutch fish-
ing industry are apt and also apply to the Texel situation. If they perceived
advantages, Texel fishermen favoured regulation and urged the state to in-
tervene, but as soon as they saw disadvantages, they vehemently opposed it
and demanded the withdrawal of regulatory regimes. Sometimes, they
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asked for shorter seasons to protect immature fish and shellfish, but when
the fisheries were struck by crisis, they often opted for an extension of the
season. There was also ambivalence concerning gear, mesh and fish-size
regulations. Fishermen would demand tight enforcement at one moment
and at the next call for more lenient restrictions. In addition, the fisher-
men protested against the part-enclosure of the marine commons when
the state leased privatized oyster beds and eelgrass plots to the highest
bidders at public auctions. For instance, a Texel Fishermen’s Union was
established in 1887 whose chief purpose was to seek abolishment of priva-
tization. The Texelians rhetorically contended that the seas around their
island had always been ‘free’, but the fact that they had claimed and gained
communal territorial use rights in oyster fishing and eelgrass harvesting
in an earlier stage contradicts this viewpoint.
In the late 19th century, there were several attempts to arrive at a na-
tional organization of fishermen, usually as a federation of local associa-
tions. However, because of the lack of concerted action ‘the fishermen’s
organizations attained hardly anything’ (Bossaers 1987:210). The efforts
failed repeatedly, as local branches of a national fishermen’s association
were converted into local organizations that steered their own courses. It
was much easier to identify with community members than with outsi-
ders. Even Oudeschild and Oosterend fishermen predominantly clung to
their own organizations (see below). If cooperation at the island level was
difficult, this applied even more to solidarity with colleagues from outside,
which was usually short-lived. The switching of allegiance in part explains
the frequent rise and fall of voluntary associations on Texel. Between 1870
and 1932, there were twenty-odd fishermen’s organizations on the island,
equally divided between both fishing communities. They ranged from gen-
eral interest organizations and mutual insurance funds, local branches of
national or sectional unions, cooperatives and trade associations to single
issue action groups. These associations, funds, unions and cooperatives
commonly had a multi-purpose character and besides short-term objec-
tives, they developed long-term strategies. They were a means of adapta-
tion to changing circumstances (Orbach 1980:55). Among many other
things, they sought state support for infrastructural and other improve-
ments, more bargaining power and leverage vis-à-vis state institutions,
fish traders and fish processors, and self-help to support fisher families in
case of mishaps and damage.
Between 1894 and 1904 alone, thirty Texel fishermen lost their life at
sea. Such tragedies were aggravated if the mortal remains could not be
recovered or identified. Apart from burial being important for religious
and ritual reasons, a wife could not claim an inheritance or remarry if her
spouse was still missing. The increasing number of accidents and deaths,
which were partly linked to the growing number of fishermen sailing the
North Sea and the share system that encouraged taking risks, led to the
foundation of a widows’ and orphans’ fund to make the victims less depen-
dent on charity. The fund, Texel’s Belang (Texel’s Interest), was established
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in 1904 and for some time united all of Texel’s fishermen but membership
fell after financial troubles and rumours about fraud, leading to internal
strife and dissension. Following the introduction of a state insurance sys-
tem, the organization stopped functioning in the early 1920s. At this stage,
Texel’s Belang was the only voluntary association that catered to the entire
occupational community of fisherfolk on the island. All other organiza-
tions functioned at the village level.
In general, the membership of local fishermen’s organizations was
large. Few stood aloof as there was strong social pressure to join and the
boards kept fees modest in order to encourage membership. Nonetheless,
sustained collective action proved to be difficult. During economic reces-
sions, many could not even afford the small fees and cancelled their mem-
bership. The associations therefore occasionally faced a free-rider problem.
Even at the local level, dissension arose easily, sometimes over minor de-
tails concerning policy or personnel. In some cases, factional strife dis-
rupted a local association, often leading to fission. Two organizations in
one village then competed for resources and members, but since the occu-
pational communities were only small, eventually one of them would per-
ish or they would reunite. Their rapid rise and decline might give the im-
pression that cooperation came about swiftly and spontaneously, dissolved
quickly, and was rekindled easily. To a certain extent, this impression is
accurate, though in many cases an existing association, union or coopera-
tive was continued under a new name, but with the same board, the same
members and more or less the same goals as its predecessor. Often little
changed in practice. At the local level, organizations brought about the so-
cial integration of the occupational community and contributed to reinfor-
cing the fishermen’s bargaining position. Through their associations, Tex-
el fishermen attempted to wield power and to defend their economic,
political and social interests with local, provincial and national govern-
ments; to gain leverage in their dealings with traders and processors, on
whom they depended for the marketing of their catch; and, more generally,
to prevent marginalization and to ameliorate their socio-economic situa-
tion.
As has been noted above, the quarter of a century after 1870 brought
relative prosperity to the fishing industry. Subsequently, however, several
problems confronted the Texel and Zuider Sea fishermen and fishing com-
munities. Many voted with their feet and an exodus of Texel fishermen
ensued. Between 1880 and 1913, no less than 152 fishermen with 494 re-
latives left the island and settled on the mainland – many of them taking
on non-fishery related jobs – or emigrated (Schreur 1953:24-27). Seventy-
eight fisher families were from Oudeschild, forty-six from Oosterend (in-
cluding many from the hamlet of Oost), twenty-seven from De Cocksdorp
and one from Den Hoorn. Seventy fishermen continued their old occupa-
tion elsewhere, mostly in neighbouring Den Helder. Twenty-six fisher
families migrated to the USA; seventeen of them were from De Cocks-
dorp, five from Oudeschild and four from Oosterend and environs. The
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majority of those who migrated to the mainland began working as un-
skilled labourers in industrial areas. In the Netherlands, the belated indus-
trialization provided many job opportunities. Mainland industries could
absorb labour that had become redundant in agriculture and fisheries or
had not yet entered it. For example, thirty-seven fisher families, mostly
from Oudeschild, migrated to Amsterdam and environs, where the adult
men found employment as dockworkers. There, they became acquainted
with socialist ideas that they took with them upon their eventual return to
the island.
In the impoverished village, neighbourliness and solidarity reigned su-
preme. In addition to informally assisting each other, the villagers founded
a number of local associations aiming at mutual support in times of sick-
ness, death and other adversities. Strikingly, the Dutch Reformed church –
to which more than seventy per cent of the local populace nominally be-
longed – did not play a significant role. After an early 1860s conflict in the
church that involved the minister and the church authorities, most villag-
ers began avoiding Sunday services. They opted for self-help. A significant
minority of Oudeschilders were Roman Catholic (23.3 per cent in 1849).
Less than three per cent were Mennonite. Oudeschild was a close-knit and
socially cohesive community, where social control was tight. Although the
fishermen were self-employed petty commodity producers, they con-
fronted capitalist relations of production and they considered themselves
to be labourers rather than independent entrepreneurs. The Social Demo-
cratic ideology could explain their marginalized position and provided a
model for a way out of poverty. As most Oudeschilders had previously
turned away from the church, they perceived socialism as a vehicle to bet-
terment and emancipation. Oudeschild subsequently turned into the is-
land’s ‘Red Village’.
In contradistinction, churches played a pivotal role in Oosterend com-
munity life. In the mid-19th century, almost three-quarters of the inhab-
itants were Dutch Reformed. There were Mennonite (eighteen per cent)
and Roman Catholic (eight per cent) minorities. Sunday church attendance
was high, but the Protestant locals did not refrain from pub-crawling,
sprees and dancing and in general were rather latitudinarian. This chan-
ged with the arrival of orthodox ministers. Revivalism began to be a force.
In 1850, conventiclers attracted more and more followers and later a Calvi-
nist Reformed (Gereformeerde) church would be established. The orthodox
Protestants were dubbed ‘the fine’ (de fijnen), while the heterodox Protes-
tants, Catholics and non-believers were called ‘the coarse’ (de groven). The
religious differences would set the tone for local relationships for decades.
They not only determined in which church one worshipped on Sunday,
but the village’s entire communal life was deeply divided according to reli-
gious denomination as nearly all organizations were based on religious
affiliation, while there was both a secular and a Protestant school. Mixed
marriages were taboo, and shopping was done with shopkeepers of the
same creed. The differences even had a spatial dimension as ‘the fine’ pre-
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dominantly lived in one neighbourhood and ‘the coarse’ in another. Gener-
ally, the orthodox proved to be more tightly integrated than the latitudinar-
ians. Many fisher families were orthodox and seemed less inclined to mi-
grate than the Oudeschilders.
For those skippers who stayed behind, it was increasingly difficult to
recruit deckhands. The mean grossing of boats fell from 1,650 guilders in
1905 to 750 guilders in 1914. By this time, nearly all skippers worked with
the share system of remuneration. It varied according to the type of fish-
ery. For example, in shrimp fishing a deckhand would get a third of the net
proceeds, in North Sea fishing twenty-five to thirty per cent, where an ap-
prentice ‘third man’ would get a fixed amount of money. The weekly in-
comes were usually less than seven guilders per fisherman. Few men
wanted to join a fishing crew. This forced several skippers to also find
work on shore permanently or temporarily, for example as farmhands.
The remaining fishermen tried to cope with the uncertainties by pursuing
new markets and making mutual arrangements regarding production and
minimum prices. Along with the expansion of markets and the introduc-
tion of fish conservation methods, the chains between producers and con-
sumers grew longer. This left the fishermen in a position at the produc-
tion-market chain’s outer end, making them vulnerable to recessions and
sharp price fluctuations. As Sinclair states: ‘the large number of petty pro-
ducers for a given market makes it difficult to adjust production in the
aggregate, with the result that particular commodities tend to be overpro-
duced relative to demand and prices are driven down’ (1985:20).
Whereas the skipper-deckhand social relationship was usually rather
egalitarian, relations between fishermen and merchants were often asym-
metric and antagonistic. Given the rapid deterioration of fish, crustaceans
and shellfish, the fishermen had little ‘withholding power’ (Löfgren
1977:228). They depended on intermediaries for marketing their catch
and they were price-takers not price-makers.12 For instance, dealers in the
nearby port of Den Helder, where many Texelians landed a part of their
catches, had developed usurious practices. By collectively protesting this
state of affairs, the fishermen succeeded in countering the dealers’ beha-
viour. We also have seen that a truck system with extremely unfavourable
conditions developed between Texel fishermen and large-scale shell, cockle
and eelgrass dealers. They often had to dispose of their catch in exchange
for commodities in the dealers’ shops while they usually had standing
debts that firmly tied them to their creditors. The fishermen’s bargaining
position was rather weak. In the eelgrass industry, this even led to incipi-
ent class divisions. At the local level, however, several traders were petty
entrepreneurs and depended on the fishermen for the supply of fish and
shellfish. Both categories were involved in a ‘moral economy’: ‘a consistent
traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic
functions of several parties within the community’ (E.P. Thompson
1971:79). The fishermen attempted to strike deals with individual traders
concerning production and prices. This moral economy often amounted to
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a rhetorical ideology: we should all cooperate with each other here. In fact,
cooperation was usually short-lived, since fishermen and traders were op-
portunistic and ambiguous with respect to price and production restric-
tions. Eventually, fishermen forgot or violated informal agreements, turn-
ing cooperating individuals into fiercely individualistic competitors. For
example, by the turn of the century the fishermen increasingly avoided
supplying shrimp and cockles to processing plants. Instead, they boiled,
salted and marketed the crustaceans and bivalves themselves. The proces-
sors eventually had to close down their plants; at the outbreak of the Great
War not a single one was left on the island. It was also difficult to maintain
voluntary arrangements, because Texelians were of course not the only
fishermen supplying the market. Therefore, even when engaging in collec-
tive action or entering contractual relations with dealers, they were unable
to control prices. Although in general dealers or processors had stakes in
maintaining an attitude of competition among fishermen and hindering
organized collective action, the Texel fish traders were not in a position to
prevent the fishermen from organizing themselves. The latter began estab-
lishing trade cooperatives in order to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis
fish traders and to obtain higher incomes.
It was a mainlander, J. Zwier Visser, who took the first initiative to estab-
lish a trade cooperative on Texel. In 1899, he toured Dutch fishing com-
munities in an attempt to make them cooperate in a national federation of
fishermen’s associations. He also visited Oudeschild and Oosterend, and
among other things emphasized the importance of circumventing as
many middlemen as possible in the marketing of catches. These interme-
diaries not only creamed off their proceeds, they also attempted to main-
tain a monopsony on the island. When outside traders visited the island to
buy fish and shellfish, the local traders outbid them. Thus, fair competi-
tion was impossible, but once the outsiders had left, the Texel traders re-
turned to offering low prices. The petty coastal fishermen depended on the
local dealers, so that they had few alternatives to land their catches.
Furthermore, the price-fixing that was practised elsewhere also left much
to be desired. Zwier Visser criticized these practices and told the Texel fish-
ermen that it was possible to bypass the middlemen by marketing the
catch directly to large dealers through trade cooperatives, which would
have the advantage of higher returns and the expansion of markets. Trade
cooperatives were then established in both Oudeschild and Oosterend, and
immediately joined by thirty and twenty-one members, respectively. Fol-
lowing a difficult start, the cooperatives became fairly successful, but
Zwier Visser’s aim of founding a national federation was crosscut by ru-
mours of mismanagement and fraud. Nonetheless, both local trade coop-
eratives continued their work under new names. The son of an Oudeschild
teacher, W.A. Muller, was appointed as manager of both organizations.
Thus, he could coordinate their activities and though de jure they remained
separate institutions, de facto they cooperated. Under Muller’s leadership,
the cooperatives succeeded in obtaining higher prices for their members.
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They even expanded their activities, found new markets and purchased
fishery equipment, baskets, salt and other goods at considerable discounts.
They also bought storage facilities and leased oyster plots from the state on
favourable conditions. To ensure high prices, the cooperatives sometimes
introduced quotas, especially for shrimp.
Until the onset of the Great War, the cooperatives worked quite well and
the fishermen clearly benefited from their activities. However, as of 1914,
fish and shellfish prices rose phenomenally, although the market for eel-
grass collapsed. In Western Europe, Dutch fishermen faced less foreign
competition, as the Netherlands remained neutral, whereas fishermen in
neighbouring countries could not fish due to the hostilities. Mussel fish-
ing, in particular, yielded excellent results. In addition, the Texel fishermen
targeted various other species in the winter. The Zuider Sea herring and
anchovy fisheries were profitable in the spring. In the summer, Texel fish-
ermen who had large flat-bottomed boats otter trawled for flatfish and
other species in the North Sea. With almost unlimited marketing potential
and rocketing prices, the fishermen wanted to get rid of the cooperatives’
restrictions. Most members withdrew and the cooperatives dissolved.
Thus, in times of economic boom, most fishermen preferred sailing an
individualistic course. They were ambivalent opportunists, but this very
same opportunism also constituted the basis for their return to coopera-
tion when the need arose. During the First World War, the local fleet was
no longer on the decline. As can be seen from the table below, Oosterend
fishermen were predominantly oriented on North and Zuider Sea fishing,
while Oost and Oudeschild fishermen mostly exploited the inshore do-
main.
Oosterend Oost Oudeschild Cocksdorp Horntje Total
North/Zuider Sea boats 18 3 2 1 24
Inshore vessels 8 13 37 6 64
Rowing boats 4 9 14 5 5 37
Total number of boats 30 25 53 12 5 125
Crew 63 46 99 21 5 234
Table 1. Texel fishing fleet in 1918 according to type of fishery and village (adapted from
Schreur 1953:14).
The upsurge of fishing during the Great War and the closing down of trade
cooperatives necessitated another way of marketing the catch. Following
repeated requests, in 1916 a small municipal fish auction was established
at the Oudeschild harbour quay. Soon, seven local fish dealers competed to
acquire part of the landings, mostly consisting of shrimp. The North Sea
fishermen preferred landing their catches in Den Helder or as far away as
IJmuiden and Scheveningen where they obtained higher prices. Others
sent their mussels and shrimp to the market through intermediaries. An-
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nual gross proceeds increased considerably. In 1917, they amounted to be-
tween 2,000 and 4,000 guilders. With such amounts of money, recruit-
ment of deckhands was no problem whatsoever. The boom was, however,
short-lived. As soon as peace was restored in Europe, the Dutch and Texel
fishermen faced foreign competition again. Markets fell away and fish
prices declined sharply. Moreover, devaluation of French, Belgian and Ger-
man currencies, inflation, diminished purchasing power abroad, high
shipping tariffs, rising import taxes in France, trade barriers in Germany,
increasing costs of fishing equipment and soaring taxes at home exacer-
bated the difficulties. On the island, the fisheries depression returned in
all its devastating dimensions. Along with it, the ambiguity concerning
mutual agreements between fishermen and traders also surfaced again. A
deal was struck to auction all landings in Oudeschild, but much to the
dealers’ chagrin, more and more inshore fishermen began dodging the
self-imposed rules. One of the local fish traders, Abraham Boon, said the
fishermen had a ‘moral obligation’ to abide by them and that ‘an iron
whip’ would have ‘to move them towards their ill-comprehended self-inter-
est’.13 Mandatory auctioning on the island turned less problematic after
that, in part because the local authorities henceforth imposed and moni-
tored the rules. The system only applied to the fleet’s small-scale segment.
The North Sea fishermen landed their catches elsewhere. In general, the
petty Texel fishermen grew more and more vulnerable to adversities. Many
fishermen became dependent on unemployment relief work or on poor
relief.
This did not apply to all Texel fishermen. Several Oosterend skippers,
who had been quite successful when fish markets thrived, continuously
invested in vessels and equipment. For them, accumulation of capital for
reinvestment was important, whereas most fishermen from Oudeschild
and Oost were content to satisfy their needs and remain self-employed.
The differences between the Oosterend and the Oudeschild fishermen
were already observed in a 1891 fisheries report: ‘There is a marked dis-
tinction in character between the inhabitants of these two villages. Added
to this disparity should be the jealousy that emanates from the fact that the
fishermen of Oosterend have gradually surpassed those of Oudeschild
concerning the size and seaworthiness of their vessels as well as the perse-
verance and profitability of their business’ (Verslag zeevisserijen 1891:102).
As stated above, Oudeschilders perceived themselves as labourers rather
than independent entrepreneurs. Through self-help and solidarity, the Ou-
deschilders tried to cope with the problems they encountered. The Social
Democratic movement rapidly gained influence in the community. After
universal suffrage was introduced in the Netherlands in 1917, the Social
Democratic Labour Party would get the majority of votes in the village
(forty-four per cent in 1922, rising to sixty-six per cent in 1929). Some of
the local socialist leaders worked in the fishing industry and obtained seats
in the municipal council. Oudeschilders were predominantly latitudinar-
ian Protestants with only nominal ties to the local church. Between 1885
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and 1925, the position of minister was vacant most of the time and in the
1920s, church attendance was negligible. Allegedly, visiting ministers even
had to wipe the cobwebs off the pulpit and the Bible.
Things were quite different in the village of Oosterend. Orthodox Pro-
testants had been gaining more and more influence. The Calvinists, who
had congregated in a wooden church since the mid-1850s, built a new
church in 1897 as it saw its membership increase, while under the influ-
ence of a new minister the Dutch Reformed simultaneously adopted a
much more orthodox doctrine. The Oosterenders nonetheless took minor
dogmatic differences to be fundamental religious oppositions and the vil-
lage remained deeply divided in matters of creed. They also believed that
socio-economic differentiation was God-given and they regarded the socia-
list goal of emancipation as being opposed to Christian principles. The
support for Protestant political parties of various persuasions was large. In
elections, they obtained seventy-two per cent of the votes in 1922 and sixty-
four per cent in 1929. The religious divisiveness notwithstanding, at the
local level there was a modus vivendi and the entire village joined forces
in times of despair. Oosterend fishermen were not as indigent as their
northern neighbours, exploited other niches and considered themselves
as capitalist entrepreneurs. They were deeply religious and regular church-
goers. They were inclined to take more risks, as they believed that the Lord
would not take their lives prematurely. The Oudeschild and Oosterend
fishermen’s different religious orientations, worldviews and economic atti-
tudes to some extent hampered inter-village cooperation in voluntary orga-
nizations (see also Chapter 3).
An old cause of disagreement also contributed to this. For a brief period,
the Oosterend fishermen had had their own harbour. It had been built in
1843, but its construction was such that it began silting up soon. With the
demise of oyster fishing and a lack of revenues for maintenance, the har-
bour fell into disuse by 1852. The Oosterenders immediately began de-
manding the right to a new harbour and more forcefully so by the late
1880s when their fleet had expanded, arguing that Oudeschild’s harbour
was too remote to keep an eye on their vessels. It took Oosterend and Oost
fishermen a ninety-minute walk to the harbour, sometimes in the dead of
night as sailing depended on the tide. Since travelling back and forth was
so time-consuming, they only returned for the weekend. This partly ex-
plains why Oosterenders turned into week-trippers as opposed to Ou-
deschilders, who were mainly day-trippers. When Oosterenders requested
that a new harbour near their home village be constructed, the Oudeschild
fishermen wanted theirs to be deepened and enlarged. This clash of inter-
ests had an impact on the social relationships between the two commu-
nities, particularly after the Oudeschilders won. As we shall see in subse-
quent chapters, for decades to come the fishermen from the two villages
would stick to their own organizations.
With the money they had earned during the First World War, several
Oosterend skipper-owners began motorizing their fleet. For example, in
90 Braving Troubled Waters
1918 a skipper had a new flat-bottom built that was equipped with a 35 h.p.
engine, requiring the formidable sum of 13,400 guilders. Such invest-
ments demanded a particular attitude of deferred gratification and con-
sumptive restraint, while they often called on the entire family to contrib-
ute. With the exception of occasionally participating in eelgrass gathering,
Texel fisherwomen and girls did not work in the fishing industry proper.
Nevertheless, their contribution to the household budget often enabled
weathering lean times or investing in the boat and equipment. A woman,
born in 1908, recalled: ‘My parents had to be thrifty, mother too. She was
so happy if she received clothes from the family.’ She continued: ‘She
made oilskins herself, as it saved money.’ Living extremely economically
enabled her parents to invest in the firm. It was a common pattern. Wo-
men would do the laundry, make and repair clothes, take care of the chil-
dren and in many cases do odd jobs or run a small shop to earn extra
money. Boys began crewing upon finishing primary school, while girls
would do household chores and earn some money, for example as a maid-
servant. The latter usually saved for a trousseau, but also chipped in their
bit to cover expenses. The fishing fleet’s modernization led to an expan-
sion of the catching potential of some production units, but at the same
time, the island’s fishing fleet was much smaller than before. In 1931,
eighty-one firms operated eighty-three vessels: four cutters, fifty-six sailing
boats –most of these equipped with an auxiliary engine – and twenty-three
flats. In less than four decades, the number of vessels was halved. Like
gear switching, turning away from the fisheries also implied a relaxation
of pressure on the marine resources. The Oosterenders specialized in
North Sea flatfish, and only occasionally switched to inshore shrimp fish-
ing in the winter when shrimp prices were high or storms made it danger-
ous to sail the North Sea. An important element in their success was the
fact that their crews were usually composed of agnatic kin. Family firms
were able to continue fishing because skipper-owners working with close
kinsmen did not have to pay full shares (see also Chapter 4).
Generally, the motorization of Oudeschild vessels occurred much later
than in Oosterend. Most of the Oudeschild fishermen began specializing
in shrimp fishing, which usually gave ‘dependable’ outcomes – at any rate
relatively dependable compared with other fisheries. They still combined
this activity with other maritime pursuits or occupational switching if nec-
essary, and between June and November catching mature shrimp was im-
possible because they disappeared from the nearby waters. As of the late
1920s, small fry were reduced down into poultry feed in a local fishmeal
plant. Four brothers who ran a duck farm for down and eggs established
and owned it. They used the dried shrimp as fodder. Initially, Texelians
protested against catching immature shrimp and demanded a prohibition,
but as it was to no avail they also began landing small fry. It helped them
stay in business, even though most of these fishermen could barely make
ends meet. The petty fishermen were dealt severe blows during the reces-
sions. With their feeble vessels, they could not sail the North Sea and they
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tried to eke out a meagre living from the crowded inshore niches. This
occasionally led to overexploitation, for example in whelk fishing. Some-
times the fishermen refrained from sailing altogether because the wear
and tear of their equipment would cost more than they could earn. They
usually curtailed consumption and cut expenses by neglecting mainte-
nance of their vessel. Some would not replace half-rotten planks and had
their boats covered with tin sheets: the vessel’s ‘shroud’. This made for
economic survival in the short run, but undermined future chances of re-
covery.
It became ever more difficult for petty skipper-owners to recruit crew-
members, especially if they could not count on their own male kin. Given
the share-system of remuneration, it was financially unattractive for crew
to join a skipper-owner who did not earn much. Thus, in an era of eco-
nomic crisis many crewmembers left the fishery. This led to a shortage of
workers, forcing some skipper-owners to temporarily leave their vessel in
the harbour and find a land-based job, especially in the summer. Others
sold their boat and acquired a smaller one that they could operate alone or
with one deckhand instead of two crewmembers. Although some petty
fishermen continued fishing part of the year, the fact that they had to eat
into their capital sapped their resilience. A teacher who had been working
on the island for some time noted:
The Texel fishermen will attempt to help themselves as long as possible. It
is precisely because of this fact that needs in many families are greater than
the outsider presumes. Whomsoever can do without will definitely not call
for support. However, when asked for it, one can be sure that it is absolutely
necessary.14
Fewer and fewer fishermen’s sons went into their fathers’ line of work and
more and more fishermen – crewmembers and skipper-owners alike –
quit fishing altogether. They either found jobs on Texel (commonly as
farmhands) or on the mainland (mostly as factory workers). Consequently,
the number of Texel fishermen steadily decreased from 234 in 1918 to ap-
proximately 176 in 1930. As we shall see in the next chapter, several devel-
opments would contribute to a further decline of a specific segment of the
local fishing industry.
Out with the Tide
‘If the sea can be fished dead, let us at least obtain our share of the funeral
meal’ (Anonymous 1854:143). With this phrase, an official report stereo-
typed the Dutch fishermen’s mentality and behaviour as early as the mid-
19th century. Underlying this idea was the perception that the sea was no-
one’s property and could therefore be freely exploited without any re-
straint. Later, Garrett Hardin (1968) popularized this view in his ‘tragedy
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of the commons’ proposition. He postulates that each ‘rational being’ ex-
ploiting commons seeks to maximize his gain in the shortest time possi-
ble. This ‘rational being’ puts his short-term self-interest above the long-
term collective interest. The inherent logic is that he receives the benefits
of extra effort and only pays a fraction of the costs, subtracting from the
potential benefits of others. The disadvantages of his behaviour are passed
off on the ecosystem, the user group as a whole and society, a problem
known as detrimental externalities. Because each user of the common
good thinks and acts this way, the inexorable result is ecological deteriora-
tion and, finally, destruction of the natural environment. Therefore, ‘ra-
tional’ individual behaviour has irrational ecological and social conse-
quences. Tragedy, says Hardin, can only be avoided through intervention
by an external authority (usually the state) or by privatization: ‘The social
arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create
coercion’ (ibid.:1247).
On the face of it, the tragic story of Ostrea edulis would seem to provide a
fairly straightforward illustration of Hardin’s theorem. However, as I have
argued, the reasons why overexploitation came about cannot be explained
by merely citing the deterministic tragedy model. Hardin assumes a direct
and unmediated relationship between individual behaviour and the eco-
system, thus obscuring a myriad of factors relevant to people’s use of nat-
ural resources. Hardin and his adherents equate commons with open ac-
cess; assume that individual actors behave as autonomous beings, are
selfish and uncommunicative, and act as if devoid of social norms and
values. They also stress individualism and competitiveness over commu-
nity spirit and cooperation; neglect institutional contexts; use a priori rea-
soning without empirical substantiation; and are ethnocentric because
they view state intervention or privatization as the only solutions to the
problem of overexploitation of natural resources.15 However, fishermen do
not operate in a historical, economic, social and cultural vacuum. Their
beliefs, norms and values, relationships of cooperation and conflict and
the institutions they have developed should be taken into account to under-
stand the shaping and constraining forces of ecological adaptation, as
these adaptations operate through systems of cultural meanings and social
relationships.
Importantly, Texel fishermen considered some fishing grounds to be res
communes (communal property). There were de facto rules and rights as to
who could exploit the resources held in common, even though the fisher-
men were rather ambivalent about territoriality. For a long time, the sys-
tem of quasi-cultivation of oysters worked rather well. It was only under
particular conditions that overexploitation emerged. Exogenous forces,
ecological and technological developments, and fluctuations in a market
economy were important. The Texel example demonstrates that in situa-
tions of ecological deterioration (not necessarily caused by fishing), indebt-
edness and impoverishment, fishermen face dilemmas that – if they have
no or few alternatives – may force them to opt for survival in the short run
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with all the detrimental ecological and social consequences that it entails.
For the individual, it may be a reasonable choice to intensify exploitation,
particularly if he depends entirely on a single resource (Ostrom 1992:297).
However, this is rarely the case under common pool conditions and usual-
ly the pressure on the resource is alleviated as a result of various adaptive
strategies. We have seen that Texel oystermen began combining oyster
fishing with other modes of marine exploitation. Moreover, the state inter-
vened and enclosed a part of the commons. According to neoclassical
economists, the introduction of property rights would theoretically: reduce
overexploitation of resources; increase the rewards for conservation and
protection of resources; improve the use of labour and capital resources
(thus increasing efficiency) and lead to internalizing the costs of resource
use (thus diminishing transaction and enforcement costs). It would also
prevent the disappearance of economic rent; maximize resource rent;
bring about more stable prices; give the producer a relatively greater pro-
portion of the benefit of his activity than under commons conditions, and
provide higher net incomes to lessee fishermen.16 In practice though, the
lease of fishing grounds to individuals and corporations did not bring
about an improvement for the oyster industry. Oyster fishermen and plan-
ters often opted for collective action to solve resource management prob-
lems. These strategies often failed because of free riding and evasion of the
rules and regulations. Therefore, the fishermen and planters asked the
state to wield its authority and enforce the rules and regulations. Once
again their attitude was ambivalent: when they perceived advantages in
state involvement, they were in favour of intervention; when they felt their
freedom to act was stifled too much, they would try to circumvent the rules
or ask the external authorities to withdraw specific measures.
The same applied to the eelgrass industry. The state leased the rights on
the exploitation of eelgrass to individuals or municipalities that in turn
permitted access to Texelians (and Wieringers), while excluding outsiders.
Depending on their stakes, the islanders repeatedly attempted to change
the extant management regime or, alternatively, to hinder transformations.
People benefiting from the continuation of a regime sought to maintain it,
while others urged for changes to share in the benefits. This led to varying
coalitions and attempts to influence decision-making processes. The op-
portunism and ambivalence of Texel eelgrass mowers-cum-fishermen in
the political game must be understood in this context and against the back-
ground of economic fluctuations: ‘In contracting over proposed property
rights, the bargaining stands taken by the various parties depend upon
how they view their welfare under the new arrangements relative to the
status quo’ (Libecap 1989:11). Each of the ecological regimes had conse-
quences for the fishermen and influenced their behaviour. If the mowers
perceived advantages in the allocation of temporary property rights to pri-
vate individuals or institutions, they argued in favour of its introduction;
but if they thought that it would be disadvantageous and felt estranged
from the ‘free’ sea, they would equally passionately demand its abrogation
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or alteration. Especially when they had experienced becoming increasingly
dependent on the lessees after the introduction of the lease by public bid-
ding, they tried to redress the power balance by collective actions. The fish-
ermen, whose values included independence and freedom, organized in
anti-enclosure movements, a development that also occurred elsewhere
following the enclosure of the marine commons. This culture of resistance
must be understood against the background of the starkly deteriorating
socio-economic position of these petty commodity producers. Many lacked
the capital to diversify or change their activities and therefore depended on
eelgrass exploitation to make a living. They were encapsulated in capitalist
relations of production. The lessees and traders paid wages and absorbed
the shocks of fluctuating market prices by lowering labour costs. In addi-
tion, they exploited the mowers through a truck system. The eelgrass
mowers developed a germinating class consciousness. The Texelians stood
up for their right to an existence and gained results despite their weak
bargaining position. In the end, the state was sensitive to their arguments
and asked the municipalities involved to take over the regulation and
supervision of eelgrass mowing again. The municipality of Wieringen did
so. Although the eelgrass mowers henceforth worked under slightly better
conditions, they remained dependent and dissatisfied. The gathering of
washed-up or floating eelgrass gave many an opportunity to supplement
their meagre incomes. So did the exploitation of various other marine liv-
ing resources.
As economists Townsend and Wilson maintain, there is a ‘normal ten-
dency of fishermen to switch away from declining stocks’ (1987:323). They
usually apply the same strategy once it has become unrewarding to catch a
particular species. Such switching behaviour is ‘the most important adap-
tive strategy used by fishermen’ (Acheson 1988:49). It may bring about a
dispersion of pressure on marine resources, a consequence neither in-
tended nor foreseen. This is exactly what Texel fishermen have been doing
for quite a long time. They turned to the exploitation of various ecological
niches in an attempt to cope with resource deterioration, market fluctua-
tions, state intervention and limitations of access such as those of the oy-
ster and eelgrass industries. They generally pursued different species with
different kinds of gear over the annual cycle. They were continually trim-
ming their sails to the wind. The common pool nature of resources en-
ables this kind of flexibility: ‘Common property is created by the guarantee
to each individual that he will not be excluded from the use or benefit of
something; private property is created by the guarantee that an individual
can exclude others from the use or benefit of something. Both kinds of
property, being guarantees to individual persons, are individual rights’
(Macpherson 1975:107). Of course, the availability of multiple niches and
resources is a precondition for resilience and efficient adaptation under
conditions of common pool exploitation. Marine commons offer more op-
portunities in this respect than, say, a small communal tract of land that is
suitable only for cattle grazing.
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However, one should not consider these adaptations as cybernetic pro-
cesses automatically leading to homeostasis. Nor should one mistake them
for evidence of control over nature or signs of ecological wisdom. These
adaptations themselves are often quite diverse, partly owing to socio-cul-
tural factors. Unless we consider these integral dynamics – that is, the in-
terdependencies and interactions of factors and actors in a system of re-
source use and the processes and transformations they bring about – we
cannot fully comprehend the complexity, heterogeneity and dynamics of
renewable resource utilization. As long as diversification provided an op-
portunity to survive economically, Texel fishermen opted for this adaptive
strategy. Depending on their financial opportunities, social and cognitive
capital, preferences and expertise, and such incentives as resource avail-
ability and market prices, they switched target species and gear or turned
to occupational pluralism. This led to a diversified annual fisheries cycle,
with harvesting efforts distributed across a host of species of fish, shell-
fish, crustaceans and other marine resources by the 1890s. Diversification
– which was feasible under common pool regimes and stimulated by an
expanding market – meant that overexploitation of any one single species
became less likely. We should of course bear in mind that a precondition is
that fish are plentiful and catches are relatively small. The existence of al-
ternative fishing opportunities also meant that distribution of income
from exploiting marine resources was spread across any number of island-
ers who wished to participate in the fisheries. In addition, informal terri-
toriality reduced the number of fishermen able to exploit a specific niche.
However, the attitude towards territoriality was ambivalent and incursions
were rife. On the one hand, Texel fishermen tried to monopolize access to
common resources to which they claimed customary rights while, on the
other, they attempted to encroach on other people’s territory.
The same ambiguity characterized cooperation. Despite their rhetoric of
individualism and independence, Texel fishermen had a penchant for co-
operation. Given the overlapping interests of all participants in the local
fishing industry, there was a strong impetus to organize. Their voluntary
associations were the vehicles through which they defended their interests
in economic, political and social arenas, but cooperation was particularis-
tic. It was usually limited to the local level because of socio-economic
differentiation within the occupational community and the concomitant
specific interests and problems of its component parts. Socio-cultural di-
vergence within the island society, particularly between the Oosterend and
Oudeschild fishing communities, also proved an obstacle to supra-local
institutionalized cooperation (see also Chapter 3). Splits in local associa-
tions, free riding, dwindling membership during recessions and dissol-
ving trade cooperatives during booms undermined sustained collective ac-
tion. Cooperation – whether formalized or not – could bring about
factional conflict and such particularistic conflict in turn often gave rise to
cooperation again. Informally, the fishermen would mutually defend their
common interests and repeatedly reunited after schisms. The shared ex-
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perience of particular uncertainties and risks forged entrepreneurially in-
clined individualists into a close moral ‘contractual community’ (Taylor
1983:xv). Generally, petty independent entrepreneurs are well aware of
their vulnerability under conditions of change due to, for example, eco-
nomic fluctuations or state intervention: ‘The sense of precariousness, of
contingency, leads to the awareness of life as “struggle” and to ambiguity
in their relationships to others in the major classes’ (Bechhofer and Elliott
1981:184). This ambivalence was indeed an important aspect of the fisher-
men’s relationships with each other, with external authorities, and with
traders and processors ultimately linking them with consumers.
The market expansion meant that the chains between producers and
consumers grew longer, making fishermen more vulnerable to national
and international competition and economic cycles beyond their control.
In the mid-1890s, Texel fishermen were hit hard by a depression that
would last for two decades. To avoid its effects, many invested in special-
ized gear. Oudeschilders predominantly turned to shrimp fishing, while
Oosterenders increasingly focused on the North Sea to catch flatfish. Ac-
cording to the ‘economics of flexibility’ hypothesis, specialization usually
follows once intensification and diversification have become inadequate
coping responses. This proposition states that:
minimal, less costly, and more reversible responses to environmental per-
turbation are predicted to occur first. If an environmental problem worsens
or is not adequately met by the initial responses, ‘deeper,’ more costly, and
less reversible responses take over, restoring flexibility to other responses
(McCay 1978:410; see also McCay 2002:375-378).
However, many Texel fishermen switched from fishing altogether when
they deemed the returns on their capital and labour insufficient. There is
usually a point long before complete resource depletion when fishermen
turn their backs on the sea. One unintended consequence of such beha-
viour may be a recovery of the marine environment’s carrying capacity.
In conclusion, the sum-total of conscious adaptations sometimes brings
about an adaptive process that operates beyond human awareness. Though
it would be a mistake to consider these cybernetic processes evidence of
control over nature or automatic homeostasis, they are nonetheless impor-
tant in understanding how natural resources are exploited. Accusing fish-
ermen a priori of being inclined to reckless exploitation is as short-sighted
as apologetically viewing them as ‘noble commoners’. Fishermen are
neither noble nor nefarious. The use of communal natural resources in
complex and dynamic socio-ecological systems cannot easily be explained
by such simplistic and deterministic models as the tragedy of the com-
mons, but should, as I have shown, be interpreted in a broader contextual
framework. Overexploitation is often brought about by a complex interplay
of processes in the wider society and their articulation with actors at the
local level. Ecological transformations (whether the result of human adap-
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tations or not), demographic changes, developments in transportation and
communication, the opening up of new markets, and the integration into a
global economic system, for example, will affect the efforts fishermen de-
ploy to exploit marine living resources. This was clearly the case in the
Texel oyster industry. Given the resilience of Texel fishermen’s adaptations,
there was no inevitable route towards a tragedy of the marine commons.
We should be careful, however, of interpreting their adjustments as un-
equivocal signs of conscious strategies that aimed at achieving ecological
sustainability. Clearly, they were not. Yet under certain conditions the
chances of successful exploitation of the commons may be considerable.
This applies if: the number of resource users is limited and not subject to
sudden increases; territoriality and rights-to-use among local fishermen
are firmly established; rule-breaking or cheating within the user-group
and incursion by outsiders present no problems; alternative niches and
resources are available and provide for flexibility, and diversification is eco-
nomically viable (see also Wade 1987). In the next chapter, we shall see that
the construction of a dam had devastating consequences for the inshore
fishing industry and undermined the inshore fishermen’s resilience and
adaptability.
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Figure 1. The early days of Oudeschild, 1609 (courtesy of Zuiderzeemuseum,
Enkhuizen).
Figure 2. Harvesting oysters near Texel, 1670s (engraving by Wenzel Hollar,
courtesy of Rijksarchief Noord-Holland, Haarlem).
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Figure 3. Oudeschild shipyard, 1835 (courtesy of Rijksarchief Noord-Holland,
Haarlem).
Figure 4. Oudeschild harbour, 1890s (courtesy of Zuiderzeemuseum, Enkhuizen).
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Figure 5. Village scene from Oosterend, 1909 (courtesy of University of
Amsterdam).
Figure 6. Village scene from Oudeschild, 1909 (courtesy of University of
Amsterdam).
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Figure 7. Texel fishermen hauling a mussel dredge, 1917 (photograph C.J. Hofker,
courtesy of Spaarnestad Photo).
Figure 8. Texel anchovy fishermen in Enkhuizen, 1920s (courtesy of Maritime and
Beachcombers Museum, Oudeschild).
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Figure 9. Unloading eelgrass in Oudeschild, 1920s (courtesy of
Zuiderzeemuseum, Enkhuizen).
Figure 10. Wieringen eelgrass mowers, 1925 (courtesy of Zuiderzeemuseum,
Enkhuizen).
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Figure 11. New steel-hulled boat (TX 37), 1920s (courtesy of Jan van der Vis).
Figure 12. Texel’s first motor-powered cutter (TX 12), 1927 (courtesy of Sam van der
Slikke).
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Chapter 3
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Texel fishermen diversified their
operations such that a complex annual round of fisheries came about.
Some opted for specialization or intensified exploitation, while others
withdrew from fishing temporarily or seasonally alternated onshore jobs
and fishing pursuits. Exploiting various niches in the marine ecosystem,
the fishermen adapted to the erratic forces of nature, the market and state
intervention. They proved to be genuine opportunists, who were ambiva-
lent concerning self-imposed or external restrictions and cooperation
among themselves and with other parties in the fishing industry. Depend-
ing on such factors as, inter alia, resource availability and accessibility,
competition for extraction of particular species, customary rules and re-
strictive external regulations, marketing opportunities, seafood prices and
alternative sources of employment, they selected specific modes of marine
resource utilization. Their individual decisions were usually intentional,
but the sum total of the actors’ choices brought about an adaptive process,
the outcomes of which no one had envisioned or planned. In order to cope
with the gamut of uncertainties in their métier, fishermen often turned to
specific modes of labour organization, remuneration and mutual coopera-
tion. Doing so enhanced their adaptability and resilience. A precondition
for their adaptive performance was that resources were held in common
and that access to and use of the marine domain was relatively easy. Ecolo-
gical perturbations and economic cycles to a great extent explained why
actors either entered or exited the fishing industry, as state intervention in
the fishing industry was rather limited, usually pertaining to legal seasons
and gear. The exception to the rule was the enclosure of parts of the mar-
ine commons for oyster cultivation – which was short-lived – and for eel-
grass harvesting. Other than that, fisheries policy was largely based on a
laissez-faire philosophy.
All this changed when the state initiated a project of coastal engineering
with little consideration for either the natural environment or the fisher-
men’s interests. In addition, the state intervened in the market through
production and price regulations. In the 1930s and the first half of the
1940s, the island’s fishing industry was hampered by a triple crisis. Firstly,
there was a severe ecological crisis. The construction of a Closure Dam in
the Zuider Sea would have devastating consequences for various stocks
and – by extension – for inshore fishermen, including those from Texel.
The Dam’s completion in 1932 turned the Zuider Sea into a freshwater
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lake, but also transformed the ecosystem and morphology of what was
henceforth dubbed the Wadden Sea, leading to habitat destruction for var-
ious species. Secondly, the ecological crisis was compounded by the global
economic crisis that assailed the capitalist world. Market gluts and tumbling
catches led to a situation in which artisan fishermen could barely survive
economically. Texel fishermen became involved in a struggle to gain recog-
nition as an interested party that had suffered losses due to the hydraulic
works, which would entitle them to at least some financial compensation.
After a fierce and prolonged battle they were finally successful in 1938.
Thirdly, the economy was slightly improving again when the local fishing
industry was hit by a political crisis: the Second World War. The occupying
German Wehrmacht severely restricted fishing operations and impounded
the best vessels. Perforce, the North Sea cutter fishermen resorted to fish-
ing with sailing and rowing boats, while the inshore fishermen continued
to work with old wooden-hulled sailing vessels. While the war’s effects
continued to influence the fishing industry for a few years after the libera-
tion of the Netherlands, the Closure Dam’s ecological consequences were
lasting and caused Texel’s inshore fishing segment to seriously decline and
almost evanesce in the span of a few decades.
This chapter explores the events of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s and the
ways in which the Texel fishermen responded to the problems that con-
fronted them. It will become apparent that not all categories of fishermen
were equally affected by the triple crisis. For example, there was a marked
distinction in this regard between the inshore and the offshore segment,
which to a considerable extent overlapped the occupational communities
of fishermen in Oudeschild and Oost on the one hand, and Oosterend on
the other hand. The distributional implications of the Zuider Sea’s closure
were such that Texel’s artisan fishermen unexpectedly suffered serious
blows, which were exacerbated by the 1930s’ economic depression. Their
time-honoured adaptive strategies of diversification, intensification and
pluri-activity were insufficient to cope with the problems. They were
trapped in a downward spiral, from which there seemed to be no escape.
Cooperation and political bargaining intensified, but initially did not yield
results, and when they finally did, could not provide a way out of the en-
tanglement in which the petty owner-operators found themselves. The off-
shore fishermen did not face the kind of problems that assailed their in-
shore compatriots. On the contrary, a specific set of incentives and motives
and a lack of restraints encouraged rapid modernization and growth. The
differential success seemed to be self-perpetuating. Are the reasons for
this dichotomy of an economic, social or cultural nature? How and to what
extent did the socio-cultural divergence of the two communities hamper
collective action and supra-local cooperation?
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The Closure Dam and Its Consequences
For decades, there had been discussions regarding the building of a dam
in the Zuider Sea and the reclaiming of land from this inlet of the North
Sea. It took a 1916 storm surge that led to dyke breaches and flooding to
convince politicians that an improvement of the area’s safety was neces-
sary. A law was passed in 1918 that approved the construction of a thirty-
kilometre-long Closure Dam. It would connect the provinces of North Hol-
land and Friesland and transform the Zuider Sea into a freshwater lake –
Lake IJssel (IJsselmeer) – of about 3,500 square kilometres. Opponents of
the Closure Dam warned of the devastating consequences for the fishing
industry and the loss of unique local cultures should it be built. However,
their protests were in vain. Environmental and cultural considerations
were not then integral to contemporary governmental planning regimes.
Prior to the work on the Closure Dam, the government in 1925 decided
that people whose livelihood would be negatively affected by the Closure
Dam should receive partial compensation. This marked an important
change in state involvement in social affairs. Hitherto, the state had clung
to a laissez-faire policy, leaving issues of social security to churches, chari-
ties and local government. However, it was a half-hearted policy, as govern-
ment and parliament alike denied the fishermen any rights of ownership.
The state had merely consented to their use of a common pool resource
that was in fact considered to be state property (Bossaers 1987). The Zui-
der Sea Relief Act (Zuiderzeesteunwet) of 1924 stipulated that only those
who, prior to the 1918 decision, owned a fishing vessel or other fishing-
related businesses – such as shipyards, sail-makers and fish processors –
would be eligible for indemnifications or other support measures. Support
included compensation for depreciation, schooling, credit facilities, job
mediation or a licence to fish in Lake IJssel. First and foremost, the meas-
ures intended to re-educate people who had been earning a living in the
fishing industry so that they could find alternative employment. A state
bureau, the Zuider Sea Council (Zuiderzeeraad), was established to imple-
ment the measures, while local committees would review applications.
The former was rather unforthcoming. Worse still for Texel fishermen
was that the Council stated that it defined as Zuider Sea the area south of
the imaginary line where the Closure Dam was planned. The waters north
of this line, which had previously been known as northern Zuider Sea,
would henceforth be designated as Wadden Sea. Importantly, only people
working in the fishing industry south of the Dam were to be entitled to at
least some indemnifications and state support. The government did not
regard Texel fishermen – or any other fishermen working from fishing
ports in the northern Zuider Sea area – eligible to any assistance from the
Zuider Sea Relief Fund.
In 1920, Texel fishermen’s associations informed the local authorities
that they feared their interests would be harmed following the imminent
closure of the Zuider Sea. They believed that mussel, oyster and particu-
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larly anchovy fisheries would decline or become impossible. Moreover,
they expected that hundreds of fisher families from around the Zuider Sea
coast would settle on the island and compete in shrimp and North Sea
fishing. In the early 1920s, when the fisheries crisis made itself felt again,
Zuider Sea fishermen were already able to apply for temporary support
measures. This was not possible for Texelians, who were not considered to
be Zuider Sea fishermen even though they had been fishing its waters for
centuries, albeit seasonally. The local administration deemed this unfair
since the Texel fishermen’s financial situation was generally similar to that
of their Zuider Sea compatriots. As share fishermen, they were exempt
from unemployment insurance. The Minister responsible thereupon sta-
ted that they should then call on poor relief. What ensued was a prolonged
battle concerning geographic definitions. The government refused to give
way and continued to stand by its definition. This would have severe con-
sequences for the Texel fishing industry. Initially, the islanders grudgingly
accepted the situation. However, once the coastal engineering project was
completed in May 1932, it soon became apparent that the Texel inshore
fisheries were suffering and declining rapidly. As expected, the closure
had drastic ecological effects on the Zuider Sea’s fauna and flora, as it was
completely shut off as a spawning and nursery area for a plethora of spe-
cies. It turned into a brackish and later freshwater lake. Many people lost
their employment in the fishing industry and scores of towns and villages
saw their traditional livelihoods and cultures changing rapidly.
In what was henceforth dubbed the Wadden Sea, the ecological impact
was also devastating: ‘The closure drastically distorted the autonomous be-
haviour of the inlet system and large-scale effects in the hydrodynamics
and consequently the morphodynamics were observed’ (Elias et al.
2003:630). For example, the tidal prism increased by about twenty per
cent, water velocity increased, currents changed and sedimentation oc-
curred. Traditional knowledge on where to set stationary gear and fishing
positions more generally became useless. Species that had been thriving
there before began dwindling swiftly or disappeared altogether. Prior to
the Closure Dam’s construction, the area had been important for spawn-
ing herring and anchovy stocks. After the dam’s completion, these stocks
vanished, ending the seasonal anchovy fisheries. For a few years, herring
continued to migrate to the Wadden Sea and Texel fishermen had excep-
tional catches. However, finding the spawning grounds blocked, the her-
ring never reappeared after 1935. Eelgrass also vanished, halting its exploi-
tation. Scientists concluded that the cause was a wasting disease, not the
damming off of the Zuider Sea. The approximately 150 Texelians who had
directly or indirectly depended on eelgrass harvesting stood empty handed.
With the eelgrass beds’ micro-ecology ravaged and the wider ecosystem
thoroughly disturbed, knock-on effects soon became apparent. Turbot, ray,
flounder, eel, oysters, garfish, periwinkles and brill, once important target
species for some Texel fishermen, all suffered a serious decline.
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Unexpectedly, shrimp catches also diminished sharply. Whereas shrimp
had previously been caught in the winter and spring, following the closure
the season in which they could be netted shifted to the summer. In that
season, the crustaceans spoiled quickly and demand was at a low. Subse-
quently, most shrimp catches went to the local fishmeal plant where a fifty-
kilo basket sometimes fetched a guilder. Only small amounts of boiled and
heavily salted crustaceans could be exported to the French market for hu-
man consumption. However, it was often saturated as early as the begin-
ning of April. As a consequence, the fishermen and dealers agreed on a
quota system. The auction only took fifty or a hundred kilos of boiled
shrimps for human consumption per boat per day. From 1928 to 1932,
shrimp landings at the Oudeschild fish auction averaged 425 metric tons
per year, while during the following five years they tumbled to less than
fifteen per cent of that quantity. In mid-summer, the auction even closed
down for a few weeks. From a mean of over 74,000 guilders between 1927
and 1931, the annual turnover of Texel’s fish auction dropped to less than
half that between 1932 and 1937. The nearby Den Helder fish auction ex-
perienced a similar decline. In 1937, the quantities of seafood landed in
Oudeschild and Den Helder were less than a quarter of what they had
been in 1931 (Hildebrandt 1952: X-85). Some fishermen worked with inter-
mediaries and sent shrimp to the French market directly, but this was to
little avail. Whereas Texel fishermen specializing in shrimp fishing had
earned from 1,000 to 1,500 guilders annually in the years prior to the Zui-
der Sea’s closure, their income plummeted to a mere 250 to 300 guilders
in 1933 (Schreur 1953:21-22). The figures are indicative of the crisis that
had assailed inshore fishing. Although 1933 was an extremely bad year, in
the remainder of the decade the incomes of small fishermen were about a
half to a third of what they earned before the Closure Dam’s construction.
The Zuider Sea Relief Fund deemed a weekly income of twelve guilders for
a married couple sufficient, to be supplemented with an extra guilder for
each child under the age of fourteen (Plomp 1989[1940]:79). Texel inshore
fishermen’s incomes were often considerably lower than that.
With nearly all inshore fisheries being struck by a severe crisis, the fish-
ermen had few opportunities to adopt their usual strategy of switching
target species. Under the new ecological conditions, only whelks thrived.
Many fishermen – among them several from Wieringen – began pursuing
this species during the legal season from October until April, which
quickly led to overcrowding. Their number increased from a total of forty
in 1934 to sixty-one four years later. High landings were offset by extre-
mely low prices. The members of Oudeschild fishermen’s association vol-
untarily agreed to limit fishing and sell boiled and salted whelks to a Bel-
gian merchant directly. Three petty fish traders from Oudeschild,
including Abraham Boon, were not amused and protested. Four members
of the association continued delivering whelks to them but after being
threatened with expulsion from the association they conformed to the
deal. This once more illustrates the fishermen’s ambiguity with regard to
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mutual cooperation and relationships with traders. The ethic of fairness
still applied, however. Whelk fishermen would occasionally take turns to
supply the auction. The concentration on whelk fishing was from sheer
necessity. Having insufficient capital to invest in larger vessels, the only
feasible alternative – North Sea fishing – was unattainable for most fisher-
men.
The ecological crisis was compounded by the devastating economic de-
pression that assailed the capitalist world in the 1930s. Most fish landed by
Dutch fishermen were exported and this also applied to the landings of
Texel fishermen. Prices plummeted, however, and national protective
measures were taken. For example, Germany introduced trade barriers,
import duties in Great Britain were high, France began levying an import
tax of thirty per cent and a devaluation of the British pound and the French
and the Belgian francs made things even worse. The Dutch state inter-
vened in 1934 because it believed supply to be in excess of demand. It
established the Dutch Fishery Board (Nederlandsche Visscherij Centrale) to
cope with the problem and to regulate the market: that is, restrict the sup-
ply of specific species, including shrimp and whelk.1 To obtain a fishing
licence, membership was compulsory. A blackboard on the auction build-
ing specified the quantities each vessel could supply. Inshore fishermen
who had engine-powered boats were allowed to supply twice as much as
those operating sailing vessels. Several had engines installed in their ves-
sels for that reason, although some fishermen refrained from actually
using them. Whelk fishing had to be done without engine power and a
maximum of four dredges. When the whelk season began in October, the
fishermen went to the shipyard’s slipway to take off the propeller and the
propeller-shaft. This restrictive measure did not, however, ameliorate the
fishermen’s destitute situation and in 1938 it was repealed. In combina-
tion, the ecological and economic crises dealt a serious blow to the Oude-
schild and Oost inshore fishermen. They became more and more impover-
ished. Agriculture, accounting for about half of the island’s employment
opportunities, also suffered from the Great Depression and many farm-
hands were laid off. The usual hiring of fishermen for seasonal farm work
in the summer pretty much turned into something of the past, virtually
blocking this escape route. Unemployment rose to unprecedented levels
and hundreds of islanders became dependent on municipal employment
relief – including well over a hundred fishermen – or ended up on the
dole. As the local authorities pointed out, the fishermen ‘perceive unem-
ployment benefits as a pittance and used as they are to being self-em-
ployed, unemployment relief goes against the grain for them’.2 The own-
ers of fishing boats exhausted their own capital before applying for any
kind of support. Savings that were badly needed for maintenance and re-
investment evaporated.
The consequences for those Texel fishermen and their families who had
been particularly dependent on inshore fishing and eelgrass harvesting
were severe. The shipyard’s owner, the sail-makers, the blacksmith, the
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fish auctioneer, the fish packers, the fish traders and others who directly or
indirectly depended on the fishing industry suffered along with them.
Those shrimp fishermen who tenaciously held on to fishing could barely
weather the bad economic times:
In many fisher families, incomes are below those of men working in un-
employment relief projects. Needs are pressing indeed. Shopkeepers are
complaining tremendously. Ship’s maintenance is suffering. … If the expec-
tation that the circumstances will deteriorate rather than improve comes
true, the future of the fishermen and Oudeschild and of the petty Oost and
Oosterend fishermen looks bleak (Texelse Courant, 5 January 1938).
Fewer and fewer skipper-owners were able to maintain their boats prop-
erly, and they used the vessel share for an income and avoided the ship-
yard to save on expenditures. Once in a while they would put their vessels
aground during ebb-tide, scrape off barnacles and tar planks on what was
dubbed the ‘beggars’ slipway’, a shallow foreshore near Oudeschild. Sev-
eral fishermen refrained from sailing at all, as the costs of fishing some-
times surpassed the proceeds. With their solvability on the decline, fisher-
men encountered difficulties finding creditors, who were increasingly
reluctant to deliver goods on tick. Poverty was looming large in many fish-
er families. Fisherwomen, who generally managed the household budget,
encountered problems in making ends meet.
Initially, the fishermen had feared an invasion of Zuider Sea fishermen,
whom they thought would be likely to migrate to Texel to continue fishing.
Although this expectation proved to be false, the Texelians who depended
on inshore fishing for their livelihood did face the direct consequences of
the Zuider Sea’s closure. Resenting the fact that they were not entitled to
any kind of indemnification from the Zuider Sea Relief Fund, they united
and sought recognition as victims of the Zuider Sea’s closure and as right-
ful claimants to the fund’s benefits. Through their organizations, the fish-
ermen launched a prolonged and bitter fight with the state. The Oude-
schild fishermen’s organization was Door Eendracht tot Vooruitgang
(Progress through Unity), originally founded in 1918, while the Oosterend
North Sea skipper-owners were organized in a Fishery Cooperative – the
Co-op for short – which was established in 1931. It also functioned as a
voluntary interest association. The organizations and their members had
regular joint meetings to discuss the situation. Attendance was usually
high, as much was at stake. The boards sent letters and telegrams to var-
ious authorities, including the local and provincial administrations, the
Minister of Water Affairs, the Minister of Social Affairs, the House of Re-
presentatives, individual parliamentarians, the boards of political parties
and – as of 1934 – the Dutch Fishermen’s Union (Nederlandse Vissersbond).
They explained that inshore fishing had suffered from the coastal engi-
neering project and requested compensation. The mayor, aldermen and
councillors of Texel immediately supported the local fishermen, deeming
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the Closure Dam the cause of the deterioration of inshore fishing and the
local extirpation of eelgrass. It was partly from interested motives that they
did so. They feared that unemployed fishermen would become dependent
on municipal poor relief. The municipal council – consisting of thirteen
persons – included three fishermen from Oudeschild (Social Democrats
Jan Henkes, Teunis Dogger and Jacob Bruin) and one fisherman from
Oosterend (Jan van der Vis, of the Christian Historian Union). Together,
they tirelessly supported the fisherfolk’s cause and at local level they had
considerable political clout.
In January 1933, the fishermen’s associations submitted a joint request
to the Ministry of Water Affairs concerning the local fisheries’ bad state
after the Closure Dam’s completion. It was signed by 161 Texel fishermen
and eelgrass workers, who demanded that they be eligible for Zuider Sea
relief. The municipal council and the mayor and aldermen supported their
address. The then responsible Minister, Paul Reymer, rejected the request,
arguing that Texel fisherfolk fished in the Wadden Sea not the Zuider Sea.
Apparently, the government was loath to see more people than had been
planned apply for money from the Zuider Sea Relief Fund, as it would
exhaust the budget early. With the severe economic crisis coming down
harshly on the country, the government’s policy was to cut expenditure.
Understandably, the Texelians experienced the Minister’s decision as a
grave injustice. They had been fishing the Zuider Sea’s waters seasonally
and they were assailed by the closure’s devastating consequences. Many
requests would follow in the early 1930s. In July 1933, fifty unemployed
fishermen demonstrated in front of the town hall in Den Burg. A delega-
tion of four was allowed in to talk to the mayor, W.B. Oort, who sent a
telegram to the Minister that very day. His plea fell on deaf ears, however,
and the same happened a month later with another telegram. The mayor
and a delegation of fishermen visited the ministry, but their voyage was
futile as the Minister did not give an inch. The whole affair started all over
again when a new Minister, Jacob Kalff, was appointed in 1934. In June
that year, he decided that the Texel fishermen could not apply for Zuider
Sea relief because they did not fish in the Zuider Sea and eelgrass had
disappeared as a consequence of the wasting disease not the Closure
Dam. The fishermen were back to square one. The mayor and aldermen
of Texel protested and pointed out that the Minister was not acting accord-
ing to the spirit of the law. They achieved the inauguration of a special
committee (the committee Defoer) to investigate the reasons for the disap-
pearance of eelgrass and to subsequently advise the Minister. The results
were disappointing. The committee concluded in June 1936 that a wasting
disease not the closure had brought about the problem. Although two al-
dermen of Texel and Den Helder, who were on the committee, opined that
the closure had had a negative effect, the government did not heed their
minority advice to compensate the eelgrass harvesters. It refused to accept
Texel fishermen as being eligible for benefits. Nonetheless, the fishermen
never tired of petitioning the Minister of Water Affairs, claiming that the
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dam had caused the fisheries’ deterioration and stating that the Texel fish-
ermen should therefore be entitled to Zuider Sea relief. They were pre-
pared to drop their claim if they could get permission to fish mussels or
gain entry to the Lake IJssel fisheries. The state rejected this option as it
had just adopted a policy of limited access and restricted production to
contain the fisheries crisis.
The Oudeschild inshore fishermen, who were hit especially hard by the
crisis, began using their Labour Party contacts to lobby in the House of
Representatives. In 1936, especially, Labour parliamentarian Willem Drop
put pressure on the Minister to come up with the committee’s results. He
repeatedly submitted written questions to the then responsible Minister,
Otto van Lidth de Jeude. Drop also visited the island on a number of occa-
sions to consult with Texel – and particularly Oudeschild – fishermen.
They made plans for justice to be done. On the basis of detailed informa-
tion concerning the experiences and proceeds of 112 fishermen, they sent a
long and thoroughly underpinned request to the House of Representatives
in June 1936, calling for new scientific research into the causes of the de-
cline. Another research committee was formed: the Reigersma committee
and in addition, a Parliamentary Committee – which included Drop –
would investigate the consequences of the closure for the Texel fisheries
and report on the island’s fisher families’ social situation. The former
again concluded that a causal link between the closure and the decline of
fish stocks was unproven and that the extinction of eelgrass was solely due
to the wasting disease. The Parliamentary Committee did deem the Zuider
Sea Relief Act applicable to Texel fishermen, because they had been fishing
in the Zuider Sea, and the dam had significantly affected the Texel fish-
eries and eelgrass exploitation, even though the primary cause of the eel-
grass’s decline was the wasting disease. In February 1937, the committee
advised the entitlement of Texel fishermen who had been working in the
fishing industry prior to 25 July 1918 to Zuider Sea relief. Following this
advice, the mayor and aldermen of Texel insisted that the House of Repre-
sentatives accept the committee’s conclusions, supported by yet another
petition of Texel fishermen. The House of Representatives indeed heeded
the advice on 12 March 1937. The efforts of Texel fisherfolk appeared to
finally be yielding some results. In November, however, the Minister re-
jected the proposal to allow Texel fishermen under the terms of the Zuider
Sea Relief Act, still arguing that the Wadden Sea was not the Zuider Sea
and that the wasting disease had led to the extinction of eelgrass. The
Oudeschild and Oost fishermen were outraged, desperate and deeply dis-
appointed in the right-wing government, a coalition of confessional par-
ties. The destitute circumstances of many Texel fishermen and the Minis-
ter’s obstinacy led to several joint meetings of Progress through Unity and
the Co-op. Many fishermen attended such gatherings, which often resulted
in new petitions being sent to the Minister and the House of Representa-
tives. The associations’ leaders and parliamentarian Willem Drop pointed
out that it was important to stick together and that any kind of fission –
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which had previously often sapped sustained collective action – would be
dangerous now. A local merchant, Abraham Boon, had attempted to strike
a separate deal for the eelgrass workers, but in response to the plea stated
that he understood what was at stake and that a separate action would be
‘insane’.
A new Parliamentary Committee (again with Drop as a member) was
inaugurated. Its report was due in February 1938. Like its predecessor, it
advised the Minister of Water Affairs to support Texel fishermen through
the Zuider Sea Relief Fund. At long last, on 1 April 1938 the new Minister,
Johannes van Buuren, decided that the boundary of the Closure Dam
would no longer be decisive in applying the Zuider Sea Relief Act. Van
Buuren was the fourth Minister with whom the fishermen had had to deal
since 1932. All along, changes of government had delayed decision mak-
ing. Without voting, Parliament accepted the Minister’s decision a few
days later. This meant that Texel fishermen could finally call on the Zuider
Sea Relief Fund. By the end of the year, ninety of them received weekly
allowances amounting to between 1.50 and 12 guilders (with a mean of
6.50 guilders). However, admission was slow due to bureaucratic proce-
dures. The measure was not retroactive, so that Texel fishermen were not
compensated for their losses from 1932 to May 1938.
There were more reasons to be dissatisfied. It still took another year
before the rules were relaxed somewhat to include eelgrass harvesters and
certain categories of fishermen. In addition, the Zuider Sea Relief Act
stipulated that only those working in the fishing industry prior to 25 July
1918 were entitled to compensation. Being unaware that the closure would
have such negative consequences, Texel inshore fishermen had neverthe-
less continued to invest in their businesses whenever possible. Their sons
had taken up the occupation, never expecting that they would be con-
fronted with the rapid and unanticipated decline of inshore fishing. They
only discovered the consequences after 1932. Therefore, the Texel fisher-
men’s associations continued to petition the government and pointed out
the unfairness of sticking to the ‘1918’ rule. The fishermen also deemed it
unfair that in certain cases money was deducted from their allowances, for
example when they were working in unemployment relief projects, re-
ceived interest from savings or had relatives living with them who earned
an income. Without support, it was nearly impossible to earn a living in
the inshore fisheries – unless skippers had young sons who did not have
to be paid a full share. Many inshore fishermen therefore refrained from
fishing altogether. They could not even afford the costs of wear and tear.
The small-scale fleet was on the decline quantitatively as well as qualita-
tively. Along with that, it became harder and harder to find creditors, en-
trapping the inshore fishermen in a downward spiral.
Much bitterness was felt and the Oudeschild and Oost inshore fisher-
men’s experiences would colour their attitude towards the authorities for
years to come. The government’s protracted rigid stance and its narrow-
mindedness brought about a surge of bitterness on the island, the ripples
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of which were still noticeable when I did research decades later. Several
retired eelgrass harvesters expressed no doubt whatsoever: the Closure
Dam had caused the eelgrass to vanish. Later research would largely con-
firm this view. The wasting disease was important, but so were higher ve-
locities of tidal currents and sedimentation following the Closure Dam’s
construction (Giesen, van Katwijk and den Hartog 1990). Even after the
wasting disease had subsided, the eelgrass did not return. In the 1930s,
the fishermen’s opinion did not count for much. State representatives and
scientists patronized them as ignorant people. The dam caused an ecologi-
cal disaster, but back then ecology did not count for much either. The dam
brought misery upon Texel’s inshore fisherfolk. By the end of the decade,
agriculture had luckily recovered from the crisis and in the summer many
fishermen – including owners – could work as farmhands again. This tem-
porarily alleviated the inshore fisherfolk’s situation, but in the extremely
cold winter of 1939-1940 inshore vessels could not sail for months due to
ice and ice-drift. The inshore fishermen fought to keep body and soul to-
gether and many led a hand-to-mouth existence. According to an Oude-
schild skipper, inshore fishermen were earning ‘just enough to keep the
hunger away, but definitely not more than that’. However, the segment of
the local fishing industry that did not depend on exploitation of the inshore
zone was doing rather well.
In general, Oosterend fishermen were still more successful than their
Oudeschild counterparts. In spite of the global economic crisis, the former
motorized their vessels and as of the late 1920s introduced steel-hulled
vessels of a type dubbed cutter (kotter). Cutters were comparatively cost-
effective and efficient and could be handled by a relatively small crew.
Their owners obtained excellent financial results. The first such vessel,
equipped with an 80 h.p. engine, was added to the Texel fleet in 1927.
Due to financial problems the vessel was sold to Den Helder after a year,
but soon other Texel fishermen followed suit. Although motorization
made fishermen less dependent on the weather, landings and gross pro-
ceeds still fluctuated heavily. A 1930 account book of an Oosterend skipper
makes this abundantly clear. That year, the two owner-operators and three
deckhands grossed an aggregate of 17,616 guilders with their steel-hulled
boat, which was equipped with a 45 h.p. engine. Less than a third of the
gross proceeds went to operating costs and share wages for non-related
deckhands. The crew did not fish for six weeks due to inclement weather.
Their highest gross revenues after a week’s fishing trip amounted to 1,616
guilders, the lowest to a mere 85 guilders. Still, the figures proved that
investment in cutters – initially requiring a sum of 20,000 to 30,000
guilders but rising to 45,000 guilders by the end of the decade – reaped
rewards. This in turn changed the balance of forces of production from
labour being more important to capital becoming ever more important,
although the local fishing industry’s social organization remained based
on family firms. A time of rapid modernization ensued. In 1931, Texel’s
fishing fleet boasted four steel-hulled cutters with 100 to 150 h.p. engines
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owned by Oosterend firms: eight years later there were twelve such ves-
sels, eleven of them owned by Oosterenders. Five families were instru-
mental to this modernization: the Drijver, Vlaming, van der Vis, and Ellen
families from Oosterend and the Krijnen family from Oudeschild. These
families constituted the local ‘fishing elite’. A councillor noted that the
Oosterend North Sea fleet was the country’s best and that despite the diffi-
cult circumstances its fishermen exhibited ‘entrepreneurial spirit, pluck
and initiative’ (Texelse Courant, 4 December 1935).
It was not mere local partisanship. At the time, the Texel North Sea fish-
ermen were indeed the vanguard of the Dutch skipper-owned cutter fleet’s
development, owning a third of the total number of this type of vessel in
the country. Their pioneering role is generally acknowledged in the Dutch
fisheries literature (see, for instance, Hildebrandt 1952; Schreur 1953,
1966; Kranenburg 1977). The example of Texel fishermen who success-
fully used cutters was swiftly followed by skipper-owners hailing from
other Dutch fishing communities. They had observed or heard of the
catches the Texelians landed. However, in addition to looking at landings
the Texelians also took account of costs, something that others occasionally
seemed to forget. A sociologist who conducted research on the island of
Urk – a community that is currently completely dominated by the fishing
industry, with the largest fishing fleet and the largest fish auction in the
Netherlands – wrote in 1940 that the Oosterend North Sea fishermen com-
pared favourably with their Urk compatriots. They grossed more, they
were on top of new developments, replaced engines long before they were
completely worn out and were not heavily indebted. The Oosterend fisher-
men, he wrote, ‘are very active and energetic and form a close-knit organi-
zation with, amongst others, a cooperative credit-bank’ (Plomp 1989
[1940]:67). In 1937 and 1938, the mean annual gross proceeds of Texel
North Sea fishermen were over 18,500 and 17,000 guilders, respectively,
which was considerably more than what Urk and Den Helder fishermen
working with similar vessels grossed.
Texel skipper-owners and crewmembers working in the offshore seg-
ment obtained good annual incomes with a mean of 2,400 guilders in
1937 (Plomp 1940:381). Cutter fishermen often earned considerably more
than skilled labourers during the years of economic crisis. Since invest-
ment in steel-hulled cutters required considerable sums of money, the
share division between vessel and crew was fixed at fifty-fifty. With a crew
of five, this implied that the skipper and full-blown deckhands would ob-
tain a ten per cent share each.3 With a fuel price of three cents per litre and
a fuel consumption of about 400 litres per week, operating costs were low.
Even though herring fishing had suffered, sole and plaice prices were gen-
erally rather good. Their motorized vessels enabled the North Sea fisher-
men to market their fish at the auctions that yielded the best prices, for
example IJmuiden. Weeks in which the gross revenues amounted to 700
guilders were no exception in the late 1930s. If operating costs amounted
to a hundred guilders, the vessel share – which was used for depreciation,
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insurances and so on – would be 300 guilders and the same amount would
go to the crew share. Each of the crewmembers, including the skipper,
would then have a remuneration of sixty guilders, which was extremely
good money. Of course, there were weeks in which the boats could not sail
due to inclement weather, but in general, the North Sea fishermen were
rather well off. Thus, the economic depression did not hit the North Sea
fisheries to the same extent as it did the inshore sector and on the whole,
the Oosterend fishermen have been considerably more successful than
Oudeschild fishermen. The question is: why?
Worlds Apart: ‘Jerusalem’ and ‘The Red Village’
The differential success of Oudeschild and Oosterend fishermen dates
back to the late 19th century, when their fishing economies began diver-
ging after a brief spell of convergence (see Chapter 2). The Oosterend fish-
ermen’s tendency was to orient themselves on North Sea week-trip fishing,
whereas Oudeschild – and Oost – fishermen were mostly inclined to day
tripping on the Zuider Sea and the Wadden Sea. The Closure Dam’s con-
struction therefore had devastating consequences for Oudeschild and Oost
fisherfolk in particular. Not only did they lose access to a vast area of fish-
ing grounds, the closure also had a strong negative impact on commer-
cially important species of fish, shellfish and crustaceans in the Wadden
Sea. Eelgrass exploitation, which was still important in the early 20th-cen-
tury seasonal cycle of Oudeschild and Oost fishermen but to a consider-
ably lesser extent in that of Oosterend fishermen, ceased to exist in the
early 1930s. Those who mainly plied the North Sea did not face similar
problems, although those who seasonally switched to shrimp, herring and
anchovy fishing in the Zuider Sea of course also felt the effects. With their
type of vessels, it still proved to be much easier for Oosterenders to find
alternatives, enabling them to avoid the crisis. The events of the 1930s
deepened the differences between both occupational communities of fish-
ermen. Even though they shared a pervasive labour ethos, Oudeschilders
were predominantly content to eke out a living, whereas Oosterenders
were much more inclined toward accumulating profits and staying ahead
of their competitors. The former perceived themselves as labourers, the
latter as entrepreneurs. In the long run, only those who modernized their
operations succeeded in maintaining a profitable business. Early on, the
economic successes of Oosterend fishermen were connected with ideolo-
gical factors, most notably religion (see Chapter 2). So, let us take a closer
look at the communities and cultural conventions of Oosterenders and
Oudeschilders and see how their respective ideologies might have influ-
enced the fishermen’s behaviour, goals, attitudes and labour ethos.
The vast majority of the inhabitants of Oosterend were Protestants of
various denominations: Dutch Reformed, Calvinist Reformed and Menno-
nite. There was a tiny Catholic minority. With four local churches, Ooster-
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea 117
end was visibly the most religious community on the island, hence its des-
ignation as ‘Jerusalem’. With hardly any exception, the fisher families were
Protestant, belonging to either an orthodox congregation or a latitudinar-
ian one. As we have seen, the heterodox and the orthodox Protestants were
nicknamed ‘coarse’ and ‘fine’, respectively. The terms refer to the degree of
strictness with which people observed the Protestant creed. On Sundays,
fishermen refrained from sailing and attended church services. The Calvi-
nists went twice, the heterodox once. On this day, religious allegiance be-
came particularly manifest:
In general, the feud between fine and coarse fishermen is not so grave.
They meet each other at the quay, at sea, at the fish auction, in the fisher-
men’s association, on Saturday evenings in the house of head teacher
Daalder. They brave the same dangers, have the same fears and the same
expectations and they confide in and pray to the same God. On Sundays
alone this all changes completely. Then they go to different churches, have
their faces in a particular fold that excludes any communion, then the
coarse are allowed to do more than the fine and the religious differences
are strongly emphasized (Daalder 1978:38).4
At face value, the differences between the various Protestant denomina-
tions were over obscure exegetic details that easily gave rise to dissension.
This became evident once more in the mid-1920s when a conflict in the
Calvinist Reformed Church led to a schism. As of 1926, there would be a
fifth church in Oosterend: the Restored Union (Hersteld Verband) Church,
which had hived off from the Calvinist Reformed (Gereformeerde) Church.
The whole affair was more or less coincidental. It so happened that in
1924, following a six-year vacancy, a young and charismatic minister, Jan
Buskes, was appointed to Oosterend’s Gereformeerde Church. Buskes was
quite popular, but became involved in a conflict when a Calvinist theolo-
gian claimed that the Bible story of Genesis 2 and 3, referring to the speak-
ing serpent in paradise, should be interpreted metaphorically. This led to a
clash when the national Gereformeerde Synod stated that the Bible ought to
be taken literally and that ministers must sign a statement that they sub-
scribe to the Synod’s viewpoint. Buskes read the statement in a Sunday
service, but confessed that he had great difficulty with it. A conflict was
born. Buskes was suspended and he left the island, but his followers estab-
lished the new Restored Union Church and about a fifth of the Oosterend
Calvinists enrolled as members. A woman, born in 1914, recalled:
My father was the Mennonite Church’s deacon. There would be a service
once every three weeks. His cousin had joined Restored Union, and he
came to ask whether it would be possible to use our church if there was no
service. My father agreed. After that, the Calvinists refused to greet us,
although they had always done so previously.
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Within the religious community of Calvinists, relationships between those
who opted for Restored Union and those who continued to be members of
the Gereformeerde Church grew quite tense and even disrupted entire fami-
lies. The members of Restored Union built a new church in 1928 and a
year later, Buskes returned to the island to become its minister. This would
only sour relationships further. The conflict had a strong moral dimension
in that it hinged upon a discourse as to who adhered to the ‘right’ interpre-
tation of the Bible. It realigned the local community and stirred emotions
precisely because the opponents had much more in common than what
divided them dogmatically.
The main dogmatic difference concerned the view on predestination.
The orthodox were convinced that they were chosen to behold paradise,
whereas the heterodox expressed more doubts. Yet at the level of social
relationships, there was strong moral construction and constriction to ad-
here to one’s own church. ‘In the old days, you had to attend church ser-
vices and confirmation classes, otherwise you would be in trouble,’ related
a man born in 1921. Social control was tight:
They simply made you. You didn’t have any opportunities for an outing, so
you stayed in the village. You were a member of a Christian youngsters
association or a Christian glee-club. That was it. Later on, though, [i.e., in
the 1960s] it got much more liberal.
The villagers were born into a particular religious community and would
not easily switch to another. They were disciplined into ‘the right belief’
not only in church, but also in a variety of other institutions such as volun-
tary associations and the school. Religion divided the village’s communal
life. To a large extent, it determined whom one married, whom one be-
friended, where one bought one’s groceries and so on. Mixed marriages
between orthodox and heterodox Protestants were taboo and if they did
occur, conflict would usually run in the families concerned. However, mar-
riage partners of different latitudinarian denominations (for instance,
Mennonite and Dutch Reformed) were seldom a problem. Protestant chil-
dren who went to the secular school and their orthodox counterparts who
attended the Protestant school would often get into fights with each other.
The latitudinarians deemed the Calvinists sanctimonious and Pharisaic.
As a Dutch Reformed man, born in 1923, related: ‘When they [the Calvi-
nists] were in the village, they behaved in a saintly way. Once they were off
the island, however, they would go and see prostitutes and indulge in
drinking. That happened during the herring season. We never did that.’
From the other standpoint, the orthodox considered the latitudinarians to
be insufficiently sound in their faith. Still, religious denomination was not
important in regard to crew recruitment or with whom one pair trawled.
Heterodox Protestant deckhands could be found aboard an orthodox Calvi-
nist skipper’s boat and vice versa. As time went by, the relationships be-
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea 119
tween the denominations relaxed considerably as was the case in Dutch
society as a whole.
The religiousness of orthodox Oosterend fishermen showed among
many other things in vessel names (for example, ‘Deo Volente’, ‘Soli Deo
Gloria’, ‘Ora et Labora’) and in the maxims that could sometimes be found
in the wheel-houses (‘How vast is your sea, O Lord, and how tiny my
boat’). For the orthodox Protestant majority of fisher families, bicycling on
Sundays was taboo. Several fishermen were on church councils or acted as
church elders – this applied to both the Dutch Reformed and Calvinist
Reformed congregations. Reference to biblical language was quite com-
mon and the orthodox were versed in Scripture. For all outer signs of reli-
giousness, several ministers still deemed the Oosterenders’ faith rather
superficial. They appreciated the latter’s civility but at the same time felt
that their belief was not submissive but rather moralist and rationalist
(Buskes 1946:36-37; Saal 1948:9-14; Janse 1955:266). According to these
clergymen, a sense of sin was lacking. The emphasis was on abiding by
biblical or commonsensical yardsticks. One of the ministers asked an old
fisherman whether he had been experiencing God’s greatness and majesty
at sea. He referred to Psalm 29:3 – ‘The voice of the Lord is upon the
waters: the God of glory thundereth: the Lord is upon many waters.’ The
fisherman replied: ‘I’ve been sailing for sixty years, sir, but I’ve never
heard it’ (Buskes 1946:19-20). For the villagers, church services first and
foremost signified social occasions, not religious ones, the ministers
claimed. A minister was appreciated for his oratory gifts and social talents,
not his evangelical message. Indeed, a Dutch Reformed skipper-owner,
born in 1923, pointed out that for him personally, the Sunday service of-
fered a moment of reflection, adding: ‘Following the service, you would
come together with the family for a cuppa. You were together then and
that was congenial.’However, the same interlocutor also related the follow-
ing:
My father was a deeply religious man. There have been times when I
thought: why don’t you curse everything to hell now. He never did. I re-
member that once we were sailing together in really foul weather. My father
said: ‘If you help a little bit, and He does too, we’ll manage.’ He never used
angry words.
Personal experiences and anxieties could indeed lead to a thorough sense
of sin and salvation. A Calvinist Reformed man, born in 1904, was on
board a cutter that capsized in a 1938 storm. Miraculously, no one was
killed in the accident. The next Sunday, the minister preached Jonah 2,
verse 3: ‘For thou hadst cast me into the deep, in the midst of the seas;
and the floods compassed me about: all thy billows and thy waves passed
over me.’ My interlocutor, who unlike most of his contemporaries was still
not confirmed at the time of the mishap, took the accident to be a sign of
God. He was confirmed and he turned into a pious believer: ‘God did not
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want me yet, but I have always believed that He had an intention with this
event.’As a 94-year-old, he related:
That night was the great night of my life; a milestone, a night in which the
clear light of God’s mercy went up on my tormented soul, and the points
were shifted to the right track. … I feel that I had to go through this, that as
a notorious sinner I had to experience this to enter the right path to truly
get to know Him like once Jacob did on the banks of the Jabbok River (Vis-
serijnieuws, 28 May 1999).
Of course, this concerns an individual experience. Accidents did not deter-
mine the measure of religiousness. Other interlocutors who had also had
narrow escapes rationalized why they survived by pointing out the particu-
lar conditions under which mishaps occurred, including the boat’s sea-
worthiness and so on. Their creed could offer comfort, though. In addition
to being religious linchpins, the Protestant churches generally were social
foci in the community.
Oudeschilders maintained quite another ideology. Thirty to forty per
cent of the population had no religious affiliation, while the Dutch Re-
formed were mostly nominal church members. The congregation often
did not have a minister for years, and if a visiting minister led a service,
attendance was negligible. It was only the Roman Catholic minority – very
few of whom were involved in the fishing industry – that was tightly inte-
grated and adhered to the church. Like Oosterenders, Oudeschild fisher-
men refrained from fishing on Sundays. To a large extent, the latter were
embedded in capitalist relations of production and often felt exploited. In
Social Democracy, they saw a means of achieving social justice. It harked
back to the late 19th century, when poverty had driven many villagers into
wage labour on the mainland. In the port of Amsterdam, in particular,
many found work at the shipyards and as dockworkers. Soon they discov-
ered that they were used as scabs. Dockworkers were on strike and told the
islanders in no uncertain terms what their work amounted to. This experi-
ence made the men susceptible to Socialist leaders who went to the island
in order to recruit a following there. With six others, fisherman Jan
Henkes had established a local department of the Social Democratic La-
bour Party in 1908. He was an independent skipper-owner of a small boat.
Henkes would be a local councillor for thirteen years and was strongly
committed to elevating the working class. For a quarter of a century, he
was also the local fishermen’s association’s chairman. Several self-em-
ployed boat dischargers in the harbour also supported Labour. Oudeschild
turned into a stronghold of Social Democrats and was dubbed ‘the Red
Village’. The Oudeschilders used a socialist jargon, referring to ‘exploita-
tion’ by the ‘capitalist class’ and demanded government intervention to
tackle the economic depression. They celebrated Labour Day on the 1st of
May. At local level, however, class relationships were mitigated by a moral
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economy. The former fish auctioneer, born in 1916, characterized Oude-
schild as a rather poor and more or less classless community:
Some were slightly better off but there were no great class distinctions.
They [the villagers] mainly opposed government, not so much capitalists,
for there weren’t any here save for some petty entrepreneurs. Nor did reli-
gious differences matter. The majority was indifferent, some were Dutch
Reformed and you had the Catholics who did attend Sunday mass. The
Dutch Reformed only went on Christian holidays or not at all.
All local children went to the local secular school. The Oudeschilders opted
for self-help: ‘No-one had money, so you just had to help each other.’ It was
an egalitarian and close-knit community. A shrimp fisherman, born in
1915, said: ‘Skipper or deckhand, it didn’t matter. You were equals among
each other. We didn’t have any differences.’ Indicative of their communi-
tarian ideology is the following. Shrimp fishermen landing their catches
first usually received the lowest prices. Therefore, they agreed on having a
fixed price, so that it was not disadvantageous to come first. The Ou-
deschilders’ solidarity and neighbourliness were acknowledged and ad-
mired by Oosterenders, who usually mentioned it in interviews.
The ideological divergence of Oosterend and Oudeschild was rooted in
structural and contingent factors. At national level, the emergence of soci-
alism and orthodox Protestantism impacted what happened at local level,
but – to a considerable extent at least – it was a coincidence that people
who subscribed to these respective ideologies gained so much influence
locally. For example, the fact that the Dutch Reformed of Oosterend grew
more orthodox by the turn of the century was linked to the fact that an
orthodox minister was called to the pulpit. The Christian and Social-Demo-
cratic ideologies had an impact on the respective villagers’ worldviews.
They suited the different experiences of Oudeschilders and Oosterenders
and provided models on how to act in the situations they confronted. The
former restricted their operations to the inshore domain, were impacted
by capitalist relations of production and perceived themselves as labourers,
whereas the latter plied the dangerous North Sea and regarded themselves
to be entrepreneurs whose this-worldly success would be an indication for
other-worldly salvation. Oosterenders were inclined to take greater risks
than Oudeschilders and in Calvinism they found a way of mentally coping
with potential perils. It reminds one of Malinowski’s anxiety–ritual propo-
sition, stating that the greater the risks, the more rituals and taboos (Mal-
inowski 1955). Elaborating on this theme, one might say that the Ooster-
end fishermen’s religious orthodoxy was perhaps linked with their métier,
being as it was full of danger and uncertainty. Oudeschilders took fewer
risks and were much more inclined to self-help and solidarity. Because the
Reformed church had stood aloof in adverse times and had increasingly
estranged the local populace, the Social Democratic movement with its
promise of future emancipation of the labour class rapidly gained influ-
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ence. As national Labour politicians showed an interest in the destitute
situation of Oudeschild fishermen following the Zuider Sea’s closure, and
in parliamentary debates supported their fight to be recognized as victims,
the local support for the Social Democratic movement only increased.
It would seem plausible to link differential economic success with the
diverging politico-religious ideational systems of the two villages. This has
indeed been done by the sociologist Schreur, who in the early 1950s con-
ducted research into the Texel fishing industry. He points to Weber’s thesis
on the ‘Protestant ethic’ and the ‘capitalist spirit’ (Schreur 1953:53; Weber
1969[1920]), arguing that the Oosterenders’ diligence, thrift, restraint and
rational economic orientation explain why they were successful entrepre-
neurs. Their leading was ‘due mainly to their economic rationalism that is
linked to their Calvinist ethos’ (Schreur 1964:222). However, this is a
rather vulgarized version of Weber’s thesis. The German sociologist made
it abundantly clear that there was no unilateral causal relationship but a
mutual influence, that the capitalist spirit sprouted from an ascetic way of
life but that economic rationalism was hardly restricted to Protestants and
had gradually penetrated all ‘modern culture’. Oudeschilders had certainly
been influenced by Protestantism, even though a process of secularization
had affected their outlook on life. Instead of a religious ideology, they
opted for a secular political ideology as their compass in life. This does not
mean, however, that they were any less diligent and thrifty or had less self-
control than their northern neighbours. Quite the contrary: the Social De-
mocratic movement stimulated such ‘civil virtues’ as a road towards eman-
cipation. Oosterend skipper-owners were often keen on hiring Oudeschild
deckhands, who were reputed to be highly skilled net-menders and to
work hard to earn their share. Whereas in Oosterend individual profit
maximization and Protestantism were in perfect harmony, in socialism
profit-making and an ethic of equality seemed to be at odds, since profits
would be made at the expense of colleagues. The Oudeschilders distrusted
capitalist entrepreneurship as they perceived themselves as a kind of sea-
going proletariat – despite the fact that they were petty entrepreneurs. First
and foremost, their orientation was towards fulfilling household needs.
Another factor, directly linked with the different ideologies, was also im-
portant. Oosterenders had larger families than Oudeschilders. Although
there were more mouths to feed, this enabled them to recruit family crews,
enhancing their versatility. As a former Oudeschild fisherman related: ‘In
Oudeschild, there were more coffins than cradles. Sons were lacking, mak-
ing it difficult to weather hard times. … Here, we only had one skipper
with a couple of sons and his firm has been quite successful.’ Demo-
graphic statistics to some extent confirm this view. The demographic com-
position of the two communities originated in politico-religious differ-
ences. Churches stimulated large families, the Social Democratic
movement smaller ones. So in addition to affecting labour ethos, the two
ideologies impacted the ethos of human reproduction. Oudeschilders in-
deed had smaller families, whereas Oosterend fishermen generally had
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more sons who contributed importantly to reducing labour costs and accu-
mulating capital. Interestingly, in the 1910s and 1920s many Oudeschild
fishermen had acquired smaller boats so that they did not need a crew of
three but could handle the vessel alone or with one deckhand. It was pre-
cisely this boat type that was unfit to sail the North Sea and as we have
seen, those who depended on inshore fishing were hit hardest by the
1930s ecological and economic crises. This in turn diminished the Oude-
schild fleet’s viability, whereupon recruiting crew became increasingly dif-
ficult. Even occupational succession was no longer a matter of course as it
had previously been. All in all, their greater economic and social assets
gave Oosterenders a considerable edge over their northern neighbours.
However, those Oosterend fishermen who also depended on inshore fish-
ing were hit equally as hard as their Oudeschild compatriots, while the
only Oudeschild skipper-owner who owned a cutter was quite successful.
We should, therefore, avoid generalizing too starkly.
The inhabitants of the respective villages themselves usually argued in
terms of ‘mentalities’ to explain the differences between the occupational
communities of fishermen. An Oosterend fisherman said: ‘It is a matter of
mentality: more entrepreneurial spirit, more viciousness, we had more of
that here than in Oudeschild. They were more relaxed, more congenial,
gossiping about the neighbours. Here we are a stubborn lot, and religion
also plays a role.’ Many of my interlocutors – regardless of whether they
hailed from the one or the other village – alluded to ‘the fact’ that the Ou-
deschilders ‘never lost sight of the local windmill’ or that they ‘always
wanted to be able to see their chimney smoke’. The Oudeschild fishermen
allegedly wanted to return to ‘Cape Bum’ (meaning their wife) each night.
The former fish auctioneer said: ‘In Oudeschild, people were more re-
laxed. They would say: “If it doesn’t happen today, it’ll happen tomorrow”.’
By contrast, the Oosterend fishermen were said to be ‘more active’, ‘entre-
preneurial’ and ‘keen’. To some extent, the images were appropriated as
self-images. A retired Oosterend owner-operator, born in 1904, contended:
‘In Oudeschild they had a big shrimp-fishing fleet. Fine shrimpers, but
they wanted to be home each night! It was another mentality. The Ooster-
enders’ outlook was more progressive: keep up with the times, acquire a
bigger vessel with a more powerful engine.’ Of course, the proximity to the
fishing grounds enabled the Oudeschilders to return home each night and
as shrimp spoil quickly, it was paramount that they be marketed as quickly
as possible. An Oudeschild skipper, born in 1918, felt that the Oosterend
North Sea fishermen were disdainful of Oudeschild shrimp fishermen:
They thought they were fine fishermen if they had a big boat. That’s not
true. Unlike us, they were not very good with nets. Nonetheless, some Ou-
deschilders looked up to those Oosterenders because they earned much
more. Anyway, we had little to do with each other, partly because our labour
rhythms varied.
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Although he clearly resented what he assumed to be the Oosterenders’
stance, he continued, saying:
We did like to be home, though, and traditionally Oudeschild fishermen
were not North Sea fishermen. The Oosterenders were. For their part, they
disliked shrimp fishing because it was a laborious kind of fishing. It in-
volved a lot of work. You sailed short distances and made brief tows.
Such stereotypical views not only impacted the perceptions of each other,
but also their mutual relationships. A retired Oudeschild skipper-owner,
born in 1915, related the following:
To be honest, we can’t stand each other. No, we can’t. They are a different
kind of people. Here they were…Well, religion didn’t matter in Oudeschild.
I am a Roman Catholic and for a long time I’ve been the only Catholic
skipper in the fleet. Still, I’ve been the chairman of the [Oudeschild] fisher-
men’s association for twenty-five years. I mean it didn’t matter. For the
Oosterenders it did matter. Then again, we did have a Catholic and a Pro-
testant bonfire. However, my father was a carpenter, and he used to say: ‘If I
only have to live off Roman Catholics, I might just as well put a rope around
my neck.’He could only make a living from the entire village. He also made
us go to the secular school here, not to the Catholic one in Den Burg. I am
of the same opinion. It would harm the village community if I had sent my
kids to Den Burg.
The perceived differences between the two fishing villages continued to be
considerable. A symbolic boundary rather pertinently divided and is still
dividing both communities. Their different outlooks on life in general,
and their métier in particular, were reinforced by their diverging ideolo-
gies. These in turn provided anchorage for their specific modes of opera-
tion, the risks they were willing to take and their labour motivations.
Their separate worldviews and modes of production also affected occu-
pational organization from its very onset (see Chapter 2). Fishermen from
both villages continued to maintain their own associations. The pioneering
skipper-owners of five family firms who constituted the island’s fishing
elite established the Cooperative Purchasing Association for Fishery Ne-
cessaries – as the Co-op’s official name read – in May 1931. These rather
successful firms owned and operated the innovative steel-hulled cutters
with powerful engines. The Co-op’s first board reflects the importance of
these families: Biem Vlaming was elected chairman, Aris Ellen became its
secretary, Willem Drijver was its treasurer and the other board members
were Fup Krijnen and Jan van der Vis. The Co-op was born out of necessity
in times of grim economic recession. It started off with thirteen members,
representing nine cutters, who had to chip in a hundred guilders each. The
Co-op’s aim was to bypass intermediary traders and directly buy fishing
materials and fuel from wholesale dealers at reduced prices. This went
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against the grain for several local tradesmen, among whom were the sail-
maker, the shipyard and the firm that supplied fuel and lubricants to the
fleet. They rightly feared that they would lose customers. The Co-op
bought its own warehouse to store fishing materials and a tan-vat to pre-
serve nets and sails. The Co-op’s scope went beyond that of buying fishing
materials at reduced prices. It also was a voluntary association that acted
on behalf of its membership in general fisheries matters. On the basis of
the minutes of Co-op board meetings, one gains the impression that mu-
tual relationships were rather genial. Crosscutting ties of kinship, friend-
ship and community membership contributed to this. Most members
even lived in the same street in Oosterend. Although the Drijver and
Vlaming families were Calvinist Reformed and the Ellen, van der Vis and
Krijnen families were Dutch Reformed, the emphasis was on together-
ness. For example, the treasurer – who could invariably report good finan-
cial results during the initial stage of the Co-op’s existence – encouraged
the members in 1936 to continue supporting it and wishing it well by
maintaining it together. Business went so well that a year later, the Co-op
was able to buy its own small oil tanker to fetch fuel from Amsterdam. The
vessel’s capacity was sufficient to supply the entire cutter fleet with red
diesel for three weeks.
In contradistinction to the Co-op, both skipper-owners and non-proper-
tied deckhands could become members of Oudeschild’s Progress through
Unity association for the modest fee of five cents per week. Generally, the
Oudeschild fishermen resented the Co-op’s efforts to bypass the inter-
mediary dealers. They called the Co-op ‘the hand-that-strangles institution’
(de Wolf 2004:28). At the root of this perception was the conviction that
fishermen, suppliers and tradesmen were interdependent and that their
fates were inextricably interlinked. The fishermen supported the interests
of the small suppliers and traders by remaining loyal and expected them in
reciprocal fashion to support the fishermen, for example through acting as
guarantors, supplying informal credit or upholding prices to a certain le-
vel. In other words, the Oudeschild fishermen and the local petty traders
and suppliers constituted a strong community of interest based on a moral
economy (see also Chapter 2). Economic transactions were to some degree
guided by norms, values and mores and face-to-face relationships helped
mitigate power differences between fishermen and merchants. The fact
that the association was led by local leaders of the Social Democratic move-
ment – including a fish dealer – is important in understanding this view-
point. Moreover, both fishermen and middlemen had joined forces in their
fight to be acknowledged as rightful claimants to the Zuider Sea Relief
Fund.
Although organized separately, the island fishermen worked together if
and when they deemed doing so beneficial. Mutual problems, goals and
desires brought them together in an attempt to achieve common objec-
tives. For example, the Co-op wholeheartedly supported the Oudeschild
fishermen’s association’s struggle to become entitled to Zuider Sea Relief.
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Both the Co-op and Progress through Unity joined the National Union of
Fisheries Associations that was established in 1934 and later renamed
Dutch Fishermen’s Union. It was the first such organization that horizon-
tally integrated the interests of disparate petty producers that did not dis-
appear from the fisheries arena within a couple of years. It was no coinci-
dence that fishermen finally had arrived at sustained supra-local collective
action by this time, as the Zuider Sea’s closure and the economic depres-
sion had a severe impact upon the Dutch fishing industry. However, by the
time the Union was gaining some political clout, it had to suspend its ac-
tivities due to dramatic geopolitical events in Europe, beginning with Ger-
many’s invasion of Poland in 1939. Dutch fishermen soon felt the effects.
Prices of fuel and fishing materials soared, while it became increasingly
difficult to ship fish because foreign markets became inaccessible. For
some time, fishing in the North Sea was prohibited due to the danger of
sea-mines.
The War and its Aftermath
German troops invaded the Netherlands in early May 1940. Texel cutter
owners moored their vessels near Oost. They deemed the Oudeschild har-
bour unsafe, as Den Helder was a naval port that was heavily shelled. Fish-
ing was impossible until the end of October. For some time, the fishermen
were allowed to participate in day-tripping fisheries with Scheveningen
and later IJmuiden as their port of call. German navy vessels accompanied
them to the fishing grounds. The Co-op was disbanded in December 1940.
The German army had requisitioned the Co-op’s oil tanker a few months
earlier, and due to the war it was increasingly difficult to acquire fishing
materials. After that, the Co-op stocks were redistributed to the members.
The Oudeschild fishermen’s association’s work also came to a standstill.
As of February 1941, the Wehrmacht began impounding the best vessels
and converted them into tug boats and patrol vessels. Soon, all Texel cut-
ters were confiscated. ‘It was a terrible time,’ one of the skipper-owners
recalled. ‘You had been working so hard for that boat.’ The fishermen
were allowed to strip the fishing equipment off their vessels and take it
home to Texel. The occupiers were not interested in wooden-hulled rowing
boats or sailing vessels equipped with small engines. As of May 1941, day
tripping from the harbour of Oudeschild with such vessels was allowed
with a special permit. The fishermen could leave between 6 and 8 am after
reporting to the Military Post and showing their Ausweis in the port office.
They were not allowed to call at other ports, had to be in possession of a
German fishing licence and should return between 14 and 16 pm and re-
port back to the authorities.
Nearly all skippers and deckhands who had become unemployed follow-
ing the cutters’ impoundment acquired new flats or an old sailing vessel.
The local fleet eventually comprised 174 small sailing vessels and rowing
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boats. Only thirty-four had auxiliary engines, with predominantly less than
20 h.p. Until September 1944, the owners of the requisitioned cutters re-
ceived a small monthly allowance in compensation. Some of them – in
particular those who had bought new vessels shortly before the outbreak
of the war – were deeply indebted and had to redeem their debts. Most
former North Sea fishermen began fishing dab with hoop nets and, to a
lesser extent, flounder – species that had not been particularly sought after
previously. Still, under the prevailing conditions the fishermen could make
rather good money landing them. The local auction even received a fillip
during the occupation. Its annual turnover increased sevenfold relative to
the five years before the war. A lot had to do with the fact that Texelians
were not allowed to land their catch in the naval port of Den Helder or
elsewhere as many had previously been doing. In addition, fish was a valu-
able food item, and the German army readily bought most of the supplies.
There were many extra mouths to feed on the island. Fish prices were
fixed but generally, the fishermen earned a good living. As a trap netter,
born in 1920, recalled: ‘Inshore fishing was good because there was no
fishing in the North Sea. Species such as mackerel and scads had been
gone for years, but they returned. We caught huge amounts and everything
you landed was worth gold.’ Several contemporaries confirmed this view.
‘With a hoop net, I sometimes caught six to eight hundred pounds of dab
in a tide. You would leave the harbour when high tide began, and with the
turning of the tide go back with the flow. The auction bought the dab for a
fixed price, I think it was a quarter a kilo,’ said a fisherman, born in 1914.
Having a small boat was a means of obtaining an income but with increas-
ing scarcity, it was also used to acquire food for one’s own household and
an exchange item in a developing informal economy: ‘We used to sort the
big dab and cycle to the farmers and swap them for butter.’ In the summer,
however, shrimp and dab migrated to other waters and most fishermen
had to find jobs as farmhands. Whelk fishing came to a standstill during
the war, since the Belgian, French and English markets could not be sup-
plied.
Although they resented the occupation and the occupiers, the fishermen
could have fared much worse. They were exempt from the Arbeitseinsatz if
they reported to the Industrial Board of Fisheries Products, an institution
established by the German authorities. However, as the war progressed,
equipment and fuel were rationed and distributed. The island’s fishmeal
plant closed down in 1942. For a long time, the devastating practice of
landing undersized by-catches had yielded a substantial part of the gross
revenues and contributed importantly to the incomes of many fishermen.
By 1943, fuel was no longer available. When the occupying forces also im-
pounded the fishermen’s bicycles, the Oosterenders had to walk the six-
kilometre distance to the Oudeschild harbour. The situation further dete-
riorated when the Germans in November 1944 commanded hundreds of
Texel male civilians aged 18 to 35 to conduct forced labour, among whom
were several fishermen. They only returned to the island in March the next
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year. A fortnight later, Georgians who were in the Wehrmacht rose up
against the Germans. The insurrection – locally known as the ‘Russians’
War’ – had devastating consequences as the belligerents’ hostilities took
weeks and the civilian population was caught in the crossfire. The event
exacted a heavy toll in human lives (see Chapter 1). Several vessels were
badly damaged when Oudeschild and the harbour came under fire. A fish-
erman, born in 1914, remembered the first day of the Georgians’ uprising:
I went to the harbour that morning, and the gate was still locked. I said to
another skipper: ‘I don’t know what is going on, but they are shooting like
madmen.’ It later turned out that the Russians’ War had begun. I was lucky
not to have entered the harbour quay. There was a dab fisherman who had
and he was taking cover near a building that was shot to fire. He got badly
burned. I wanted to go home, but the bullets were whistling all around me
so I had to duck for cover.
The Russians’ War would last for weeks and kept the island’s populace in
its grip. Texel was one of the last areas in the Netherlands to be liberated.
In the final stage of the war, heavy damage was inflicted upon the island
that only a few months earlier had seemed to be escaping relatively un-
scathed.
As the Netherlands emerged from the Second World War, the fishing
industry was in a state of severe disorder. The modern fishing vessels had
been impounded; others were demolished or badly damaged. The country
was in dire need of animal protein and the post-war government’s recon-
struction policy prioritized food production and economic recovery. Imme-
diately after the conclusion of hostilities on the island in late May 1945,
Texel fishermen whose vessels had been confiscated by the German occu-
pying troops longed to resume their means of livelihood. However, they
could only guess as to the whereabouts of their cutters. Search parties
were formed and several vessels – some of which had served as far away
as the Baltic Sea – were recovered. Three cutters were never retrieved.
They were eventually substituted with new-built craft with the same regis-
tration numbers, but meanwhile their owners had to crew for others for
want of a boat. The vessels that were repatriated to Texel needed substan-
tial repairs. The state indemnified the owners and as soon as the boats
were ready to return to sea, the Texel fishermen began fishing again. With
catching efforts in the North Sea having been at a low for five consecutive
years, fish stocks thrived. Once back in business, Texel fishermen discov-
ered that large sole, plaice, cod and other species could be caught in abun-
dance. A retired skipper-owner recalled:
Right after the war, we fished with a flat-bottomed sailing vessel with an 18
h.p. engine. We otter trawled, using a thirty-pound footrope only, and we
caught plenty of big flatfish and cod. Within thirty-six hours, we grossed
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2,500 guilders in Den Helder. As they say: big fish eat small fish. Initially,
we hardly caught smaller specimens.
Many of my interlocutors confirmed this view. The fishermen made good
money, even though the Dutch government introduced a system of max-
imum prices. Markets at home and abroad were craving for fish and prices
rocketed. Bumper catches and fairly good prices led to unprecedented
gross proceeds and net incomes. For example, after three days and nights
of fishing, the crew of a Texel cutter landed such quantities of fish at the
Oudeschild auction in October 1945 that it took hours and hours to un-
load, sort and pack the catch, which grossed a record of about 9,000
guilders. Bumper catches and windfalls encouraged risk-taking. That fish-
ing immediately after the war could be hazardous became evident when in
1946 and 1947 three Texel vessels hit sea-mines. Two vessels were heavily
damaged, while one boat was lost and a crewmember – the skipper-own-
er’s son – badly injured. In solidarity, the Texel fishermen collected money
to provide the uninsured owner with a substitute vessel. It could have been
much worse: when fishing just north of Texel, a cutter from neighbouring
Den Helder sank in July 1945 after it netted a sea-mine. The device ex-
ploded, killing a crew of six.5 But Texel’s North Sea fishermen did not re-
gard such perils and mishaps sufficient reason to quit fishing. They were
keen on maintaining their leading position and dared to invest in improv-
ing their vessel’s performance and safety.
Texel’s North Sea fishermen confronted the question of whether or not
to revitalize the Co-op. It was only in February 1946 that the first post-war
meeting was held. Mutual relationships had suffered from the fact that a
few skipper-owners had been able to keep their boats for some time and
continue fishing, whereas most fishermen had lost their vessels to the oc-
cupying forces for all those years. Meanwhile, some operators were mak-
ing good money and this went against the grain for those whose cutters
were never found again and whose owners had to crew for others until
they could acquire new boats. It took some heated discussions to convince
everyone to uphold the Co-op, including its tannery and heavily damaged
warehouse, which badly needed repairing. A new board was elected, but
restoring mutual trust was not easy. During the next meeting, the Co-op’s
secretary hammered on the need to let bygones be bygones:
We should support our cause together and in unison because it is in our
mutual interest. This requires that all of us mean well and refrain from
cold-shouldering each other or indulging in slander. Just frankly say what
fault you find with each other. For how can we build up something if mu-
tual relationships are corrupt?
This emotional appeal struck a chord. Becoming a Co-op member seemed
easy enough: it still required a symbolic contribution of a hundred
guilders. The skipper-owners began cooperating as of old, although it took
130 Braving Troubled Waters
many years for ill feelings to finally subside. The Oudeschild association
Progress through Unity, however, did not face problems of internal strife
and was re-established as soon as the war ended. A new board, succeeding
the old generation, was elected and would stay in office for many years.
Generally, board members of Texel’s fishermen’s organizations were re-
elected by acclaim.
Despite the fact that the local fishermen organized, their self-image was
of an individualist and independent lot whose differences of opinion were
legendary. ‘You won’t ever find two fishermen who agree,’many remarked,
usually referring to past and present experiences and examples. In the im-
mediate post-war era, this folk model of a deep-seated penchant for indivi-
dualism was backed by outside views on Dutch fishermen. In a speech for
the 1946 Fisheries Days, a social geographer propounded the following
view:
The fishermen’s inclination to associate is poorly developed; the women do
not play a role in this whatsoever. Organizations and cooperatives, which
are thriving in other parts of society, are hardly known. Only hesitatingly
do our fishermen become members of local occupational associations,
even though it is currently evident that this is desirable. … They persist in
their individualism. This is an unfavourable disposition. Leaving aside the
important fact of externally promoting interests with the state, they should
organize to obtain better social security (Visser 1946-47:315).
Other contemporaries also referred to the alleged individualism of Dutch
fishermen and their disinclination to organize (Hildebrandt 1947-48).6
Fishermen ‘take great pride in their occupation and if at all possible they
solve their own and their family’s problems. If they are unsuccessful, they
turn to the unorganized spontaneous help of their own group’ (Hildeb-
randt and Visser 1947:64). Contrary evidence as in the Texel case notwith-
standing, auto-images and external images seamlessly overlapped. To be
sure, it was difficult indeed to encompass the entire heterogeneous occu-
pational community of fishermen at local and national levels, but this did
not mean that fishermen were unorganized or under-organized. The
Dutch Fishermen’s Union – on whose board a man from the Vlaming line-
age represented Texel fishermen – even reinforced its bargaining position
in post-war times.
Before the war, the island’s North Sea fishermen had avoided the Oude-
schild auction because they could obtain much better prices in IJmuiden.
However, with prices fixed at maximum levels, it did not matter where
fishermen landed their catch as they would obtain similar prices every-
where in the Netherlands. Forced by the German occupying authorities to
focus on inshore fishing, Texel cutter fishermen had grown used to land-
ing their fish in Oudeschild. Inshore fishermen were initially also experi-
encing good times. Due to a shortage of coal, which was needed to boil
shrimps aboard just after capture because they spoiled quickly, they initi-
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ally did not go into shrimp fishing. Mackerel, scads, whelks, sole and
plaice were now their prime target species. They were earning well and so
were petty fish traders. The dozen or so fishermen utilizing stationary trap
nets, who had been landing (part of) their catch in Den Helder, also opted
for the Oudeschild auction. However, it was mainly due to the fact that the
local North Sea fishermen landed their catch in Oudeschild that the auc-
tion – a municipal venture – thrived for five consecutive years after the
liberation. Its annual turnover amounted to a mean of around a million
guilders (with only fifteen to twenty per cent coming from the inshore seg-
ment). Demanding a three per cent fee on sales, the municipality could
employ four to five men, including the auctioneer. In addition, about
twenty persons were involved in unloading, sorting and packing the land-
ings. A handful of traders bought the fish, shrimps and shellfish and
shipped the merchandise to wholesale dealers at home and abroad, mostly
in Belgium and France. Since prices were fixed, there was no real sale by
auction. The dealers had agreed among each other what percentage of the
landings they would buy. The retired auctioneer said, ‘There were a few
fish dealers, but everything was so petty, you can hardly imagine. They
would buy small quantities of dab, flounder and shrimp; it was really,
really small-scale. It is hard to explain. They all worked on commission for
larger traders elsewhere in the country.’
The good times for the petty fishermen were short-lived. With the excep-
tion of trap netters, the inshore fishermen turned to shrimp fishing again
as soon as sufficient coal was available. Since first-comers usually obtained
low prices, the drawing of lots decided who had to land shrimps first at the
auction. By October 1946, shrimp prices fell mainly because the exchange
rates of Belgian francs were unfavourable. The Dutch Fishery Marketing
Board (Nederlandsche Visscherij Centrale) still regulated prices. In 1947, a
category of inshore fishermen working with eleven medium-sized vessels,
mostly from Oudeschild, obtained gross revenues ranging from almost
8,250 to a little over 16,000 guilders. Another fifteen small boats, whose
owners hailed from the hamlets Oost and Horntje, grossed less than 6,500
guilders. The majority of these fishermen only fished seasonally or part-
time and used rowing boats or sailing vessels with small auxiliary engines.
Some hardly sailed at all because the gross proceeds would not even cover
the operating costs. Even for the full-timers, many fishing days were lost
due to ice, inclement weather and sundry other reasons. In the second half
of the 1940s, for example, they only fished 140 to 150 days on average, as
opposed to 210 to 220 days in the offshore segment.
In 1947, there were fifty-seven owners or co-owners of boats in a total of
114 active fishermen. Thus, a considerable part of the occupational com-
munity was propertied, although perhaps about twenty (co)-owners had
retired and were not counted in the ‘active fishermen’ statistics. In the vast
majority of cases co-owners of a vessel had agnatic kinship ties (see Chap-
ter 4). Part of the problem in the inshore sector was, however, that fathers
who owned small boats did not encourage their sons to become fishermen
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any more. In this section of the fishing fleet, only nine sons of skipper-
owners crewed vessels, whereas in the offshore segment they numbered
thirteen. The petty inshore fishermen were rather pessimistic about the
fisheries’ future. The Zuider Sea relief prevented some older fishermen
from poverty, but fewer and fewer young fishermen entered a fishing ca-
reer. The financial results of the inshore sector proved to be so bad that
many owners of inshore boats complained that it was hard to recruit young
deckhands. The reason was that few young adults saw future prospects in
the Wadden Sea fishery, as it could hardly provide an income. By the late
1940s, the devastating pre-war depression of the local fishing industry’s
inshore segment had returned in full force. Occasionally, inshore fishing
was so bad that fishermen preferred working for farmers: agricultural jobs
provided well over forty per cent of employment on the island, fishing less
than four per cent. Other petty skipper-owners worked as farmhands in the
summer months. The local shipyard got fewer and fewer customers. Lack-
ing the means, fishermen again did not maintain their vessels properly
and postponed highly necessary repairs.
On the contrary, the offshore fishing fleet continued to perform extre-
mely well. In 1947, eight North Sea cutters with 100 to 150 h.p. engines
grossed between 52,000 and 82,000 guilders at the Oudeschild auction
alone. On account of not having fished during a part of the year, two did
less well – grossing a mere 28,000 to 29,000 guilders. However, this con-
stituted only a part of their proceeds as Texel offshore fishermen discov-
ered that they could earn more in herring fishing than in flatfish fishing.
From mid-October until early March, they followed the herring into the
southern North Sea, steaming as far south as the French coast between
Calais and Dieppe. They landed ‘the silver darlings’ in the Zeeland port of
Breskens. Their catches were so plentiful that nets were frequently torn by
their weight. In his cashbook, a Texel skipper-owner jotted down on 24
January 1948 that his landings of herring fetched a phenomenal 7,761
guilders – a grossing that was almost equalled a week later. For deckhands,
this implied that they made extremely good money. On average, they
earned three to four times as much as the deckhands of the most powerful
inshore vessels. Bigger boats with powerful engines and a crew of five or
six men of course implied higher costs that had to be subtracted from the
gross revenues than smaller ones with only two or three crewmembers.
Yet even taking this into account, the financial results of the North Sea
cutters were much better than those of shrimp and other inshore fisher-
men. The North Sea fishermen’s rule of thumb was that depreciation and
profits should be kept aside for investment in a new cutter. In addition,
owner-operators did not take their full crew share but instead made do
with a weekly allowance and used the remainder to redeem debts and save
money (see also Chapter 4). Although by that time it was common practice
to take out a bank loan, they were of the opinion that their own capital
should provide the greater part of the initial expenses for a new boat.
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Whereas the offshore fishermen were able to steam to remote fishing
grounds, the inshore skippers lacked such opportunities, and at times
when shrimp prices improved, North Sea fishermen would also switch to
shrimp fishing in the Wadden Sea. As of 1945, the Progress through Unity
board had been attempting to get access to Lake IJssel (the former Zuider
Sea) for Texel fishermen who wished to participate in eel fishing there.
However, the state wanted to check the number of fishermen operating
there and bluntly rejected the Texelians’ request, as it had previously dis-
missed a Texel fishermen’s petition to be admitted to mussel fishing. The
same happened when Zeeland mussel farmers gained entry to traditional
shrimp-fishing grounds in the Wadden Sea. In 1950, a parasitic copepod
killed a large proportion of mussels in Zeeland waters, where ninety-five
per cent of the country’s total mussel production was farmed. Some enter-
prising Zeeland mussel planters obtained permission to cultivate plots in
the Wadden Sea, which was not infested by the parasite (see van Ginkel
1990, 1991). Soon all Zeeland musselmen relocated parts of their produc-
tion areas to the western Wadden Sea. This was to the detriment of Texel
and other shrimp fishermen who much to their dismay saw ‘their’ territory
radically reduced while they themselves were still coping with the conse-
quences of the Closure Dam. Realizing that mussel cultivation was more
profitable than shrimp fishing, several Texel fishermen considered switch-
ing to farming mussels. They applied for licences, but the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries refused to provide licences. It had reserved these
grounds for Zeeland musselmen who faced a problem at home and it did
not want to expand the number of mussel farmers. The ministry put the
interests of the successful Zeeland mussel industry over those of the petty
inshore fishermen whose troublesome ventures it neglected. Repeatedly,
the Texel inshore fishermen – with the support of the local and provincial
administrations and a Labour parliamentarian – applied for plots. The
state, however, refused to budge.
Understandably, the Texel – and particularly the Oudeschild – fishermen
deemed it a grave injustice and were outraged. ‘We fished mussels here
until the 1920s,’ Jan Boom, the local fishermen’s association’s chairman
from 1945 until 1971, contended. He continued saying, ‘But they didn’t
grant us access even though the mussels were farmed right in front of our
door. It was a grave injustice, a scandal!’ The issue obviously rekindled the
inshore fishermen’s resentment of state institutions. The Oudeschild and
Oost fishermen certainly had reason to be suspicious and spiteful. Boom
related that he had had several meetings with state representatives to dis-
cuss the matter. On one of these occasions, a civil servant riposted his
desperate remark that the petty fishermen had a right to participate in mus-
sel farming with the following words: ‘Well, mister Boom, there is much
more that you are entitled to, but that you nonetheless won’t get.’ Appar-
ently, the arrogance of ‘might is right’ applied. The inshore fishermen con-
tinued to be entangled in a ruthlessly negative spiral: they had neither the
means nor the opportunities to relocate their fishing activities; financial
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institutions would not provide loans; for want of credit they could not ac-
quire a modern cutter that would require an investment of 180,000
guilders. They had to continue working with ageing boats, and due to their
meagre gross revenues they failed to attract crew.
Winners Take All, Losers Stand Small
In 1950, fishing accounted for approximately four per cent of employment
on the island, with a turnover of 1.4 million guilders. Agriculture and tour-
ism yielded twelve and two million guilders, respectively. The fishing fleet
consisted of a mixture of cutting-edge steel-hulled cutters with up to 200
h.p. engines, old wooden-hulled flat-bottomed sailing vessels that were
equipped with auxiliary engines, and a small number of flats used mainly
in seasonal trap-net fishing. The socio-economic differences between ex-
pansive entrepreneurs and petty self-employed fishermen had been inten-
sifying for decades and this would continue to be the case for some time to
come. The divergence was also still evident at the organizational level. The
Co-op expanded its activities from merely acquiring commodities at re-
duced prices to other ventures. It became the co-owner of an ice-making
factory, had a new warehouse built and bought a new oil tanker to supply
the fishing fleet with fuel. It also established a fishmeal plant that reduced
fish offal and discards into animal feed. However, due to fierce mainland
competition, the plant proved a failure and closed down within months.
With the Co-op’s expansion, profits increased. Half of the profits were
shared out to the members – the cutter owners – and put on an account at
a five per cent interest rate. Members could take out money from this ac-
count for investments or borrow money from the Co-op at a modest inter-
est rate. This state of affairs aroused the curiosity of a news reporter, who
believed the local fishermen’s ‘progressive business outlook’ and ‘good
mutual relationships and cooperation’ to be unique in the Dutch fishing
industry. One of the Co-op leaders responded by saying: ‘Look, we may
live on a remote island, but this certainly does not mean that we are back-
ward in development’ (Het Vrije Volk, 6 March 1951). Partly through the
Co-op, the local fishermen kept up to date with new developments. For
instance, it organized courses in the use of radio communication equip-
ment and echo sounders, it discussed and arranged collective insurances
for vessels and accident and health insurances for crew, and it generally
acted as an interest association for its members. It employed several wage
labourers. All in all, the Co-op constituted an important linchpin for the
North Sea fishermen, who still hailed mostly from Oosterend.
The vast majority of Progress through Unity members continued to
stand aloof from the Co-op. With their small boats, the Oudeschild fisher-
men had little to gain from Co-op membership. For them, the cuts on the
costs of fuel and commodities were relatively small and they received only
a fraction of the profits because every member had to contribute his share
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to the Co-op’s operating costs. Being strongly communitarian, some Ou-
deschilders doubted its ‘cooperative’ character. As one of them explained:
The Co-op had a peculiar arrangement. Fuel supply made for its profits, but
the warehouse always had deficits because wage labour was expensive. All
members were liable for deficits. So if there were twenty members,
shortages would be divided by twenty. However, the fuel profits would be
shared out according to the litres you had consumed. We owned a cutter
with a small engine, so we received virtually nothing. It was not a coopera-
tive idea. I therefore terminated my membership. My sons became mem-
bers again, but by then it had all changed.
Lacking the means to ameliorate their situation, most inshore fishermen
exited the fishing industry or simply muddled through.
The situation was much the same in other Dutch fishing communities.
A substantial part of the inshore fishing fleet was ageing and was believed
to be in need of modernization. The state established a committee to look
into the matter. It reported that family firms encountered difficulties ob-
taining external capital for investments; that the fishing fleet needed to
expand and that state support for newly built vessels was necessary (Com-
missie Sanering Zeevisserij 1952:5). Based on the committee’s advice, the
state introduced special grants for decommissioning and development of
the fishing fleet. Texel fisherman Jan van der Vis responded in a March
1953 issue of the weekly Visserijwereld. He deemed expansion and state
support unnecessary and even undesirable as well as irresponsible. He re-
garded the extant fishing fleet as sufficiently large and growing exploita-
tion and increasing competition were not in the fishing industry’s interest.
Early on, the Dutch Fishermen’s Union also expressed concern about the
cutter fleet’s expansion. It defended vested interests. However, the com-
mittee argued that since foreign states protected and supported their na-
tional fishing industries, the Dutch government should follow suit. The
Social Democrats, who were in the 1950s coalition governments, came up
with a report of their own and backed the idea that the fishing industry’s
modernization and expansion were in the national interest (Anonymous
1956). Hence, subsidies became available for the modernization of the
fisheries, not because fishermen called for them but because politicians
indulged in economic nationalism. As we will see in the following chap-
ters, this would have far-reaching consequences.
Many older boats were decommissioned or scrapped, while new ones
continued to be added to the fleet. The process was also evident in the
Texel fishing industry. By the end of 1952, Texel’s inshore fishing fleet con-
sisted of twenty vessels, three-quarters of which were old wooden-hulled
boats with less than 25 h.p. engines. Their owners hailed from Oudeschild
(seven vessels), Oost (seven), Horntje (four – all of them trap netters), Oos-
terend (one) and Den Burg (one), while the twenty-two deckhands mostly
lived in the same locales as the skipper-owners. Apart from the trap net-
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ters, shrimp fishing was the predominant occupation of these fishermen,
while some also fished whelks, cockles, flounder, eel and sardines. Only
two skipper-owners of somewhat larger vessels fished flatfish in the sum-
mer. Nearly all the inshore fishermen were day-trippers. Five fishing firms
in this category grossed between 10,000 and 20,000 guilders; the others
grossed less than that. Several of these fishermen worked as farmhands
during a part of the year or were on the dole. On average, the inshore fish-
ermen were older than North Sea fishermen. Sons of crewmembers often
opted for working aboard North Sea cutters (this applied to ten out of fifty
crewmembers in the North Sea fleet; seven of them were from the hamlet
of Oost). Only a few sons of skipper-owners in the inshore segment fol-
lowed in their father’s footsteps (Schreur 1953:33-37). The old wooden ves-
sels required a lot of maintenance and it was increasingly difficult to re-
cruit crew. By the mid-1950s, most owners had sold their outdated boats.
Likewise, the trap netters could no longer exist from fishing alone and
some gave up, while two men combined fishing with fish hawking and
odd jobs. One of them, born in 1920, remembers: ‘You had to work hard,
but you were free even though it was a meagre livelihood.’ His colleague, a
year older than him, recalls: ‘You did not want to give up, you were always
hoping for better times.’ However, by the end of the decade both men had
switched to onshore jobs. By then, there were only six shrimp-fishing boats
left. Two of their skippers found new ways to use their vessel in connection
with the growing importance of tourism: during the summer season, they
began taking holidaymakers aboard on shrimp-fishing trips for a fee of two
guilders per person. In the months of July and August, it was too warm to
preserve the shrimps, so this proved to be a good alternative. ‘You were a
kind of entertainer,’ said a retired shrimp-cum-tourist-boat operator from
Oudeschild, ‘In those months we were pretty busy and we earned well. We
did three two-hour trips a day. During the shrimp-fishing season we
earned a rather meagre living.’ Four wooden-hulled sailing vessels hardly
ever came off the mooring ropes and were left to rot in the harbour.
The miserable state of affairs in the inshore fishing industry had knock-
on effects in the local economy. As soon as the price-fixing system was
abolished in 1951, the bigger boats began marketing their catches in IJmui-
den again. Dealers there offered higher prices and the additional transpor-
tation costs of ferry and train made it difficult for the Texel fish traders to
compete. The extent to which the Oudeschild auction had depended on the
landings of Texel’s North Sea cutter fleet soon became evident. Its 1951
turnover was half that of the previous years. Within two years, the auction
personnel were reduced to one, the team of sorters and packers was down-
sized and only a few fish traders remained active. Trap netters went predo-
minantly to Den Helder again and only obtained approximately twenty per
cent of their gross revenues on Texel. The other inshore fishermen contin-
ued to land their catch in Oudeschild and received eighty-five per cent of
their grossing there. Although prices in the nearby ports of Den Helder,
Wieringen and Harlingen were usually higher, the latter remained loyal to
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the local auction because it saved time and they preferred to be home each
night (Schreur 1953:47-48). Across the board, though, shrimp prices were
low, hardly ever surpassing fifty cents per kilo. The national Fish Trade
Organization therefore introduced minimum prices for shrimps as per
April 1952, but for the Texel shrimp fishermen this measure barely im-
proved their situation. With their number dwindling, the auction’s impor-
tance was on the decline. Hardly any fishermen from outside visited the
island to dispose of their catch in Oudeschild. Its peripheral location and
the additional costs of ferry transportation proved to be an obstacle. The
consequences of these developments were that the auction’s turnover
plummeted to a mean of 134,000 guilders per year in the remainder of
the decade. By 1956, the local authorities began to consider discontinuing
the auction but as yet they merely resorted to reorganization. The main
reason for keeping the auction open despite it not being cost-effective was
that the municipality did not want to sack its manager, but preferred to
wait until his retirement.7 Suppliers of fisheries goods also suffered, as
offshore fishermen acquired most of their necessaries via the Co-op. In
1958, the shipyard shut down. According to its owner, it had become im-
possible to make a living because too few boats showed up for mainte-
nance and repairs. In Oudeschild, the island’s ferry company TESO in-
creasingly provided employment for former fishermen, particularly when
its schedule intensified following the upsurge of tourism. By the end of the
decade, nearly two score villagers were working for TESO. Oudeschild’s
labour force of active fishermen had dwindled to less than twenty-five;
most of them were crewing on the North Sea cutter fleet. Contrary to the
inshore segment, it was still thriving and expanding.
In 1948, there were eleven cutters of over 50 gross register tonnes
(GRT) and equipped with up to 150 h.p. engines. A decade later, this num-
ber had increased to sixteen, thirteen of which were built after the war,
while engine power had increased to between 150 and 250 h.p. The owners
belonged to the island’s fishing elite lineages, although two in-laws had
become co-owners. With the exception of the Krijnen family, they lived in
Oosterend. Depending on the stage of the family cycle, family members
crewed the boats. About half the offshore fleet’s vessels had a core of three
or more agnates, often partly supplemented by in-laws. In addition, quite a
few Oudeschild crewmembers and even men from the mainland were re-
cruited. Based on the share system, remunerations were excellent as in the
1950s sole and herring catches were plentiful and prices were generally
high. Oosterend fishermen were relatively wealthy: ‘Exceptionally good
money is earned in the [offshore] fisheries and it is no exaggeration to say
that by Texel standards the Oosterend cutter fishermen are affluent. How-
ever, they have experienced different times’ (Janse 1955:260-261). A few
figures can illustrate the proportions the offshore segment had assumed.
Fishing contributed 700,000 guilders to the local economy in 1950, rising
to over 2.5 million guilders in 1959. Per boat, the gross revenues rose from
a mean of just over 100,000 guilders in 1950 to around 150,000 guilders
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by the end of the decade. With such gross proceeds, expansion and moder-
nization were feasible. Moreover, parts of the investments were tax-deduc-
tible as of 1954. Wheelhouses made way for bridges, while ship-to-ship
and ship-to-shore radios and echo sounders – instruments needed in the
herring fishery – became standard equipment. Of course, decisions to in-
vest were based on any number of personal considerations, for example
depending on the stage of the family cycle; age and health of the owner-
operator; number and age of (potential) successors; their interest and abil-
ity in pursuing a fishing career; availability of credit and so on. Along with
the offshore fisheries’ modernization went a demand to professionalize.
As of 1947, certificates were required for certain categories of crew – skip-
pers, steersmen and engineers – of vessels of 50 GRT and over. Previously,
the acquisition of knowledge and skills was exclusively based on ‘learning
by doing’ – an epistemology of practice. The state began monitoring the
Sea Fishing Certificates Act more tightly as of the mid-1950s and, subse-
quently, vocational training in a Fishery School turned into a matter of
course, particularly for sons of owner-operators.
Although the fishing fleet’s modernization was a major step forward,
the work aboard was arduous. Shipboard facilities were rather basic, and it
was hard to preserve milk and bread. Due to a lack of vitamins, poor hy-
giene and the chafing of oilskins, many fishermen developed sores. An
eyewitness told:
You should have seen the hands of those men! Of course, hygiene was not
as good as today and there was no good soap either. The fishermen’s dis-
ease was ‘sleeve eaters’, that’s how we called them. They were tiny sores
they had on their wrists. The oilskins would chafe them open continually.
They would also get them in their neck. God, I’ve seen old fishermen who
had them all over. Tears would spring to your eyes. Of course their hands
were wet and cold and in the winter when they had to pull the nets… They
didn’t have hands but claws. Obviously there was a lack of hygiene and they
couldn’t do anything about it. They would rub some ointment on their
hands and put a cloth on them, but, well, they just had to go to sea. They
just had to earn a living.
A deckhand, born in 1934, said about the 1950s fisheries:
We fished with otter trawls. It was mostly manual labour. You hauled the
nets by hand. Only the cod end line and the otter doors were winched in.
[…] There was a small stove in the accommodation. In the wheelhouse it
was cold and draughty. I always wore long underwear in the winter and you
really needed that. You had mittens, but they didn’t help much when you
were hauling the nets. You were always exposed to all sorts of weather. We
would not get out of our clothes the entire week; you didn’t even change
your underwear. We had to wash at a small tap, using a pump. When it was
cold, it was sometimes frozen. You hardly ever used it anyway and you
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didn’t shave. We didn’t have a toilet either. We defecated on a barrel or, if
the weather permitted, right across the rail.
His wife adds, ‘When he got home, he stank to high heaven. That fish
smell and the engine room stench!’ Step by step, however, shipboard con-
ditions improved, as skippers continued to invest in their boat. Continual
reinvestment prevented the owner-operators from having to hand over a
considerable part of their profits to the tax inspector. They preferred to
keep the money in the firm. It was precisely this kind of attitude that the
state sought to stimulate through its fisheries development policy.
When pursuing flatfish and other demersal species from May to Novem-
ber, the Texel offshore fishermen used otter trawls, as they had been doing
for decades. The technique is based on the use of two heavy wooden or
steel boards – the otter boards or ‘doors’. The boards work like a kite and
extend the net’s mouth horizontally using the vessel’s motion. In the first
few years after the war, otter trawling was also used in the herring fishery
from November to April. However, after a few good seasons, bumper her-
ring catches with otter trawls were a thing of the past. Then the fishermen
began hunting herring using pelagic nets made of nylon. Two vessels
dragged the net in between them. A ‘head rope’ connected them and kept
the distance between the boats at approximately sixty metres. The techni-
que called for considerable expertise and close cooperation, particularly
because herring fishing was mostly done at night, which increased risks.
To get the catch aboard, the boats had to come alongside each other and
this was possible only in relatively calm weather.
Knowledge of the fishing grounds was rather basic. Following the com-
pass, the skippers determined a course and after a specific steaming time
they knew where they were – by approximation at least. Using lead lines,
they fathomed the depth and by putting some grease on the lead, they
collected samples of the type of soil. In conjunction, the information gave
fishermen an indication of their position. In flatfish fishing, this usually
sufficed to steam to locations where they expected concentrations of flat-
fish to be. Herring being a migratory species, the herring hunt required
another approach, to some extent based on hunches. To discover where
the herring shoaled, skippers would look for gulls, gannets and seals. ‘The
herring gathered in shoals. If you were just by yourself, you had to be lucky
to hit upon a school. So usually we searched with the entire fleet. When
you saw that a pair (span) shot their nets, you would go there and also try
your luck,’ said a retired skipper-owner, born in 1904. Competition was
fierce, however. A colleague, twenty-eight years his junior, claimed that
skippers would ‘almost try to sink each other’s boats’: ‘They begrudged
each other everything. My father was a persistently successful herring
skipper, and his colleagues could drink his blood for that.’ An important
improvement in catch efficiency was the introduction of echo sounders,
although there were teething troubles. Texel skippers proved to be agile
and quite successful herring hunters. The demand for herring was high,
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particularly in Germany. The herring was shipped to the country by truck-
loads and the Germans paid handsomely. The good outcomes attracted
many islanders into the herring hunt. In the second half of the 1950s,
nearly the entire local offshore fleet participated in pair trawling. To some
extent, it led to further integration of the island’s occupational community
of North Sea fishermen as Texel owner-operators pair-trawled with each
other, and together they usually cooperated in the initial search for herring.
They shared experiences not only in fishing, but also in being away from
the island for part of the year. Still, tensions always lurked in the shadows.
A retired skipper-owner, born in 1928, intimates, ‘If you pair trawled, the
skippers had to get along with each other. There were weeks when you
earned hardly anything at all ... When you didn’t gross anything, there was
a tendency to blame each other.’ Furthermore, differential success within
the local fleet gave rise to jealousy (see also Chapter 5).
Since the distance to the fishing grounds was considerable, many Texel
cutter fishermen decided to take up temporary residence in the Zeeland
port of Breskens during the herring season. They rented summer cottages
and those who were married with children brought their families over,
transporting the furniture with their boats. When the herring season
ended sometime in March, the families returned to Texel. Hence, a parti-
cular kind of transhumance came about. From mid-March until the end of
October many Texel fishermen conducted the flatfish fishery from their
island; in the remainder of the year they moved over 300 kilometres south
to Breskens for the herring pair-trawl fishery. Some crewmen preferred
travelling to and fro between Breskens and the island by bus or train for
the weekend, a trip taking many hours. Many interviewees had fond mem-
ories of the Breskens episode in their lives. They experienced the relations
with their hosts as congenial. Several Texel children were born there and
five young Texel fishermen found a bride in Breskens. ‘She was my best
catch,’ joked a deckhand married to a woman who was born and raised in
the Zeeland town. All the newlyweds settled on Texel. Since herring
catches were often so plentiful as to necessitate landing the catch two or
three times a week, the women saw their husbands, albeit briefly, more
often than they were used to on Texel. Moreover, pair trawling could only
be done in fair weather, so the boats remained in port for more days than
during the flatfish fishery. ‘Sometimes we went home for a cuppa,’ a skip-
per-owner born in 1921 said. ‘Come Saturday, we told the deckhands to
leave early as they had a long trip ahead. Those staying behind would clean
the boat and mend the nets for the upcoming week.’ The Breskens popula-
tion welcomed the Texel fisher families who temporarily lived in the town,
spent their money there and provided work for many labourers. It was an
era of affluence for the Texel colony and Breskens retailers and ship chand-
lers alike. The riches of the seasonal herring fishery contributed greatly to
the wealth of Texel owner-operators and deckhands. However, it is a well-
known fact that herring are a notoriously fickle fish, sometimes showing
up in abundance in specific areas for a number of consecutive years or
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decades, only to disappear again for prolonged lengths of time (see Corten
2001). In 1959, several Texel cutters returned from Breskens in early Feb-
ruary, as the herring were too far south. Subsequently, the importance of
herring fishing declined and the Breskens episode in the Texel fisherfolk’s
lives would gradually come to an end (see the next chapter).
‘Frogs in a Wheelbarrow’
The petty inshore fishermen’s experiences with state intervention fuelled
distrust in government. Firstly, they regarded it a grave injustice that for
six years, the state had not acknowledged that the Closure Dam had had a
devastating impact on their economy, and had only belatedly recognized
them as an interested party that was entitled to indemnification, which
subsequently arrived slowly and in a limited supply. Secondly, they re-
sented the fact that they were not granted access to Lake IJssel while their
Wieringen compatriots could fish in both the inland lake and target
shrimps in the Wadden Sea and so compete for scarce resources and mar-
ket opportunities. Thirdly, they loathed the fact that Zeeland mussel farm-
ers could rent plots in what they perceived to be ‘their’ territorial waters,
while Texel fishermen were not granted access to these fishing locations
for mussel cultivation on the account that they had not been fishing mus-
sels for years. These events severely restricted the small-scale fishermen’s
possibilities to obtain a livelihood from fishing, whereupon this segment
of the local fishing industry suffered a serious decline. The petty owner-
operators found themselves trapped in a whirlpool that sucked them down
and did not let go. Creditors looked away, the government seemed to be
glad to get rid of an outdated fleet in times of modernization, non-proper-
tied and unrelated deckhands voted with their feet, and – having already
eaten into their capital for a considerable length of time – the skipper-own-
ers of inshore boats lacked the financial and social resources to pull them-
selves up by the bootstraps. Most of them attempted to muddle through for
as long as possible, either because they desired to remain independent or
because they had no alternatives.
The offshore segment, on the other hand, was in quite another mael-
strom. The Closure Dam did not impact the fishing elite to the extent that
it impinged upon the inshore sector. With their vessels’ range of action,
the cutter fishermen did not depend on exploiting the Zuider Sea or Wad-
den Sea. Nor did the economic depression hit them significantly. Good
outcomes accomplished with cost-effective boats enabled continual rein-
vestment, stimulated by state subsidies and tax policies. In hindsight, the
war was an intermezzo that temporarily interrupted the North Sea fishing
fleet’s development. Upon the war’s conclusion, the offshore fishermen
did not have to start entirely from scratch but in most cases could soon
begin operating their cutters again. With the excellent post-war results the
skipper-owners continued to reinvest in their boats and, if feasible, ex-
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pand. In addition to extrinsic incentives to modernize, there were several
intrinsic motivations to keep up with the times. It would be tempting to
also involve the divergent ideational systems and mental dispositions in
explaining why differential success so clearly marked the communities of
Oudeschild on the one hand, and Oosterend on the other. However, this
might boil down to social and cultural reductionism. No doubt, different
outlooks on life and varying practices importantly impacted the ways in
which the distinct categories of fishermen went about their business, but
it would be wrong to assume that cultural factors alone could provide a
satisfactory explanation. Above all, it was the particular articulation of var-
ious forms of capital assets – ecological, economic, social, cultural and psy-
chological – at individual and firm level that made for success or failure.
As we shall see in the next chapter in considerable detail, the family firm’s
social and cultural importance and the way in which it tied together these
capital resources explain a lot in this respect.
The divergence of the two segments – inshore and offshore, to a consid-
erable extent localized in the distinct communities of Oudeschild and Oos-
terend – had important consequences for collective action. It may perhaps
seem self-evident that shared interests should bring entrepreneurs to-
gether in voluntary associations, cooperatives and other organizations, but
this is not so ‘logical’ as it might appear to be. Historians, sociologists and
ethnographers have presented myriad examples of failed fishermen’s orga-
nization from various corners of the world. This lack of sustained collec-
tive action is often attributed to an interrelated cluster of economic, social,
cultural and psychological factors deemed typical of the fishing industry.
Some argue that their frequent absence from shore and their inexperience
in dealing with officialdom prevent fishermen from organizing (Smith
1977:5; Andersen 1979:3). Others surmise that non-cooperative behaviour
is inherent in the capitalist mode of production where perpetual competi-
tion for scarce common pool resources impedes concerted action (Tho-
mas, Johnson and Riordan 1995:143; Jentoft 1986:199; Libecap 1989:74).
Skipper-owners are each other’s rivals and compete for prime fishing posi-
tions, bumper catches, markets and prices. In their folk models, fisher-
men often value the conviction that they are independent or autonomous
personas (Thomas, Johnson and Riordan 1995:150-151). Indeed, in the Tex-
el fishermen’s self-image, the view that they were and are an independent
and individualist lot was and is strongly embedded. ‘It is hard to make all
noses point in one direction. Fishermen are like frogs in a wheelbarrow:
they usually jump in all directions,’ an Oosterend fisherman said. He used
this metaphor to refer to the problem of sustained cooperation among his
colleagues at the local and supra-local level.
Fishermen greatly value the notional idea of ‘autonomy’ and the corre-
sponding identity as ‘independent individualists’. In many fishing com-
munities, an ethos, rhetoric and idiom of freedom, self-reliance and auton-
omy prevails (Vestergaard 1996; McGoodwin 1990, 2001). In social
science analysis, the predominant – yet most unconvincing – argument
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for failed organization is that competition and economic and socio-cultural
autonomy lead to the psychological character trait of individualism and a
‘need for independence’ that allegedly inhibits the creation of associations
and cooperatives.8 These explanations are summarized in the following
proposition:
the mode of production associated with commercial exploitation of a re-
source held in common engenders an atomistic organization of labor,
which results in a culture and psychology of independence. This indepen-
dence, in turn, constrains the ability of fishermen to act collectively (Tho-
mas, Johnson and Riordan 1995:144).
In my view, such circular arguments hold little water in the case of Texel’s
fishing industry and indeed probably more generally also. They are tautol-
ogies claiming that fishermen do not cooperate because they are individu-
alists and that they are individualists because they do not cooperate. It was
Emile Durkheim who stated: ‘every time a social phenomenon is directly
explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the
explanation is false’ (1982:129; also see Durrenberger 1992b:153).
Although fishermen may often cooperate reluctantly, institutionalized col-
lective action did and does occur. It would be impossible to explain their
attempts at organization if they were really ‘independent individualists’.
Moreover, independence and individualism do not necessarily confound
cooperation; they do not exclude each other, as Lawrence Taylor shows
with regard to fishermen of Dutch descent working on the Great South
Bay in the USA. In this connection, he uses the concept of ‘contractual
community’ (Taylor 1983:9ff.), a configuration of individuals who freely
choose to establish and maintain social ties.
It is important, then, to understand under what conditions fishermen
seek to organize themselves; what kind of outcomes they attempt to
achieve through organization; which type and degree of organization they
deem necessary; and what causes success or failure. As early as the 1870s,
Texel’s occupational community of fishermen acted as a formal interest
group while previously informal collective action for specific ends had also
come about. For various reasons, the island’s fishing communities clung
for a long time to their own organizations and their activities waxed and
waned. This particularistic stance needs explanation. Why did Oosterend
and Oudeschild fishermen usually refrain from establishing a joint volun-
tary association? The answer is rather complex. Given the fact that at face
value Texel fishermen had common interests and confronted similar prob-
lems, one would expect them to cooperate supra-locally. Often, the local
organizations discussed similar issues and pursued similar goals and in
general, the boards of these voluntary associations met frequently and de-
veloped joint plans of action. As a rule of thumb, they also addressed
authorities together. The fishermen acted collectively if they deemed it nec-
essary to do so. The same applies to cooperation with fishermen from out-
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side. Every now and then their associations joined a federative fishermen’s
organization. Usually this happened when a spokesman from such a re-
gional or national corporation visited the island and expounded the view
that ‘union is strength’. More than once this kindled the Texelians’ enthu-
siasm. However, it usually vanished equally quickly because they were not
really interested in the wider and long-term objectives of a federation,
which of course could not simultaneously deal with the specific problems
of all categories and communities of fishermen. The Texel fishermen were
preoccupied with their own immediate interests, for which a local associa-
tion was best suited. They did not want to give up their own organizations
and autonomy. This also applied to the situation on the island and was a
consequence of socio-economic differentiation within the occupational
community. So the reasons for collective action problems are social, not
psychological. The sociologists Bechhofer and Elliott maintain that within
the class of small independent entrepreneurs, institutionalized collective
action is hampered by ‘the disparateness of the various elements and the
intense individualism that pervades it’ (1981:190; also see Verrips 1989 on
Dutch bargemen). More generally, Mancur Olson contends that ‘unless
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests’ (1971[1965]:2). However, he also
states that the prospects for voluntary collective action are high for small
interest groups. This is so because frequent interaction and face-to-face
contact facilitate social pressure and social incentives to maintain coopera-
tion, for example by ostracizing non-cooperative individuals and rewarding
cooperative actors (ibid.:61-62). It is much harder to mobilize and organize
large-scale social configurations, particularly if they are economically and
socially heterogeneous.
The fishermen indeed constituted a heterogeneous economic grouping
and differed widely with regard to their social positions, fishing strategies,
investment policies, adoption of innovations, work attitudes and world-
views, and these differences were in turn linked with demographic and
ideological differences, among other things. The majority of Oudeschild
fishermen specialized as shrimp and shellfish fishermen who mainly op-
erated in the Wadden Sea. Most Oosterenders were North Sea fishermen,
catching flatfish and herring and in the harsh winter season some fished
shrimp in the Wadden Sea. Besides common interests, both categories
also had their own specific ones. Pursuing different species led to divisive-
ness, not because fishermen were independent and individualist competi-
tors per se, but because their group interests did not converge. Although
Texelians adhered to the subjective belief and rhetoric of independence
and individualism, their actual behaviour showed that this ‘folk model’
had little to do with practice, since they organized time and again and
acted collectively if the need arose. The fact that they cooperated – and still
cooperate – in associations belies their image of being independent, indi-
vidualistic, non-cooperative and politically inert human beings. This is not
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to say that sustained solidarity came about automatically and that it was
entirely unproblematic. Collective action problems did occur. Above all, it
was the economic heterogeneity with its concomitant divergence of sec-
tional interests – not some innate penchant for individualism and inde-
pendence or a collective behavioural disposition leading to social atomism
– that impeded cooperation and sustained solidarity. In addition, to some
extent the organizational localism also had roots in socio-cultural contrasts
between the island’s two fishing villages. Conflicting ideologies and the
creation of symbolic boundaries divided the communities and fanned a
slumbering antagonism. However, as we shall see in later chapters, faced
with problems of scale and increasing intervention from outside, the
Oudeschild and Oosterend fishermen would eventually overcome their dif-
ferences.
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Chapter 4
Booming Business: The Rise of Beam
Trawling
The offshore fleet’s gradual growth and the inshore segment’s rather rapid
decline characterized post-war developments in the Texel fishing industry.
It was evident that owner-operators needed to modernize to stay in busi-
ness. Those who were unable do so began to lag behind and in most cases
were ousted from the fishing industry or had to muddle through and ac-
cept substandard incomes. In hindsight, modernization in the offshore
cutter sector was rather modest. In many respects, the 1960 boats re-
sembled the ones that dated from the 1930s. Generally, engine power had
only slightly increased, while several skipper-owners continued to operate
pre-war boats into the late 1950s. Otter trawling for flatfish and pair trawl-
ing for herring did not require enormous pulling power. With the advent
of new technology, this would change radically as of the early 1960s. It was
the beam trawl’s reinvention, in particular, that brought about a headlong
expansion and innovation of the fishing fleet, leading to an unmitigated
‘horsepower race’ in the Texel and Dutch fishing industries. Catches in-
creased extraordinarily and so did the fishermen’s incomes. It was not a
strictly local or national phenomenon. Globally, the development of fish-
eries since the Second World War has been dramatic. Reported landings
more than trebled between 1945 and 1972, an expansion caused by techno-
logical developments and the human demand for fish (Garcia and Newton
1994). In most countries, the emphasis of fisheries policy was on fleet
development and increased production to set off a Blue Revolution, with
relatively little concern for the dangers of over-fishing. International nego-
tiations and agreements on the exploitation of marine living resources,
however, did lead to the foundation of the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Convention in 1959. Having extremely limited powers, the convention re-
mained a paper tiger for quite some time, even after the establishment of
the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in 1964 to further articulate
and implement it. That year, sixteen Western European states introduced a
12 nm (nautical mile) zone at the European Fisheries Convention, giving
these states jurisdiction in specific coastal areas. Foreign fishermen could
only fish within this zone if they had historical rights to do so. In this case,
too, protecting national interests rather than fish stock management was
the predominant goal.
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As of the early 1960s, the Dutch family-owned fishing fleet expanded
rapidly and the fisheries thrived. The dual fisheries policy of decommis-
sioning and development seemed to be paying off. In addition, the Treaty
of Rome increased the trade potential for fish landed by Dutch fishermen.
The European Economic Community – established in 1957 by six nation
states, including the Netherlands – created a common market without
trade barriers and tariffs that had previously hampered free trade to a large
degree. The Dutch fishing industry benefited as the Netherlands was the
most important fish-exporting country of the original member states (Kra-
nenburg 1978:293). The Dutch seafood-processing industry and wholesale
dealers also profited from these European policies, while in addition the
national fishing fleet assured a steady supply of fish because auctioning in
the Netherlands was mandatory from 1959 onward. The objective of man-
datory auctioning was still to regulate the market to some extent. The ob-
ligation for Dutch fishermen to sell fish through Dutch auctions was abol-
ished in January 1976, because it appeared to be at odds with European
Community rules pertaining to the common market. Meanwhile, however,
the Netherlands had reinforced its position as one of Europe’s leading fish-
exporting countries. This position was partly based on transit trade.
Like their compatriots in other fishing communities, the owner-opera-
tors and crewmembers of the Texel offshore fishing fleet benefited from
the new opportunities that arose in the 1960s. From the mid-1970s on-
wards, however, the fisheries management regime would change pro-
foundly. In this chapter, I will cover the period from 1960 to 1975 when
the sky seemed to be the limit. It was a time when fishermen gained a
reputation of being successful petty commodity producers: ‘The Dutch
fisherman is an improviser, perseverant with entrepreneurial gusto and
zest for work. He is an individualist, certainly, but he also has an eye for
the power of cooperation’ (de Boer and van der Meulen 1976:8). With few
restraints and many incentives to invest, the Texel – and the Dutch – fish-
ing fleet expanded at a fast pace, both in number of boats and in engine
power. The present chapter seeks to address the underlying causes for this
unprecedented growth. As we shall see, they were not of an economic na-
ture alone, as there were several other reasons to expand. In part, these
were of a social and cultural character, with the logic and dynamic of the
family firm being at the forefront. Although owner-operators were well
aware that collectively their decisions to expand had negative conse-
quences, as individual actors they had their own rationalities – or, rather,
‘reasonable strategies’ – to participate in the game of keeping up with the
competitors. The particular system of remuneration and the labour ethos it
stimulated were also important. So, what was the tangle of factors that im-
proved the Texel fishermen’s situation?
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The Reinvention of the ‘Wondyrchoun’ and the Horsepower
Race
Beam trawling presently dominates offshore flatfish fishing, with impor-
tant fleets of beamers in several fishing ports in the Netherlands. Beam-
trawling effort is concentrated in the southern and south-eastern North
Sea. Until the late 1980s, use of this gear was mostly restricted to the Neth-
erlands and Belgium. Later, it also spread to Germany and the United
Kingdom (Rijnsdorp and van Leeuwen 1996:1201). The beam trawl be-
came highly popular in the 1960s, but the basic principles of this fishing
technique are much older. A predecessor of today’s beam trawl was already
in use in late 14th-century England. The net was spread open by a heavy
ten-foot-long bar and had a leaded rope weighted with large stones at-
tached to the net’s lower part. A group of hook-and-line fishermen from
the Thames estuary worried that ‘this new and subtly contrived instru-
ment’ – dubbed the ‘wondyrchoun’ – could seriously damage fish stocks
(Kennelly and Broadhurst 2002). Two centuries later, the Dutch prince
William the Silent (William I, Prince of Orange) launched similar com-
plaints and cautioned that catches could decline rapidly if fishermen con-
tinued applying the device (de Groot 1984, 1988:7). Throughout the his-
tory of its utilization, the beam trawl has been highly controversial. Due to
its disturbance of the benthos (organisms living on or near the seabed), in
recent times ecologists and environmentalist organizations have empha-
sized the alleged harmful effects of beam trawling (see Chapter 6). Early
criticism arose especially from fishermen deploying other types of gear,
particularly stationary nets. For centuries, fishermen working with mobile
gear and those using fixed nets have resented and clashed with each other.
There have been occasional spells when beam trawling has been prohib-
ited, but it has always been reintroduced. For example, in the late 19th
century, Texel fishermen used this type of trawl net to catch North Sea flat-
fish. However, in the days of sail, no more than three relatively light tickler
chains could be used and the beam’s width was usually less than eight
metres (Kranenburg 1977:83). It was only with the diffusion in the 1910s
of the otter trawl, a net that was easier to handle and more efficient, that
the beam trawl temporarily lost its popularity.
In the late 1950s, the beam trawl was reinvented. New technology en-
abled the use of two such beam trawls simultaneously, one on each side of
the vessel. They could be operated by means of derricks or outrigger
booms and winches. The double-rig beam trawls were towed by means of
warps passing through blocks at the end of the outriggers. Following these
and other modifications, it became much easier to shoot and haul beam
trawls than otter trawls. Moreover, due to their twin character the trawl
path was wider than that of otter trawls while in addition beam trawls
could be used at low speeds. These advantages led to a rapid distribution
of beam trawls in the early 1960s. The relatively specialized beam-trawl
flatfish fishery would soon turn into a particularly Dutch concern. By Au-
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gust 1963, save for two cutters, the entire Texel offshore fishing fleet had
switched from using otter trawls to beam trawls. The technology’s basic
principles are still much the same as in the original version. A heavy steel
tube spreads the net open horizontally. The apex of triangular trawl heads
(‘skids’ or ‘shoes’) are mounted at the beam’s ends and keep the cone-
shaped net open approximately half a metre vertically, thus creating an ob-
long ‘mouth’. The shoes’ lower part moves across the seafloor. Sets of tick-
ler chains (wekkers) are suspended along the bottom of the mouth and run
in front of the ground rope, disturbing the seabed’s top layer and activating
flatfish species such as sole, plaice, dab, turbot and brills lying on or partly
buried in the seabed. The fish start to swim, but due to the towing speed
and the top net, they are funnelled into the cod end (see figure 1). The
headline of each trawl is less than a metre from the bottom to avoid by-
catches of cod and whiting. The net’s bottom sheet is made of heavy twine
to resist abrasion and, in addition, nylon strings protect the net’s under-
side from wear and tear. A fishing rope is attached to the cod end; when
the gear is hauled in, only the cod end is lifted aboard by means of the rope
and emptied on deck.
Beam trawling was hugely successful in terms of catching efficiency.
The rather shallow depth, the extensive areas of relatively smooth seafloor
and the productive ecosystem of the North Sea make it a particularly good
area for intensive beam trawling. Before long, the beam-trawl fishermen
discovered that the more and the heavier the tickler chains, the larger the
catch, particularly of sole. The tendency was to use more and heavier
chains. A retired skipper-owner (born in 1922) explained: ‘We sometimes
wanted to fish with lighter gear, so that we could make longer tows and get
more sleep. However, if another fisherman, who used heavier gear, caught
considerably more, you swiftly deployed heavier chains yourself.’ More
and heavier chains required greater pulling power and hence engine capa-
city or, rather, thrust of the propeller. To increase pulling power and to
improve propulsion efficiency, in the late 1960s most cutters were fitted
with nozzle propellers. More horsepower also allowed fishing at greater
speeds of up to seven knots to cover much larger areas. Soon the develop-
ment towards more powerful boats was evident in the entire Dutch off-
shore fishing fleet. The fishermen were quick to make the necessary in-
vestments, leading to a steep growth of engine capacity. In less than
twenty years, the aggregate engine power of the Texel fleet increased ten-
fold to 17,500 h.p. by the end of 1969. Vessels became longer, wider and
had more draught. Older technology made way for new. The use of syn-
thetic fibres became widespread in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nylon
nets replaced cotton and hemp ones. They improved the handling charac-
teristics and efficiency of fishing gears and were less susceptible to wear
and tear than cotton nets.
Due to these technological developments, sole catches increased. Prices
paid for sole were several times those paid for plaice, and the fishermen’s
gross proceeds were generally considerable (see below). But the success of
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beam trawling came at a price. It proved a rather dangerous fishing techni-
que that exacted a heavy toll in human lives. From 1960 up to and includ-
ing 1970, twenty-eight Dutch beam trawl cutters toppled over in fair
weather. During storms another six beamers capsized. In these accidents,
fifty-seven beam-trawl fishermen were killed (Vissersbond 1994:52), in-
cluding five from Texel. For various reasons, the beamers’ stability was
poor. Underwater streamlining of hulls to increase speed and heavy super-
structures had negative consequences for stability. For vessels under 50
gross register tonnes (GRT), no seafaring certificates were needed. Since
many fishermen had not had any formal vocational training, several skip-
pers did not have such diplomas. When owners ordered new boats, they
would sometimes limit the tonnage to 50 GRT, yet have powerful engines
installed. Again, this was detrimental to vessel stability, but a requirement
to undergo stability tests was lacking for new-built boats up to 200 GRT.
The technical problem was that if gear snagged on a wreck or another ob-
stacle, the momentum and the engine power would cause the boat to be
pulled over sideways by the boom. If the cable did not snap in time, the
cutter would capsize. A new Vessel Order was introduced in 1965. It de-
manded stability tests for all sea-going vessels to obtain a ‘certificate of
soundness’. The measure was immediately effective for new-built vessels.
Between September 1967 and April 1969, all Dutch cutters – including
older ones – had to undergo such tests. No less than 175 boats failed to
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Figure 1. Beam trawling.
pass. Many had to be replaced or lengthened and would consequently sur-
pass the 50-GRT limit. For vessels built before March 1967, the Shipping
Inspectorate was lenient. It dropped the diploma requirements if the ves-
sel had passed the stability tests. In 1968, the Inspectorate, in conjunction
with the Fishermen’s Union, came up with additional safety measures. It
demanded the application of safety-release systems in the boom stays or
winch breaks to minimize the vessel’s lever action if the gear snagged. It
also came up with procedures on how to handle adverse and hazardous
situations. These regulations have benefited fishing-industry safety (Vis-
sersbond 1994:65-68).
The measures to improve stability brought about another wave of rapid
modernization in the late 1960s, on Texel as well as elsewhere in the Neth-
erlands. In 1967 and 1968, there was a veritable investment boom in the
island’s fishing industry. Despite increasing prices, in these two years
alone ten cutters were launched or lengthened and equipped with new en-
gines. By then, to be modern was to own a vessel with a length of 26
metres and a 600 h.p. engine that required a crew of five or six. Bigger
boats with increased draught and powerful engines enhanced seaworthi-
ness, allowing for more days at sea, greater pulling power and a wider
radius of action. Between early 1965 and early 1969, the number of Texel
cutters expanded by forty per cent (from 35 to 49), while aggregate engine
power more than doubled from approximately 7,500 h.p. to 16,000 h.p.
The expanding fishing fleet necessitated the construction of a new harbour
in 1969. Texel fishermen boasted that they had ‘the most modern fishing
fleet of the Netherlands’, but in other fishing communities similar devel-
opments occurred. The inshore segment of the Texel fishing fleet, which
had been declining for decades, also slightly recovered. In the 1960s, five
to eight owner-operators had shrimp-fishing licenses, including two that
still took tourists on shrimp-fishing trips in the summer. However, by the
end of the decade, shrimp fishermen encountered difficult times again
due to low prices connected with the import of cheap shrimps from Ger-
many. Structural state support as of late 1970 led to a considerable im-
provement. To a modest extent, the shrimp fishermen also modernized,
mainly through the subsidized acquisition of rinsing and sorting ma-
chines. The inshore segment also included a small number of boats whose
owners pursued other species, such as cod, eel or cockles. However, the
inshore sector was very small in comparison with the offshore fleet. In
1970, out of 186 fishermen a mere twenty worked in the inshore fisheries.
Clearly, expansion was most evident in offshore fishing, where there
seemed to be no limit to the growth in engine power.
Several beam-trawl fishermen showed concern about the ‘horsepower
race’. They believed that it would ultimately result in unmitigated competi-
tion and possible bankruptcy, while the effect on flatfish stocks, in particu-
lar, would be devastating. In June 1971, Texel’s Progress through Unity and
several other local fishermen’s associations in the Netherlands demanded
a 800-h.p. limit for sole fishing. They stated that increasing fishing capa-
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city endangered sole stocks. Texel fishermen were already experiencing
problems, because catches lagged behind what could be expected with
more engine power. The Progress through Unity board maintained that
such a measure would protect fishermen against themselves. The horse-
power limit would apply to sole fishing only. However, by then there were
already three beam-trawl cutters with engines over 800 h.p. The associa-
tion’s leadership suggested that these should be either exempt or finan-
cially compensated. Eighty per cent of the members were in favour of a
legal limit at 800 h.p., twenty per cent favoured capping it at 900 h.p. The
Texelians realized that to be effective, such a measure would have to be
taken at international level, not just in the Netherlands. However, they be-
lieved that if they set an example, they would have ‘reason to speak vis-à-vis
our foreign colleagues’, as someone said at a meeting of the fishermen’s
association. ‘But we should act now, for otherwise we will miss the boat,
just as before with the 500 h.p. limit.’ Another skipper-owner opined, ‘All
of us are fishermen and if we want to continue being that we should be in
favour of capping engine power.’
The Dutch Fishermen’s Union also discussed plans to limit engine ca-
pacity to 800 h.p., but by October 1971, it was clear that the plans to protect
the sole stocks would not become effective, mainly because by this time
many vessels were already equipped with engines that were more power-
ful. Subsequently, the Union suggested introducing a 1,000 h.p. limit. All
of its local departments subscribed to this proposal. In January 1972, the
Union again urged fishermen to restrain themselves, since more powerful
engines would endanger the sole stocks and at the end of the day would be
detrimental to the fishermen themselves: ‘You will not only oust others
from the market, but also yourself.’ The problem was that the fisheries
sector could not arrange this voluntarily. The Union emphasized that the
fishermen were caught up in a devastating competition and that the gov-
ernment should intervene. Once again, however, some fishermen had al-
ready ordered more powerful vessels. Expecting that the state would heed
the Union’s desperate plea, their strategy was to stay at least a step ahead of
potential restrictions. Tragically, the state had no plans whatsoever to put a
lid on the booming fishing industry. On the contrary, it still extolled mod-
ernization and stimulated its achievement through various support meas-
ures (see below). Policymakers and advisors argued that bigger boats
would mean higher catches, lower costs and larger profits, which they con-
sidered to be in the national interest.
A fishing-industry meeting discussed the issue of capping engine power
in February 1972. A fisherman made a dramatic call on the state: ‘We are
busy destroying each other. If my neighbour has a 1,000 h.p. engine, I
want one of 1,200 h.p. Government, please control us.’ However, the ad-
ministration refrained from intervention, as it did not want to curb the
growing industry. A senior official said that he regarded an engine power
limit as a measure of ‘distributive justice that cannot work in the long run’.
The government favoured a stop on fishing in certain areas during certain
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times. This would maintain fair competition and could be arranged
through the recently established Producer Organizations. However, the
European Economic Community would have to agree upon such a deal.
The state did not want to regulate engine power because it did ‘not have
any means to intervene’, as the head of the ministry’s Fisheries Directo-
rate, Th.J. Tienstra, explained. He pointed out that the 1963 Fishery Order
did not provide for possibilities to limit engine power, and that the govern-
ment – fearing foreign competition – would continue its liberal fisheries
policy. This message would have drastic consequences. One of my interlo-
cutors told me: ‘Immediately after Tienstra had said this, many fishermen
went home, grabbed the phone and lodged an order for a new vessel.’ In-
deed, during the following two years no less than sixteen new thirty-two to
thirty-six metre-long beamers with flake-ice machines and engines ranging
from 1,200 to 1,500 h.p. joined the Texel fishing fleet. In part, they re-
placed older vessels, while several other boats were completely overhauled,
lengthened and equipped with more powerful engines. In addition, Texel
fishermen bought three old but powerful side and stern trawlers from Kat-
wijk and Scheveningen and had them converted into beam trawlers.
Similar developments occurred in other Dutch fishing ports. These
were hectic times for shipyards. They launched 282 new cutters between
1967 and 1974. The fences seemed to be down. The fishery was still
mainly controlled by input measures such as minimum mesh-size and
fish-size regulations, but at the international level, discussions were mean-
while underway to limit the almost unbridled fishing effort through output
measures. The buzzword of the day was ‘quotas’. Based on recommenda-
tions of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas, the North
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission by 1970 began discussing the concept
of quota-based catch restrictions. In the Netherlands, the expectation was
that international quota measures were about to be introduced soon. A
leading Dutch fisheries biologist, Pieter Korringa, was one of the keynote
speakers at the 1972 Bergen meeting and proved to be an advocate of
closed seasons and quotas: ‘Fishermen themselves can decide whether
they want to catch a quota with either the trawl or a dip net.’ He added,
‘Long before the fish is exterminated, the point is reached where fishing is
no longer rewarding and owing to the sea’s enormous reproductive poten-
tial, recovery will come soon.’ With state officials and fisheries biologists
seemingly rather unconcerned about growing engine power, one could
hardly expect self-restraint from fishermen. However, they did not aban-
don all hope. Reviewing the state of Texel’s fisheries in 1972, the chairman
of the fishermen’s association, Ben Daalder, wrote in the local newspaper,
‘The fleet’s expansion implies a further taxation on the already “over-
fished” North Sea. I do hope that next year we, in fruitful cooperation with
the organizations and the fishing trade and industry, can arrive at a sensible
management of the fishing grounds’ (Texelse Courant, 29 December 1972).
His words were ignored, at least concerning engine capacity. The Texel
fleet’s aggregate engine power more than doubled to over 36,000 h.p.
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between early 1970 and early 1975 (see Appendix B), while in both years
the number of vessels was about the same (forty-six and forty-eight, re-
spectively). Aggregate landings were similar to ten years earlier, but effort
had increased tremendously. That the fishermen were well aware of the
dire consequences of the sum total of their individual behaviour shows in
the remarks of a Texel owner of a brand-new vessel. After stating that he
was not happy with the powerful engines because there was staggering
over-fishing already and nursery areas needed protection, he said: ‘But as
an individual, you have to stay abreast when other fishermen continue to
increase their engine power’ (Texelse Courant, 17 July 1973). The horse-
power race also went on unabatedly elsewhere in the Netherlands. The
Dutch cutter fleet grew spectacularly and in the span of two decades, ag-
gregate engine capacity increased tenfold to around 250,000 h.p. in 1971,
steeply growing to approximately 380,000 h.p. by 1975. Reversing a pro-
longed trend of decline, employment on the Dutch cutter fishing fleet in-
creased from more than 1,300 crewmembers in 1958 to over 2,400 crew-
members in 1964, subsequently growing slightly to approximately 2,500
fishermen in 1974.
Why, then, did Texel and other Dutch offshore fishermen continue to
invest so heavily in the early part of the 1970s – even though they appeared
to be aware of the fact that collectively, their decisions might lead to ruin?
There were several incentives to do so. As we have seen, one reason was
the race to stay ahead of a possible introduction of an engine power limit.
Most fishermen seemed to argue as follows: ‘It is fine by me to restrict
engine capacity, as long as my vessel will be the most powerful one, for
otherwise I will be in the category of losers.’ They were entangled in what
is a typical example of a prisoners’ dilemma. The best solution was to col-
lectively limit catching effort and thus engine power. Flatfish stocks would
not be depleted and – all other conditions being equal – the beam-trawl
fishermen would earn fairly good incomes. The worst solution was to col-
lectively increase engine power in an unmitigated way. This might lead to a
collapse of flatfish stocks, ultimately bringing ruin to the entire occupa-
tional community of fishermen. From an individual viewpoint, the highest
gain could be had if all others restricted themselves save for oneself. Hav-
ing the most powerful vessel would mean taking the highest proportion of
the aggregate catch without the flatfish stocks being endangered. The
worst situation from the individual viewpoint would be if a fisherman
chose to restrict himself, but not all others followed suit. His share of de-
clining catches would be small, and the fishery would be heading for dis-
aster. With the first solution depending on state intervention that failed to
come and dismissing the fourth possibility as foolish masochism, the fish-
ermen opted for the third, which, because it was opted for by them all, in
fact led to the undesirable second ‘solution’: theoretically the worst of all.
Of course, the real situation was further complicated by the fact that the
Dutch fishing fleet did not operate in isolation. Both fishermen and the
Dutch state were firmly embedded within the dynamics of fishing indus-
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tries and fisheries policies in a much wider context. Even so, when the
government refrained from intervening, keeping up with the Joneses was
the norm. This penchant also entailed an ‘irrational’ aspect that was linked
with occupational culture. Fishermen took profound pride in their vessels,
owners as well as non-propertied crewmembers (see also Chapter 5). Hav-
ing the latest equipment at their disposal had an intrinsic value. In their
perception, ‘new’ usually equalled ‘good’ – until proven otherwise – and
being able to purchase state-of-the-art gadgets to become a top-ranking
skipper was part and parcel of the fishermen’s competitive game. In nearly
all interviews, my interlocutors pointed out that they had been ‘the first’ in
the Texel or Dutch fishing fleet to introduce this or that technique, instru-
ment or piece of equipment. Having done so provided a source of self-
esteem – although older fishermen would often state that dependency on
electronic devices had led to a loss of traditional skills.
In order to avoid lagging behind, fishermen needed the financial re-
sources to modernize their vessels. Between 1970 and 1975, the mean
price of a new beam trawler belonging to the most powerful segment
doubled from one million to two million guilders. It was no sinecure for
family firms to come up with this amount of money. Thus, there must
have been other reasons why the offshore fishing industry expanded at
such a swift pace. Because of certain tax measures, it was wise to reinvest
in vessels and equipment. This stimulated the expansion of the fleet and
aggregate engine capacity. Like most people, fishermen were not fond of
paying taxes. If they were making a profit, they had to pay tax. If they re-
invested, however, this ‘fiscal profit’ would often evaporate and stay in the
firm. Most fishermen therefore opted for a forward retreat. They had to
continue doing so to escape from the tax collector. In addition, the state
strongly encouraged modernization through its fiscal policies: in the mid-
1950s, it had introduced tax-deductible investment reductions of twenty
per cent during a five-year period (see Chapter 3). As of 1964, fishermen
who modernized their vessels could obtain a twenty-five per cent state sub-
sidy. Similar ‘structural measures’ leading to subsidized overcapacity ap-
plied to the shrimp-fishing fleet, where decommissioning and replace-
ment schemes enabled fishermen to buy bigger and better boats –
including beamers. Still, the Fishermen’s Union pointed out that the heav-
ily subsidized fishing industries of Germany and the UK had led to larger
supplies of fish and lower prices, particularly following the development of
the common market and the abolishment of protective measures. With
fishing equipment becoming increasingly expensive, the organization
called for more state support.1 Indeed, in 1972 tax arrangements turned
even more lenient: fishermen could subtract a quarter of investment costs
over a five-year term and could write off the cost of their vessels in five
years’ time. Moreover, bank loans were easily available. Financial institu-
tions had long been hesitant to provide fishermen with capital, since a
vessel did not seem to be secure collateral. For this reason, it had been
hard for inshore skipper-owners to work their way up into the offshore
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fisheries. Members of the fishing elite lineages usually made sure that they
were possessed of a large part of the capital needed for a new vessel: they
were often well beyond sixty per cent solvent. However, against the back-
ground of previous successes in the share-based offshore fisheries, the
banks cast off old prejudices. As a retired skipper-owner from Oudeschild,
born in 1915, told:
For my first boat, I had to mortgage my house. The Boerenleenbank [a coop-
erative farmers’ bank] would not give loans on vessels. Later, they gave me
300,000 guilders on my bare bum. Everything had changed by then, and
they did provide mortgages on vessels. Previously, however, that bank
shunned fishermen.
Fishermen proved to be very dependable when it came to paying interest
and redeeming debts. Shipyards were of course more than willing to build
new vessels with bank guarantees. Moreover, to obtain such orders they
paid handsome prices for second-hand boats, which they sold abroad or at
home. With the entry of scores of newcomers – usually ex-crewmembers –
into the Dutch fishing industry, the demand for used vessels was high.
Often, they were sold at prices that equalled the initial expense – or even
more than that. Again, taxes, subsidies, bank loans and high trade-in
prices are only part of the story. The risks fishermen ran in becoming
heavily indebted had to be offset by optimism about the opportunities to
redeem loans and mortgages, account for depreciation, pay all operating
costs and crew shares and still make a profit.
Indeed, based on the fishermen’s experiences in the recent past and
despite the growing concern that they might out-compete each other and
ruin flatfish stocks, in their view the future looked rather bright. Beam-
trawl fishermen had had some extremely good years. Those hailing from
Texel grossed an aggregate of three million guilders in 1960, steadily
climbing to twenty-one million guilders in 1972.2 The most powerful ves-
sels obtained the highest proceeds; one vessel grossed over a million
guilders in 1972. By then, mean gross incomes of Texel share fishermen
amounted to 47,500 guilders. Corrected for inflation, this implied a dou-
bling of income in fifteen years, making fishing an attractive occupation.
Beam trawling brought prosperity. Many local young men desired to be on
a crew, so there was no shortage of hands. There was even a pool of sub-
stitute crewmembers. Only a decade earlier, two score of fishermen from
the mainland had had to work aboard Texel cutters for want of islanders
willing to crew the boats of the expanding local North Sea fleet. In 1963,
for example, approximately forty to fifty of the 175 men and one woman
who crewed the Texel fishing fleet hailed from the mainland. By then,
there were thirty-one fishing firms, operating twenty-six big cutters and
ten small cutters. Due to the fleet’s growth, more and more hands were
required. Initially, it was hard to come by crewmembers, especially quali-
fied crew holding certificates. In the 1960s, new legislation made educa-
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tion compulsory for youngsters up to sixteen and no longer allowed four-
teen-year-olds to hold full-time jobs. Henceforth, boys entered fishing ca-
reers when they were fifteen or sixteen years of age. As of the mid-1960s,
young Texelians became increasingly interested in getting a berth aboard a
beamer. With weekly gross revenues of over 10,000 guilders unexcep-
tional, many were lured into fishing. By the end of 1967, only three main-
landers were still crewing on the Texel fishing fleet. Things had obviously
turned for the better. In 1969, only seven per cent of Texel’s occupational
population worked as fishermen, but they generated no less than seven-
teen per cent of the gross income of the island. In 1973, there were 227
active fishermen crewing forty-seven boats. The easy recruitment of locals
was inextricably connected with the attractive share remuneration (see be-
low). Bigger beamers required no more labour effort than smaller vessels
and had considerably better gross proceeds and living conditions. There-
fore, crewmembers attempted to join the crew of the bigger vessels. To
avoid losing experienced deckhands to other skippers, this created another
incentive for owners to expand. As a Texel fisherman argued, ‘I dare say
that some skipper-owners had cutters built to keep their crew. They said,
“If I don’t go along, I won’t get good personnel.” And it worked out fine.’
The beam trawl fleet’s impressive results were due to larger catches –
although not for all species – and better fish prices.
In the winter season, a number of boats still switched to pair trawling
for herring, operating from the Zeeland port of Breskens, as many had
been doing since the end of the war (see Chapter 3). In the early 1960s,
the Texel herring hunters began the season as early as August, starting to
fish off the coast of Flamborough Head and gradually following the her-
ring south along the English coast into the Channel until early spring. In
1963, there were record catches, but prices were so low that most herring
went to fishmeal factories. By 1965, the seasonal herring fishery conducted
from the port of Breskens ended. Higher quality demands inhibited trans-
portation on motor trucks to Germany. The herring had to be packed in
wooden boxes before being supplied to the traders and Breskens had
neither the space nor the facilities to switch to the new mode of operation,
and so the Texel fishermen’s transhumance came to an end. The dwind-
ling number that continued to seasonally pursue herring would from now
on operate from Texel and land their catches in such ports as IJmuiden
and Scheveningen. More powerful and faster boats also enhanced their
radius of action, diminishing the need to operate from other locales during
the herring-hunting season. With the good results in flatfish fishing, there
seemed to be no reason to switch to herring fishing, but some skipper-
owners nonetheless continued to do so. Texelians had focused mainly on
spent herring (herring that has ejected its spawn), which was processed
into pickled herring. In 1971, six Texel pair trawlers participated in fishing
fat herring or ‘maatjes herring’, which was processed in brine. The skip-
pers had to steam for thirty hours to the Scottish coast. As the Texelians
were inexperienced concerning the necessary fat content of herring and
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the salting process, each pair had a Katwijk herring fisherman aboard.
Catches were disappointing, however, and later that year, a temporary her-
ring ban was promulgated, which was repeated the following year. Despite
this, in the early 1970s, several Texel fishermen had their newly built ves-
sels equipped with net drums aft so that they could continue combining
beam trawling with pair trawling or otter trawling. They did not want to
put all their eggs in one basket, even though it proved increasingly attrac-
tive to concentrate on flatfish fishing.
In terms of the contribution to gross revenues, sole was the offshore
fleet’s most important target species. Three-quarters of Texel’s fishing fleet
focused on sole fishing for most of the year. On average, sole usually made
up less than fifteen per cent of the total catch in weight, but it often ac-
counted for more than half of the gross revenues. Aggregate landings in
the Netherlands went up from around 4,200 metric tons of sole in the late
1950s to between 7,000 and 11,300 metric tonnes in the early 1960s. Ow-
ing to the beam trawl’s efficiency and widespread distribution, 1966 saw a
record high of 23,300 metric tonnes. From then on, sole landings steadily
declined to 15,000 metric tonnes in 1972, levelling off at around 14,000
metric tonnes in the next three years – despite growing engine capacity
and catching effort. In other words, it took ever more energy and more
days at sea to catch a dwindling amount of sole. This tendency was be-
lieved to be a fair indication of overcapacity and overexploitation of sole
stocks. The secretary of Texel’s fishermen’s association emphasized that
this could not go on. The fishermen’s worries about the state of the stocks
in connection with increasing engine capacity did not come out of the
blue, but were firmly based on their experiences.
Steadily increasing market prices easily made up for diminishing sole
landings. Between 1957 and 1963, mean sole prices had been fairly stable
at around 2.87 guilders per kilo, deviating by no more than eighteen cents.
In 1964, however, prices rocketed because sole catches were exceptionally
low and demand remained high: the extremely harsh winter of 1962-1963
had wiped out a large percentage of the sole stock’s younger year classes.
On average, a kilo of sole fetched no less than 5.32 guilders. Although
prices fell by twenty-five to thirty per cent in the following four years, they
eventually climbed again to 9.13 guilders in 1973, remaining fairly high
from that time on. Thus, in the time span of a decade sole prices rose quite
considerably – even with correction for inflation. Prices of other important
species such as plaice and herring also went up, although less spectacu-
larly. The total landings of plaice averaged 28,639 metric tonnes per year
between 1966 and 1969, increasing to 44,576 tons over the next four
years. In 1972, the Dutch cutter fleet’s aggregate gross proceeds were al-
most sevenfold that of 1958 (and if corrected for inflation: 3.4 times as
much). It rose from 32 million to 217 million guilders (Rijneveld, Smit
and de Wilde 1973:7). Plaice and particularly sole were highly valued,
prime fish species for which there was a buoyant export market, especially
after the establishment of the European Community with its ideology of
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free internal trade. Overall, the fishermen’s experience was that both
catches – with the exception of sole catches – and fish prices increased
and their expectation was that this would continue to be the case. In addi-
tion, vessel operation costs depended largely on fuel prices. Although en-
gine capacity and thus fuel consumption had increased slowly in the
1950s, when the fleet developed at a much quicker pace, red diesel prices
went down for most of the 1960s, then slowly increased again until 1972.
Fuel accounted for less than ten per cent of operating costs. Calculating
from their account books, the fishermen certainly had reason to be opti-
mistic.
Then the global oil crisis of 1973 struck, hitting the fishing industry ex-
tremely hard. Arab oil-producing countries boycotted the Netherlands,
along with the United States, for its support of Israel in the Israeli-Palesti-
nian conflict. The embargo severely affected the Dutch economy, not least
the fisheries. Heavily indebted due to their recent investments, most
beam-trawl fishermen faced serious difficulties when red diesel prices be-
gan soaring. Within a year, they rocketed from nine cents to thirty cents
per litre. The most powerful vessels by then consumed up to 25,000 litres
of fuel per week, weighing heavily on exploitation bills. Adding to the fish-
ermen’s misery, sole and plaice landings decreased compared with pre-
vious years, despite the growth of the fleet and engine capacity. Plaice
prices rose slightly but sole prices fell and so could not make up for higher
fuel costs. On aggregate, the mid-1970s yielded negative net results of
many millions of guilders for the North Sea fishing fleet. Instantaneously,
the fishermen’s optimism made way for pessimism and in some cases
even panic. Investments halted. The leader of the local fishermen’s organi-
zation, Ben Daalder, told his compatriots: ‘We are in the midst of the over-
fishing problem.’ The association’s secretary noted in his annual review:
All of us should cooperate with the recovery of fish stocks. … If everyone is
honest, we have to admit that all of us have been involved in bringing about
the current situation. Of course, the state is also to blame because it did not
intervene [that is, cap engine power] despite the organizations’ repeated
calls. Our individualist attitude makes doing so difficult but not impossible.
A majority of the fishermen were in favour of catch reductions, provided
that the state compensated the fishermen. Again, they turned to the gov-
ernment for assistance. This time, it did not leave them in the lurch, as it
had done in regard to the engine capacity limit. Rationing and distributing
red diesel and temporarily providing fuel subsidies, the state sought to
prevent the fishing industry from facing mass bankruptcy. It also intro-
duced a decommissioning scheme in an attempt to cope with overcapacity.
With the risks of investments now obvious, the owners began to negotiate
with crew concerning new divisions of the share remuneration (see be-
low). For the time being, fishermen refrained from lodging orders for new
vessels or yet more powerful engines. Some even began to economize on
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maintenance. Most fishing firms proved to be resilient, not in the least
because generally they were family-owned and operated. In the post-war
era, the specific dynamics of family firms had also been significant in
bringing about the Dutch fishing fleet’s growth and modernization. The
owners did not solely reckon in terms of net losses or profits and future
returns on investments or other economic incentives. Nor were status con-
siderations alone sufficient reason to desire growth. Social reasons – con-
tinuity of the family firm and equal opportunities to all sons – were also
important in their motivations. Fishermen thus had their own rationalities
to expand; rationalities that might deviate from pure business economics.
Blood Runs Thicker Than Water: The Family Firm
Kinship plays a prominent role in the fishing industry’s social organiza-
tion, not just on Texel or in the Netherlands, but also elsewhere (see, for
instance, Byron 1975, 1986; McGoodwin 1990; Menzies 2003). A number
of economic, social and psychological factors are significant, as are several
adaptive characteristics. Anthropologist Reginald Byron emphasizes the
socio-psychological function of family crews: ‘the model of a family part-
nership makes possible the conversion of the kinship values of trust, soli-
darity, the equivalence of siblings and mutual aid on the private level into
the organizational norms of voluntary cooperation, equality and mutual
reliance on the team level’ (1975:155). Close social ties enhance teamwork
aboard a fishing boat. Rules of inheritance are also important (Löfgren
1972; Norr and Norr 1978). A vessel constitutes an undividable asset. Con-
sequently, relatives – and especially agnatic kin (father-son(s), paternal un-
cle-nephew(s) or brothers) – are strongly interdependent; they have to stick
together to continue fishing. More importantly, a family firm is a common
pool of resources. Relatives share forces of production, labour, capital,
knowledge and expertise. In so doing, they spread risks and reduce vulner-
abilities. The earnings remain within a narrowly defined core of kinsfolk,
enabling the quick accumulation of capital in good seasons. All participat-
ing family members ultimately benefit. Therefore, the family firm is a sys-
tem of self-motivated labour (Thompson et al. 1983:156). Conversely, in
bad times a particular economic outlook is highly significant. If revenues
are low due to meagre catches or disappointing fish prices, fishermen who
are (part-)owners tend to work longer hours and/or cut back on their ex-
penditure and on their income from the ship’s and crew share. They will
postpone reinvestments in equipment and possibly even eat into their own
savings to weather a depression. Generating profits is not their only objec-
tive. Thus, the family firm is also a form of self-exploitation (Jorion
1983:10). Their pervasive labour ethos and the specific definition of profit-
ability enable fishermen to keep their firms afloat even in the face of se-
rious economic crises: ‘Family involvement gives small capital a flexibility
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that ... alters basic assumptions about rationality in economic behaviour’
(Apostle et al. 1992:321).
The economic logic and social dynamic of the family firm contributed
importantly to the Texel and Dutch fishing fleet’s expansion. Highly signif-
icant to this is an ethic of deferred gratification. Relatives are prepared to
cut their own incomes for some predefined or implicit future goal. With
the greater capital outlay needed in the North Sea cutter fisheries, it was
important to acquire the necessary funds to buy seaworthy boats. Whereas
labour used to be more important than capital in the era of wooden-hulled
sailing vessels, this changed as of the 1930s and more so after the Second
World War. Although skipper-owners were usually able to redeem debts,
account for depreciation and still save money to buy new boats, after the
war vessel prices were such that they usually needed to contract higher
loans. Using a boat – and often a house too – as collateral, banks would be
prepared to provide part of the money, particularly if an owner had sons.
Sometimes, bank loans would not entirely suffice. The fishermen there-
fore also had to raise funds through private loans that had to be redeemed.
Usually, they called on relatives whom they knew or believed to be affluent.
In order to quickly redeem such loans, their most commonly used strategy
was to take out ‘week money’ (weekgeld) for a fishing trip. On paper, there
would be the vessel share and the crew share (see below), the former uti-
lized for depreciation and interest and the latter providing the money that
crewmembers – including crewing co-owners – earned. Whereas non-
propertied deckhands would obtain their full share, owners and their crew-
ing offspring usually only took a modest predetermined sum of cash per
week. This would amount to less than a deckhand’s share. Young unmar-
ried crewing sons of owners would generally receive ‘spending-money’
only. Thus, family labour was often underpaid. An Oudeschild man who
began his fishing career aboard his father’s shrimp cutter in the 1950s
said: ‘My brother and I were teenagers then. Father gave us just a few
guilders a week and that was it. We did not care at all. We just wanted to
fish and thought of nothing else.’ ‘With your own people [meaning kins-
folk], you had fewer costs,’ summarized a skipper-owner. The money thus
saved would go straight back into the firm so that debts could be redeemed
quickly, enabling investment in a new boat at some point in future. This
mode of self-restraint and self-exploitation stimulated rapid modernization
and growth. ‘It cuts both ways,’ stated a retired skipper-owner, born in
1923: ‘Because you had sons, you could progress and later on, you in turn
would help those lads.’
Relatives working as crewmembers provided an important social asset.
Depending on the stage in the household’s life cycle, a father and son(s) or
brothers constituted the crew’s core. If skipper-owners had male offspring,
their sons would often be impatient to assume their father’s role, work
aboard and eventually become skipper-owners themselves. When a fisher-
man’s young son showed an interest in becoming a fisherman, he would
occasionally join his father on a trip to sea, simply being aboard and lend-
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ing a hand if and when possible. This way, the father got to see whether his
son had ‘a turn for it’. There was a pervasive sense of the significance of
occupational inheritance and handing down of fishing traditions, knowl-
edge and zeal. It was every owner’s dream to have at least one successor to
continue the family firm, putting a strong moral obligation on the male
offspring of owner-operators to follow their father’s example. Fishing was
an important source of identity and an occupation that was highly valued
by those in the industry, something skipper-owners in particular wanted to
pass on to the next generation. Better still was to have more sons and to
provide each of them showing an interest in fishing with a vessel of his
own. Thus, one of the driving forces underlying the growth of the Texel
(and Dutch) fishing fleet was the fishermen’s desire to become indepen-
dent and, ideally, to set up each owner’s son with his own vessel to skipper.
When the father retired and became a ‘shore skipper’ – often maintaining
a position as paterfamilias for a considerable time – brothers usually con-
tinued the firm and cooperated until their sons joined them aboard ship.
There would sometimes be insufficient positions to accommodate them
all. In addition, patrilateral cross cousins often did not get along regarding
fishing matters and other decisions and wanted to work with their own
father on their own vessel. Consequently, schisms of family firms usually
occurred during the stage when two or more brothers each had sons
aboard. Conflict and subsequent fission could also occur if one of the co-
operating brothers had the feeling that he contributed disproportionately
to the firm. An Oudeschild skipper-owner (born in 1940), who turned in-
dependent in the early 1970s, related the following:
We ran a single firm, my father and my brothers, with four cutters. I was
the only one who sailed the North Sea. They were home every evening,
while I was away for a week, from Monday until Saturday. I was earning
the greater part of the firm’s proceeds while they all shared equally. The
thing that bothered me most was that my brother’s wife told my wife that
she could suffice with less week money because I was on the cutter the
entire week and had my board there. She shouldn’t have said that, it went
against the grain. It spoke volumes about her lack of understanding. I was
the one who was earning most of the money for the firm! Therefore, I
bought the cutter and began working alone.
This was certainly not the only example of brothers splitting up owing to
disagreement on skewed contributions to the firm or – often equally im-
portant – incompatible characters. Occasionally, brothers did not get along.
This could be a reason for a firm to hive off into two or more firms. An
older informant, born in 1905, gave a concrete example and said the boys’
mother had had many sleepless nights. Finally, the parents decided to have
a second cutter built so that each brother could skipper his own vessel.
‘They just did not get along, until the death of the eldest brother. They
simply couldn’t tolerate each other!’A father had another solution for such
Booming Business: The Rise of Beam Trawling 163
a case, as a retired deckhand, born in 1928, intimated: ‘The father of two
boys chalked a line in the wheelhouse and told them that they shouldn’t
cross it.’ Conflicts could also arise concerning who would be the skipper,
as an Oosterend owner-operator (born in 1923) related:
Working with cousins aboard is difficult, although even brothers some-
times have problems. There is bound to be someone who is obstinate and
it easily kindles feelings that the one does more than the other does. You
should contribute equally, but a skipper does less work with his hands, and
if his brother is a deckhand and does manual labour, he might say ‘you
don’t do anything’. The fat would be in the fire then…
Both centripetal and centrifugal forces (Faris 1973:93) consequently char-
acterize the family firm. Schisms generally occur during a particular stage
in the family cycle. If brothers have sons who are old enough to join a
crew, they often break away from the existing firm and establish their
own. Due to this dynamic, the Texel fishing fleet expanded, particularly in
times of boom, making family firms even more common. Occupational
inheritance and – where several agnates (or cognates) were co-owners –
fission or expansion of family firms meant that the number of vessels in-
creased. As in other Dutch fishing communities, the fishing family firm
dynamic was an important reason for the local fleet’s growth. Continuity of
the family firm was deemed extremely important – for most owners even a
raison d’être. Obviously, it depended on the social contingency of having at
least one son who, in addition, had to be physically and mentally up to the
job. ‘If you don’t go out to sea with heart and soul, it won’t work, even if
you come from a fishing lineage,’ an informant said. Daughters were –
and are – regarded as unsuitable successors. If they married in community
of property, a deceased skipper’s widow owned the cutter, but her son(s)
usually ran the firm. If she had no boys or if they were too young to crew,
she might employ a hired skipper and deckhands. Unless he had taken out
life insurance, a deckhand’s wife would stand empty-handed if her hus-
band died. This was not the case with the spouse of an owner, however.
For example, the widow of an owner-operator who suddenly died from a
heart attack age 47 continued the firm and had the relatively new cutter
skippered by an unrelated deckhand. As in this case, most couples were
married on equal terms, so that the wife in theory owned half her hus-
band’s property.
The fact that in the Texel fishing industry women generally did not crew
is not exceptional. In many places across the globe, there is a clearly gen-
dered division of labour: men work at sea while most women stay at home
and manage the household and the household budget and take care of
child rearing.3 In fact, this required continual role-switching: ‘While their
men are at sea, women must become “reluctant matriarchs”; when their
men are at home, women must turn into dutiful wives’ (Davis and Nadel-
Klein 1992:139). Underlying the division of tasks are cultural and symbolic
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constructions and constrictions. This does not mean that women’s work is
less important than men’s work: ‘not infrequently it is their economic con-
tribution that underwrites or provides the risk fund necessary to sustain
fishing activities’ (Davis and Nadel-Klein 1988:19). The family firm usually
rests on close conjugal cooperation and the fisherman’s wife’s organiza-
tional, economic and emotional contribution to the fishing household is
often crucial for its flexibility, versatility and resilience.
The role of women in Texel family firms was usually considerable. Some
women played an important part in running the financial side of the firm.
For instance, an Oudeschild North Sea cutter owner’s wife, born in 1914,
did all the bookkeeping, handled the bank accounts and paid the deck-
hands from the moment her husband took over the firm from his father
in the early 1950s. She said her spouse lacked the time to do so during the
weekend – ‘and the banks would be closed anyway’. When her husband
passed away, she inherited part of his share. While a widowed septuagen-
arian, she was still actively involved in her sons’ firm. In the North Sea
segment of Texel’s fishing fleet, there were more examples of women who
were a firm’s financial brains. In contradistinction, wives of shrimp fisher-
men were not involved in bookkeeping or similar tasks. Their husbands
were home often enough to take care of this chore. Generally, spouses
would discuss financial decisions concerning the firm. A woman, born in
1921, recalled that when her husband was still a deckhand, she was only
remotely involved. This changed when he became a co-owner:
When the firm was ours, I managed all sorts of business. You contacted an
accountant who had to take care of things, you made phone calls, wrote
letters, remitted money and so on. Sometimes I knew more about what
had happened than he did. You always had to arrange all sorts of things. I
did it myself, but my sister-in-law never took care of that. It was my job; I
had the authority to take it on. My husband used to call home via the radio
and say something like ‘we will be in port by that and that time and you
should make sure that so-and-so or such-and-such is there’. Bringing up
the kids was my task. You just did it alone, punishing them too. My hus-
band never had to punish them. He didn’t have to be the bogeyman. I never
told them ‘you just wait until your father gets home.’ My sister was differ-
ent. She always told her husband [a fisherman] what the kids had done
wrong and he would give them a smacking. However, when my husband
was home it was always a party for the kids. You had to do everything by
yourself, though. Sometimes it was difficult, for instance when the children
were ill. Their care always rested on my shoulders. When they got a bit old-
er, you had to make sure that they did their homework for otherwise they
would do it haphazardly.
Her husband interjected: ‘Yes, a fisherman’s wife has a great responsibil-
ity. She is a mother and a father at the same time.’ She continued:
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He would come home late on Saturday afternoon. The weekend was brief.
A fisherwoman was already emancipated back then. You took care of every-
thing yourself. It demanded a particular attitude. I could never share my
worries with him, so I had to carry the burden alone. Oh well, you were
aware of that if you married a fisherman.
Although they were mostly indirectly involved in the fishing industry, the
women’s – and particularly the skipper-owners’ wives’ – supportive role
enabled the men to go out to sea and earn a living. Hence, there was a
clear-cut division of labour, with men’s tasks being at sea and women’s
tasks being on shore. In the 1960s, only one girl worked aboard her
father’s boat for several years. They took tourists on shrimp-fishing trips.
The skipper had sons, but they did not like sailing with holidaymakers and
they went on to skipper their own vessels. This was an exceptional case. In
their role of rearing the children, mothers were important for ingraining
the values boys needed at sea. They were just as keen as their fathers were
to prepare them for their future role in the firm, as occupational inheri-
tance in skipper-owner families often was a matter of course. Ideally, skip-
per-owner’s sons would be skipper-owners themselves in future.
Living economically and being thrifty often enabled expansive growth.
Women had a significant part to play in accomplishing this goal. Their
spending patterns reinforced the firm’s financial strength and facilitated
redeeming debts and paying interest on loans in time. If they did not inter-
nalize this kind of behaviour early on, there would sometimes be a mother-
in-law to tell her son’s wife she should not be spending too much. This was
not always appreciated: ‘At some stage, I had a job and if I bought a coat or
something like that, my in-laws couldn’t say anything about it for it was my
money,’ said a woman, born in 1931, still slightly indignant. By making do
with a rather modest weekly allowance for running the household, she
enabled her husband to reinvest or to keep up with his brother(s) in acquir-
ing his share in the firm. An Oudeschild skipper-owner, born in 1940, put
his mother on a pedestal:
She was always toiling to make ends meet. My father was terribly thrifty,
almost stingy. Nearly all the money he earned went straight into the firm.
That is how we could expand, but my mother made clothes on an old sew-
ing machine and did the laundry for twelve children by hand. She had to
deny herself a lot, for my dad would always put the firm first.
Some women were keenly aware of the fact that their austerity contributed
to a firm’s solidity: ‘I helped build up the firm,’ a skipper-owner’s wife
(born in 1921) contended. The men acknowledged – and appreciated – this
fact. A retired owner-operator, born in 1923, related the following:
In Oosterend, family ties have always been tight. The fishermen’s wives
played an important role, not just with regard to raising the kids and run-
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ning the household. If something needed to be taken care of for the boat
and such, it always had been done at the time we returned home. They had
to talk to agents and manage all sorts of business affairs. The Oosterend
women were squarely behind their husbands. They never complained and
always said, ‘You just go ahead, I’ll make sure that everything is in order
here.’
In honour of his wife or their mother, owners in several cases gave their
vessel her name. ‘When we named our boat after my wife, she got even
more involved and made sure that everything was thoroughly cleaned on
Saturday,’ a skipper-owner intimated.
The fishermen cherished their weekend, which they tried to spend with
their wife and children. Usually, however, they had several additional com-
mitments. First of all, after returning to the harbour of Oudeschild on Sa-
turday at around noon, the boats had to be made shipshape for the upcom-
ing fishing week, ice had to be stored and drinking water bunkered, nets
mended, fishing necessaries replenished and so on. The weekend thus
usually began only late on Saturday afternoon. Birthdays were always cele-
brated at the weekend, and for many skipper-owners there would be work
on committees and boards of voluntary associations, either fisheries-re-
lated or connected with school, church and so on. Oosterend fisher fami-
lies were commonly sabbatarian and attended Sunday worship. A woman,
born in 1916 and married to an Oosterend skipper-owner, related:
We had seven kids. My husband went away on Monday morning, and re-
turned from sea by Saturday noon. Then he usually had meetings of the
fishermen’s association and on Sunday morning there would be the
Church Council and the religious service. It was only by Sunday afternoon
that we could finally say: ‘At long last, we’ll have father to ourselves for a
brief while.’ Sometimes he would sail again by Sunday midnight. Well, you
just had to accept that.
Fishermen’s wives perceived themselves primarily to be homemakers.
They made sure that when their husbands returned from sea, they had
done all the shopping and the house was spick and span. On Saturday,
many skipper-owners’ wives cleaned the boat’s pantry, wheelhouse and ac-
commodations and did the firm’s laundry. In addition, they would often
prepare meat for the crew’s upcoming fishing trip.
When their husbands were out at sea, fishermen’s wives occasionally
turned to each other for moral support. Some would also meet in a wo-
men’s club, but for those with small children it was not easy to leave
home. News from relatives who were away on a fishing trip was scant.
Until the 1980s, there was only ship-to-shore communication. At specific
times, women had to listen in to a special radio frequency that enabled
them to hear their husband and kinsfolk at sea conveying short messages
that could also be picked up by others. Communication was therefore one-
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way and public. For this reason, the fishermen kept their ‘calls’ brief and
rather general, often saying little more than that everything was alright and
that catches were satisfying or disappointing. ‘I always listened to the
radio’, a woman born in 1908, said, ‘and I still do.’ Particularly during foul
weather, there used to be considerable anxiety and uncertainty. With a
wind force of seven or eight, the fishermen would attempt to reach a safe
haven or refrain from sailing. ‘You didn’t sleep well when they were out at
sea in a storm, your thoughts were with them and you prayed,’ an owner-
operator’s wife, born in 1921, confessed. A deckhand’s wife said:
You sometimes worried. There was a terrible storm once and I was an-
xiously listening to the radio. Apparently, a huge wave hit the cutter and I
heard the skipper say ‘goddamn’. The man never ever cursed. Then the
radio went silent. I was convinced they had capsized. It was only after
three-quarters of an hour that I heard them again. Save for this once, I
have never been afraid, although you did worry from time to time.
In general, women born into fishing lineages were more used to coping
with the men being away most of the time than women with a ‘landlubber’
background.
All in all, the family firm’s economic logic and social dynamic – includ-
ing the role of women – enabled the expansion of production units, ulti-
mately leading to processes of fission. Newcomers from non-fishing
lineages also contributed considerably to the local offshore fishing fleet’s
growth. In the 1960s, especially, several deckhands aspired to become in-
dependent and bought their own vessel. ‘It is better to be a small boss than
a big servant,’ as they expressed it. Having served as deckhands for a num-
ber of years, they had learned the ropes of fishing. If they had earned a
certificate as a helmsman, there were few obstacles to beginning for them-
selves, apart from financial ones. Not all deckhands desired to become in-
dependent owner-operators. Several of the retired crewmembers I inter-
viewed told me that they refrained from taking on the responsibility of
starting a firm of their own because they thought they would be unable to
handle the responsibilities. ‘I did not dare, I was afraid of being in debt,’
one of them, born in 1912, disclosed. ‘I preferred being a deckhand.’ An-
other (born in 1938) said, ‘I was given the opportunity, my skipper offered
to help my brother and me to set up a firm. I had a good life as a deckhand
though, and perhaps I didn’t have the guts or I wasn’t enterprising en-
ough.’ Several crewmembers did not have such hesitations. As we have
seen, they often earned considerable sums of money under the share sys-
tem of remuneration (see also below), part of which they could set aside
for investment in a vessel of their own. In addition, banks provided loans
and credit more easily than in previous years. One of the newcomers, who
in 1967 as a twenty-six-year-old began a fishing firm with his brother, re-
membered:
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The manager of a certain bank would not even discuss the option of provid-
ing a loan, but the manager of another bank was less reluctant and said,
‘You just buy that cutter.’ The man apparently had faith in our abilities. I
never gave a thought to the idea that it might be a financial risk. We were
self-assured and thought we could run a cutter with a bank loan just as well
as others could run one with family capital. The skipper-owners of the tradi-
tional fisher families were sceptical until we proved them wrong. Initially,
they told deckhands who began sailing with us: ‘Are you working for them?
You must be mad. They are as poor as church rats. You will have to take
your own toilet paper with you.’ Later, they had to admit that they were
wrong and they never mentioned it again. They simply forgot that we had
had years of experience before we began skippering. They firmly believed
that only sons of skipper-owners could become skipper-owners. My father
was a farmer. Later they would say, ‘The farmers are catching the fish now.’
They were also sceptical because originally, our family was Roman Catholic
– even though only nominally so – and nearly all fishermen here are Protes-
tant.
Another newcomer, who as a twenty-two-year-old started a firm with his
nineteen-year-old brother, at the time considering this ‘nothing special’,
said similar things about the initial scepticism of descendents from tradi-
tional fishing lineages: ‘They regarded us as intruders; at least this is what
we sensed. It didn’t take long though before we were accepted and be-
longed to the club, but you certainly had to prove yourself.’ Some newco-
mers were assisted financially by their former ‘boss’ or by other wealthy
fishermen. Shipyards and suppliers were also important in providing
loans, on the condition that aspiring owners bought their vessels and
equipment (for example engines) from them. Several rather young Texel
fishermen started a firm this way, some being heavily indebted initially.
Due to the excellent financial results in these years, they were able to ‘fish
their firm out of the water’, as they expressed it, meaning that they were
able to redeem their bank loans and debts. The upward social mobility of
some pioneers stimulated several others to follow suit. Among the new-
comers were several fishermen from Oudeschild. In 1966, for example,
Oudeschilders operated six big beamers, while in addition the village
boasted six or seven shrimp-fishing boats. Inshore fishing also provided
opportunities for newcomers, particularly for those who did not want to be
deeply indebted.
In many cases, the newcomers also followed the ‘family logic’ and
worked with agnatic kin – usually a father and son(s) or two or more broth-
ers. In the first stage of such firms, they bought a second-hand cutter,
working their way up until they were able to order a new vessel. Of at least
thirteen newcomers in the offshore segment between 1961 and 1969, two
firms began with a father and sons as co-owners, and three started with
two or three brothers as co-owners. As soon as they consolidated their
firms, the family dynamic of occupational inheritance applied. The father
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would leave at a certain stage, the brothers would cooperate until sons en-
tered the crew and the firm would split. To give an extreme example: one
of the firms that began with one boat in 1962 had three vessels by 1967,
owned by a man and his four sons who were also on the crew. One of the
brothers died in a fisheries accident in 1968. Subsequently, one of the cut-
ters was sold and the two remaining brothers each continued with a cutter,
setting up independent firms that would eventually disappear from the
local fisheries arena. The other new family firms do still exist and belong
to the most successful of the Texel fishing fleet. Among the newcomers
were two firms that began as a partnership between two former crewmem-
bers. These were not successful – the firms were dissolved after only a few
years. Two former partners set up new firms with siblings, while the other
two went it alone. Two brothers-in-law set up another firm, but as they dis-
agreed on almost everything and could not get along, they quickly went
their separate ways, each establishing a firm of his own. Both firms only
existed for a few years. One cutter sank; the other was sold, as there were
continual engine troubles. Although it would be too simplistic to say that
family involvement alone determined success, it certainly was an impor-
tant contributing factor.
Because of family involvement in fishing firms, ownership was rather
widely distributed in the occupational community of fishermen. From
1960 until 1971, between thirty and forty per cent of the Texel fishermen
co-owned a vessel. The vast majority of Texel owner-operated family firms
had a single fishing boat. In some cases, fisher families with several agna-
tic kinsmen who could be on a crew owned more than one vessel. For
example, in 1969, four firms owned two cutters and one firm owned three.
Although a large percentage of the fishermen had financial stakes in fish-
ing firms, the owners usually could not do without external labour. Deck-
hands often had a fisher family background. Family enterprises generally
used the share system of remuneration to hire crew. Both the involvement
of kindred and co-adventurers contributed importantly to the Dutch off-
shore fleet’s success in comparison with the wage-based distant water
fleet. By 1950, the former had surpassed the latter in economic impor-
tance. ‘Family-owned boats, skippered and crewed by family members
generally perform better than company-owned boats with hired skippers
and crews. Share fishermen bearing the full catching risk will perform
better than fishermen having a partly fixed or minimum wage’ (Banks et
al. 2001:46). However, the share system does have a number of disadvan-
tages for crewmembers. So, let us have a closer look at the pros and cons of
co-venturing as perceived by owners and non-propertied fishermen.
Co-Venturing: Sharing Risks and Revenues
The share system of remuneration – in which all crewmembers are co-
adventurers and share costs, risks and rewards – is common in many fish-
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ing communities across the world. Anthropologists argue that the system
elicits the crew’s commitment and labour motivation, stimulates produc-
tivity, alleviates tensions, minimizes conflict, promotes cooperative beha-
viour and fosters a spirit of egalitarianism (Acheson 1981:278-279; Jorion
1983:143; Lummis 1985:42; McGoodwin 1990:33). Both owners and crew
benefit from attempting to obtain the maximum output while keeping op-
erating costs to a minimum. As has been remarked about British fisher-
men, the share convention ‘undercut class attitudes in two ways, for it fos-
tered both individualism, and interdependence across the normal
boundaries of class’ (Thompson et al. 1983:244). Generally, anthropolo-
gists and historians would seem to emphasize – perhaps even overexpose
– the share system’s positive sides. In practice, however, there are some
serious cons, as I will attempt to show (see also Chapter 6).
Dutch fishermen – including those from Texel – usually also operate
under a share system, with crewmembers and owner(s) signing a partner-
ship contract (maatschapscontract), stating that all crewmembers receive a
certain percentage of the net revenues and that owner(s) and crew have a
joint responsibility and a stake in the result.4 Accordingly, in theory, the
parties should consult each other on such matters as fishing positions,
fishing strategies and times of departure and return (see also van der Vlist
1970:13). The maatschapscontract states that the owner will provide for the
vessel and the nets (the means of production), while the non-propertied
crewmembers will deliver ‘labour, knowledge and assiduity’. The contract
is valid for a year and automatically renewed, unless one of the signatories
terminates it within a set term, usually four weeks in advance. In principle,
owners benefit because crewmembers share the fishing operation’s risks,
are dedicated and work hard to maximize the gross revenues, are moti-
vated to limit costs and are conscientious in keeping the vessel and equip-
ment in tip-top condition. If feasible, the crew conducts maintenance and
minor repairs. If a vessel cannot sail due to repairs and if catches or prices
are bad, owners do not face the problem of having to pay fixed weekly or
monthly wages. Deckhands are better off because they share in the pro-
ceeds of capital. If catches and prices are good, they earn a lot, creating an
incentive to put in extra effort because they will share in the rewards.
Hence, under the share system labour productivity is high, but the deck-
hands’ weekly incomes fluctuate considerably. They may reap a windfall or
earn nothing at all. The share convention ties them directly to ecological
and market contingencies. If operating costs surpass gross proceeds, for
example if fishing has been particularly bad or inclement weather requires
riding out storms at sea, they will usually be passed on to the next week’s
bill. If share fishermen fall ill, are on holiday or cannot work for other
reasons, they do not earn a penny. The same is true during regular main-
tenance or when vessels are docked to be repaired or overhauled, which
may take weeks or even months. It is therefore deemed wise to set some-
thing aside in good times in order to be able to weather bad times. The
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disadvantage for owners is that they have to bear the costs of damages and
the boat’s and gear’s wear and tear.
The net shares come about as follows. First, operating costs are sub-
tracted from the amount of money the fish fetches at the auction (the gross
revenues). These costs include expenses for fuel, lubricants, ice, commis-
sariat, rent of electronic equipment, fish-handling and auctioning fees,
and ‘mending money’ (boetgeld), which is set aside to pay the one or two
retired fishermen who work on the nets ashore. The remainder is divided
between the vessel (meaning the owner or owners) and the crew according
to some predetermined ratio. The division of vessel and crew shares is
dependent on the type of fishery. The boat share should cover instalments,
maintenance, repairs, renewal of the engine, nets, electronic and other
equipment and so on. Part of it is for investments, reservations, deprecia-
tion and – in some cases – an income for the owner(s). The remainder is
profit. Unlike deckhands, owners can deduct certain costs related to run-
ning the firm (for example, a car, phone bills and so on). Each crewmem-
ber receives a fixed share, occasionally varying somewhat according to se-
niority and position. Experienced deckhands get a full share; a hired
skipper may obtain a small bonus, while a young apprentice’s share is
usually slightly lower than that of the other full-blown crewmembers. If an
owner works aboard as skipper or deckhand, he also receives a share. In
the offshore cutter fisheries, the vessel and crew share used to be fifty–
fifty, and with equal shares: so for example for a crew of five, each crew-
member would receive ten per cent of the net proceeds.
A fisherman born in 1928, with experience as both deckhand and own-
er, explains the mutual benefits:
If a skipper-owner does well, you earn more as a deckhand. Owner and
crew have the same interest in running things as smoothly as possible.
Everything has to be perfect, not just the nets, but also all the equipment. If
there is a problem because something busts, it will cost the crew money
too, because you will make less. [...] The better the relationships aboard, the
better the returns. If relationships are good, you will look after the vessel
much better: you will take care that everything is in perfect shape, you will
grease and oil it and you will make sure that the nets are in tip-top condi-
tion. Maintenance is part of your work, even though you do not earn a pen-
ny for it. If you do not land fish, you cannot get a share and you will not
receive any benefits either, because as a crewmember you are a small self-
employed entrepreneur.
Crewmembers are meticulous about their jobs. They have a stake in keep-
ing everything in good repair. Many handle the boat and the equipment as
if they owned it. Their work practice is conscientious, which is not im-
posed, but elicited through the share system of payment. The system
stimulates a penchant for independence and self-reliance. Crewmembers
accept long working hours and a relentless labour rhythm because they
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benefit directly. They will agree to sail in rather inclement weather, be-
cause if they refrain from so doing they will not earn a penny.
As I have alluded to above, crewing owners usually agreed on not actu-
ally cashing their full crew share but instead taking out a pre-fixed sum of
money; their ‘week money’. They remitted the remainder to the firm. The
boat share could lead to profits, but these were usually reserved for future
investments. This implied that deckhands often had higher cash incomes
than propertied fishermen. A retired skipper-owner, born in 1930, remem-
bers:
After a week of fishing, a deckhand would sometimes take seven or eight
hundred guilders home. Back then, that really was a lot of money, you
know. [As a co-owner] you just had a hundred-and-fifty guilders, which was
not so handsome. Then again, a wage labourer had eighty guilders, so if
you had almost double that amount you were still in clover. […] Sometimes
the boat share yielded some extra money, but it could also be quite disap-
pointing. For instance, if you lost a net, it cost you a lot of money. There
have been times when we lost so many nets that we had to work a month
to make up for it. Well, that was the risk of being an entrepreneur.
With their ‘week money’, skipper-owners sometimes had trouble making
ends meet within their nuclear families. The system of a weekly allowance
occasionally gave rise to tensions and conflicts. The difference between
making do with a hundred-and-fifty guilders for a household of six and for
one of three was quite a difference, as a skipper-owner’s wife, born in 1921,
elucidated: ‘We had four kids and my sister had just one. So that was not
entirely fair.’ For larger expenditures, co-owners could take out money
from the firm. This, however, would affect their share in it.
Generally, deckhands remember the fifty–fifty share convention quite
favourably. Come Saturday night, they would go to the skipper-owner and
receive their money in an envelope. ‘There have been months when I
earned what Mr Average had in a year, especially in the herring season.
You have to be lucky,’ related a crewmember born in 1938. An older collea-
gue, born in 1911, assented: ‘We had ten per cent [with a crew of five]: that
was before the beam trawl. We earned well, although we did not get rich.
In comparison with onshore labourers, we earned at least twice as much.’
A deckhand, born in the previous year, who worked for the same Ooster-
end skipper, agreed. ‘When it was transmitted on the radio what our cutter
had grossed, the neighbours would tell my wife: “You can hold out your
apron again”’ (implying that quite a bit of money would land in it). For
what is pejoratively termed ‘unskilled labour’, deckhands indeed made ex-
tremely good money. Incomes could fluctuate heavily, though. He contin-
ued:
One particular week or another could make a huge difference. There was
not always lard in the frying pan. We have had weeks that we earned hardly
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anything at all. In those days, you would not set sail in a force 7 or over.
Therefore, you always had to set something aside: otherwise, you would get
your fingers burnt.
‘One week you would gross so much, the next week three times that
amount of money and the third week you would earn nothing,’ said a re-
tired deckhand, born in 1929. ‘You always had to calculate what you
earned across the entire year.’ The fishermen were generally well aware of
the vicissitudes of fishing and adapted to the ups and downs.
Because of the partnership model, the micro-social relationships aboard
are rather egalitarian. Apart from some specialist tasks, there is no clear
division of labour. Even ‘specialists’ (the engineer, the cook, the ‘fish hold
man’, the helmsman), take part in all other work. Having his own respon-
sibilities, the skipper stands out to some extent. However, in many cases, a
skipper is also a father or an elder brother and this can make his authority
seem ‘natural’ (although with brothers this is certainly not always the case.
Siblings may even be disinclined to accept each other’s authority when
working together on a boat). Moreover, the usually long-standing and mul-
ti-stranded relationships between crewmembers – in many cases they are
consanguineous relatives, in-laws, neighbours or fellow villagers – foster a
relaxed shipboard atmosphere and enhance a team spirit (see also van der
Vlist 1970:13). What Byron remarks concerning Shetland fishermen also
applies to Texel fisherfolk in the 1960s: ‘the structure of shipboard social
relations articulates in an idiom of kinship that stresses the qualities of
equivalence, trust and cooperation’ (1975:147). Age can also be an interven-
ing variable in hierarchy: the social distance between a skipper and an old-
er, experienced crewmember – who has perhaps already been crewing with
the skipper’s father – is usually much smaller than between a senior skip-
per and an apprentice deckhand. Ideally, synergy should pervade and char-
acterize social relations aboard cutters. It is important that one can trust
and depend on the other deckhands, especially in inclement weather.
Being interdependent also necessitates a great measure of tolerance. Skip-
per-owners take meticulous care to hire men who ‘fit in’ with the rest of
the crew. They seek to avoid tense relations at sea. If, despite these precau-
tions, they have recruited someone who appears to be out of tune, they will
not hesitate to sack him. According to an owner-operator, ‘it only takes one
bellyacher to spoil the mood.’ A colleague confirmed this view: ‘The crew
constitutes a temporary family with smooth relationships. Individuals who
do not fit in are usually gone quite soon.’ Another experienced skipper,
born in 1923, told me:
The mood aboard has to be good. It is like a marriage, though: there is al-
ways bound to be something [that leads to friction]. You have to talk it over.
That is also the reason why we never go off to our bunks right after work on
deck. We always chat over a cup of coffee first.
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Although he emphasized that it should be possible to discuss everything
related to fishing, he also stressed that when it comes down to it, the skip-
per decides and the crew should accept this. He acknowledged that ‘with a
good team spirit, motivation and dedication are better, even if the work is
ashore and [being share fishermen] they don’t get paid.’
The partnership rhetoric notwithstanding, there is hierarchy: owners
and crew are unequal partners. For instance, crewmembers perceive own-
er-operators as ‘bosses’ (bazen) and call themselves mates (maten) or hands
(knechten), while owners often refer to crew as personnel (personeel). Ide-
ally, however, there is an ethic of cooperation, relations are congenial and
egalitarian and a skipper downplays his power. Anthropologist Fredrik
Barth explains this egalitarian ethos, which is also apparent aboard Norwe-
gian herring fishing vessels, in terms of a transaction: skippers underplay
their authority in exchange for a stable, motivated and hard-working crew,
often resulting in higher catches (1966:10). However, other anthropolo-
gists point out that this ethos is a façade and that Barth’s emphasis on
harmony as an adaptation to technological demands completely ignores
tensions and conflicts (Byron 1986:99; Knutson 1991; Pascual Fernández
1999). True enough, status differences exist that may surface in subtle
ways. On New Year’s Day, deckhands used to go to their skipper-owner
and his wife and wish them a happy New Year, but this tradition has since
vanished. Sometimes the egalitarian façade is a thin veneer. A deckhand
(born in 1928) maintains, ‘There are skippers who think they’re always in
the right, even if they clearly are not.’ It was a moot point and several of my
interlocutors complained about it. A former deckhand, born in 1938, ex-
plains:
The crew’s say is limited. You may talk things over, but the skipper deter-
mines what will happen. Some skippers do not communicate at all and just
strike off as they see fit. However, it can fly in their face if catches are bad.
In that case, there is bound to be a lot of moaning and groaning. It also
depends on whether it happens incidentally or structurally. If the deck-
hands have been involved in decision making, for example to steam for
twenty-four hours to remote fishing grounds, and the trip ends up in com-
plete failure, it is much easier to swallow.
Despite egalitarianism being the principle, in practice the skipper does in-
deed make the decisions (also see Chapter 6). In this regard, some of my
interlocutors perceive a difference between operators who are born into
the traditional fisher families and those who have experience as deckhands
themselves. The former are usually less inclined to involve deckhands in
decisions. Allegedly, they are also less transparent concerning the grossing
and the costs. Therefore, ideal and practice are often at odds. Although in
theory the share system appears to be to the advantage of crewmembers –
which benefit from the owner’s capital input – not all of them were parti-
cularly enthusiastic about it (see below).
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The fact that deckhands can leave a vessel at short notice mitigates a
skipper-owner’s power, however. To some extent, labour is footloose. A re-
tired skipper-owner, born in 1904, revealed that his son had had a joint
venture with someone who did not communicate with the crewmembers.
‘He was honest and a fine skipper, but he always experimented and never
ever told the men what he was up to. He could not keep a crew, they were
always leaving and that was the worst. He was impossible.’ Often, deck-
hands will attempt to get a berth aboard the vessel of a good skipper – a
‘catch king’ or ‘high-liner’. Conversely, skipper-owners not only compete
for fish but also for experienced deckhands. This means that proficient
skippers usually have an experienced, dexterous and highly skilled crew
who excel in tasks related to, for example, nets or engines. This in turn
reinforces the success of a successful enterprise, while making it difficult
for less fortunate skippers to recruit the best deckhands. A retired skipper-
owner said: ‘The skippers sometimes pick on the men. But a good crew-
member is worth his weight in gold.’ There is also peer pressure to have a
‘golden team’ as crew. Deckhands sometimes find it unfair that less experi-
enced, less qualified or less dexterous deckhands should receive equal
shares while forcing them to compensate for inabilities. Share fishing im-
plies that each crewmember ‘has to earn his share’, meaning that he has to
work hard and keep up with his colleagues aboard ship. ‘The labour ethos
is forced upon you,’ a retired deckhand (born in 1938) says. ‘You get used
to performing well as you will earn more. It turns into a compulsive drive.’
Staying in tune with the ceaseless work rhythm is important and there is
considerable peer pressure and social control to conform. Shirking may
imply lower gross revenues and therefore slackers are teased and gossiped
about. Pranks should indicate to them that they must not slow down the
pace of work. Given the importance of good shipboard relationships, this
is the most common way of putting someone in his place. Should he fail to
understand such ‘mild’ signs he may turn into a scapegoat and eventually
be socially ostracized. With shipboard congeniality jeopardized, the owner
is likely to sack such a crewmember.
Young deckhands who are novices to a crew usually face ragging rituals
in the guise of jokes and pranks played on them. This way, the peer pres-
sure to perform well is brought home to them early on. It is a rite of pas-
sage that most fishermen have to undergo to learn the occupation’s ropes
and ‘to prove their worth’. The quicker they learn to work hard and show
themselves dependable colleagues, the sooner such teasing and nagging
ceases. They are then accepted as full-blown crewmembers. Some skippers
would not tolerate bullying, however. A sixty-seven-year-old owner-opera-
tor, who was still active as a shore skipper when I interviewed him in
1990, told me:
If you are a newcomer, you are unfamiliar with many things. You have to
develop an instinct for all sorts of things; you have to be on the alert conti-
nually. Take for example the waves. We always sense when a wave will crash
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onto the deck in rough weather. We simply know when to move off the
deck. It is dangerous, for your oilskins will make you float and you can easi-
ly be washed off the boat, or be in water up to your neck. Usually, the young
lads have to learn this the hard way, and they will be a laughing-stock. The
other deckhands will take it out on him. If he does not respond light-heart-
edly, they will keep picking on him. As a skipper, you have to back the lad.
My father always did that and I did the same. I hate ragging rituals. If you
help those lads, you should see how they appreciate it and in the end, they
will be excellent fellows and fine deckhands, as they know they can trust
you.
For a skipper, it is not entirely for moral or disinterested motives that he
will stick up for young scapegoats aboard. He is well aware that all deck-
hands need an on-the-job training regardless of whether they have at-
tended Fishery School or not. The more he invests in this, the more likely
it is that the novice will turn into a dexterous and loyal deckhand.
For fishermen in their fifties, it can be increasingly difficult to follow
suit. Consequently, younger crewmembers have to put in extra effort to
make up for them. Depending on crew relations, they are often willing to
do so, but only to a certain extent. After some time, the older deckhand –
even if he is a co-owner – will realize or be made to understand that it is
time to abandon ship. A skipper-owner, born in 1921, related the following:
Once you get older, it gets harder to catch up on your sleep aboard. You
begin worrying whether the person in the wheelhouse has everything un-
der control, the way you would do it yourself. I have heard other older fish-
ermen say similar things. Those young lads go off to their bunk, turn over
and fall asleep. However, if you have only been sleeping for half an hour or
less and you have to get up again, it starts getting tough. It gets more de-
manding, mentally and physically. It also depends on the season. In the
winter, the seafloor is firm and you can make long hauls, but in the sum-
mer, it gets weaker and the tows are much shorter. You get insufficient kip
and you worry. Do not forget that the work is demanding. If you are out on
deck when you are 55, you do not have a pretty life. My wife’s cousin also
told me about this. He said, ‘They [the other deckhands] do spare you, but
you want to chip in your bit.’ […] The physically demanding labour forces
you to quit because your body can no longer handle the rhythm of those
young lads. […] Your knees and your back suffer from the boat’s continual
motions, and you have to sort the fish in a stooped position. There are all
sorts of occupational diseases. The rule of thumb is that the youngest deck-
hand is the cook, but sometimes the crew will let the oldest one aboard be
the cook, saying, ‘You just prepare the coffee and the meals, and we’ll do
the work on deck.’
Legally, share fishermen are considered self-employed entrepreneurs, as
fishing is regarded a co-venture of petty independent businessmen. This
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implies that deckhands are not seen as employees to whom Collective La-
bour Agreements apply. Therefore, they have to arrange for their own in-
surance and old-age pension contributions. Industrial disability is a con-
siderable risk, so insurance has to be good. Even so, if crewmembers
depend on an industrial disability allowance, they will not receive the level
of income to which they have become accustomed. In the Texel and Dutch
beam-trawl fishing industry fishermen are expected to retire early: that is,
when they are around fifty-five years of age, and that they should have
accumulated capital to stick it out until they are sixty-five, the age at which
they are entitled to a state pension. Consequently, they have to save up for a
rainy day and this goes for deckhands in particular. Upon their retirement,
owner-operators can still obtain an income from the boat share’s profits.
With the improving financial results of the 1960s cutter fisheries, early
retirement became feasible. In 1947, slightly less than half of the Texel
fishermen were younger than forty; almost a third were older than fifty. In
1970, more than three-quarters of the Texel fishermen were younger than
forty; only approximately ten per cent were older than fifty. Still, some
deckhands encountered difficulties bridging the gap until they were en-
titled to a state pension. They had to find shore-based work as quinquagen-
arians or even sexagenarians. If they were skilled net-menders, they could
often earn extra income by taking on such a job for an owner-operator.
The fact that share fishermen as self-employed co-adventurers were ex-
empt from the Dutch welfare society’s social security system and had to
arrange for private insurance was a thorn in the side of labour unions and
several political parties and politicians. For example, a 1956 Labour Party
report stated, ‘Today, hundreds of fishermen are still exempt from the
blissful effect of social insurance laws by concluding so-called partnership
contracts’ (Anonymous 1956:59). As of the early 1920s, the Texel vessel
owners had arranged insurances for their crew, but these were limited to
accident and illness insurance and the rather modest benefits lasted six
months only. In the 1950s, insurance coverage improved after the Texel
fishermen discussed the issue in Co-op meetings. The Co-op arranged for
collective insurance in 1954, but this did not cover pensions. A govern-
ment committee in 1959 began studying the possibilities of a comprehen-
sive social insurance and other social issues in the cutter fisheries. The
discussion did not lead anywhere, however, and ended up in some bureau-
cratic drawer. Several years later, it was rekindled. Although the self-em-
ployed share fishermen did not desire any kind of state intervention con-
cerning social insurance in the fisheries, the Minister of Social Affairs and
Public Health, Bauke Roolvink, sought to change this situation and wanted
to introduce mandatory social insurance. Christian Democrat Roolvink,
who was in office from 1967 to 1971, had a union background and was a
member of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, a political party that traditionally
could count on many fishermen’s votes. Despite lacking their support, the
legislation was changed and as of 1 July 1967, a part of the share income of
fishermen had to be deducted and set aside for social insurance, including
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old-age pension, unemployment benefits, and social costs. Owners were
exempt, but the share fishermen did not agree. The sum could amount to
half their gross income and cost them considerably more than private in-
surance. The skipper-owners, in particular, insisted on maintaining the ex-
tant mutual insurance system, as they feared that they would not be able to
pay the state-induced insurance fees in lean years. They opposed state in-
terference and were of the opinion that mandatory arrangements would
‘breed a wage labourers’ mentality’ with the crewmembers (Visser
1950:138). Boat owners pointed out that the partnership had created a
‘community of interest’ between the providers of labour and capital (Kra-
nenburg 1968:554; Dubbelaar 1980:122-123). On Texel, insurance was ar-
ranged collectively – ‘a matter of community sense’ – as someone com-
mented in a Co-op meeting. They feared that under the arrangements
Roolvink proposed, relations between owners and crew would become ad-
versarial, that the crewmembers’ labour ethos would suffer and that sick
leave would become much more common. They did admit that the extant
system had its pitfalls. Initially, beam trawling was highly dangerous and
many vessels capsized. Scores of fishermen drowned (see above), often
leaving the bereaved widows and orphans uninsured, and under the care
of the state. This was one major reason why the government intended to
alter the social security system for fishermen.
The Texel crewmembers met several times to discuss the matter. There
were also talks between them and the owners. Fishermen hired by fishing
companies (reders) usually worked under Collective Labour Agreements,
receiving fixed wages plus a bonus. However, that was not what the Texel
deckhands and owner-operators desired. The share system’s success for-
mula was that putting in extra effort meant that crewmembers would po-
tentially earn more and could even reap windfalls. Most share fishermen
earned considerably more than wage-labour employees. Nevertheless, in
1968 Minister Roolvink took another step towards bringing the fishermen
in line with ‘ordinary’ employees. He intended to introduce minimum
wages and a holiday allowance for deckhands. The share fishermen were
outraged and intended to protest in the country’s seat of government, The
Hague. However, after talking to representatives of fisheries organizations,
the Minister decided not to introduce the measure, but the fishermen re-
mained discontented.
The threat of losing their self-employed status, which would have conse-
quences for both owner-operators and crewmembers, made it abundantly
clear to Texel fishermen that they had to organize more tightly to gain poli-
tical power. As we have seen in previous chapters, cooperation was usually
restricted to the local level because of socio-economic differentiation with-
in the occupational community of fishermen, the concomitant specific in-
terests and problems of its component parts, and socio-cultural differences
within the island society. As they had for decades, the Oudeschild and
Oosterend fishermen still maintained their own separate associations. In
1970, however, they began talks regarding arriving at a merger. They rea-
Booming Business: The Rise of Beam Trawling 179
lized that they needed to join forces to be better able to cope with outside
intrusion on the fishing industry that affected fishermen’s lives.
Oudeschild’s Progress through Unity had been languishing for some
time. When the number of its members had dropped to a mere seventeen
in 1968, the board – three of whose members had been serving for twenty-
five years – began successfully recruiting new members. A year later, sev-
enty-nine fishermen had joined the association. Since its inception in 1931,
the Co-op had also functioned mainly as an association for Oosterend own-
er-operators. As we have seen, it served as an important linchpin in the
local fishing fleet’s offshore segment. In 1970, the Co-op represented
thirty-four vessels and their owners. By then, its board felt that Co-op mat-
ters and representation of general interests – particularly in connection
with the social insurance issue – were at loggerheads. In addition, as mem-
bers of the national Fishermen’s Union, Texel fishermen shared the same
interests.
The Co-op and Progress through Unity joined forces in the sense that
the Co-op continued to operate as a commercial cooperative, but no longer
functioned as a fishermen’s association. This task was relegated to the new
association, which was officially established on 1 January 1971 and contin-
ued under the name of the Oudeschild organization: Progress through
Unity. The old board members stepped down and the members elected a
new board. The North Sea fleet’s owner-operators (who would deliver the
chair), the non-propertied deckhands, and the Wadden Sea fishermen
would each have three representatives. The first chairman was Ben
Daalder, a young fisherman aged twenty-eight who had been skippering a
boat for seven years. Although his father was a postal worker and his an-
cestors did not belong to the island’s fishing elite lineages, he was to be-
come a leading face in the Texel and Dutch fishing industries. Looking
back on this, he claimed it was easy: ‘If you got up twice to intervene dur-
ing a meeting, you were on the board. If you got up a third time, you were
elected chairman.’ Within a few months, about 170 members – nearly the
entire occupational community – signed up to the local fishermen’s asso-
ciation. Interestingly, about forty per cent of the members hailed from
Oudeschild, the village that had suffered most from the decline of inshore
fishing. Apparently, offshore skippers much appreciated the fishing knowl-
edge and skills of Oudeschilders. Almost thirty-five per cent of the associa-
tion’s members came from Oosterend and Oost and about twenty-four per
cent lived elsewhere on Texel. A few members were deckhands from Den
Helder. With its broad representation that included deckhands, the asso-
ciation would turn into an important vehicle for the promotion of the
members’ interests and the social integration of Texel fisherfolk. Other lo-
cal, regional and national fishermen’s organizations were run by and for
skipper-owners; deckhands could be members but were not on the board.
The main subject that was initially discussed in Progress through Unity
was the social insurance issue. For example, in one of the first general
meetings, the Fishermen’s Union’s chair, Klaas Hoekstra, delivered a
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speech in which he pointed out that joining forces was a wise idea, against
the background of growing state intervention in the fishing industry. He
continued by saying that the battle to get an exemption from the social
insurance system finally appeared to be successful. The disadvantage was
that fishermen would not be eligible for unemployment benefits, but the
advantage was that if they arranged for their own insurance system, fees
could be kept relatively moderate.
Minister Roolvink finally proved to be susceptible to the fishermen’s
criticism and resistance. In the course of 1970, he defended a proposal in
Parliament to exempt fishermen from mandatory social insurance pro-
vided that they arranged for insurance collectively. Indeed, the next year it
was determined that, as previously, fishermen would be considered self-
employed and could arrange for insurance mutually. This demand led to
the establishment of the Social Fund for the Share Fishery (Sociaal Fonds
voor de Maatschapsvisserij) in which all mutual insurance of fishermen was
to be combined. Unlike wage labourers, fishermen were not legally en-
titled to state unemployment and disability benefits, health care and sick-
leave allowances. As per 1 May 1971, the Texel fishermen joined the Fund
and effected additional types of insurance: a health insurance and a local
mutual insurance. Overall, this implied that insurance fees were consider-
able, detracting from the deckhands’ gross incomes. In addition, the Fund
did not cover unemployment benefits. If deckhands were laid off, they
would end up on the dole. Still, the fishermen preferred to arrange for
such matters themselves rather than being subject to what external author-
ities decided for them. ‘Don’t forget that Texel is a community that likes to
do things autonomously. It is a homogeneous community, perhaps more
homogeneous than [communities] elsewhere,’ a skipper-owner explained.
To the share fishermen, it finally appeared to be a case of all’s well that
ends well. However, new difficulties were afoot and, again, they were con-
nected with the share system. This time, however, the problem came from
within.
Because of the rapid capital-intensive fishing fleet’s modernization,
skipper-owners began discussing the share arrangement. For decades, it
had been based on a fifty–fifty division between vessel and crew, but with
the greater capital outlay newer vessels required, the skipper-owners
deemed it reasonable that the vessel share should be increased. The issue
was discussed at firm level and also in the local fishermen’s association. It
would lead to heated debates. In 1972, the Progress through Unity board
suggested maintaining the fifty–fifty share base for vessels under 1,000
h.p., and changing the division into a fifty-five–forty-five per cent division
for vessels with greater engine power, subject to negotiations between
owner and crew. Crewmembers were not amused. The deckhands who
were on the association’s board faced a difficult position: they had to repre-
sent the crewmembers’ interests, but they also had to be receptive to the
owners’ position and take into account the general interest. It would make
for a degree of reluctance on the deckhands’ part to be on the board. In
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order to avoid social division and labour unrest, Texel skipper-owners initi-
ally adopted a passive stance. The vast majority of vessels maintained the
fifty–fifty division. The matter would stay on the agenda, and in the wake
of the 1973 oil crisis discussions concerning a rearrangement of the share
percentages intensified at local as well as national levels. The Fishermen’s
Union proposed a scheme of proportions for four categories of vessels: a
fifty–fifty share division for small boats (0-399 h.p.); a fifty-two–forty-eight
per cent share division for the next category (400-699 h.p.); a fifty-five–
forty-five per cent arrangement for a 700-999 h.p. category and a fifty-
eight–forty-two per cent arrangement for the most powerful vessels of
1,000 h.p. and over. The Texel fishermen opposed such uniformity, ar-
guing that the shares should be fixed in agreement between skipper-owner
and crew. The Progress through Unity meeting in which the issue was
discussed attracted nearly a hundred fishermen. In its 1974 annual meet-
ing, the association decided that the fifty–fifty share agreement would be
maintained in the category of boats with up to 1,000 h.p. engines, while on
beamers over 1,000 h.p. the shares would be fifty-five–forty-five per cent
for boat and crew, respectively. This change of the share convention re-
flected the fact that powerful boats tended to be more capital intensive and
had greater exploitation costs than smaller ones. The skipper-owners
firmly believed that they would be able to explain the need to change the
share convention and that the crew would accept it if they did. Even in
hindsight, they legitimized changing the share convention: ‘For the crew-
members, the fifty–fifty arrangement was sacred, but as skipper-owners
we were confronted with ever higher exploitation costs. Initially, the deck-
hands protested and it gave rise to tension. When they discovered they
were earning more because boats were bigger and better, all was serene
again,’ claimed a skipper-owner, born in 1946.
However, changing the shares did lead to crew dissatisfaction aboard
some boats. The recession hit the crewmembers thrice: firstly, they earned
less due to the below-average proceeds after subtraction of the fuel costs;
secondly, they saw their share percentages diminished; and thirdly, on top
of that their insurance fees increased. This happened while the pressure to
perform well had increased along with the growing investments in and
modernization of the fleet. The deckhands discussed the situation among
themselves and this ‘quay talk’ worsened the deterioration of the relation-
ships between skipper-owners and crewmembers. The association’s crew
representatives therefore asked deckhands to see them about problems on
board individual vessels so that they would not need to resort to gossip,
and the difficulties could be dealt with through the organization. The deck-
hands continued their attempts to redress the share convention to the
fifty–fifty arrangement. Their efforts stood little chance. There was more
to be disgruntled about. A retired deckhand, born in 1928, recalled:
During the oil crisis, the owners received state subsidies on fuel. We never
got anything at all, though. That was improper, for we also paid for the fuel
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because the costs were subtracted from the gross revenues. I told the own-
ers that it was unfair, but they just said, ‘We are not allowed to pass it on to
you.’ […] The deckhands certainly did not appreciate the smaller percen-
tages, but if there are many crewmembers, there is bound to be a lot of
grumbling, although not in front of the skipper-owner. You would not tell
that you were dissatisfied, because there were many people looking for a
berth. Particularly if you crewed with a top skipper, you shut your mouth
and said Amen. Money alleviates labour.
Another thorn in the crewmembers’ side was that some skipper-owners
chose to maintain the traditional share convention so that some crews
fared better than others. Generally, skipper-owners who were not heavily
indebted had more leeway to do so. For example, a skipper-owner told his
colleagues: ‘I will give my deckhands what I think they are worth. It is no-
body else’s business.’ He clung to the traditional share convention. An-
other skipper-owner allegedly told his deckhands: ‘As long as I am the
skipper, we will stick to the fifty–fifty arrangement.’ However, when his
sons took over, they immediately changed the share division. The deck-
hands – particularly those who received lower shares, of course – deemed
heterogeneity with respect to the share system unfair. Skipper-owners jus-
tified altering the shares by pointing out that investments were up and
hence capital risks had increased. They needed a larger share to remain
solid with the bank and to cover for their boat’s depreciation. The deck-
hands’ say was minimal. In a Co-op meeting, an Oosterend skipper-owner
remarked, ‘The owner stands at the edge of the abyss while deckhands are
earning a reasonable income.’ The mounting tensions between owners
and crew during the oil crisis revealed that the share system and the part-
nership contract were not so perfect after all.
The Dynamics of Intensification
At local and national levels, rapid modernization and expansion character-
ized the share and family-firm-based fishing industry of the 1960s and
early 1970s. A number of intertwined developments that mutually ampli-
fied each other brought about these processes. Technological, ecological,
economic, political, social and cultural structures and contingencies all
contributed to the dynamics of increases of scale and intensification of
resource exploitation. Taken by themselves, these variables would insuffi-
ciently explain the course of events. For example, reference to greed or an
innate penchant of fishermen to over-invest and overexploit would amount
to psychological reductionism, while merely pointing to financial incen-
tives would boil down to economic reductionism. Instead, as I hope to
have shown in this chapter, it was the specific interlinkage and interaction
of various factors that coalesced into a process of rapidly intensifying capi-
talization – ‘capital stuffing’ – and exploitation. Technologically, the kind of
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equipment available to fishermen determined to a great extent what spe-
cies and quantities they could catch and under which (weather) conditions.
For instance, bigger boats and sophisticated fish-finding and navigation
instruments meant more days at sea and greater exploitation accuracy;
more powerful engines, beam trawls and nylon nets enabled greater catch-
ing efficiency of targeted species. In addition, preservation methods and
means of transportation and communication were significant concerning
the markets that could be supplied. Ecologically, the variety and richness of
marine living resources were important. With intensifying exploitation, ag-
gregate catches initially increased and fish stocks – flatfish stocks in parti-
cular – did not seem to decline. Beyond a certain point, however, intensifi-
cation endangered sustainability. Sole catches, for example, diminished
after 1966, although they remained at a fairly high level. However, the
catch per unit of effort declined. Catches were not subject to human-in-
duced change only; climate oscillations and other natural causes also con-
tributed to fluctuations. Economically, food supply and demand (linked
with cultural food preferences), fish prices, costs of fuel and other com-
modities, the share system of remuneration, subsidies, taxes, the ample
availability of bank loans and credit all added up to specific exploitation
bills that either enabled or hindered firm continuity and fishing industry
expansion. Politically, structural support measures on the one hand, and
access, use and gear regulations and restrictions on the other hand im-
pacted upon the range of choices open to fishermen. Socially and cultural-
ly, the family-firm ideal and the pervasive labour ethos contributed to spe-
cific economic orientations that stimulated growth.
Despite feeling entangled in a ruthlessly competitive game, most fisher-
men-owners as individuals saw no alternative but to participate in the
horsepower race. Apprehending that they would lag behind if they did not
follow suit, skipper-owners invested in expansion even though they were
well aware that the sum total of their individual decisions could potentially
be devastating. It was a drama of collective action with an outcome that no
one desired but all experienced as being inevitable. The government ig-
nored the desperate fishing industry pleas to check the collective expan-
sion. Had the state heeded this advice, many problems could possibly
have been avoided. The episode is inscribed in the fishermen’s memory.
‘The expansion of horsepower was the root of all evil,’ one of them con-
tended. Older and younger generations of fishermen alike frequently refer
to the state’s ‘historical error’ in apologetically explaining why overcapacity,
overexploitation and other problems have subsequently assailed the fish-
ing industry. They point out that it would have been nearly impossible for
the fishermen to have voluntarily restrained themselves. This would have
required collective action and mutual trust that were in fact lacking. The
fishermen realized that free riding would soon undercut voluntary regula-
tions, and lacking the means to enforce rules implied that the premium on
flouting them was high because there would be no sanctions whatsoever.
Mandatory engine power regulations enforced by an external agency might
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have worked. Then again, such restrictive measures would have stood a
chance only if taken in a European Community or international context.
Had the Dutch government restrained the national fishing industry in this
respect without other states taking similar measures, the fishermen would
certainly have protested and dodged the regulations. Of course, this is
‘what if history’. An agreement on a European Common Fisheries Policy
was at that time still lacking. However, it became increasingly clear that
‘[t]he initial aims of structural policy – expansion, modernisation and effi-
ciency improvements – were at variance with the growing awareness of
over-exploitation of many important stocks’ (Symes 1997a:149).
The drive to expand converged with the family firm’s logic and dynamic,
where – under conditions of economic growth – hiving off into two or
more firms was a common pattern. What is evident is that cooperating
kinsfolk proved to be an important economic asset. Owners were prepared
to curtail incomes, consumption and expenditures, which turned out to be
extremely important in weathering bad times and building up the financial
reserves needed to expand. With a single owner, such shock-absorbing and
hoarding capacity obviously amounted to less than that of multiple owners
or prospective owners who were prepared to defer gratification, as was the
case with relatives. Young sons of skipper-owners were confident that they
would in future receive their share of the patrimony. Based on this trustful
expectation, they were content with a weekly allowance instead of a full
share of the gross revenues. For this reason, cooperating with sons or
brothers was more attractive than recruiting unrelated deckhands. Kin pro-
vided for the flexibility, versatility and resilience needed in an industry
where uncertainty was rife. Through being economical and instilling ‘fish-
ing values’ in their sons, the wives of owner-operators contributed signifi-
cantly to family firm success. Therefore, social capital constituted at the
same time significant economic capital. The cultural ideal of family-firm
continuity and expansion could not, however, be attained by all the local
actors in the fishing arena. At the micro-level of the family firm, there
were contingencies related to the stage of the family cycle and the compo-
sition of the nuclear family that to a large extent determined the kind of
options that were available and the course of action that could be envis-
aged. Some skipper-owners remained unmarried or had no offspring.
Others had sons who did not aspire to skippering or were unfit for a fish-
ing career, or only had daughters who – under the extant gender relations –
rarely obtained or desired to obtain a berth aboard a boat. The fishing ves-
sel was regarded as a male-dominated world by men and women alike.
Even owner-operators who could work with a core of agnatic relatives
depended on recruiting additional deckhands to complete a crew. The
share system of remuneration brought together capital and labour in their
interest to minimize costs and maximize production and proceeds. As top-
earning skippers tended to attract the most skilled and the most experi-
enced deckhands and as labour was footloose, it was paramount to keep
up with recruiting the best crew, creating yet another incentive to moder-
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nize. Based on the excellent financial outcomes of the late 1950s and
1960s, in more than a dozen cases it provided crewmembers with the in-
itial capital to turn independent, several of them successfully following the
family firm logic. Newcomers therefore also contributed importantly to the
Texel – and Dutch – fishing industry’s growth. Entry to the offshore fish-
eries was fairly easy, as no major restrictions were in place yet, and banks
easily provided credit. The ideal of becoming one’s own boss was deeply
ingrained in many – but certainly not all – fishermen. Although starting
from a relatively disadvantaged position compared to the established fish-
ing lineages, many newcomers succeeded in redeeming their debts in a
fairly short time and subsequently continuing a viable enterprise. The de-
sire to run one’s own firm makes it clear that, although benefiting from
the capital input of owners and for all the egalitarianism allegedly charac-
terizing shipboard relations, being a deckhand was not the favoured posi-
tion of all fishermen. There still existed a considerable covert and overt
hierarchy between owner-operators and crew, as became apparent when
the former unilaterally altered the share convention. Nonetheless, deck-
hands earned substantial incomes, even after the share division changed.
A considerable part of the net revenues accrued to them, and revenues
soared when the beam-trawl fishery for flatfish prospered.
The catching efficiency and economic successes of beam trawling led to
a focus on flatfish and catalyzed headlong expansion. A vast proportion of
the Dutch North Sea fishing fleet caught sole and plaice as the main target
species, although the seasonal herring fishery did not entirely lose its im-
portance. In the early 1970s, the Dutch fishermen landed about eighty per
cent of sole catches in Western Europe, and approximately forty per cent of
plaice catches (Kranenburg 1977:15). This would prove to be crucial with
the onset of quotas in 1975. The next chapter will deal extensively with the
introduction of quota regimes in the fishing industry, their significance for
fishing practices and the actions and reactions of Texel and other Dutch
fishermen. Having been subject primarily to the vagaries of marine eco-
systems and fish markets for centuries, fisherfolk henceforth had to cope
with the additional and perhaps even more fickle forces of fishing politics.
However, far from being passive recipients of top-down decisions, they
would attempt to steer their own course, in turn forcing policymakers and
politicians to continually respond to the fishermen’s actions. The blind
process of this interactive dynamic would lead to a profound complication
of policymaking, burgeoning red tape and impracticable and unenforce-
able rules and regulations. Perhaps more than anything else, the messy
fisheries policy and management measures that ensued encouraged,
rather than impeded, behaviour that contributed to irresponsible exploita-
tion.
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Chapter 5
Catch Kings and Quota Busters
In the mid-1970s, several international events affected the fishing indus-
tries of Western European countries in major ways. Negotiations on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the establish-
ment of 200 nm (nautical miles) Exclusive Economic Zones were under-
way. It would be the largest sea-based ‘enclosure’ operation. The lengthy
talks were expedited when the second British-Icelandic Cod War (1972-
1973) reached a zenith. With the Law of the Sea agreement emerging but
not yet in place, Iceland nonetheless decided to unilaterally extend and en-
force its exclusive fishing zone from 50 to 200 nm, giving rise to the third
Anglo-Icelandic Cod War (1975-1976). The conflict between the two NATO
allies ended when they agreed on a compromise. Territorial use rights
were also a major issue in negotiations regarding the accession of new
member states to the European Economic Community (EEC). When Den-
mark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, it was
agreed that member states would have equal access to Community waters
– that is, within the national 12 nautical mile (nm) limits. At a conference
in The Hague in 1976, the member states decided to extend their jurisdic-
tion from 12 to 200 nm through the establishment of Exclusive Economic
Zones, while they also determined that the 12 nm zone would be prohib-
ited for boats with an engine power exceeding 300 h.p. and 50 gross regis-
ter tonnes (GRT). A forceful European fisheries policy still lacked, but with
the accession of the three new member states – all of which had important
fishing industries – the development of a comprehensive Common Fish-
eries Policy (CFP) for the North Sea and Atlantic fisheries was agreed
upon. It was scheduled to be implemented by 1983. In the interim, mem-
ber states should introduce measures, which needed to be consented to by
the European Commission, to maintain the state of the stocks at a sustain-
able level.
In 1975, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) estab-
lished total allowable catches (TACs) for several species of fish. Each state
that had signed the convention preceding the commission’s founding re-
ceived a share based on ‘historic rights’. The NEAFC allocations were not
binding and at the national level, the introduction of catch restrictions was
very messy indeed. The European Economic Community stepped in the
next year and allocated national shares of the total allowable catch to mem-
ber states. Sidestepping the NEAFC, the EEC established total allowable
catches following the advice of the International Council for the Explora-
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tion of the Seas, and, from 1979 onwards the Advisory Committee on Fish-
eries Management. On the basis of its recommendations, the European
Commission formulated a proposal that was subsequently discussed in a
Council of Fisheries Ministers meeting. The Council made the final deci-
sion on the maximum output, usually following prolonged political lobby-
ing and negotiations that predictably led to considerable amendments of
the initial proposal. Administrators and officials found themselves in a
contradictory situation. On the one hand, they had to issue and enforce
catch limitations, while on the other they sought to safeguard national in-
terests and socio-economic stability by negotiating total allowable catches
and attempting to achieve the greatest possible share for those species that
were particularly important for the national fishing industry. It is clear that
conservation and the national interest make strange bedfellows. Being
pragmatic and having to arrive at a consensus decision, the Ministers often
simply ignored scientific advice or used its alleged ambiguity as a pretext
for compromise. During lengthy and opaque in camera sessions, they
‘translated’ the advice by capping the limits at higher-than-proposed levels,
in fact creating non-limiting conditions for their fisheries and thus mini-
mizing potential enforcement problems (Symes 1997a:146; Daan
1997:324). Their focus was consequently on the short term, which com-
pounded rather than solved the fisheries crisis. Although there was a poli-
tical rhetoric of tackling over-fishing, the policy mainly aimed at keeping
the peace among fishermen and guaranteeing their incomes. Besides
these goals of conflict avoidance and socio-economic stability, the common
internal market continued to be the primary European concern.
Meanwhile, negotiations on a Common Fisheries Policy were pro-
foundly arduous, in particular because the UK and Ireland sought to hold
on to the exclusive right of exploiting fish stocks in what their govern-
ments regarded as their national waters: a zone of 50 nm. Following seven
years of political discussions and concessions, the member states met their
deadline and initiated a Common Fisheries Policy in January 1983. It
would be valid for a ten-year term. Its objectives were: conserving re-
sources; maintaining the viability of fisheries and fishing communities;
and improving economic performance (Holden 1984). There were three
key management instruments under the Common Fisheries Policy: effort
management (input restrictions and regulations such as mesh-size and
days-at-sea restrictions); quota management (output restrictions and regu-
lations); and fleet management (capacity adjustment). Common Fisheries
Policy measures were binding for member states and individual fisher-
men. They usually took the form of regulations that were directly appli-
cable without requiring the implementation of national legislation. Enfor-
cement was carried out through inspection at ports and at sea as well as by
protection vessels and aircraft. The member states arrived at an agreement
concerning the allocation of total allowable catches based on the principle
of relative stability, implying that national quotas were allocated according
to fixed shares. Hence, the individual member states could expect to retain
188 Braving Troubled Waters
their positions in relation to each other because national fishing industries
would equally benefit or suffer from resource fluctuations. These political
processes of negotiation and compromise became deeply ingrained in EC
decision making.
Under the European Community’s ‘principle of subsidiarity’, member
states had some leeway in defining their own rules and were responsible
for proper enforcement of CFP measures in the waters and territories un-
der their jurisdiction. The transition from a national to a European fish-
eries policy that had to be retranslated into a national policy was far from
smooth. The initial vagueness and uncertainty are evident from the fact
that the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries frankly reported
above-quota landings in the second half of the 1970s. Discovering that en-
forcement was lacking, the fishermen took this as a sign of ‘no objection’
to overshoot what they believed to be targets rather than limits, and instead
of curtailing production, they expanded. Europe’s common market en-
sured that they could sell their landings. In regard to the allocation of al-
lowances within its boundaries, the Netherlands opted for licences and
divided the national quotas into individual quotas that would soon become
transferable. If individual transferable quotas (ITQs) meet with the charac-
teristics of long duration, complete specificity, transferability, exclusivity
and security, they make for ‘complete property rights’ (Scott 2000; Caddy
and Seijo 2005:69-70). Champions of the individual transferable quota
system – generally neoclassical fisheries economists – claim that, theoreti-
cally, individual transferable quotas have important economic, administra-
tive and ecological benefits:1
1. The system improves efficiency in that the most viable units acquire
landing rights that are transferred on the market, facilitating adjust-
ment, while economically marginal units will sell them, reducing ex-
cess capacity and balancing vessel size and landing allowances.
2. This progressive rationalization also creates incentives to reduce the
costs of landing quotas by economizing on labour and capital per fish
landed, preventing ‘capital stuffing’ and rent dissipation (that is, using
more capital than required to produce a good).
3. The system facilitates access to loans for capital improvements with pri-
vatized landing rights being accepted as collateral.
4. The system leads to higher and more stable prices as it ends the frantic
‘race to fish’, allowing for planning a better distribution of landings
across the year and optimizing marketing opportunities to maximize
prices, thus ending boom-and-bust cycles and production bottlenecks
in processing.
5. The system therefore augments mean earnings and profitability.
6. The system enables specialization, in that operators can focus on what
they do best and have the opportunity to improve.
7. Since costs are internalized, the system creates incentives for steward-
ship and sustainability from self-interested motives.
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8. It enhances compliance with the rules, cutting on the costs of monitor-
ing and enforcement, and it improves cooperation with fisheries biolo-
gists, regulators and law enforcers, reducing information and adminis-
trative costs, enabling a simplification of the regulatory regime and
facilitating participation in management. Privatized rights, the neoclas-
sical economists argue, are superior to common property rights. In this
chapter, we shall encounter how the system operated in practice and
whether the assumed economic, administrative and ecological benefits
did in fact apply.
Transformations in the regimes of access and use rights affect economic
behaviour and performance: ‘By allocating decision-making authority, they
also determine who are the economic actors in a system and define the
distribution of wealth in a society’ (Libecap 1989:1). In what follows, I will
detail Texel and other Dutch fishermen’s responses and modes of action
concerning their encapsulation into European and national fisheries man-
agement regimes. With new restraints that restricted their freedom of act-
ing in their customary way, it was inevitable that they would ‘sacrifice and
suffer’ (Jentoft, McCay and Wilson 1998:434). As we shall see, they at-
tempted to steer a collision course, seeking to find the loopholes of the law
and, if they thought it necessary, flouting the rules and regulations. They
proved to be not passive recipients of top-down decisions, but actors who
made and remade their own world. Still, their daily livelihoods were im-
pacted in several major ways. To understand their behaviour, it is impera-
tive to devote attention to the economic, social and cultural dynamics of
the fishing industry and the ways in which it was embedded within the
legal and regulatory frameworks of national and supranational politics.
What ensued was an interactive process: the fishermen would respond to
measures in various ways, in turn forcing the national and supranational
authorities to react upon the fishermen’s reactions and come up with new
regulations almost in perpetuity. In the course of the process it would be-
come apparent that fisheries policy in many respects was counterproduc-
tive. This chapter will outline the successive regulatory regimes and deal
with the fishermen’s perceptions of and responses to the demise of mare
liberum. It will transpire that harnessing the fishermen proved to be extre-
mely difficult and had profound political consequences. I will examine the
attitudes and views of Texel fishermen towards those who have played a
major role in this development: civil servants, politicians and biologists.
Next, I will discuss the important role that is attributed to the skipper in
the catching of fish, the status he derives from being successful, and the
competitive dynamics that status ranking, reputation and rivalry give rise
to. These cultural considerations are important for the comprehension of
why non-compliance was rife.
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Fishy Business, Flawed Policy and Faltering Enforcement
Owing to the fact that Dutch fishermen had been investing so heavily in
beam trawling for flatfish since the early 1960s, they obtained over seventy
per cent of the total allowable catch for sole, and nearly forty per cent of
that for plaice in the initial NEAFC allocations for 1975. These species rep-
resented about two thirds of all the fish Dutch fishermen landed. The na-
tional quota for sole amounted to 9,445 metric tonnes; that for plaice was
set at 47,020 metric tonnes. This would mean a drastic reduction in legal
landings: forty-seven per cent and nine per cent, respectively, compared to
the landings of the previous year. Herring fishing entitlements were also
subject to the system of total allowable catches. By then, the North Sea
herring stocks were alarmingly low and biologists called for draconian
measures. The herring fishery – traditionally important for Texel family
firms – would be closed as per January 1977. Subsequently, many of the
large Dutch trawler companies based in Vlaardingen, Scheveningen and
Katwijk went bankrupt. Some converted to beam trawling and otter trawl-
ing for cod, which led to additional competition in a segment of the fishing
fleet that was already experiencing unprecedented growth. At the national
level, the allocation of flatfish quotas was initially left to the fishing indus-
try – in casu the statutory Fish Board, a vertically integrated corporate orga-
nization representing the interests of producers, traders and processors in
negotiations with the government. This did not prove to be a success. The
implementation of quota measures was due from 23 February 1975, but
the Fish Board only publicized the quota measures almost three months
later. By then, fishermen had already caught a considerable amount of the
sole and plaice they were entitled to catch (by mid-year approximately two-
thirds). In addition, the state did not monitor and police the catch limita-
tions. The Dutch Fishermen’s Union asked the Ministry to take steps, also
with regard to the ban on fishing within the 12 nm zone with vessels over
50 GRTand engines over 300 h.p., and landing undersized sole and plaice.
Those who disobeyed the rules did not get fined, but only received warn-
ings. The Union protested and said that the state ought to supervise and
enforce its rules. If not, many fishermen would obviously ignore them. As
of 7 July, the Fish Board announced that vessels with odd and even num-
bers should alternate fishing every fortnight, a measure that was bluntly
ignored. Catches were simply transferred at sea to a cutter with an even or
an odd number, depending on which part of the fleet was allowed to land
the fish. The Ministry declared that policing and inspection would be tigh-
tened and doubled the number of General Inspection Service’s vessels to
four. Initially, quotas were not allocated individually. The fishermen’s orga-
nizations, the Minister and the Ministry’s Fisheries Directorate were all in
favour of individual quotas, but the Fish Board had not come up with such
an arrangement. All in all, the transition to the quota system was rather
confusing.
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Initially, most Dutch fishermen did not oppose the introduction of quota
measures. The topic was discussed at a 1974 meeting of the Dutch Fisher-
men’s Union. All local departments – including Texel’s Progress through
Unity – voted in favour, provided that the state avoided mandatory decom-
missioning and came up with support measures (Vissersbond 1994:71).
The Union was willing to cooperate so as not to compromise its leverage
in negotiations with state institutions. However, an Urk fishermen’s asso-
ciation – which had left the Fishermen’s Union earlier – did fiercely op-
pose the quota regime and advised its members not to abide by the rules.
Subsequently, more and more owner-operators from other fishing ports
followed suit. Many fishermen feared that they would lose their jobs. The
oil crisis and economic recession contributed to their pessimism. A
plethora of new rules and regulations and heavy debts made for tremen-
dous uncertainty and anxiety. The depreciation term of a new cutter was
ten years, that of an engine five years. Bank loans had to be redeemed and
interest paid, making short-term adjustment difficult. Like their compa-
triots in other Dutch fishing ports, Texel fishermen also feared imminent
unemployment as a consequence of the quota measures. They would then
end up on the dole because they were not in the state’s unemployment
benefit scheme. The Fisheries Directorate claimed that – given overcapa-
city – decommissioning a fifth of the Dutch fishing fleet would be neces-
sary. However, none of the Texel owner-operators was inclined to decom-
mission his vessel. In a January 1975 meeting with the Texel fishermen,
the head of the Fisheries Directorate, A.C. Freling, said: ‘The weak will
have fewer opportunities. There is a structural rift, a watershed. Heads
will roll. It is very annoying that the quota measures are introduced at a
time of economic recession when many are already experiencing prob-
lems.’ The owner of a brand-new beamer deemed it hard to swallow that
‘someone who is up to his neck in debts cannot make up for this by push-
ing harder to meet his commitments’. Their willingness to work relent-
lessly had always been a key value for fishermen, but with output limits in
place they felt they could no longer put it into practice. Freling stated that
for the survivors, there would be support measures in the form of subsi-
dies. The Texel fishermen were not at all confident that this would provide
a solution.
The local fishermen’s association continued to hammer home the ne-
cessity of capping engine power. Its members were also in favour of allo-
cating quotas per horsepower category (up to 1,200 h.p.), but other associa-
tions did not share this viewpoint. What bothered the Texelians was that
they continually faced opaque new rules and regulations with which they
had to comply, but which were not enforced at all, and could change over-
night. This obfuscated what was expected of the fishing industry. In a July
1975 board meeting of Progress through Unity, chairman Ben Daalder said
that he was extremely disappointed with the extant situation:
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As it stands, none of the owners and deckhands knows what he has to abide
by. At present, everyone with good intentions concerning the quota system
takes his own course of action. You cannot blame them. New rules change
again the very same week.
Daalder certainly had a point. A blueprint seemed to be lacking and ad hoc
rulemaking made for considerable uncertainty. Tensions between com-
pliers and non-compliers mounted and emotions ran high. The former
accused the latter of leading the fishing industry into a crisis, while the
latter reproached the former for being overly cooperative with incompre-
hensible and impracticable regulations. The association’s board members
had to meet more and more often to address all the problems and red tape
that swamped the fishing industry.
Later that year, in October 1975, the members of Progress through Unity
discussed the introduction of individual quotas in a general meeting. Petty
and large fishermen appeared fundamentally divided. Daalder did his ut-
most to bring the factions closer together: to no avail, however. Many fish-
ermen announced that they would not comply with the rules until they
received some kind of financial compensation in return. Daalder disagreed
and threatened to step down. He was loath to bring this message to the
Fishermen’s Union’s board meeting. The Union had proposed to arrive at
individual quotas for the year 1976. Daalder deemed individual quota
measures ‘unavoidable’ because of over-fishing, although at the same time
he thought that until then, the measures had been ill-informed. When in
the third week of November 1975 the Dutch sole quota was exhausted and
the Fish Board informed skipper-owners that it was forbidden to land sole
until 1 January, the fishermen collectively ignored the ban and steamed to
the fishing grounds because the state did not come up with financial com-
pensation. Texelians followed suit, although some began pursuing round-
fish (a generic term for such species as cod, hake, haddock, whiting and so
on). The next week, they targeted plaice and round-fish only, in line with
the Fishermen’s Union’s advice. However, many Texel fishermen dis-
agreed with this advice and with the board of the local fishermen’s associa-
tion. They favoured a tougher stand towards the government. When a de-
legation of Dutch fishermen, including Daalder, met with the Minister
responsible for fisheries, the latter made it crystal clear that the govern-
ment did not intend to compensate the fishermen. As a consequence, the
fisheries organizations, including Progress through Unity, stopped con-
sulting with the Minister. In his annual review of the fisheries in the local
newspaper, Daalder referred to the violated trust in the government. The
fishermen had agreed to the quota measures on the condition that the
state would provide financial compensation, but the state did not even en-
force the measures.
Partly at the fisheries organizations’ instigation, an individual quota sys-
tem was implemented in 1976. Based on the track records of their highest
catches in 1972, 1973 and 1974, the Fisheries Directorate – which took over
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the task of allocation from the Fish Board – assigned individual, non-trans-
ferable quotas to sole and plaice fishermen.2 The idea underlying the mea-
sure was that allocation of exclusive allowances would lead to a responsible
mode of fishing and offer fishermen the prospect of earning resource rent,
maximizing their profit and increasing operational certainty. In theory, this
seemed attractive. The mean sole quota allocated to Texel owner-operators
amounted to approximately seventy metric tonnes per firm, but there were
major variations. One of my interlocutors claimed: ‘Those who had over-
fished big time were rewarded.’ The arbitrary choice of the years on which
the allocation was based meant that fishermen who had not pursued flat-
fish during this time or whose boats were under repair during part of it
obtained relatively small quotas. Moreover, aggregate sole landings had
been considerably lower in the reference years than in the late 1960s (see
Chapter 4). Another bone of contention was that skipper-owners who had
been targeting flatfish and herring – as many Texel offshore fishermen
traditionally did – were allocated rather small sole and plaice quotas in
comparison with those who had been specializing in the mixed flatfish
fisheries. When the herring fishery was closed as per January 1977, this
proved to be an important disadvantage. Right from the onset, the seeds
of dissension were sown.
On Monday 10 May 1976, approximately 2,500 Dutch fishermen went
to the country’s seat of Parliament, The Hague, in protest. They wanted to
call the government’s and the Dutch people’s attention to the ‘perilous
situation’ of the fisheries due to the quota regime. Fishing industry leaders
had urged local associations and their members to join the mass demon-
stration: ‘Now you should show your solidarity and concord to accomplish
the objectives we set. The decision to campaign applies to the entire cutter
fleet. With no exception,’ a pamphlet read. Approximately seventy-five cut-
ters steamed to the fishing port of Scheveningen near The Hague, and
many demonstrators went to The Hague in buses, including three coaches
from Texel. The action committee’s leader, Ben Daalder, presented a peti-
tion to the speaker of the House of Representatives. Daalder addressed the
protestors and said that if the Minister did not give in, the fishermen’s
protest would become much tougher than a demonstration alone: ‘If we
are forced to go down the drain, we will sell our lives dearly.’ However, the
national administration was firmly embedded within the European Com-
munity and, save for extending some sympathy, could neither change the
quota regime nor do much to support the fishing industry. The fishermen
went home empty-handed. Yet it would not be the last time that they
voiced their discontent in a mass demonstration. A few days prior to the
protest action, Daalder said in an interview:
In hindsight, we can now conclude that previous governments were wrong
to leave unchecked and even support the fishermen’s inclination to invest.
We are left with the bitter fruits. The fishermen should have been protected
against themselves. Mind you, the fishing industry even called for such
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measures. With catch restrictions in place, we have been driven to the wall.
Of course, we realize that catch restrictions are beneficial. However, better
measures are necessary. The state ought to come up with a decommission-
ing scheme and an adjustment fund. We should be helped through the
difficult times ahead by means of fuel and interest subsidies (Texelse Cour-
ant, 7 May 1976).
Daalder rightly expected the decisions concerning the fisheries to increas-
ingly become a matter of give and take between European Community
member states. A Texel owner-operator remarked in the 1976 annual meet-
ing of the local fishermen’s association that under the extant conditions,
‘one can imagine that a fisherman at a certain moment says “let’s catch as
much as we can and throw the rules to the winds”, even though this does
not solve the existing problems’.
The mood was grim and the fishermen’s worries about the future were
genuine. The forward linkages of primary production – auctions, fish tra-
ders and processors – feared that their business positions would deterio-
rate with diminishing landings. In a meeting with directors of municipal
fish auctions on 23 September 1976, the head of the Fisheries Directorate,
Tienstra, maintained that overcapacity had to be reduced. When the direc-
tors claimed that this would be detrimental to their businesses, he alleg-
edly replied: ‘The auctions should ensure that everything adds up on pa-
per’. Although perhaps not intended this way, the auction directors and the
fishing industry understood this to mean that illegal trade circuits would
be condoned as long as the account books were in order. In a startling
report on the fishing community of Urk, two journalists extensively de-
scribed the murky wheeling and dealing in the fishing industry as early as
1977 (Verhey and van Westerloo 1977). They stated that local and national
officials were fully aware of the illicit dealings. Infringements were mani-
fold. They consisted of: using liners or blinders (binnenzakken, nets within
nets) and too-small mesh sizes; stashing away catches in hidden spaces;
landing the fish in the dead of night when auctions were officially closed
and General Inspection Service officials were not present; discharging fish
abroad in ports where inspections were known to be lenient or lacking and
subsequently transporting the fish with trucks to Dutch auctions where its
origin was not registered or delivering directly to dealers and processing
plants; transferring fish at sea to smaller boats that discharged the fish in
ports without auctions; orchestrating simultaneous landings of many
beamers so that only a handful of boats could be inspected; filling boxes
with much more than the forty-kilo limit; landing undersized fish; putting
a tiny layer of plaice on top of sole to pretend that boxes contained plaice;
filling in the unspecified term ‘sea-fish’ on slips of paper that marked the
species contents of fish boxes; trading ‘consigned’ fish of unknown produ-
cers through auctions; indicating the wrong catch areas in logbooks; writ-
ing fictive vessel registration numbers on administration forms, and so on.
The authorities could not condone such massive contravention of the rules
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and regulations. Not officially, at least. They demanded compliance, but
the fishermen refused to budge.
Hence, the quota system’s introduction was disruptive in regard to rela-
tionships between the fishing industry and state institutions. It also proved
to be internally divisive. On Texel, it provoked disagreement between the
categories of larger and petty skipper-owners and between owners and
crew. At national level, it translated into tensions between the Fishermen’s
Union’s board and owner-operators who wanted to steer a confrontational
course. Deeming the Fishermen’s Union overly cooperative with the state
and its chairman, Klaas Hoekstra, ‘too nice’, several local fishermen’s asso-
ciations abandoned the organization, including Progress through Unity,
chaired by Daalder. Daalder was on the Union’s executive board for some
time, but he and some other fishermen were of the opinion that a new,
reorganized and professional national fishermen’s organization should be
established since they believed the Union to be too weak and too accom-
modating to successfully negotiate with the government. The matter was
discussed several times at local level to see whether things were improv-
ing. However, Daalder concluded that the Union was ‘a mess’. He would
later recall that most skipper-owners who were on the Union’s executive
board were septuagenarians, some of whom had even operated sailing ves-
sels. ‘They could not keep up with the developments,’ he said. To some
extent it was a generational conflict, with Union executives being conserva-
tive and law-abiding citizens, whereas younger skipper-owners who
wanted to expand were more akin with the contemporary fashion of pro-
testing authority – a legacy of the 1960s’ contestation of power. In a Sep-
tember 1977 meeting, Progress through Unity decided to withdraw its
membership from the Fishermen’s Union. Following heated discussions,
Daalder exclaimed: ‘We will always have our differences of opinion, but
let’s show the outside world a collective and united face.’ Thirty out of the
thirty-two members who were present voted in favour of abandoning the
Union. The Texel fishermen said they would consider returning if the Un-
ion’s structure was reorganized and its board members became more en-
gaged in defending the interests of the owners of big beamers. A new na-
tional organization, the Federation of Fishery Associations, was
established. Soon, it represented almost half of the Dutch fishing vessels –
mostly powerful beamers. A few Texel fishermen remained loyal to the
Union, among whom were the kin-related owners of three vessels,
whereas the vast majority opted for the Federation. For years to come, dis-
cord rather than unity among and within the fishing industry’s national
associations would be common.
With two national voluntary associations in addition to several other
branch organizations and a host of local and regional associations, the fish-
ermen’s leverage in regard to state institutions was weakened rather than
reinforced. In an era in which the European Community and the Dutch
state introduced various measures affecting the fishing industry, a united
viewpoint of all fishermen was needed to lend effective weight to the bal-
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ance. The fact that they were divided among themselves prevented them
from successfully opposing the growing state intervention. Moreover, the
fission profoundly complicated negotiations between the parties, because
membership of either of the national associations increasingly became a
matter of conviction that had deep symbolical implications for the social
relations in the fishing industry. ‘Union’ or ‘Federation’ turned into some-
thing similar to ‘left wing’ versus ‘right wing’, ‘Protestant’ versus ‘Catho-
lic’, or ‘orthodox’ versus ‘heterodox’. For years to come, the old sore would
continue to ooze. If the Union said ‘yes’ to a proposal, the Federation was
inclined to say ‘no’. Mutual opposition and suspicions made it nearly im-
possible to come up with a united stand, undermining the fishermen’s
political clout. Thus, the quota regime drove a wedge into the fisherfolk’s
occupational world. Once again, it was not a ‘need for independence’ or
individualism that had brought about division. Clearly, the factional pro-
cess was about the diverging interests of specific categories of fishermen
that subsequently developed into groups. Cooperation and conflict were
not mutually exclusive phenomena but reflected changing interdependen-
cies (Elias 1974:xix).
The Federation’s tough course of action would soon become apparent.
Late in 1977 rumour had it that the EEC was going to radically reduce the
Dutch sole quota and take measures to enforce compliance. The news
caused upheaval among the flatfish fishermen. When discussing the issue
in the local fishermen’s association, a Texel skipper-owner asked rhetori-
cally: ‘What kind of image do the high and mighty who regulate everything
have of fishermen, and does the fisherman’s opinion count at all?’ The
fishermen felt cornered. The Federation, provisionally established in Janu-
ary 1978, immediately flexed its muscles when that very month about sev-
enty cutters – ten of them from Texel – briefly blockaded Holland’s main
fishing ports. The action was coordinated from Texel. Ben Daalder said
that the prime goal was to impact public opinion. The fishermen, who
were of the opinion that the government came down upon them too
harshly for non-compliance with the quota rules, did indeed gain some
sympathy. In addition, the quotas for 1978 were still unknown and they
would be established month by month. The fishermen could land a twelfth
of their annual individual sole and plaice quotas per month. They consid-
ered this to be unworkable, since catches tended to fluctuate across the
year, with lows in the summer. Such ad hoc measures also hindered long-
term business planning. The fishermen were further dissatisfied with the
Dutch government’s decommissioning policy, while the British fleet was
believed to be expanding at the same time. Anxiety mounted and anger
reached a zenith. The General Inspection Service defused the tension by
temporarily relaxing inspections. In addition, a voluntary tie-up scheme
with some financial compensation for weeks that boats did not fish was
introduced, but the vast majority of owner-operators preferred to sail. The
fishermen felt that they had no other option than to simply ignore the
rules.
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Contrary to the owner-operators’ initial expectations, quota allowances
proved to represent substantial economic value. They had received these
individual entitlements free of charge, but when they became transferable,
the rights-holding owner-operators could capitalize on them. Quite soon
after their introduction, a lively trade in landing rights developed; a sign
that owner-operators wanted to match their entitlements with vessel capa-
city and not depend entirely on illegal activities. Although individual quo-
tas would officially be transferable as of 1985, de facto such transfers came
about much earlier (Smit 2001). Fishermen simply bought a boat with as-
sociated quotas and then sold the vessel without landing allowances. Fis-
sion and fusion of enterprises also enabled transfers of individual quotas.
Thus, the government merely put the practice on a statutory footing.
Although it stipulated that only a vessel’s entire quota could be sold, Pro-
ducer Organizations could purchase an entire ITQ and then resell it in
parts to their members. Acquiring quota rights was facilitated because the
same tax benefits applied to their purchasing costs as investment in equip-
ment. Entitlements were in great demand and prices soared, much to the
dismay of Texel skipper-owners. The quota system and the market for
landing allowances did not, however, lead to a more responsible and effi-
cient fishery that enabled fishermen to respond flexibly to changes in the
market, while the burden of management and enforcement still rested
with the government (van Vliet 1998a:219). Property rights were insecure,
since the flatfish fishery would be closed once the national quotas for sole
and plaice were exhausted. This implied that those fishermen who chose
to use their individual quotas steadily across the year might stand empty-
handed well before year’s end. They quickly learned to fish as much as
they could in as short a time as possible. The social dynamic was that suc-
cessful quota busting encouraged law-abiding skippers to join the trans-
gressors in their illegal operations for fear of being put at a disadvantage.
Deeming total allowable catches to be fixed at ridiculously low levels and
discovering that their protests to have them altered were in vain, many
fishermen simply ignored the quota regime. With quota prices being high
and monitoring and enforcement of restrictions suboptimal, to say the
least, it paid to continue fishing illegally. The fishermen claimed that they
would be ‘stealing from their own wallet’ if they refrained from doing so,
since ‘everyone was doing it’. Being ambivalent about state intervention
and strict law enforcement, they said that the state should do a better job
of regulating and policing the industry, yet they continued their illegal
practices. Right from the onset, the national sole and plaice quotas were
overshot. In spite of the individual quota system, the derby-style competi-
tion to catch fish was not eliminated. Neither was the horsepower race.
Following a brief intermezzo, when due to decommissioning, aggregate
engine power of the Dutch – including the Texel – fishing fleet dimin-
ished, the expansion of the number of boats and engine power continued
almost unabatedly from 1976 onwards (see Appendix C). Since the oil cri-
sis, the fishing fleet had been encountering negative net results for a few
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years in succession and the enthusiasm for investment was low. However,
as of 1976, debts were redeemed at a fast pace, ameliorating the owner-
operators’ credit-worthiness with banks. The solvency of Dutch cutter own-
ers increased from 52.3 per cent in 1973 to 68.9 per cent in 1978, the first
year after the oil crisis to yield net profits. The mean annual gross reve-
nues of Dutch cutters in 1978 increased by sixteen per cent compared to
the previous year. In 1978, Texel cutters grossed an aggregate of 36.4 mil-
lion guilders: slightly over ten per cent of the Dutch cutter fleet’s total
gross proceeds. With confidence in the future restored, fishermen almost
immediately began ordering new and more powerful boats, nullifying re-
cent decommissioning efforts and increasing overcapacity. Despite re-
newed fishing industry requests in 1979, 1980 and 1981 to introduce an
engine power limit, the government again refused to intervene on account
of favouring a liberal market economy and lacking the legal means to do
so. It regarded self-restraint the fisherman’s individual responsibility. In
conditions of fierce competition, the skipper-owners’ attitude was to stay
in business as long as possible. In fact, owner-operators who could or
would not expand began lagging behind and were ousted from the fish-
eries arena. Many vessel owners therefore felt a need to expand, while
deckhands who aspired to become independent and sons of owners who
wanted to set up an independent firm bought second-hand vessels from
those who had acquired new vessels.
Fishermen were able to obtain bank loans fairly easily. Their solvency
was considerable and – in addition to boats – they could use their landing
allowances as collateral. Moreover, from 1978 onwards a general invest-
ment subsidy (known as WIR premie) in the form of a fiscal allowance of
twelve per cent or more on newly built vessels created an important incen-
tive to invest in new fishing boats, while liquidating a firm was fiscally
unwise. The state’s left hand did not seem to know what the right hand
did: while the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was discussing how to
tackle overcapacity, the Ministry of Economic Affairs came up with a gen-
eric scheme of investment subsidies to stimulate national economic
growth. Fishermen could also apply, in fact exacerbating the overcapacity
and overcapitalization problems. Quota restrictions on the one hand, and
investment subsidies on the other, gave ambivalent messages and contra-
dictory incentives to fisherfolk, putting them ‘in a somewhat schizophre-
nic position’ while at the same time making for uncertainty (van Vliet
1999:168; also see van der Schans 2001:425ff.). Individual fishermen
blamed each other for the overcapacity problem, collectively they blamed
the government for failing to intervene, and the government in turn
blamed the fishing industry for investing irresponsibly (Vervaele,
Ruimschotel and Widdershoven 1990:133).
The Dutch cutter fishing fleet expanded rapidly, both in terms of num-
ber of vessels and aggregate engine power (see Appendix B). Although the
pace of developments on Texel was slower (Appendix C), on the island, too,
there was a clear tendency towards boats becoming bigger and more
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powerful. Along with growing engine power, fuel bills subtracted a greater
and greater share of the gross proceeds. Not only did fuel consumption
increase, but fuel prices also rose sharply even though they were tax-free.
In 1974, fuel costs accounted for seventeen per cent of a vessel’s operating
costs: six years later they represented over a quarter (Rijneveld et al.
1981:122), but owner-operators continued to lodge orders for yet more
powerful vessels. Expansion was the buzz-word, to which end owner-op-
erators continued to invest. Fears about over-fishing, which had often
been expressed in the early and mid-1970s, seemed to have vanished com-
pletely. By 1980, a few cutters with over 2,000 h.p. engines were launched.
The first such ‘super beamer’ would make her appearance in the Texel fleet
four years later. The owner-operators’ expectation was that more engine
power would result in more pulling power, so that longer beams of twelve
metres or over and more tickler chains could be applied, enhancing the
catching potential for sole, which dig into the sediment. At the same time,
powerful engines would reduce steaming time and enable fishing to con-
tinue in rough weather. In addition, new high-tensile fibres and more so-
phisticated net constructions would allow towing at higher speeds and im-
prove gear efficiency (Banks et al. 2001:44). Navigation equipment (Loran
replacing the less accurate Decca) was particularly important in the mixed
flatfish fishery. It enabled mapping positions, so that a particularly abun-
dant fishing spot could be worked rather systematically by returning to a
set course until productivity declined.
Some of the money invested went into improving safety and working
conditions aboard. The boats had sheltered whalebacks where the crew
could process the catch, and could be completely operated from the bridge.
They also had central heating, a shower and a lavatory – which had pre-
viously been regarded redundant ‘luxuries’. In the early 1980s, fish-sorting
installations with conveyor-belt systems and gutting machines eased the
tasks of deckhands. Previously, the cod ends were emptied on deck, where
the fish was mostly mixed with a lot of benthos, debris and sand. While
being exposed to spray and the weather on a rolling and pitching vessel,
crewmen had to sort, grade and gut the catch – a repetitive job – in a kneel-
ing or stooped position. This quite often led to back troubles at a relatively
young age. The new equipment enabled them to do the job in an upright
position under the whaleback. With CCTV monitors to keep an eye on the
engine room, watch alarm and closed sterns becoming more and more
common, safety aboard increased.
Owner-operators also acquired more sophisticated navigation and fish-
finding equipment, which was particularly important in the pelagic fish-
eries. When the ban on herring fishing was lifted in 1983, most Texel fish-
ermen who were entitled to do so resumed seasonal pair trawling. It re-
quired quite an investment, as a single herring net alone cost something
in the order of 63,000 guilders. Shifting from flatfish to herring and back
took two weeks of adjustments to the boat and the gears, weeks in which
precious fishing time was lost and nothing was earned. Entitlements were
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even more insecure than in flatfish fishing. Herring fishing was not based
on an individual transferable quota system. For licence holders, the na-
tional herring quota uptake was initially on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis.
The largest company-owned trawlers consequently had more opportunity
to catch their share in as short a time as possible, since for family firms
herring fishing was a seasonal affair that was usually alternated with mixed
flatfish fisheries. Nevertheless, nine Texel firms continued their switching
strategies. Three of them even had identical purpose-built stern trawlers
made that specialized in the herring and round-fish fisheries. They were
twenty-four metres long and had two main engines of 300 h.p. each. The
owner-operators expected that if they switched off one of the engines, they
would be allowed to fish within the 12 nm zone. However, much to their
dismay, this turned out not to be the case because the vessels were over 70
GRT. The firms had received substantial EC subsidies to have their boats
built; amounting to almost half a million guilders per unit, but it would
prove to be extremely difficult to operate the vessels in a cost-effective way.
Texel’s rather small inshore segment of the fishing fleet was not subject
to the kind of output restrictions and other measures imposed upon the
offshore boats’ owner-operators. Several fishermen tried their luck in the
inshore fisheries. In the early 1980s, the local fishing fleet comprised
about seventeen to eighteen inshore cutters with up to 300 h.p. engines,
nearly all of whose owners lived in Oudeschild. Approximately thirty men
manned the boats, whereas the offshore fleet employed about 170 fisher-
men. In contradistinction to the state-of-the-art big beamers, these small
boats were usually rather old – with the exception of a few new-built ves-
sels. Inshore fishing provided an alternative route for fishermen who
wanted to be independent but who did not have sufficient capital to ac-
quire a beam trawler or did not desire to ply the North Sea. The inshore
fleet was a hotchpotch of craft that targeted shrimp, shellfish, eel and sun-
dry other species. Most firms also had mini-quotas for flatfish. Three or
four boats specifically catered to tourists; they still took holidaymakers on
shrimp-fishing trips, and with the tourist season’s extension the impor-
tance of their commercial fishing diminished. Approximately ten vessels
specialized in targeting shrimp. Entry to inshore fishing was not always
easy, however. In the early 1980s, Wadden Sea shrimp fishermen had to
have licences as the state adopted a policy of non-expansion. Several Texel
shrimp fishermen initially encountered difficulties in obtaining such a li-
cence. Even with a limited number of owner-operators, competition was
fierce. There were no catch restrictions, but markets were soon saturated
and shrimp prices were usually low. In the shrimp-fishing industry, it
proved to be hard to arrive at mutual agreements to contain production,
even after a Union of Shrimp Fishermen was established by the end of the
decade. It became increasingly difficult to recruit crew for shrimp boats.
Most deckhands desired a berth aboard a big beamer, where the share re-
muneration was soaring. Many were even willing to work as a substitute
crewmember on the North Sea fleet.
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In summary, the times of the Dutch offshore fishing industry’s rapid
expansion were characterized by reports of illegal fishing, underreporting
of catches, grey and black trade circuits and inadequate policing and enfor-
cement by the Dutch state. The monitoring of compliance with fisheries
legislation was entrusted to the General Inspection Service, whose inspec-
tors were assigned as special enforcement officers. They had full control,
inspection and investigation powers. In the quota regime’s early days, their
land-based inspections were rather lenient – although the number of war-
rants they handed out would appear to indicate otherwise. Usually, how-
ever, these concerned minor offences. Moreover, the legal basis of Com-
munity law was initially unclear, and several Dutch District Courts
referred fishery offences to the European Court of Justice stating prejudi-
cial questions. It often took more than a year to obtain a ruling, and many
fishermen believed this to be a sign that things would turn out right. Ac-
cording to the Fish Board chairman, Dick Langstraat, fishermen were of
the opinion that ‘having an elastic conscience offered a better future than
to suffocate in one’s own decency’ (Subcommissie Visquoteringsregelin-
gen 1987:196). It was a confusing time, when no one seemed to know
how stringent Community regulations should be applied. In addition,
there was considerable uncertainty concerning the extent to which other
member states would enforce the rules. Initially believed to be born out of
necessity, illicit dealings soon turned into a conventional mode of conduct.
Auctions, processors and dealers colluded with rule-dodging fishermen so
that illegally landed seafood could be marketed. The traders needed steady
supplies throughout the year and the auctions’ existence depended on a
three per cent commission charge from fish sales. They feared losing cus-
tomers to competitors if they abided by the law. Despite the quota regime,
auctions reported record turnovers in the 1980s and invested heavily in
new facilities. Even the Fish Board collaborated. It distributed landing
forms that had to be completed ‘truthfully’, but it nonetheless demanded a
0.2 percentage charge on all landings, including grey ones. Consequently,
many parties had stakes in continuing the illegal fishing game. However,
forces from without threatened to thrust a spoke into the wheel.
Mushrooming Rules, Insecure Rights
Dutch fishermen who evaded or violated the regulations abroad faced tight
surveillance. In the early 1980s, Belgian, British, German and Danish
authorities caught many Dutch beam trawler skippers fishing in territorial
waters or using prohibited gear devices. They were fined heavily. These
events had an impact on the fishermen’s public image at home. For a long
time, they had been perceived as ‘noble commoners’, toiling to eke out a
livelihood. Now they were increasingly viewed as irresponsible and reck-
less egotists plundering the sea’s resources. Dutch beam-trawl fishermen
gained the reputation of being unscrupulous brigands with an insatiable
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appetite for fish, blatantly and quite openly flouting the regulations. Point-
ing fingers was popular, self-reflection was lacking. Fishermen hailing
from other member states were no saints either, but much to their amuse-
ment and relief their Dutch counterparts were in the limelight. Dutch fish-
ing-industry leaders were convinced that this was inextricably linked with
jealousy concerning the state-of-the-art Dutch beamer fleet and its eco-
nomic successes (Schaap 1990:102-104). They alluded to ‘protectionism’.
Criticism was mounting and Dutch fishermen turned into scapegoats who
allegedly scoured the North Sea illegally catching fish. Soon there was a
call for stricter enforcement and punishment of those who evaded or
breached the rules and regulations, especially after the introduction of the
Common Fisheries Policy in 1983. The European Commission, sensing
that catch registration and enforcement in the Netherlands were subopti-
mal, sent European inspection officers and demanded tighter control in
1984. This proved to be difficult in practice as the state’s grip on the fish-
ing industry was rather weak.
The Deputy Minister (staatssecretaris) who was responsible for sea and
coastal fisheries from 1984 to 1986, Ad Ploeg, implemented a number of
new regulations and increased monitoring and enforcement efforts. He
regarded fisherfolk as industrious and generally law-abiding people, but
he nonetheless warned them that they had become scapegoats in Brussels,
and that the number of fisheries offences in the Netherlands surpassed
that of other member states (Subcommissie Visquoteringsregelingen
1987:275). Although this fact could also be indicative of a lack of enforce-
ment abroad, Ploeg was under pressure to take measures. As of 1985, fish-
ermen needed licences to target species for which the European Commu-
nity had established quotas. These transferable licences registered the
engine capacity of a boat. Licence holders would only be allowed to in-
crease their vessel’s engine power when they garnered additional horse-
power licences on the market. Such licences could only be transferred
within specific fleet segments. The measure’s aim was to fix aggregate en-
gine capacity at the December 1984 level and as engine capacity licences
represented market value, prices went up. The measure’s weak point was
that extant orders for new vessels or engines were exempt. Because word
about the imminent rule had transpired, shipyards booked a torrent of
orders for new cutters and new engines just before it became effective. It
was the same old story of keeping up with the Joneses. To contain the over-
capacity problem, Ploeg introduced a mandatory five-week tie-up scheme,
but the measure was ineffective. Given the mismatch between landing al-
lowances and catching capacity, the national quotas for several species
were exhausted prematurely. The fishermen nonetheless continued to
fish. Ploeg instituted a by-catch maximum of five boxes of cod for the flat-
fish fishing fleet. The General Inspection Service began checking vessels
at landing sites more thoroughly in an attempt to do away with ‘grey’ and
‘black’ trade circuits. Tensions between inspectors and fishermen
mounted. Ploeg threatened to begin Navy inspections of vessels at sea.
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Fishing industry leaders deemed the stricter control policy and the wheel-
ing and dealing of establishing total allowable catch shares at European
level ‘nauseating’ (Borghouts 1991:67). However, despite additional meas-
ures, fishermen continued to circumvent rules, which created further ten-
sions between them and state institutions.
Texel fishermen ardently discussed how to deal with the tightened man-
agement regime. In April 1985, Progress through Unity’s chairman Bert
Weijdt emphasized that a united stance was urgently needed to cope with
‘the dark clouds on the horizon’. In order to successfully demand higher
quotas, ‘all those earning a living on the North Sea should make a front
together with the dealers and processors and act as a single force. Any fric-
tion between interest groups or associations, any threat with fission from
whatever group will weaken our strength’. The fishermen rightly feared
that the national quotas would be exhausted early. This expectation
brought about worries among the deckhands, who wanted to know what
they were up against. The Texelians suspected that ‘Brussels’ was playing
foul and that the Community bureaucrats were placing all the blame for
fish stock problems on Dutch fishermen. In their view, the real problem
was that individual entitlements were extremely insecure. Several Texel
skipper-owners had been investing in acquiring additional landing rights,
but regardless of whether their uptake had been possible or not, fishing
opportunities would be closed once the national quota for a particular spe-
cies of fish had been exhausted. ‘Look, we have bought extra quotas at
great expense, so we want to be able to land what we are entitled to. The
authorities must enforce the rules,’ said an Oosterend owner-operator.
There was thus a serious mismatch between the individual entitlements
and national obligations towards Brussels. The problem was aggravated
because new big beamers continued to be launched, often with little or no
landing rights. The majority of the Texel flatfish fishermen favoured group
quotas, whose uptake the state should protect. Pooling individual landing
rights would enable quota transfers within the group so that those who
had used up their individual quotas could rent quotas from other group
members who had not exhausted their entitlements. Urk fishermen had
already pooled their individual quotas in a group under the aegis of their
Producer Organization. Although many Texel skipper-owners expressed
doubts about the effectiveness of organizing this way, they nonetheless
developed plans to establish a group together with fishermen from neigh-
bouring Den Helder. The structure of the Den Helder fishing fleet was
similar to Texel’s, with owners holding comparable landing rights. Five
Texel skipper-owners said they would stay aloof and refuse to cooperate,
among whom the local Fishermen’s Union members. However, negotia-
tions had hardly begun when well before the end of the year (1985) the
uptake of plaice exceeded the national quota and the state stipulated that
fishermen must refrain from landing any more plaice. The Texel skipper-
owners were determined to steer a head-on course and continued fishing.
So did fishermen from other communities. Despite putting up an occa-
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sional show of power, state institutions again failed to effectively enforce
the ban.
Ploeg was not amused and demanded that flatfish fishermen work on
fishing plans for 1986 and arrange group quotas, claiming that he would
only negotiate with statutory groups. The Texel and Den Helder fishermen
then resumed their talks about establishing a group. All skipper-owners
now voted in favour and group regulations and by-laws were formulated.
The whole matter was put on hold because Ploeg – whose efforts to con-
tain the fishing industry seemed to have been in vain – did not return in
the new coalition government following the 1986 general elections. He
was blamed for failing to control the fisheries, while his senior, Minister
of Agriculture and Fisheries Gerrit Braks, resumed office without any
complication whatsoever. This time, however, he assumed full responsibil-
ity for the fisheries. Braks immediately had his work cut out for him. As a
consequence of a drastic reduction of sole quotas in the late 1980s (see
Appendix D) and faltering enforcement, illicit landings increased. A
plethora of new measures, including an increase of legal mesh sizes to 80
millimetres, added to the management regime’s complexity and made for
more rules – rules that had loopholes and that could be circumvented or
flouted. The fishing industry continually made headline news about quota
overshooting, early closures, clashing fishermen, illegal fishing, court
cases, and clashes with fisheries inspectors. European Community pres-
sure on the Dutch fisheries authorities to do a better job was mounting. It
reported that in spite of the catch registration system, the systematic mon-
itoring of landings, the expanding enforcement staff and the significant
number of prosecutions, the Dutch record of curtailing quota overshooting
was the poorest of all member states (Vervaele, Ruimschoten and Widder-
shoven 1990:107).
In 1987, the controversies pertaining to the fisheries climaxed. Braks
and his Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries were critiqued for failing to
enforce the law and even condoning illegal fishing. This led to an enquiry
of a parliamentary subcommittee into the Ministry’s role concerning over-
quota landings. It concluded that the Ministry’s civil servants had been
passively – and in some cases even actively – involved in dodging the Euro-
pean Community’s quota measures because they identified the fishing in-
dustry’s interests with the national interest (Subcommissie Visquoterings-
regelingen 1987). This attitude had not stimulated ‘loyal’ abiding by
Community obligations. Knowledge of the illegal practices was widespread
in the Ministry’s Fisheries Directorate, but its civil servants turned a blind
eye. Other parties were complicit. The state’s condoning of over-quota
landings gave fishermen the impression that they could continue their ille-
gal practices without serious repercussions, which they then obviously did.
The fishing industry – including the Fish Board – resented hardly being
involved in the policymaking process. They sensed that many of the meas-
ures the state announced were little more than paper tigers, bringing
about mistrust concerning the rules’ efficacy. Auction managers helped
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fishermen to logistically and administratively get rid of illegal fish, because
their existence depended on an auction levee. They feared that the fisher-
men would go elsewhere if they did not assist in maintaining this ‘second’
market. Fish processors and traders were also involved. They needed stea-
dy supplies, and with higher than legally allowed landings, prices would be
low, turnover high and employment ensured. Local authorities often
turned a blind eye to what was going on.
Even when fishermen had been caught fishing or landing fish illegally,
judges usually sentenced them to low and tax-deductible fines. Failing to
deprive them of commercial gain, such sanctions did not deter skippers
from continuing illicit practices. ‘The last haul for the judge’ became a
popular expression. The flatfish fishermen consequently considerably
overshot their quotas, leading to early exhaustion of national quotas and
subsequent premature closure of the fisheries. Because entitlements were
insecure, a derby-style catch-as-catch-can attitude surfaced. Obviously, as
individuals the fishermen had much to win by contravening the rules if
they succeeded in not getting caught red-handed, or after the fact on the
basis of their administration. Many were heavily indebted as a conse-
quence of recent investments in new vessels. Mortgages and loans had to
be redeemed. Overshooting their individual quotas meant that they could
keep their incomes up to the mark and stay afloat economically. This was
especially the case for the category of fishermen with big beamers but
small quotas. There was peer pressure aboard these vessels to fish more
than their owners-cum-quota-holders were entitled to. As share fishermen,
deckhands had an interest and a stake in attempting to obtain revenues
that were as high as possible. They would benefit just as much as owner-
operators. Therefore, the partnership contract usually included a term that
stated that fines would be subtracted as ‘costs’ from the crew share. Since
illegal landings had a price-undermining effect, the fishermen had to land
even more to maintain gross proceeds at the level they desired. Of course,
this in turn only aggravated the problem. Until the fishery was closed, fish
swamped the market, usually yielding low prices. The fishermen who had
not yet fished their individual quotas suffered. With this experience of
being entrapped in a prisoner’s dilemma, the race for fish continued, sti-
mulated by lenient enforcement, ample opportunities to contravene the
rules, and a strong demand for flatfish abroad. For a long time, Minister
Braks had stubbornly insisted that the official fisheries statistics were ‘ab-
solutely accurate’, and had only admitted to the subcommittee that the
Ministry had known about the illegal circuit. In his view, knowing about it
did not equal condoning it (ibid.:322). After his humble mea culpa, Braks
politically survived the parliamentary debate that followed publication of
the subcommittee’s report. The head of the Fisheries Directorate was
forced to move department, but the vast majority of MPs gave Braks ‘the
benefit of the doubt’ when he promised to adequately deal with the prob-
lems in the fishing industry. ‘I am of the opinion that extant and future
measures will cope with the problems’, he maintained.
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Indeed, a host of new regulations and restrictions were implemented as
of 1987, including a days-at-sea regulation and compulsory registration
and check of all landings (van Vliet 1998b:70). The days-at-sea regulation
sought to adjust fishing effort to the available quotas and to prevent the
need to close the fishing season early (Davidse 1998:59). A team of 120
inspectors began to systematically monitor fish landings for which specific
places, times and conditions were set. Fines for violations of the rules be-
came much stiffer, and some fishermen, traders and auction directors
were even incarcerated for non-compliance with the law. As an additional
technical measure, the maximum beam length for the flatfish fishery was
fixed at twelve metres for vessels over 300 h.p. and to four-and-a-half
metres for those under 300 h.p. At long last, Braks also announced that
there would be a maximum main engine capacity of 2,000 h.p. for newly
built vessels. By then, there were already scores of vessels with more
powerful engines, while orders for quite a few new boats had been lodged
just before the deadline. The same happened when it transpired that the
general investment premium (WIR premie) was going to be abolished the
next year. Instead of containing the overcapacity problem, the 1987 policy
decisions gave an unintended boost to expanding aggregate engine power,
which peaked at almost 600,000 h.p. the next year. The aggregate engine
power of Texel cutters also reached its zenith in 1988, when it amounted to
almost 55,000 h.p. Several of the island’s beamers carried engines of over
3,000 h.p., the most powerful one having a 3,600 h.p. engine. Elsewhere
in the country, beamers with stunningly powerful 4,000 to 4,500 h.p. en-
gines began to be launched. By then, a new-built cutter required the sum
of seven to seven-and-a-half million guilders. The flatfish fishermen’s opti-
mism had received a fillip in the mid-1980s, when financial results were
beyond expectation, and they did not worry about operating costs. Fuel
prices amounted to twenty-five cents per litre in 1988, which despite infla-
tion was considerably less than those paid in 1980, when the price had
briefly peaked at sixty-four cents. Although after 1987 the Dutch cutter
fishing-fleet’s size steadily decreased, the category of big beamers of
2,000 h.p. and more continued to grow. In addition, a class of so-called
Euro-cutters – 300 h.p. boats built specifically for use within the 12 nm
zone and so named because this vessel type was developed with EEC sub-
sidies – quickly arose (see Appendix C).
As one of its manifold measures, the state created a quota reserve of five
per cent to cover for overshooting of individual quotas and to allow others
to fully use their rights. Here was the crux of many problems. Individual
quota entitlements were extremely uncertain because once the national
share of the total allowable catch for a species had been exhausted, the
fishery would be closed regardless of whether fishermen had exercised
their individual entitlements or not. This weakness proved to be particu-
larly calamitous for round-fish fishermen. The beamers’ cod by-catches
consumed a large part of the national cod quota. This was detrimental to
the specialized round-fish fishing fleet as it led to early closures of cod
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fishing. In 1986 and 1987, for example, it was closed as early as May.
Although they were only allowed to land five boxes of cod per week, the
beam-trawl fishermen claimed that they could not avoid catching cod and
it went against the grain to throw the fish back into the sea because it
would certainly die. They regarded it an example of a perverse policy. For
the twenty holders of a specific cod-fishing licence (a ‘cod document’),
which was implemented in 1987, the fishery seemed no longer viable. As
a Katwijk cod fisherman exclaimed:
The beamers have brought shit upon us. They have ruined the fishery.
Over-fishing is getting worse every year. They come up with more horse-
power all the time and they only want more, bigger and ever bigger. This
way the one firm brings down the other in disaster. We are about to become
our own hangmen (de Volkskrant, 20 June 1987).
His words are symptomatic of the rifts and ruptures that had come about
in the expanding fishing industry. They caused new fissions in the sector’s
organizations, including the Federation, which failed to adequately repre-
sent and defend the small owner-operators’ interests. In November 1987,
round-fish fishermen blocked the IJmuiden sea sluice gates to protest the
flatfish fishermen’s dodging of the by-catch measure. Minister Braks had
to admit that the individual quotas ‘would appear to be insufficiently se-
cure’ (de Volkskrant, 21 November 1987), but nonetheless the government
summoned police troops to end the blockade. Early in 1987 Braks had in-
troduced the measure that flatfish fishermen should stay ashore a number
of weeks to give cod fishermen the opportunity to take up their quotas.
This decision was successfully contested in the Supreme Court, and the
Ministry was forced to renegotiate with the fisheries organizations. The
burgeoning rules and regulations led to increasing litigation and stifled
the fishermen’s time-honoured strategy of gear and species switching. For
example, the cod document was only allocated to fishermen whose in-
comes between 1984 and 1986 had depended for at least sixty-five per
cent on catches of cod and haddock. The measure caused upheaval among
the three Texel round-fish fishing firms that also pursued herring, because
they did not meet these conditions. Another hotly contested rule was that
fishermen’s individual over-quota landings of the previous year would be
subtracted from their current quotas.
Along with the 1987 measures, a voluntary decommissioning scheme
was adopted. Owner-operators who decommissioned their vessel only re-
turned their engine capacity licence and could sell their individual quotas
to other boat owners. Vessels were not necessarily scrapped, but could be
sold, so that capacity did not diminish but was often merely relocated. The
option to sell individual transferable quotas at high prices was intended to
facilitate exit decisions. Early in 1987, sole quotas sold for twenty guilders
per kilo. This price tripled by mid-year. A 1,500 h.p. vessel had a mean
individual sole quota of seventy metric tonnes; the mean value of landing
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allowances for sole thus increased from 1.4 to 4.2 million guilders. How-
ever, it was still unattractive for owners to have their vessels decommis-
sioned and to leave the industry, while the prohibitively high costs of ac-
quiring quotas made it extremely difficult to match catching capacity with
entitlements. Despite a fifty per cent contribution from the European
Community and a twenty-five per cent contribution from the national gov-
ernment, the state raked in a disproportionate amount of decommission-
ing money through its fiscal measures. Forty per cent of the compensation
had to be paid in tax at once. In 1988, this amounted to 2,160 guilders per
GRT, whereas the state’s decommissioning subsidy was only 1,800
guilders (Schaap 1990:49). In order to deal with the overcapacity problem,
in 1988 ten-week and eight-week mandatory tie-up schemes were applied
to the big and small cutter sections of the fleet, respectively. All the old
‘irrational’ fishermen’s motivations to continue with their occupation still
applied and the incentive to decommission was meagre for those vessel
owners who had few prospects of finding another job. The state’s Develop-
ment and Decommissioning Fund (Ontwikkelings- en Saneringsfonds) was
good at achieving development but not at decommissioning. Moreover,
there was no social scheme for non-propertied deckhands who would be-
come unemployed due to decommissioning. By this time, slightly over
3,000 fishermen manned the Dutch cutter fleet, 500 more than in 1975.
On Texel, the occupational community boasted 200 to 220 fishermen in
the 1980s. About eighty-five per cent of them worked in the offshore fish-
ing fleet. Most big beamers were ‘overstaffed’. They had at least one and
often two or even three more than the legally required crew of six, so that
crewmen could alternate having a week off. Given the situation of over-
staffing, the expectation was that it would be difficult to find a berth for
deckhands whose skippers opted to decommission their boat. Owner-op-
erators whose vessels were decommissioned would be the beneficiaries of
the decommissioning subsidies. Deckhands were not entitled to any of the
money. Nor would they – as self-employed entrepreneurs – receive state
unemployment benefits. If they owned property they would have to sell it
before being eligible for the dole. The issue brought about considerable
unrest among crewmembers, who were already dissatisfied, having just
had to swallow new changes in the share percentages, which were com-
monly fixed at a fifty-eight per cent boat share and a forty-two per cent
crew share. In a special meeting of Progress through Unity in June 1989,
the deckhands and owners discussed the matter. In order to avoid fission,
they arrived at a solution. The owner-operators decided that they would use
part of their contribution to the Decommissioning Fund to compensate
those deckhands who became unemployed and could not find work aboard
another cutter. Again, the local association proved its worth.
Faced with all the restrictions coming their way and in an attempt to
maintain at least some say in their businesses, the Texel owner-operators
resumed their talks on the formation of a group, an issue that had been
postponed for some time following the 1986 change of government (see
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above). By the end of 1988, fifteen Texel skipper-owners decided to estab-
lish a local group. They pooled their individual quotas, facilitating swaps,
leasing and selling of quotas and quota uptake within the group. The
group would only function for one year, however. It was abolished in Janu-
ary 1990, when Braks disallowed groups in an attempt to tackle difficulties
with catch registration and quota over-fishing. Nine out of ten groups had
overshot their entitlements. The Texel group was the exception to the rule
– on paper at least. Some of the larger quota holders had refrained from
joining the local group, having preferred to take up their individual entitle-
ments. ‘It really was a mess,’ a skipper-owner told me about the group: ‘It
was entirely non-committal.’ As soon as the group was disbanded, discus-
sions ensued about linking individual rights and horsepower with alloca-
tions of days-at-sea. The problem was that every boat was assigned the
same number of ‘base days’ (basisdagen) and that firms had to request
more in order to be able to fully exercise their quota entitlements. Some
smallholders successfully applied for extra days. This went against the
grain for large rights holders, who suspected that the former would inten-
tionally use these days to overshoot their quotas. Most Texel owner-opera-
tors had large quota entitlements, and therefore they preferred a system
that would link up fishing time with fishing rights. However, the small
quota holders vehemently opposed such an arrangement, particularly
those who had vessels with powerful engines. It proved to be yet another
matter that nourished disharmony in the local fisheries arena. However,
on another front, success was in the pipeline. The Progress through Unity
board members began negotiations with their counterparts in the Den
Helder fishermen’s association to take over the municipal auction in the
naval town. It was privatized in 1989 when owner-operators from Den
Helder and Texel as a joint venture established the Cooperative Fish Auc-
tion Den Helder/Texel. Forty-five firms chipped in 1,000 guilders each.
About eighty per cent of the turnover was henceforth realized by the home
fleets.
A new chairman of the local fishermen’s association, Bas van der Beek,
was to lead the organization into the 1990s. He was an ardent advocate of
uniting forces. In his maiden speech to the association’s general meeting
in February 1989 he expressed his apprehension regarding the fact that
each sub-sector in the fishing industry preferred to safeguard its own inter-
ests. He rightly pointed out that ‘the danger is that the opponent [the state]
will divide and rule in negotiations’. By repeating his message over and
over again, he could at least attempt to close ranks at the local level. Pro-
gress through Unity would have to speak with one voice in submitting
proposals to the national fisheries organizations and state institutions.
The most pressing topic on the association’s agenda was how to enable
quota holders to fully exercise their entitlements; hence the idea of linking
individual quotas and horsepower with days-at-sea. Most board members
believed that such a measure could solve the problem of premature ex-
haustion of the national landing shares since ‘smallholders’ with big boats
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would not be able to fish as often as large rights holders. The entitlements
of owner-operators would then be better protected, quota uptake would be
ensured and fish prices would improve because of a more even distribu-
tion of landings across the year. The weaker firms – of which the island
had few – could either invest to match their allowances with vessel capacity
or decommission. They could sell their individual quotas to fishermen
who wanted to reinforce their position. It all seemed quite simple and fair,
but it took time to convince all owner-operators, particularly those who had
below-average quotas and mixed fisheries firms. For reasons I will discuss
later, the Texel fishermen would soon become convinced that such a man-
agement system might be just and efficacious. However, they did not dom-
inate the national fisheries arena, and skipper-owners from several other
fishing ports rejected a system of days-at-sea related to landing entitle-
ments (Connolly 1997). They feared that such a measure would stifle their
operations as many of them were smallholders.
For a part of the Texel fleet, seasonal herring fishing was traditionally
important. It was combined with beam trawling for flatfish or round-fish
fishing. Four big beamers and three smaller stern trawlers had herring
landing allowances, but these were not individual quotas. To counter the
derby race for herring, in 1989 the allocation of landing allowances was
changed. Based on historical rights, the national share of the total allow-
able catch for herring was first divided between the company-owned off-
shore fleet and the fleet that was owned by a score of family firms. The
share of the latter was subsequently allocated individually to rights holders
following lengthy negotiations, which were supervised by Fish Board and
Fisheries Directorate representatives. The allocation was based on horse-
power categories and, later, gross tonnage. Every year, this resulted in an
agreement on the annual quota each cutter could land. The beamers
would, for example, receive 6.84 per cent of the national herring quota;
the stern trawlers 2.65 per cent. In addition, there was a days-at-sea regula-
tion. Days used for the three-month herring season were initially sub-
tracted from days-at-sea for beaming, regardless of flatfish entitlements,
which caused considerable problems for the big beamers’ owner-operators.
They would be assigned additional days when they could prove that it was
impossible to take up their individual sole and plaice quotas. In the her-
ring fishery, too, quotas and sea days usually fluctuated. For instance, a
firm operating a big beamer had landing rights for more than 2.5 million
kg in 1987 and 1.1 million kg three years later, while the assigned days-at-
sea declined from ninety-two to forty. With few competing dealers and pro-
cessors –most of them had not survived the herring ban – herring was not
auctioned but sold directly to the processing firms, at prices negotiated in
advance. It proved to be difficult to reach agreements, not only regarding
prices – which were extremely low – but also concerning an even distribu-
tion of herring landings across the year. In 1989, two beamers that pair
trawled could land a maximum of 6,000 boxes of herring per week. With
a prefixed price of eighteen guilders per box, the gross revenues would
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amount to 54,000 guilders per vessel per week at most. This was hardly
deemed cost-effective, as substantially more could be earned in the mixed
flatfish fisheries. Skipper-owners nonetheless continued the herring hunt
to retain their rights, hoping that the herring market would recover in the
future. However, this was not the case (see Chapter 6 and de Jonge 2005).
Texel’s offshore fishermen would therefore increasingly come to depend
on flatfish.
However, the difficulties in the flatfish fishing industry also seemed to
multiply. Despite all the measures that had been taken, reports about
Dutch fishermen who evaded or breached the law again figured promi-
nently in news bulletins in 1988. Politicians and state officials obviously
considered non-compliance a serious offence, while fishermen regarded it
as a survival strategy. They increasingly felt entangled in a net of red tape.
In October 1988, the Zeeland port of Vlissingen became the scene of occa-
sional rows and riots. It was the home-port of Vlissingen and Arnemuiden
beamers, which represented ten per cent of the national catching capacity
but only four per cent of landing entitlements. This discrepancy indicates
why these fishermen strongly depended on black and grey fish landings to
stay in business. They clashed with General Inspection Service officials
who attempted to check for illegal landings and police trying to protect
them while doing their jobs. The skirmishes came to a head when an in-
spection team was awaited by furious fishermen and their friends and
families – including women and children. They set fire to an Inspection
Service van and the inspectors were forced to make a swift retreat. The
atmosphere had turned ugly. In subsequent weeks, platoons of special po-
lice troops were deployed at the dockside when the score of big beamers
from Vlissingen and Arnemuiden discharged their catches. The fishermen
from these fishing ports in the southern part of the Netherlands were
branded as ‘professional criminals’. Their compatriots from other commu-
nities disapproved of the events as they rightly feared they would also be
stigmatized. Texel fishermen firmly condemned the incidents: ‘In a consti-
tutional state, it is intolerable to express discontent in this manner,’ said
Progress through Unity chairman, Bas van der Beek. ‘The events have da-
maged the reputation of fishermen, even though the vast majority dissoci-
ate themselves from these actions’ (Texelse Courant, 25 October 1988). Ben
Daalder, who was about to step down as chairman of the corporatist fish-
ing industry organization (Visserijschap), pointed out in several interviews
that the state ought to tackle skipper-owners who had few or no landing
allowances for species to which quota restrictions applied. The two na-
tional fishermen’s associations also believed that decommissioning meas-
ures should target the owner-operators with insufficient entitlements to
run a firm within the limits of the law.
Mutual trust in the national fishing industry had completely withered
away. Fishermen from different communities accused each other of being
the culprits. For example, Texel owner-operators firmly believed that their
Urk and Den Helder colleagues were tampering with the days-at-sea regis-
212 Braving Troubled Waters
tration. They were also convinced that some officials were leaking informa-
tion to the Urk fishermen, so that they could avoid being caught in the act
when they illegally discharged their fish. A lack of trust thwarted coopera-
tion and was an obstacle to the emergence of mutual agreements on colla-
boration. Solidarity was also undermined. When asked to contribute finan-
cially to a decommissioning fund for round-fish fishermen, the Texel
skipper-owners responded by saying that they had already to discard pre-
cious cod so that round-fish fishermen could take up their quota; they
were not inclined to come up with money as well. For the Dutch govern-
ment, the fisheries sector was a terrible headache. Its reflex was to further
tighten regulations and to come up with new legislation. Most of the Fish-
eries Department’s leading staff had a background in law. Their legalistic
approach led to a stacking of rule upon rule, in an attempt to grapple with
the problem of non-compliance. They erroneously ignored the question of
whether the torrent of regulations were comprehensible, equivocal, effica-
cious and enforceable. This was clearly not the case and the process was a
clear example of a bureaucratic catch-22: complexity increased, coordina-
tion diminished and rules were contradictory. In addition, enforcement
was difficult. In 1989, no less than 1,100 warrants were issued, more than
forty per cent of which had to do with inaccurate catch registration. De-
spite this show of force, flatfish landings continued to exceed individual
and national quotas, and as a consequence of his failure to contain this
problem and his alleged misinformation of Parliament, Braks was forced
to step down on 19 September 1990.
Anxiety, Encapsulation and Ambiguity
When Braks had to leave office, I was in the midst of conducting field
research on Texel. The local fishermen were not pleased with the situation,
arguing that some of the Ministry’s civil servants should have been kicked
out. They feared that monitoring and policing would be tightened even
further. After Braks’s resignation and with the growing risk of heavy fines
for non-compliance, many were anxious that their situation would deterio-
rate as a consequence of draconian measures that would almost certainly
descend upon the fisheries sector. Braks’s successor, Christian Democrat
Piet Bukman, would not want to run the risk of being censured by the
House of Representatives for incompetence in harnessing the fishermen.
In addition, the fishermen comprehended that they had lost control over
their individual businesses and the fishing industry as a whole. Moreover,
prices were far from optimal due to grey and black landings and the pre-
mature closure of flatfish fisheries that invariably followed the national
quotas’ exhaustion. Flatfish catches were excellent in 1990, but with a sa-
turated market fishermen had to land even more to keep their earnings up
to the mark, but doing so meant exceeding their entitlements. Therefore,
most Texel fishermen became more and more inclined to invest in landing
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rights to match their vessel’s capacity. Early on, Texelians had been advo-
cates of individual quotas, whose uptake should be ensured and protected,
and a system of days-at-sea linked with landing rights. They loathed the
fact that big beamers with small entitlements had enjoyed unrestricted ac-
cess to the fishing grounds. However, the strategy of acquiring additional
quotas would only be fruitful if they were secure, which was still not the
case. (I will return to this in the last section of this chapter.)
Texel fishermen had certainly not been sea-green incorruptible. They
were involved in illegal fishing and fish landing activities perhaps as
much as their counterparts from most other fishing ports. Many got away
with it without being caught. It did create new worries though, as a retired
Oosterend skipper-owner (born in 1921) explained:
Look, when you had a nice catch in the old days, you landed and sold it.
Currently, you wonder how to get rid of the fish. You have to sell the fish,
but there are quotas. It is mentally demanding. Everything used to be free,
but the freedom is gone.
The expression ‘to get rid of’ (‘wegwerken’) was a commonly used euphe-
mism for illegal landings. Occasionally, the owner-operators would have to
appear in court for overshooting their individual quotas. They were also
privy to the way the Den Helder auction dealt with ‘consigned’ fish, which
could not be traced by inspection officers. The ‘second market’ – which in
addition to ‘consigned’ fish included sole and plaice landed under the code
name of fictive ‘sea fish’ to which no catch restrictions applied – provided a
lucrative channel for Texel and other fishermen’s over-quota landings. In
addition, black landings were fairly common.
As in other fishing communities, many could not resist fishing within
the 12 nm zone with big beamers, and the use of blinders was also wide-
spread. Their utilization was believed to be necessary to catch marketable
sole. Sole larger than the legal minimum size can get through eighty-milli-
metre mesh; hence the temptation to use blinders or smaller-meshed nets.
Several skipper-owners were vigorously opposed to utilizing them. ‘Blin-
ders are detestable. You’ll catch more than you’re entitled to land and you’ll
land smaller fish. You have to get rid of those fish and it will undermine
prices,’ said a shore skipper. In several meetings I attended, the leaders of
local and national fishermen’s associations called on the owner-operators
to behave responsibly and ban blinders. Fishermen’s Union leader Johan
Nooitgedagt begged on one such occasion in February 1990:
Don’t use those things! How can we arrive at compromises with politicians
when the next day they are used again? We just cannot explain that to poli-
ticians or in Brussels. You’ll burn your own fingers! Don’t do it. It has to
stop, or else we won’t be able to achieve anything at all any more.
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In 1990 meetings of the occupational community of Texel fishermen there
were occasional pleas and promises to ban the blinders. This seemed to be
a discursive reassurance that ‘“we” don’t indulge in using illegal gear de-
vices’. The fishermen acknowledged that should it become evident that
many were nonetheless still using them, the self-discipline would eva-
nesce. Later that year the issue was brought up in a meeting again by an
angry young skipper-owner: ‘I’m so furious… There are perhaps five, six or
seven [skippers] who use blinders. I thought Texelians wouldn’t be so stu-
pid, but shit, they are.’ When a few months later a skipper-owner in a
meeting confessed to using blinders ‘because I also want to take up my
quotas’, a colleague burst out in anger and shouted: ‘That’s how we go
down the drain. We can’t even stand by agreements on Texel. They should
put a GIS [General Inspection Service] inspector on every cutter!’ Later, an
owner-operator and his father told me that they didn’t blame the culprit:
they themselves also used blinders and they were convinced that the out-
raged skipper was doing exactly the same. Pointing fingers and looking for
scapegoats had become a popular pastime.
Several Texel skipper-owners admitted that a number of government
measures made sense, if they could only be enforced equally. In their
view, here was the crux of many problems. In an interview with a skipper-
owner and his wife from Oosterend, both born in the early 1930s, she said:
You can never strike agreements because no one will stick to them. They
will always think they own the fish. In the days when there was little poli-
cing, everyone messed with the rules, and those whose messed with them
were rewarded. If you abided by the rules, you burned your own fingers.
Her husband nodded, adding:
Well, some rules are incomprehensible and you have to run a firm. Look, if
you have huge quotas and you will get the same number of days-at-sea as
firms with half your quotas, that cannot be right, can it? They will have to
land their catch illegally. […] If the fisheries were entirely ‘clean’, in the
sense that everyone could be certain about what he could catch, the fisher-
men would not have a problem with that. You should be absolutely sure
that the fish is not snatched away illegally. That’s the whole point: You can
never be sure!
The differences of opinion and the differences between words and actions
– some owner-operators said they opposed illegal fishing but in fact in-
dulged in it – had an impact on the mutual relationships between local
fishermen. Tensions rose, and this was also felt in the wider community.
The skipper-owner’s wife quoted above explained that even in church this
was the case:
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If there are certain fishermen who get rid of their fish, and they are on the
Church Council, this will breed ill feeling. Every year we have a thanksgiv-
ing for the harvest, a shared meal of bread and fried fish. This year, my
daughter did not want to go. She said: ‘They can eat their own fish.’ They
sit up front in the church, but still get rid of fish.
The vast majority of my interlocutors deemed capping engine power an
example of a sound measure. ‘Without it, we would certainly have ousted
each other from the fishing industry,’ an owner-operator voiced the domi-
nant opinion, adding:
Fishermen are ambivalent about state intervention. They always think
about their short-term self-interest, not the long-term general fishing-in-
dustry interest. There’s a change of mentality now. Most Texel skipper-own-
ers have invested in landing rights. Currently, if there’s an early closure in
sole fishing, they’ll say: ‘They [that is, others] have caught our quota.’ But
that’s nonsense. Texelians also have messed with the rules; I won’t close
my eyes to that.
These views are indicative of a fundamental ambiguity. The Texel fisher-
men deemed regulations necessary, but they would not abide by them un-
less the state systematically monitored and enforced them. Despite this
stance, the older ones nostalgically recalled the days of ‘much liberty and
few rules’. They were of the opinion that the tighter measures and enforce-
ment stifled their autonomy. A few examples I obtained during my first
stint of fieldwork illustrate this.
In the shed where he is mending his nets, an Oosterend beam-trawl
fisherman (born in 1946) contemplates the transformations in the fishing
industry. ‘It used to be a fine occupation, an excellent occupation... It still
is, but with all the rules and regulations it has become less and less attrac-
tive.’ He cherishes memories of the days when fishermen could still freely
roam the North Sea in pursuit of prey. Although he is only forty-four years
old, he rarely joins the crew of the beam trawler he co-owns. He prefers
operating as a ‘shore skipper’, arranging all sorts of businesses for the fa-
mily firm while staying ashore. Recently, his twenty-two-year-old son be-
came the other part-owner and skipper. ‘These young lads know how to
deal with the tension of inspections,’ he says. ‘They have grown up with
them, whereas we were used to freedom, and then one day we suddenly
were confronted with all sorts of regulations and inspections.’ He explains
that he had a bad time learning to deal with officialdom and tightened
enforcement:
Some time after the introduction of quotas I had a nervous breakdown.
After every week at sea I needed a week to recuperate. I couldn’t stand the
inspection officers. When you are dead tired returning from a week’s trip at
sea and they are awaiting you ashore, you get pretty fucked up. Don’t forget
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that if you haul the nets for the last time at, say, one o’clock Friday morning,
it is still hours of work before you’re back in port. You’re completely knack-
ered and then a guy like that comes aboard. Regardless of whether he fines
you or not, he will receive his pay-check anyway.
With a tinge of embarrassment, he continues:
We were in port once and while I was busy repairing a burst pipe in the
engine room, an inspection officer shows up saying: ‘Skipper, I will have to
fine you.’ I was half tucked under the pipe with a huge pipe wrench in my
hand and I got so angry that I nearly bashed his head in. I’ve never seen
anyone get away so quickly! Of course, that was completely wrong and in
hindsight I became aware of this. ... I apologized to the man later on, but I
also told him that he shouldn’t have come into the engine room just like
that. ... I just couldn’t stand it anymore and I stayed home on sick leave for
some time.
With the state attempting to wield its authority, Texel fishermen felt that
inspectors encroached on what they regarded as their private space. To
fishermen, a vessel is not merely a material object; it is a piece of equip-
ment that they perceive as having special characteristics and vagaries, a
body and a soul. In other words, boats are saturated with symbolic mean-
ing. Fishermen can wax lyrical about the qualities and aesthetics of their
vessels and develop an emotional bond with their cutters. They depend on
their boats for their survival, and many have encountered situations in
which this was unequivocally brought home to them. In many fisherfolk
homes, paintings and photographs of vessels that have been or still are
family property decorate the walls. These vessel genealogies often take as
prominent a place as family photographs, and show the analogous impor-
tance of age. Owners in particular connect their own life history with
launches of new boats and they remember all the important events in the
vessel’s span of life: when a new engine was installed, when major altera-
tions were made, when and where bumper catches were taken, who were
the crew at particular points in time and so on. Many owners give their
vessels names referring to their wife, father or mother, a grandfather or
grandmother, a brother or a sister, a daughter or a son. The tradition re-
flects the significance of family ties in fishing identities. The photo shoots
of the various stages of the construction of a new boat resembles that of a
wedding. There is a baptizing and a naming ceremony for a new vessel,
and a minister or a priest says a prayer for the well-being of boat and crew
and usually donates a ship’s bible. On its maiden voyage, there is a rite of
passage when the exchanging of the shipyard’s flag with the owner’s
marks the official transition into new hands. A new cutter arrives in a
blaze of glory and its inauguration is celebrated with a party on board.
Scores of people are invited to admire all the boat’s qualities and to wish
‘her’ and her owners well. A family member or a long-time crewman ad-
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dresses the owner(s), usually going into the family firm’s history and stres-
sing the importance of its continuity. Afterwards, there will often be a lav-
ish dinner for invitees. The local newspaper extensively covers the festive
event, presents a detailed description of the boat’s qualities and publishes
several photographs. Many fishermen – owner-operators and crew – take
profound pride in their vessel and experience her as an extension of them-
selves. Boats are a referent of social status and self-respect and a dominant
symbol of identity. The accommodation and the bridge are carpeted and
fishermen only enter these domains on stocking-feet to keep things neat
and clean. That is the reason why the uninvited boarding of a vessel by
strangers can lead to outrage: it is experienced as an intrusion of the pri-
vate – deeply symbolic – domain and even the self. It partly explains why
inspection officers were usually not really welcome aboard.
Inspectors are renowned for their nit-picking of insignificant infringe-
ments. Such actions have a psychologically stressful effect on fishermen,
especially if they perceive hefty fines to be unfair. For instance, the beam-
trawl fishermen resent the subjective nature of measuring the mesh size
with hand-held wedges. Depending on the inspector, more or less force
can be used to push the wedge into the mesh and this may lead to sizes
either being deemed correct or too small. The stricter regime does indeed
have an emotional impact upon most fishermen, particularly the older
ones. The owner of one of Texel’s most powerful beam trawlers, a man
from Oudeschild, born in 1940, contends:
When the quota regime was implemented, and enforcement got tighter, we
had a tough time. Sometimes I didn’t go to the harbour for weeks. People
my age couldn’t handle it. I don’t like having to mess with the regulations.
When we had caught too much fish I would almost pee my pants upon
arriving at the fish auction. Those young guys don’t give a damn though.
They have no problem with landing sole or cod illegally; they have grown up
with it. It’s not right, though. It makes me nervous just thinking about it.
When conducting fieldwork in 1990, I frequently heard such lamentations
from the generation of skipper-owners who had had first-hand experience
of the introduction of quotas, the burgeoning national and supranational
regulations of the fishing industry, and the increasingly strict enforcement
of rules and laws. In this connection, they often refer to ‘before’ and ‘after’
and this perceived watershed colours their occupational world. They com-
plain that ‘the heydays are over’. Younger skipper-owners and deckhands
do not perceive such a watershed. Despite tight regulatory regimes and
policing, they appreciate their métier, even though the measures have had
a strong impact on the daily lives of fisherfolk and fishing communities.
The regime change has also put a mental strain on family life, as the sixty-
year-old wife of an owner-operator who had recently sold his cutter makes
clear:
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Just before he [her husband] sold the firm, I told him: ‘If you go on with
this mess, I’ll leave you.’ I mean, you get to a stage in your life that you can
no longer handle it mentally. I mean, all the fuss and bother and situations,
you just can’t cope. It backfires on the family. Although I have never done
the administration and things like that, I have always felt committed to the
firm. But at a certain moment I thought as far as I’m concerned you just
blow up. I hated it at some stage, that’s the point it had got to. The continual
moaning on this or that new measure… Occasionally, I talk to fishermen’s
wives and listening to them I think to myself, I’m so glad I got rid of all
that, honestly. They return home and they are all nerves and misery.
Leaving aside the more general problems fishermen have with regulations
and their enforcement, these interview fragments point to the following.
Firstly, there would seem to be a difference between the older and younger
generation with respect to non-compliance and ‘cheating’. The younger
generation of fishermen is supposedly less nervous about it than their old-
er counterparts. The tensions and mental strains also affect family life.
Young fishermen began going to sea when quota regimes were already
firmly in place and so they are used to having to deal with them. Conse-
quently, they do not continually compare the ‘present situation’ with the
‘era of unlimited freedom’. The second point concerns the perception that
the work aboard is extremely tough and tiring. Beam-trawl fishermen are
at sea for four or five consecutive days, and they work continual shifts of
for example two hours on, one hour off. The work rhythm is determined
by the nets’ shooting and hauling and the gutting of the fish. In between
there is time for coffee and a nap, but once the bell rings to signal that the
gear will be hauled again, the fishermen have to be on deck in minutes.
The only ‘breaks’ from this monotonous and exhausting routine are the
meals. Fatigue makes it difficult to strike the right tone when dealing with
officials. Thirdly, owner-operators often retire at an early age; they still have
an income from the ship’s share. It is not unusual for them to become
‘shore skippers’ when they are still in their forties. Their role is to manage
the firm from ashore, and only when the need arises to occasionally ac-
company the crew. Although they like the occupation, they also perceive it
as vigorous. Fourthly, there is the pride skipper-owners take in their vessel,
a pride that appears to be put down by the growing criticism fishermen
meet. As independent entrepreneurs they have attempted to continually
modernize their firm, and for a long time the Dutch state and the Euro-
pean Community supported them in doing so. Currently, however, many
people find fault with their behaviour. Lastly, it is clear that ‘outsiders’ who
interfere with the fishing industry –including inspection officers, regula-
tors and biologists – are viewed quite critically. Fishermen regard them as
people who meddle with their business without running any risk for their
own livelihoods, while fishermen themselves bear all the risks of their en-
trepreneurship and are relentless when it comes to the hours and the en-
ergy they put into their work. ‘Civil servants,’ says one vessel owner, ‘try to
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make your life miserable, but they earn a living whatever they do. We have
to make sure everything is running smoothly and that we take care of our
family’. On the other hand, many fishermen think that the officials’ men-
tality as ‘wage labourers’ gives them an advantage. ‘Those Inspection Ser-
vice lads work office hours, but at night they are in bed with their spouse.
So you have to land your fish when they are sound asleep.’ Fishermen thus
resist the stifling of their perceived independence, which – in their self-
image – is one of the occupation’s core values. They have the feeling of
being boxed in from all sides and losing their autonomy in decision mak-
ing. Still, there is more to it than a straightforward integration conflict of
resistance to encapsulation. Some rules and regulations they find at best
simply silly and at worst perverse. It goes against the grain for each and
every fisherman to return prime fish they have caught to the sea, particu-
larly if they cannot survive, as is the case with cod. It is in flat contradiction
to common-sense behaviour. Just abiding by administrative orders that
lack legitimacy and lead to wasteful practices seems to make little sense.
The resentment towards onshore technocracy also extends to scientists.
Although not all fishermen oppose catching effort limitations, many are
aggravated by the fluctuations in the biologists’ ‘guesstimates’ and the
usually short notice on which quota measures for the upcoming year are
published (see also Chapter 6). Fishermen deem the biologists’ advice to
be politically coloured. Their mutual relationships have the additional di-
mension of battles over competence. Fishermen say that the biologists al-
ways carry out research in fixed spots and do not listen to the fishermen’s
opinions, whereas the former follow the fish or switch positions if catches
are low. They often have a clue or a hunch where the fish might be. On the
quayside, one of them points out that the fishing industry has to cope with
more and more highly educated managers, who know nothing about the
fisheries, earn high salaries but do more harm than good to the fishing
industry. What is at stake here is a feeling of self-esteem and an awareness
of the value of the fishermen’s own knowledge and expertise concerning
fishing and the seascape. The gist of opinions is that biologists may have a
university degree, but they should not think that their theoretical knowl-
edge is more valuable than the fishermen’s practical knowledge. Fisher-
men are out at sea most of the week and work around the clock. They live
and breathe fishing and consider themselves to be experts par excellence
in fishing matters. It is precisely in the domain of knowledge and expertise
that some of the occupation’s core values are situated. To understand the
fishermen’s responses to the state’s tightened enforcement of manage-
ment regimes, it is necessary to dwell a bit longer on the way fishermen
perceive their occupation. Fishing is not a nine-to-five job, but permeates
all aspects of life. It is as much a way of life as it is a way of making a
living. It is an existential matter, an important marker of identity and a
cherished lifestyle to be continued by successors. This goes especially for
skipper-owners. In the following section, I will deal with success, competi-
tion, communication strategies and the changing views concerning pres-
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tige and reputation. The perceptions and the concomitant modes of beha-
viour in these domains can tell us a lot about what makes fishermen tick
and why they appear to be such ardent opponents of regulations and re-
strictions or –more accurately – failed enforcement.
Pursuing the Big Haul: Rivalry, Reputation and Respect
The feeling that they are able to operate independently is an important
aspect of the fishermen’s mental world. For a long time this outlook on
life has been accompanied by rivalry. Fishing used to be – and to some
extent still is – highly competitive. ‘Beating the others’ is part of the fishing
game. Successful fishermen enjoyed tremendous prestige among fisher-
folk and in their communities. Skippers and crews judged and ranked
each other on the basis of their ability to land as much fish as possible.
They paid close attention to the latest innovations in boats and gear that
would give them an edge over their rivals. The number of boxes filled with
prime species of fish a skipper could put ashore was not merely a measure
of his economic success, but also of his self-esteem and prestige. It earned
him social recognition. In this respect, in the first instance kilos, not reve-
nues, seemed to count. ‘My father used to say: I fish to catch fish, not to
earn money,’ an owner-operator (born in 1963) told me. However, with the
limitation of landing rights and stronger enforcement, fishermen lost the
liberty to land as much as they could. They have had to learn how to con-
trol their penchant for competitive rivalry. If a skipper has long been eval-
uated on the size of his catch, this no longer applies, much to the disap-
pointment of the fishermen themselves. Nonetheless, it still is prestigious
to be the week’s ‘top grosser’ (topbesommer) and fishermen – skippers and
crews alike – always compare how they have performed by the end of the
fishing week. They say that ‘there are fishermen and there are catchers’.
Some fishermen consistently land more fish than others and there is fierce
competition as to who will be the ‘catch king’. However, catches fluctuate
from week to week, on occasion quite sharply.
In my interviews with Texel fishermen, the fact that one wants to catch
more than ‘the neighbours’ was often alluded to. ‘If they [the other local
skippers] envy you, you’re doing fine,’ according to an owner-operator. A
colleague maintains: ‘At sea we begrudge each other everything.’ Within
the local fishing fleet, the fishermen keep a sharp eye on each other. A
former owner-operator explains: ‘At sea, there’s competition. You’re rivals
there, because a fisherman is a hunter. When you land your fish and there
are plenty of boxes at the quayside, you’re proud. When the catch has been
bad, you have a lousy weekend.’ A locally renowned skipper, born in 1922,
intimates: ‘When you’re in the auction with half of what your neighbour
lands, it just cannot be. You’re so ashamed; you feel you could sink into the
ground.’ Many Texel fishermen have told me about how important it is to
them to outdo their colleagues-cum-competitors. They regard their fishing
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prowess as ‘a matter of honour’, a phrase I heard used time and again in
this context. In this sense, there is definitely a local fishing arena. Even – or
perhaps particularly – between co-owning brothers who each skipper their
own boat, there is competition as to who will land the bigger catch by the
end of the fishing trip. The occupation’s competitive nature is important
for the fishermen’s appreciation of the job but also leads to envy. Success is
in short supply, as by its very nature it is always measured in relative
terms. Catches and incomes may be satisfactory or even good, but this is
not what counts in the social ranking of skippers and crews. The vast ma-
jority of the Texel fishermen are convinced that success is linked to crafts-
manship and dexterity not fortune. ‘Sure, you have to be lucky, but you
can’t always be fortunate, so skill and expertise are primary. On the other
hand, as they say “without luck no one fares well”,’ says an owner-operator,
born in 1941. While many anthropologists report that among fishermen
across the world luck is an important emic concept to explain differential
success, this is certainly not so on Texel, although most local skippers ac-
knowledge that chance is a contributing factor.3 All of them have experi-
enced weeks in which catchability proved to be poor, but a single ‘lucky
haul’ could partly make up for this.
Occupational communities of fishermen are commonly characterized
by fierce rivalry and competition between skipper-crew units and, at the
same time, cooperation, loyalty and egalitarianism. For social and moral
reasons, fishermen must strike a balance between these seemingly op-
posed stances.4 They might be viewed as reluctant rivals or cooperating
competitors. The key issue is that there are conflicting incentives between
the social and the individual. As an individual, no one can accumulate suf-
ficient knowledge to capture the quantities of fish that are potentially avail-
able. Sharing information is necessary, but this social characteristic con-
flicts with the individual interest of catching fish (Wilson 1990). So let us
explore how Texel fishermen attempt to solve this dilemma. Communica-
tion with others is a continual game of poker. All skippers have their famil-
iar and favourite fishing grounds that they will attempt to keep secret. It is
only with certain categories of colleagues that they share information con-
cerning catches and niches where there is plenty of fish. These categories
usually include people from local communities and especially kinsfolk and
friends. To some extent, the time-honoured differences between Oude-
schild and Oosterend surface in the small networks of cooperation,
although these often also coincide with kin networks, making it difficult to
determine which one is the more decisive factor. ‘We always cooperate in
small clubs, swapping data. You assist each other and it works out fine,’
says a skipper-owner, born in 1941. Some agree on certain secret codes
that indicate how one is doing. Exchanging knowledge about prime fishing
locations is strictly based on reciprocity. Those who do so scramble the
channel to avoid others from listening in. Even in this case, however, the
information that is volunteered is often limited and not entirely accurate.
For example, only the approximate not the exact position of good catches
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will be given and a difference of half a mile can make a substantial differ-
ence in yields. Alternatively, one can volunteer information only towards
the end of the week or underestimate catches to some extent. When join-
ing a crew for a week, I was able to observe these communication strate-
gies. The radio was on all the time and I could hear voices utter incompre-
hensible phrases when news was exchanged with ‘friendly’ skippers. There
was also the continual squeaking of scramblers when cutter skippers who
were fishing nearby exchanged information. When ‘Biem’ called the skip-
per of our boat, one of the deckhands intimated that as a partner the man
was useless. ‘He lies and cheats. He wants you to think that he’s caught
zero fish, but come Friday he’ll still land a nice number of boxes.’ Knowl-
edge of micro-niches is precious cognitive capital that is exchanged only as
part of a tit-for-tat strategy. Temporarily monopolizing a niche may give
important benefits by the end of the week. Often, a few good hauls deter-
mine above-average landings. Hence the tendency to claim rich fishing
positions for oneself and to be reluctant to share the information (see also
Byron 1975:152 153). With improved communication, the potential to ex-
change information has increased, yet owner-operators want to make sure
that it is restricted to those who reciprocate. A virtual ‘arms race’ has there-
fore been going on ‘in means to keep confidential information secret and
means to get access to it’ (Banks et al. 2001:43).
In general, fishermen regret the fact that today competition is fiercer
than previously, in their perception at least. Perhaps somewhat nostalgi-
cally, they recall that in ‘the old days’ there used to be more cooperation
and relations were more amicable. With scramblers distorting communi-
cation, they are of the opinion that something of the traditional congenial-
ity has been lost. At the same time, however, they all use scramblers and
deem it necessary to participate in this competitive game. To a consider-
able extent, they exaggerate about the willingness to cooperate and ex-
change information in the past. With the limited electronic means to com-
municate and the scant opportunities for others to listen in, it may seem to
them that earlier on distortion of information was lacking. However, in
actual fact this was certainly not the case. A skipper-owner, born in 1915,
vividly remembered that competition was perhaps even fiercer in the days
of sail: ‘When the weather was foul you always waited until someone dared
to go. When someone did, all the others with some guts followed suit. If
you didn’t participate in that game, you were always at the bottom end.’ It
is not just secrecy concerning good catches that is part and parcel of com-
petition: deceit can also be involved. Therefore, fishermen have to learn to
interpret other fishermen’s behaviour and this skill even has to become a
second nature. It involves knowing where other boats are fishing and for
how long, whose distorted voices you hear on the radio, whether a skipper
is prone to underreport or exaggerate catches, where a vessel was before its
lights were switched off, what pattern of tracks other beamers are trawling
according to the radar. It is a habitus that fishermen cannot learn at Fishery
School; they can only acquire it through everyday action and years and
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years of experience (see also Pálsson and Helgason 1998). This also goes
for deckhands, who are in the bridge as watchmen. Strict boat solidarity is
required of them in that they are expected not to leak precious catch infor-
mation to other crews.
Not all specific types of fishery are equally competitive. With herring
being a migratory species that travels in shoals, there are advantages in
closely communicating and cooperating with each other during specific
stages of the hunt. Although skippers may have a hunch where the herring
might be, they can never be certain about this. Consequently, they have to
search the North Sea in pursuit of prey. Foraging until they strike upon a
school of herring costs time and energy. To save on these expenses, it pays
to cooperate closely. Once a skipper hits upon a good herring shoal, he and
his partner-skipper will shoot the pair trawl. If the catch is rewarding, he
will immediately inform other pair-trawl skippers. By the time they arrive
at this particular position, the first-comers will have caught their share. It
usually takes only a few short tows to fill up the fish holds of two cutters.
The skippers then have to market the catch. Since the herring will be else-
where by the time they return to the fishing grounds, monopolizing the
information is of no use whatsoever. In addition, the fishermen have
struck an agreement with processing firms about prices and maximum
weekly landings (see above). In the herring-fishing season, skippers will
therefore refrain from scrambling their radios and keep each other in-
formed about prime catches. This conduct is based on an ethic of recipro-
city. This does not mean that secrecy and deceit are lacking: quite the con-
trary. In herring pair trawl fishing, too, information-sharing and
cooperation are restricted to certain clubs, there are leaders and followers,
and landing a bumper catch in as short a time as possible is considered an
honour. Most skippers thoroughly enjoy the ‘herring hunt’ thrill. One of
them leaves skippering in the beam-trawl fishery entirely to his son, but
always assumes responsibility in the wheelhouse during the three-month
herring season. However, following the herring ban (1977-1982), the num-
ber of Dutch skipper-owners who combine beam trawling and pair trawl-
ing for herring is small – most of them hailing from Texel – and this facil-
itates close communication and cooperation. To keep relationships in good
repair, the Texel skippers who partner in pair trawling usually also ex-
change information in beam-trawl fishing.
To be at the top of the skippers’ hierarchy demands a considerable
amount of nerve, stamina, skill and knowledge. This was particularly true
in the era when sophisticated navigation and fish-finding equipment was
lacking. For example, several skippers pointed out that the navigational aid
Decca was highly unreliable at night: ‘If you knew exactly where you were,
you could sometimes have fabulous catches without others being able to
trace you,’ related one of them. ‘Today, with GPS [Global Positioning Sys-
tem], you just tell the watchman what track to trawl and you can go off to
your bunk to sleep. Back then, you would hardly leave the wheelhouse. I
had trouble handing over the responsibility.’Although state-of-the-art tech-
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nology is important, it still requires more than electronic devices to find
the fish. Being able to ‘read’ and understand ‘natural signs’ continues to
be of great significance. Skippers of beam trawlers are continually building
up their expertise. Fishing patterns comprise alternating exploration and
exploitation stages, and foraging decisions involve tradeoffs between per-
ceived costs and benefits (Rijnsdorp et al. 2000a). On the basis of their
previous experiences, expectations and hunches, skippers have to decide
where and how they will trawl to have a rich catch and minimize the risk
of damages to nets and vessel. Their decisions depend on the behaviour of
other fishermen, the crew’s commitment, the location of shipping lanes,
the occurrence of physical obstacles such as wrecks, oil rigs and cables, the
sediment’s contours and the seabed’s suitability for beam trawling, and, of
course, the target species’ abundance. Once they have located a concentra-
tion of fish, skippers will intensively trawl such a niche. They attempt to
stay close to previous fishing positions, but also try to avoid fishing exactly
the same position (see also Piet et al. 2000). With modern navigation
equipment such as track plotters and autopilot, the skippers will tow the
gear on ‘a line’ (that is, a track) for, say, two hours, then haul, stop, turn,
shoot and trawl a parallel line in the reverse direction at a small distance,
repeating the operation several times in succession. This way, they often
cover a patch of a few square nautical miles. When the catch rate decreases
significantly, the skipper will return to the search mode or steam to other,
more remote fishing grounds where he expects to find sole or plaice. How-
ever, steaming requires the gears to be brought aboard and means fishing
time is lost, while fuel costs continue to be added to the exploitation bill.
Therefore, skippers usually avoid criss-cross courses and going to and fro.
Whereas some skippers would be content to ‘haul, shoot and scrape’ the
entire week for average gross revenues, others are less quickly satisfied. ‘I
would sometimes continue fishing on a Saturday,’ says a high-lining skip-
per, born in 1959. ‘It might lead to tensions with the crew, but you try to
catch as much as possible.’ A retired owner-operator, born in 1928, con-
tends that pluck is important:
There are certain locations where you can expect a rich catch. When you
fish there, you should not be afraid of occasionally losing a net. You have to
learn by bitter experience. Now Willem and Pieter know how to do it, but
Aris (Pieter’s brother) doesn’t.5 ... If you’re a good skipper, you dare to go to
places that other skippers tend to avoid.
Nerve in itself is not enough. Some skippers go out by themselves a lot,
fish near wrecks or in places others circumvent, but they are prone to dam-
age. Building up a fund of knowledge, skill and experience and developing
proficiency as a skipper are costly investments in time and money. A re-
puted skipper-owner (‘Willem’ in the quote above) intimated that when he
began skippering in his early twenties, the gears sometimes got carried
away because he took risks in positions he was unfamiliar with. The crew
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became disgruntled. Through sheer trial-and-error and being perseverant,
he eventually succeeded in collecting information that enabled him to fish
in risky environments and gross more than most of his competitors, ulti-
mately to the crew’s satisfaction. ‘I just mademy reckonings [bestekken],’ he
said, adding: ‘I’ve had colossal gross revenues, but have also had empty
fuel tanks and hardly any fish in the hold.’ Such risk-taking to seek a bum-
per catch is certainly not every skipper’s choice, given its low probability.
Many opt to be on the safe side and go for the higher probability of a rea-
sonable catch in particular spots (see also Pálsson and Durrenberger
1982). At the same time, they attempt to avoid the shame of landing the
least fish. The crewmen usually respect the skipper’s decisions, but if
catches are poor he has to bear the brunt of their overt or covert criticism.
In their eyes, the skipper is a somewhat ambiguous persona who can make
or break their week. ‘We will be the asses again this week,’ said a deckhand
in my presence, while throwing an angry look at the wheelhouse. Catches
were initially poor during that particular fishing trip. However, if things go
well, it is also the skipper on whom crewmembers bestow respect and
symbolic power. All of them prefer a berth aboard a vessel skippered by a
high-liner, although social chemistry is also extremely important. Serving
under a successful but grumpy skipper would certainly not be everybody’s
choice. In general, success tends to be self-reinforcing. Outstanding skip-
pers can afford bigger and better boats with more powerful engines, have
easier access to bank loans based on their past performance, and are able
to recruit the most experienced, dexterous and skilled deckhands. Since
the outcome of fishing depends to a large extent on teamwork, this social
nature of production probably contributes as importantly to success as do
the material factors of production.6
Working one’s way up in the pecking order is not easy. Following a suc-
cessful skipper may be a strategy, but not a strategy that always works out
well. Low proceeds and considerable costs because of damaged nets and
lost fishing time is disappointing in itself, but in addition a skipper who is
‘stalking’ is not highly respected. Successful skippers will attempt to shake
off such stalkers. A skipper’s knowledge of the fishing grounds and the
behaviour of fish and other fishermen is insufficient to be ranked a profi-
cient skipper. Knowledge of markets and market prices is also important.
Skippers have to decide where and when to land their catch and these
usually hunch-based decisions can make for considerable differences. Still,
it is their comprehension of the marine ecosystem and the behaviour of
fish that is valued most. In the course of his career, a skipper accumulates
a wealth of knowledge concerning specific fishing areas. In a trial-and-er-
ror process, he develops a cognitive map of good fishing locations, the
results of hauls in particular seasons and under particular conditions, the
position of wrecks and treacherous rocks, currents, depths, breeding hab-
its and migration patterns of fish, the behaviour of other fishermen and so
on. Therefore, skippers treasure their personal logbooks and private sea-
charts, which contain a detailed record of the outcomes of their strata-
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gems. In order to prevent others from acquiring this knowledge all too
easily, these logbooks are kept in safe-deposits. The skipper’s job is de-
manding. They have extremely long working hours, both because other
crewmembers are not sufficiently competent to judge the continual flow
of information, and because nearly every skipper has to obtain the infor-
mation on which his own catch depends (see also van der Vlist 1970:102).
Indeed, some skippers hardly leave the wheelhouse, save for inspecting
what a tow has yielded. ‘When others were in their bunks, I would always
have a look at what was in the nets,’ comments a retired skipper. The size
of the fish, the kind of by-catches and ‘trash’ provides experienced skippers
with valuable information. Through years and years of building up know-
how and experience, skippers get to know certain fishing locations like the
backs of their hands. However, it is difficult to monopolize knowledge for
great lengths of time. Eventually, others get to know about these locations.
Secrecy tends to be short-lived because such information will eventually
percolate through social networks. Clubs are small, but their boundaries
are permeable and sooner or later information will ‘leak out’. It is therefore
important to join social occasions such as birthday parties, weddings,
meetings and quayside gatherings in order to keep up to date. Conversa-
tions often focus on fishing and news is exchanged about the behaviour of
other fishermen, good fishing locations, new electronic instruments, parti-
cular gear devices, and so on.
As a consequence of the increasingly tight regulation of the fishing in-
dustry, the quota regimes, and the stricter supervision of compliance with
the rules, the fishermen’s view of differential success has changed to a
considerable extent. The perception concerning who deserves respect
changes with alternating modes of production (Pálsson 1991:163). It is no
longer landing the most boxes of fish that necessarily leads to respect.
‘When fishing was free, there was a healthy rivalry, but today the dominant
question is: “How did they get the fish?”’, a skipper-owner indicates. A
colleague adds: ‘Who is messing around? That’s the issue now. There’s no
longer a yardstick to measure who are the good skippers and crews.’ Dur-
ing my first spell of fieldwork on Texel, relationships among fishermen
were growing increasingly tense as a consequence of differences of opin-
ion regarding compliance with the law and suspicions that certain fisher-
men still evaded or violated particular rules. Such violations included, for
example, illegal fishing within the 12 nm zone; registering and operating
vessels as Euro-cutters while in fact their engine power exceeded the re-
quired limit; using nets with too small mesh sizes or using blinders; mes-
sing with landing rights through sales in the grey circuit; and keeping part
of the landings out of the books by selling them on the ‘black’ market.
During a fishermen meeting I attended, one fisherman angrily accused
others of fishing within the 12 nm zone when it had been agreed at the
local level not to do so. The mutual mistrust increased as a consequence
of the tighter management regime. An accusing finger was no longer
pointed exclusively in the direction of fishermen from other communities
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– as used to be the case – but also in the direction of Texel compatriots.
Those who admitted to using illegal gear provisions said they did so be-
cause others also did. The problem was aggravated because one could not
even be sure that local fishermen refrained from using blinders, let alone
fishermen from other Dutch fishing ports and other European countries.
At the same time, I was able to observe the changing mood regarding
the regulatory regime. In early 1990, many Texel fishermen still defended
and legitimized illegal practices by saying that the plethora of management
measures stifled their operations, while sole and plaice were believed to be
so abundant that they ‘practically jumped on deck’ and ‘shouldn’t die from
old age’, as a sturdy young skipper-owner phrased it. Relationships among
fishermen became increasingly tense as a consequence of differences of
opinion concerning compliance with the law and suspicions that some
fishermen still evaded or violated certain rules. One of the recurring dis-
cussions pertained to the illegal use of blinders. Some skipper-owners ad-
vocated the view that ‘we ought to get rid of those things’, while others
maintained that they could not do without them because too many legal-
sized soles would escape their nets, especially in rough weather. By the end
of the year, the dominant opinion was that restrictions were necessary and
should be complied with (which obviously does not mean that all fisher-
men actually complied with all rules and regulations). Another hotly de-
bated topic was linking days-at-sea allocations to quota rights and horse-
power. Since most Texel skipper-owners had been investing in acquiring
additional landing entitlements, the majority was much in favour of such
a measure. They believed that it could effectively tackle the problem of
quota overshooting by those fishermen who had insufficient landing
rights to be at sea throughout the year. However, Minister Braks perceived
no advantages in linking days-at-sea with individual quotas, and his suc-
cessor left the issue to rest because he was brooding on something entirely
different. As we shall see in the next chapter, a profound change of affairs
would have a soothing influence on the Texel and Dutch fishing indus-
tries.
Vexing Problems, Daunting Tasks
The developments described above have thoroughly transformed the mé-
tier of Texel and other Dutch beam-trawl fishermen. Since 1975 they have
been restricted in their operations more and more through national and
supranational input and output regulations that came about in a rather
piecemeal manner. The fishermen felt increasingly suffocated by burgeon-
ing rules and regulations about which they had not been consulted and
upon which they had little or no influence. Believing that the extant na-
tional fishermen’s organization was too lukewarm to oppose the fisheries
authorities’ measures, factional strife resulted in fission in the Fisher-
men’s Union. The newly established Federation was more militant but ac-
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complished little in terms of redressing the regulatory regime. On the con-
trary, the fishermen got entangled in ever more red tape. This is not excep-
tional. Throughout the western world fisheries management is usually
characterized by top-down modes of policy design and implementation
that involve centralized, hierarchical, command-and-control decision mak-
ing and monitoring to make up for market imperfections and ecological
problems (Symes 1997a, 1997b; Dubbink and van Vliet 1996, 1997). The
Common Fisheries Policy is a prime example: measures affecting the fish-
ing industry are determined in Brussels with little or no involvement of
fishermen and their organizations. Such top-down policymaking often
leads to poor transparency and high information, monitoring and enforce-
ment costs, as well as exasperation and a lack of legitimacy and compliance
on the part of fishermen (McCay 1995:16). With burgeoning rules, man-
agement turns increasingly complex but less effective because the quality
of information available to regulators deteriorates while at the same time
reducing the fishermen’s incentive to abide by the rules and providing
them with a rationalization for violations (see also Healy and Hennessey
1998:116-117). State intervention under the European fisheries regime,
writes Symes, ‘has left fishermen confused, alienated and embittered’
(2000: n.p.). All this is evident in the Dutch flatfish fishing sector, but
other European fishermen have also had to cope with this. The fishing
industries in each member state attempted to deal with the difficulties in
their own particular ways.
The Netherlands was among the first countries to implement individual
transferable quotas. This happened de jure in 1985, although de facto the
practice of trading individual flatfish quotas developed in the late 1970s,
quite soon after the establishment of total allowable catches and quota re-
gimes. Neoclassical economists generally advocate such a regime as a po-
tentially effective and efficient mode of managing fisheries. Expansive
firms can acquire fishing allowances from marginal firms that are even-
tually ousted from the fisheries arena. Secure property rights are supposed
to increase efficiency, and to make (self)-enforcement easier and less ex-
pensive. Theoretically, the system has important economic, administrative
and ecological benefits. In practice several adverse consequences have
been observed. Firstly, quota busting and cheating still occur if monitoring
and enforcement are suboptimal, requiring large public expenditures to
coerce fishermen into compliance. Secondly, the system leads to irrespon-
sible fishing practices (high-grading, discarding) for purposes of maximiz-
ing the economic value of entitlements. Thirdly, the ‘race to fish’ continues
unabated if landing rights are insecure and national quotas are prema-
turely exhausted. Fourthly, productive capacity is consolidated or even ex-
panded. Fifthly, the inducement to provide information – a public good –
remains weak because there is an incentive to free-ride and underreport.
Lastly, the commodification of quotas does not simplify the administrative
regime (see Davis 1996; Grafton 1996; Shotton 2000). All of these unfore-
seen and undesired outcomes have been evident in the Dutch flatfish fish-
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ing industry. In the real world of multi-species fisheries, the ideal-typical
maximizer apparently behaves less rationally than predicted.
Furthermore, sociologists and anthropologists point to equity problems
and the social costs of introducing property-rights regimes.7 The initial
allocation usually amounts to a giveaway of public resources, privileging
the generation of fishermen who receive allowances to a certain percen-
tage of total allowable catches free of charge over future generations who
have to pay for them. If based on historical rights (‘grandfathering’), it re-
wards operators who took disproportionate shares of the fish stocks and
thus contributed most to overexploitation (which is generally the reason
for the implementation of quotas). This windfall typically accrues to the
boat owner while co-venturing crewmen do not share. It thus brings about
a shift in the power balance between the rights-holding owner-operator or
company and the crew, widening the social distance between them, and it
may even result in capitalist relations of production if the share system of
remuneration is replaced by a system of flat wages. The assignment of
allowances creates further inequities in that it benefits some (the ‘haves’)
while disadvantaging or excluding others (the ‘have-nots’), for instance
part-time and seasonal fishermen. The system creates relations of depen-
dency in that some operators come to depend on large rights-holders –
including non-operating ‘slipper skippers’ (see the next chapter) – to lease
rights. It may also lead to the phenomenon of ‘agency capture’, in that
government agencies tend to serve the interests of the most tightly orga-
nized groups, with large rights-holders having the best opportunities and
resources to increase their bargaining power. The system virtually blocks
social mobility in that crewmen and newcomers have few opportunities to
acquire allowances and as capital is substituted for labour, it leads to di-
minishing employment in conditions in which crewmen are usually not
liable to receive redundancy payments. The accumulation of rights leads
to concentration, capitalization and industrialization. Rights are often ac-
cumulated in particular communities and the ‘rights drain’ makes for re-
gional concentration of entitlements that may be to the detriment of fish-
eries-dependent communities and areas. This in turn may thwart locally
important knowledge and skills and more generally a traditional culture of
fishing in families and communities. Once in place, the system is rigid,
consolidating vested interests, while it is difficult to revoke since property
rights are solid and the costs of reimbursing rights holders through buy-
back programmes would be prohibitive. Although neoclassical economists
are aware of some of the detrimental social effects (Grafton 1996:12-14),
they seem to accept them as regrettable but inevitable side effects of im-
provements in efficiency and economic rationalization.
The Dutch experience shows that following the introduction of individ-
ual transferable quotas and encompassing regulatory regimes, a mass of
problems prevailed. Despite being prime stakeholders, Dutch fishermen
felt twice removed from the policymaking and implementation process. It
came about in the Brussels and The Hague bureaucracies, with little or no
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grassroots involvement or consultation. The measures that were imposed
upon the national and local fishing industries often held little water with
the fishermen, while in turn their ideas, suggestions and solutions were
usually bluntly ignored by policymakers and regulators. The paternalistic
authorities firmly believed that they were acting on behalf of the fishing
industry, without so much as listening to, let alone involving, its practi-
tioners. Feeling disempowered, the fisherfolk took their own course of ac-
tion. Marginalized fishermen maintained that those who had accumulated
a large share of the landing rights had done so through initial illegal fish-
ing, investing the perks of their practices in additional quota entitlements.
Those who bought or leased quotas countered the accusation by saying
that they had the right kind of entrepreneurial and managerial spirit and
that it was those who did not have sufficient landing allowances who in-
dulged in illegal fishing. The problems pertaining to enforcement and
compliance led to huge transaction costs. The crux of the matter was that
rights proved to be extremely insecure and thus did not meet with an im-
portant precondition of the neoclassical economic school of thought. The
professed benefits require that rights are exclusive and durable and that
fishermen comply with the rules: ‘If fishers who are not quota-holders are
able to fish with impunity, the quota becomes valueless as a meaningful
property right’ (Grafton 1996:8). Regardless of individual entitlements, ex-
haustion of national quotas led to early closure of the fisheries. Individual
overshooting of entitlements consequently led to sanctions that impacted
the collective of fishermen, undermining their trust in external authorities,
since rights could not be exercised. Under these conditions, a derby race
for fish was encouraged rather than mitigated. Moreover, investment in
individual transferable quotas was expensive, while long-term certainty
was lacking because European and national fisheries policies might
change and quota cuts implied that entitlements diminished in absolute
quantities (although they could of course also increase).
Rather than as vehicles to enhance secure rights, Texel fishermen there-
fore perceived external authorities as a source of anxiety. Increasing state
intervention also stymied the fishermen’s freedom at sea and brought
about more paperwork, leading to less job satisfaction. In addition, ten-
sions mounted due to policing and enforcement and the public image of
fishermen deteriorated because their activities were seen as environmen-
tally damaging and they were perceived as notorious law-breakers and
reckless egotists, leading to a declining status of fishing as an occupation.
Furthermore, mutual mistrust and suspicions increased as bumper
catches were believed to be caught illegally. Catch kings turned into quota
barons, placing entrepreneurial skills higher than fishing skills and affect-
ing the system of prestige and status ranking. Crew loyalty declined, since
investments in quotas meant lower percentages in the share system of re-
muneration. This in turn led to a declining interest in becoming a fisher-
man, while at the same time it became more difficult to maintain family
firms. However, fishermen – owner-operators in particular – do not easily
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decide to leave the fishing industry. Their occupation is a way of life that
gives them an identity. They highly value continuity of family firms and all
of them have experienced good times as well as bad times, and they are
inclined to attempt to weather adverse times. In general, Texel fishermen
felt they had lost control over how to run their individual enterprises, but
they tried to muddle through. The quota regime undermined what they
regarded to be the backbone of share fishing: their labour ethos of working
hard to catch as much as possible. Initially, they continued to do so, but
with tightened policing and enforcement they often collided with law en-
forcers. The system of entitlements also undermined the culturally impor-
tant system of status ranking, since the yardstick to measure catch kings –
their ‘conspicuous productivity’ (Byron 1980:228) – was believed to be cor-
rupted by illegal behaviour. In short, the regulatory regime’s new realities
profoundly changed the traditional meaning of the fisherman’s métier.
Confrontation and litigation rather than consultation and compromise
were the dominant political processes in the Dutch fishing industry of the
1980s and early 1990s. With increasing regulation the number of viola-
tions rose, leading to more warrants, fines and court cases. Judges were
often lenient or deemed evidence of infringements of the law insufficient
and acquitted suspects. If not, fishermen’s lawyers often successfully ap-
pealed against District Court judgments in a Court of Appeal, the Supreme
Court or succeeded in having cases referred to the European Court of Jus-
tice for prejudicial questions. This stalling tactic gained the fishermen pre-
cious fishing time. In theory, the Common Fisheries Policy provided a
blueprint for fisheries management. In practice, a host of ad hoc measures
had to be taken as a consequence of stakeholder resistance and litigation.
The skipper-owners also filed law suits against the national fisheries Min-
istry – often successfully. The fishermen regarded the burgeoning bureau-
cracy a nuisance, and it did not lead to improving compliance. Quite on
the contrary: the more petty and equivocal rules and regulations, the great-
er the number of violations. Abiding by the law was difficult with imper-
fect, ambiguous and contradictory legislation, and rules deemed unwork-
able or unfair. Although the chances of being caught increased with tighter
monitoring and enforcement, many fishermen were inclined to continue
taking risks. First and foremost, their labour ethos of working hard to
achieve success was deeply ingrained. It constituted the backbone of ‘being
a fisherman’ and top-down rules that challenged its very foundations could
not change this overnight. As long as the benefits of flouting the rules out-
did the costs of penalties, the incentive to fish illegally remained high. In
addition, fishermen were still actively looking for loopholes. The state’s
legalistic approach proved to be counterproductive. Its reflex was to come
up with more instead of better and more acceptable regulations. The prob-
lem of rule beating seemed endemic. All in all, therefore, the Dutch fish-
eries bureaucrats and regulators faced vexing problems and daunting
tasks. They were squeezed between the national Parliament’s and the
European Commission’s demands and the prying eyes of European politi-
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cians and fisheries inspectors on the one hand, and the national flatfish
fishing industry’s resistance against and dodging of tighter management
regimes on the other. Having been reputed as law-abiding citizens for a
long time, fishermen seemed to have developed a penchant for civil dis-
obedience.
The stricter management of the fishing industry was not entirely with-
out result. Instead of continuing to fish illegally, many owner-operators
began investing in quotas, hoping that certainty in regard to landing allow-
ances would increase and that additional fishing entitlements could keep
their revenues up to the mark. This inclination led to a greater balance
between catching capacity and landing rights and as a consequence of
stricter enforcement, demand and prices for quota entitlements rose shar-
ply, making them an additional production factor. Prices of quota rights
continued to be extremely high from 1988 to 1992. Quotas were even
traded above the net present value of future returns from fishing, suggest-
ing that owner-operators wanted to remain in business despite the high
costs of matching vessel capacity with landing allowances (van Vliet
1998b:70). The commodification of individual quotas brought about a
measure of concentration of entitlements in the hands of fewer owner-op-
erators. Thus, some could expand while others were ousted from the fish-
ing industry. By 1992, the number of Dutch cutters had declined to 472
(see Appendix C), crewed by 2,195 fishermen. While acquiring landing
rights led to economic mobility, at the same time it blocked upward social
mobility. With the capital needed to purchase a vessel and quota entitle-
ments, it became hardly feasible for deckhands to become independent,
especially if they did not belong to a family of owner-operators. The initial
investment would be prohibitively high and probably not profitable, which
was sufficient reason for financial institutions to refrain from providing
loans (Davidse 1997a:9). Newcomers were therefore effectively barred
from entering the flatfish fishing industry, leading to a consolidation of
vested interests with extant ownership being in a relatively comfortable
position. However, even with landing opportunities becoming somewhat
more in line with catching capacity, monitoring and enforcement by exter-
nal authorities remained highly necessary.
At the same time, the Dutch government was looking to rid itself of the
increasingly heavy burden of implementing and enforcing the rules and
regulations pertaining to the fishing industry. The costs of devising and
instituting a watertight inspection system were simply unaffordable. Land-
ing inspections relaxed after a while. The initial target was to monitor
eighty per cent of all landings, but this was eventually reduced to thirty per
cent. According to on-the-ground inspection officers, fishermen always
landed about twenty per cent above what they jotted down in their log-
books. If they got caught they would not get a warrant; the only thing that
happened was that the twenty per cent would be added to their logbook.
The easing of inspections brought back peace and quiet in the fisheries
sector. In addition, an extremely large increase of the sole quota in 1990
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(see Appendix D) was accommodating enough to make rule-breaking
more or less unnecessary. It helped to considerably calm down the flatfish
fishermen’s discontent with the European and national fishery measures
and led to greater compliance with quota regulations. Still, despite the
eighty-five per cent increase, the race for sole continued. Sole fishing was
banned on 19 November 1990 because the national share of the total al-
lowable catch was exhausted. The owner-operators had been expecting an
early closure and in order to get their portion had been fishing quite inten-
sively during the preceding weeks. It was a standard example of a self-ful-
filling prophesy: ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their con-
sequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928:572). Soon illegal trade circuits
functioned again (van der Kroon 1994:270-271). In 1991, it was estimated
that illegal landings still amounted to twenty per cent. At the 1992 annual
meeting of the Dutch Fishermen’s Union, Johan Nooitgedagt said in no
uncertain terms that catch restrictions were being massively circumvented
again and that this ought to stop. Bona fide fishermen suffered from the
fraudulent practices of compatriots and, breaking a taboo, Nooitgedagt
openly called for the former to act against the latter.
It was abundantly clear that something needed to be done. Yet more
restrictive rules and tighter policing and enforcement were not an option.
The allocation of public funds to do so had already gone beyond limits that
politicians deemed acceptable. ‘We have reached the end of our possibili-
ties’, Minister Piet Bukman admitted. The situation that had emerged was
a classical example of reducing and socially de-contextualizing the conduct
of fishermen by focusing on the rational individual. Another policy would
have to bring change. Mutual confidence had to be restored and the legiti-
macy of fisheries policy regained. As we shall see in more detail shortly,
state agencies and fisheries representatives alike became convinced that
the top-down command-and-control style of fisheries management –
which involved considerable risks of non-compliance and therefore extre-
mely high transaction costs – should be replaced by something entirely
different. In the next chapter, I will scrutinize how the external authorities
attempted to tackle the difficulties and how the fishing industry re-
sponded. It will transpire that the days of the catch kings and quota busters
were numbered. At last the government and state institutions realized that
the solution was to be found in legitimacy, not more red tape and more
policing. The task was formidable. The new regime would require nothing
less than a leap of faith from fishermen on the one hand and politicians
and regulators on the other. In superimposing its rules, the European
Union – so renamed in 1992 – would tremendously complicate the mental
transition.
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Figure 13. Texel shrimp fishermen, 1930s (courtesy of Klaas Tuinder).
Figure 14. Oosterend family crew, 1940s (courtesy of Wim Ellen).
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Figure 15. Sorting fish in front of the Oudeschild auction, 1950 (photograph Jan de
Waal, courtesy of Texelse Courant).
Figure 16. Texel herring pair trawlers in the port of Calais, 1958 (courtesy of Sam
van der Slikke).
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Figure 17. Texel cutters caught in the ice, 1963 (courtesy of Sam van der Slikke).
Figure 18. Texel beam trawlers in their home port, 1965 (courtesy of Sam van der
Slikke).
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Figure 19. Backbreaking work on the deck of the TX 5, 1975 (courtesy of Jan Ellen).
Figure 20. Three generations of Oudeschild fishermen mending a net, 1970s
(courtesy of Fup Krijnen).
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Figure 21. Emptying the cod end aboard the TX 37, 1990 (photograph by the
author).
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Figure 22. Crewmembers of the TX 38 enjoying supper, 2006 (photograph by the
author).
Figure 23. The TX 19 Elisabeth Christina fishing, 2006 (photograph by the author).
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Chapter 6
Commissioned Cooperation: Plentiful
and Lean Years
The previous chapter showed how the fishermen’s discontents and their
contraventions of the rules and regulations combined into a tense situa-
tion that politicians and bureaucrats found difficult to handle. Fishermen
tended to ignore and flout the rules, prompting a response from state in-
stitutions to force them to comply. This state coercion was unsuccessful.
Despite huge monitoring and policing efforts and expenditure, compli-
ance problems continued to exist. At face value, it was a typical integration
conflict in which the fishermen attempted to hold on to their perceived
autonomy, which was being sapped because they became increasingly en-
tangled in burgeoning regulatory regimes. While the state ignored their
calls for change, the fishermen in turn simply ignored the state’s manage-
ment regimes. The rift between them widened and deepened. The real
problem was that the fishermen felt the rules ought to make sense, should
apply to each and all of them and should be enforced equally. Those who
had obtained quota entitlements wanted to exercise what they perceived to
be their rights (instead of privileges or allowances). This made for consid-
erable tension within the fishing industry, particularly between large rights
holders and skipper-owners who landed more than their fair share.
Having become convinced that additional top-down decisions would
only aggravate the fishermen’s opposition, and would hence be expensive
and ineffective, in 1993 the Dutch authorities finally attempted to involve
flatfish fishermen in fisheries governance. Using their discretion of ar-
ranging the specifics of management structures within the Common Fish-
eries Policy framework, they delegated considerable responsibility to the
fishing industry for quota management, self-regulation and self-enforce-
ment. Group management of individual transferable quotas is a key fea-
ture of this governance system. The new regime has proved to be a turning
point in the Dutch fishing industry’s recent history. In a sense, it amalga-
mates theories of neoclassical economists, who proffer that individual
transferable quotas are efficient because the strongest and more efficient
units of production survive economically, and theories of institutional
economists, sociologists and anthropologists concerning a proper, partici-
patory and effective fisheries management system in which consultation,
delegation and legitimacy are core elements. The Netherlands was the first
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EU member state to work with individual transferable quotas, co-manage-
ment groups, and days-at-sea restrictions.
The predominant viewpoint of many neoclassical fisheries economists
and regulators posits a need to encourage economies of scale and reduce
inefficiency. This puts a premium on those units that are able to capitalize
on investments, while marginalizing small-scale units that cannot afford
the rising costs of new harvesting technologies and investments in acquir-
ing landing rights. Economists and regulators regard the latter units as
redundant; they believe them to be inefficient ‘excess capacity’. This ideo-
logical framing of a particular category of owner-operators – which
amounts to blaming the victim – has profound consequences. Compara-
tively speaking, the petty production units are precisely the ones that con-
tribute least to the problem of over-fishing, yet they are the ones that usual-
ly suffer most from new technologies and new regulatory regimes. Owner-
operators with the highest levels of capital, education, knowledge and skill
are in the best positions to adjust to and adopt technological innovation.
With individual quotas being transferable, they tend to accumulate rights.
In Chapter 5, we have already encountered some of the adverse conse-
quences of this regime, which regards individual actors as atomistic and
one-dimensional profit maximizers, and to some extent creates them. Neo-
classical economists consider transformations in the social relations of
production, and the concomitant creation of social inequalities and
changes in the socio-cultural fabric of fishing communities, to be regretta-
ble but necessary payoffs in order to achieve economic and administrative
efficiency in the fisheries.
The really difficult question is whether the pain is worth the gain. Argu-
ably, any regulatory system creates winners and losers. Therefore, with
every shift in the regime, political bargaining and political contracting will
be inevitable. The disadvantaged are likely to demand modifications that,
when enacted, create still more drawbacks – a ‘paradox of fairness’ (Healey
and Hennessey 1998). The powerful actors with stakes in the fisheries
arena will seek continuity and protection of their interests. Such consolida-
tion may not necessarily be detrimental to the fishing industry or fisheries
governance: the political participation of established stakeholders might
ensure that a degree of legitimacy and effectiveness of the management
system emerges (Jentoft and McCay 1995:241). In contradistinction to neo-
classical economists, anthropologists and sociologists proposed another
avenue of tackling the prevailing problems in the fisheries: co-manage-
ment, a concept that began emerging in the social science fisheries litera-
ture in the late 1980s (see, for example, Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989).
Co-management involves consultation of stakeholders by external
authorities concerning management decisions and implementations, and
delegation of certain management responsibilities to user groups. Deci-
sion making pertaining to and governance of particular resources are
shared to a greater or lesser extent between state agencies and interest
groups exploiting these resources (see, for example, McCay 1995:14,
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2000:210; Nielsen and Vedsmand 1999:20; Singleton 2000:6; Schreiber
2001:377). The basic premise is that ‘when users obtain more manage-
ment responsibility in functional terms, they are likely to behave more re-
sponsibly in moral terms’ (Jentoft, McCay and Wilson 1998:427). Advo-
cates of co-management strongly believe that such hybrid power-sharing
and participation of user groups promote a sense of belonging and involve-
ment, in turn fostering communication, collaboration, cooperation and
compliance (Bennett 1999:10). It was precisely this dimension that was
taken into account when in 1991, under the aegis of the Dutch Fish Board,
negotiations were begun between fishing industry representatives and
state officials to develop a management scheme in which certain responsi-
bilities were devolved to producers, traders and processors. The hope in
the Dutch situation was that the less legalistic approach of fisheries gov-
ernance would leave more discretion to the fishermen and fishing firms
‘to adapt their conduct to “the spirit of … public policy”’ (Dubbink and van
Vliet 1997:183). Assuming greater responsibility to manage one’s own af-
fairs would supposedly give a boost to the legitimacy of government meas-
ures and augment compliance to its rules and regulations (ibid.:184). The
primary objective was to reduce the potential for conflict.
The fisheries management system that emerged in the Netherlands
seems to have combined ‘the best of both worlds’: individual transferable
quotas embedded within a co-management regime. The present chapter
addresses the initial experiences with this governance system, focusing
especially on the views of fishermen, biologists and state representatives
regarding its efficacy and its unforeseen and unintended consequences.
Special attention will also be devoted to the ways in which, and the extent
to which, beam-trawl fishermen were indeed able to participate in fisheries
policy and management, and their perceptions concerning the current gov-
ernance system’s benefits and pitfalls. Increasingly, they faced new opposi-
tion. If they regained some of their autonomy under the new management
regime, they were also up against formidable resistance from environmen-
talists and public opinion. Beam trawling became increasingly controver-
sial because of the alleged damaging effects on benthos, forcing the fisher-
men to defend and legitimize their mode of operation. The new regime
also impinged upon the practice and perception of their occupation in sev-
eral major ways. More than ever before, the fishermen’s topics of conversa-
tion focus on what the seats of political power have in store for them. To
understand their outlook on their métier, it is necessary to dwell on some
of the management scheme’s particulars.
Grassroots Involvement: Co-Management and Compliance
In 1991, the government inaugurated a committee to investigate the possi-
bilities of a system of mandatory decommissioning. Another committee –
presided over by former Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel – had to look
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into ways of devolving management tasks to the fishing industry (Stuur-
groep Biesheuvel 1992). This committee comprised two working groups,
representing the producers and the traders and processors, respectively.
Fish Board executive Dick Langstraat chaired both working groups. The
government and the House of Representatives threatened that, should the
fisheries sector fail to cooperate with the Biesheuvel committee’s sugges-
tions, a harsh compulsory decommissioning scheme, limiting the engine
power of each vessel, would be inevitable. This approach simultaneously
pushed and pulled fishermen representatives to the negotiation table. A
time of reconciliation ensued. The government and the fishing industry
began talks on the establishment of co-management groups that would be
closely associated with Producer Organizations (POs). The major differ-
ence compared with the groups that had briefly existed previously (see
Chapter 5) was that the state now envisioned much tighter group regula-
tions and monitoring. A new head of the Ministry’s Fisheries Directorate,
Peter Draaisma, made it abundantly clear that the fishing industry would
suffer if it refrained from accepting the co-management system. ‘The state
has lost confidence in the fishing sector. You are at a dangerous point,’ he
admonished the participants at the annual national fisheries meeting in
1992. The national fishermen’s organizations’ leaders wanted to start with
‘a clean slate’ and visited the fishing communities in order to convince
fishermen that they had few alternatives but to join a group.
It was indeed decided that fishermen should organize into co-manage-
ment groups, dubbed ‘Biesheuvel groups’ after the chairman of the com-
mittee that advised on the new policy. The state aimed at increasing fisher-
men’s responsibility and social control through devolution of specific
management responsibilities, and returning some of the decision-making
authority to owner-operators. The idea was that fishermen’s involvement
in policy and management would lead to greater legitimacy, and in its
wake to increased compliance with the rules and regulations and coopera-
tion with the administration. In turn, this should enhance exploitation of
marine living resources in an ecologically and economically viable way. In
the early 1990s, there was growing pressure for the integration of fisheries
concerns and marine environmental management. This harmonization
policy of balancing economic and ecological interests was laid down in the
1993 white paper Vissen naar evenwicht (Balanced Fisheries), a document
embodying fisheries policy until 2003 (Anonymous 1993). It reflected the
fact that the environment had taken pride of place on the political agenda.
Henceforth, the prime goal of Dutch fisheries policy was to achieve a re-
sponsible way of fishing and a sustainable exploitation of fish stocks. Fish-
ermen therefore had to take into account other functions of the seascape,
especially its value as a nature area. If it proved to be impossible to recon-
cile fishing effort and natural values, priority should go to the ecosystem.
In addition to seeking a balance between economic and ecological inter-
ests, the white paper aimed at giving responsibility to the Dutch fishery
sector through co-management and new forms of cooperation. It expli-
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cated that further intensification of state enforcement and policing would
be financially and politically unfeasible (Anonymous 1993:5-6). It sought
to implement a policy that would fit within the Common Fisheries Policy
and at the same time enhance the social and political feasibility of the reg-
ulatory regime with less, rather than more, government. More generally,
cutting back on state expenditures was the political fashion of the day. Es-
sentially, the Biesheuvel system of public–private management was a com-
promise between the long-term interests of nature and the short-term in-
terests of fishing enterprises. It was dominated ‘by a desire to “keep the
social peace” within the limits set by scientific research and the public de-
bate’ (Salz 1997). It reflected the then predominant Dutch modus operandi
of solving economic, social and political problems and conflicts through
consultation and compromise, a political practice that had been conspicu-
ously failing in fisheries matters since the quota regime’s introduction.
The threat of mandatory decommissioning helped convince the owner-
operators of beam trawlers to participate. Eight co-management groups,
each comprising between twenty and ninety vessels, were established.
Ninety-seven per cent of the skipper-owners joined a co-management
group, even though initially several were reluctant to cooperate. The high
percentage came about due to Parliament’s threat of taking coercive struc-
tural measures should the percentage remain below seventy-five per cent,
leaving the fishermen little choice but to join. There were also positive in-
centives. Group members were entitled to ten per cent extra days-at-sea in
comparison with non-members and the latter could only trade quotas dur-
ing the last two months of the year. The allocation of sea days was based on
landing rights, fulfilling a long-term wish of large rights holders. More-
over, the state announced tight monitoring of non-members. This ‘carrot
and sticks’ approach was successful. The management groups’ aim was
twofold: firstly, to arrive at an effective and efficient system of quota com-
pliance that would be supported by the fishermen; and secondly, to im-
prove economic performance within the quota restrictions. With the derby
race for fish, skipper-owners tended to fish quite intensively at the begin-
ning of the year so they would not be left with unused landing allowances
should the fishery be closed prematurely. As supply would be high, this
tendency drove prices down in the early part of the year. Agreeing fishing
plans within a group would make for a steady supply of fish and hence
higher prices across the year. The Fish Board supervised and coordinated
the groups. If necessary, it harmonized their regulations, assisted in secre-
tarial work and intermediated between owner-operators and the govern-
ment. It organized meetings with group delegates to discuss problems
and performance, and it advised the government and its agencies. The
Fish Board thus acted – and still acts – as an intermediary organization
between co-management groups and between groups and the state.
Internally, a board of directors – which supervises group management
and has certain rights and obligations – heads each group, considerably
reducing state involvement and enforcement costs. A chairman without
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any stakes in the fishing industry leads the board; the other board mem-
bers are producers elected by group members. Group members must sign
an agreement committing them to abide by the group’s rules, remain in
the group for the entire year, and provide logbook and auction data to the
group and the General Inspection Service. The board controls and man-
ages the quotas of individual members at the group level, arranges for
quota transactions and days-at-sea transfers within a group and warns in-
dividual fishermen when their quota uptake has reached eighty per cent. It
also sees to it that fishermen do not speculate with individual transferable
quota shares and that redistribution takes place according to need rather
than to the highest bidder (van der Schans 2001:364-367). Hence, to some
extent, the board is governing a socially embedded, moral economy type of
exchange. Individual fishermen bring their quotas and days-at-sea entitle-
ments into a group but remain proprietors, and they are responsible for
establishing annual fishing plans to achieve a better distribution of days-
at-sea and quota uptake across the year. The Fish Board must approve the
fishing plans and determines how to allocate the group quotas and how
and when they will be caught. Members may buy, sell, lease, rent or ex-
change individual quotas throughout the year and the state has lifted sev-
eral restrictions on quota transfers. For example, landing rights are now
divisible. These measures provide for greater flexibility to smooth out sur-
pluses or shortages and to respond to unexpected events and contribute to
higher price levels. It is mandatory for group members to sell landings
through one of the eleven designated Dutch auctions to ensure that the
quantity and price of fish can be effectively controlled and that adequate
information is available (van Vliet 1998b:71; van der Burg 2000:48).1
The Biesheuvel co-management regime largely hinges on the idea and
practice of social control and peer pressure. What is important in this res-
pect is that the co-management groups are relatively homogeneous, since
membership is mostly arranged according to the type of vessel and gear
used, the species sought, the region from which fishermen hail and mem-
bership of one of the two national fishermen’s organizations (Hoefnagel
and Smit 1997b:163). In addition, there is considerable overlap between
specific co-management groups, Producer Organizations and local fisher-
men’s associations. For this reason, the owner-operators are socially well
integrated. The group board can prosecute members who exceed their
quotas under private law, while also ensuring that group members who
are unable to take up their quotas receive compensation. Fines are hefty,
outweighing any gains an offender might have from non-compliance. It is
possible to expel members who fail to comply with group rules; their fish-
ing opportunity may be limited or the number of days-at-sea to which they
are entitled reduced. All members suffer if the group exhausts its quotas
early because the state can then prematurely close the group’s fishing op-
portunity. Moreover, groups have to apply for government recognition each
year, and it may withhold approval if the group has previously exceeded its
quotas. The underlying idea is that fishermen will indeed report on offen-
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ders from their own group. Given the fact that an individual firm’s trans-
gression disadvantages the entire group, in theory, the incentive for report-
ing on offenders is high.
Reporting may be at variance with community values though, and fish-
ermen regard it as ‘tale-telling’ or even ‘treason’ (Hoefnagel and Smit
1997a:17, 1997b:164; van der Schans 2001:345, 371). For example, fisher-
men complain about colleagues using illegal net provisions exceeding
horsepower limitations or fishing within the 12 nm zone, if they think
they will fail to exhaust their own individual quotas before the end of the
year, but they do not consider it their duty to report specific cases to the
group board or the General Inspection Service. There is, therefore, a social
code preventing reporting on infringements of the rules – perhaps with
the exception of days-at-sea regulations, since fishermen dislike seeing col-
leagues who have used up their days going out to sea. Because they are
acquainted with offenders, or are even their relatives, group board direc-
tors occasionally feel exposed to social pressure not to mete out fines (Dub-
bink and van Vliet 1997:198; van der Schans 2001:351-352). Reporting on
colleagues, friends or relatives to the authorities jeopardizes community
cohesiveness and fragile power relations. Group board members therefore
have to strike a balance between the interests of the group as a whole and
its individual members. Given these limitations, some researchers criti-
cize the co-management system for being inadequate in its self-enforce-
ment aspect, requiring a statutory system of penalties and procedures
(Berg 1999a, 1999b). However, this view entirely ignores the power of in-
formal control mechanisms. Although they may avoid officially reporting
on offenders, the owner-operators keep a keen eye on the conduct of their
fellow group members and may resort to gossip and social ostracism. The
effect of such social control, which also works indirectly via fishermen’s
wives and the rest of the shore community, boils down to peer monitoring
and self-regulation (see also Connolly 1997). Not reporting on offenders is
the unwritten rule, but subtle – or not so subtle – peer pressure often
makes fellow group members conform.
This is also clear in the case of the co-management group established by
the Texel owner-operators. During discussions leading to the group’s for-
mation, they openly expressed their doubts as to whether the new manage-
ment system would work. Although they were not particularly enthusias-
tic, not a single skipper-owner voted against the idea. The Texel co-
management group began with twenty-six cutters, and was soon joined by
more. Its board, chaired by the ferry company’s chief executive, was keen
on disseminating moral rules regarding abiding by the regulations. It
proved difficult indeed to fine group members who transgressed group
rules. They often responded quite emotionally and sometimes refused to
pay. Nevertheless, mutual social control was certainly efficacious. The
group exerted more social pressure on the owner-operators than imposing
a penalty would have done. If the group board called a culprit to account,
this amounted to being shamed in front of colleagues. Such reprimands
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were not uncommon, for instance when a member had overshot his enti-
tlements or ignored the obligation of auctioning catches, but soon they
grew increasingly rare as the co-management group’s benefits became ap-
parent and the members internalized group norms. A simple warning of-
ten sufficed to end any conduct that might breach group rules. However,
the board members believed that being too lenient was not an option, as
this would sap their authority. At the same time, they did not consider it to
be their task to be overly strict, as this would undermine the support for
and the legitimacy of the group. They were consequently treading on egg-
shells. One of the board members said: ‘You have to be careful, for the
members might dig in their heels. You impinge upon their identity and
dignity. However, if it works well, everyone is satisfied, but you should not
behave like police officers.’
There were also some teething troubles. In the co-management system’s
early stages, the Texel fishermen discovered that other Biesheuvel groups
included ‘ghost boats’. These were small craft with one to twenty-five h.p.
engines that were listed on the Fishery Register. The co-management
group received the full number of days-at-sea for them, which it subse-
quently reallocated to the big vessels. The Texel group had no such boats
and its members deemed it unfair that owner-operators from other fishing
ports should have more fishing opportunities. In addition, the allocation of
ten per cent extra days-at-sea applied to flatfish fishing, not herring fish-
ing. As Texel had quite a few firms that combined flatfish and herring fish-
ing, this led to further disadvantages. The Fisheries Directorate refrained
from intervening as it regarded the issue a matter to be solved by the
group board. Once the board had tackled the problem, the owner-operators
began fully supporting the co-management system. In general, the Texel
co-management group worked well. It created a strong community of in-
terest. The board informed members when their quota and days-at-sea up-
take surpassed a certain level and it facilitated quota swaps and leases with-
in the group and with other groups. It also acquired cod and whiting
quotas, part of which members could rent to cover by-catches. Nearly all
Texel owner-operators eventually joined, while a few ‘outsiders’ – herring
fishing firms from Scheveningen – were also members for some time.
Only two Texel owners opted for membership in a Fishermen’s Union co-
management group.
With the Texel co-management group established, the skipper-owners
deemed it expedient to establish a Texel Producer Organization, which
they did in 1994. Until then, they had been members of one of the two
extant Producer Organizations in the Dutch fishing industry, namely PO
West. The islanders had been dissatisfied with the manner in which it
functioned for several years and their influence on its internal affairs was
minimal. Hiving off provided an opportunity to do things in the way the
Texel owner-operators desired, and to link the co-management group’s af-
fairs closely with those of the PO. With these new voluntary associations,
the Texel fishermen were over-organized rather than under-organized. Of
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course, they maintained the local fishermen’s association Progress
through Unity, the Fishery Cooperative and – with their Den Helder neigh-
bours – the Cooperative Fish Auction Den Helder/Texel. In 1996, the Tex-
elians established yet another association that exclusively dealt with collec-
tive vessel insurance. Running all these organizations was (and is)
demanding on the small local occupational community of fishermen, and
on the owner-operators in particular, although there were (and are) some
overlapping directorates. The voluntary associations enhanced democracy,
functioned as linchpins for the integration of fishermen and proved their
worth in negotiations with external agencies impinging upon the (local)
fishing industry. The owner-operators also benefited economically through
the Co-op and the auction. By the end of the century, the Co-op’s annual
turnover amounted to between thirteen and fourteen million guilders and
it provided jobs for nine employees. The Cooperative Fish Auction’s an-
nual turnover fluctuated between 89 and 107 million guilders in the
1990s. A completely new auction opened its doors in 1995. On peak days,
it employed about a hundred fish sorters (fifty per cent of them women).
Despite being members of the cooperative auction, a few Texel owner-op-
erators continued to discharge catches in IJmuiden, as they had estab-
lished good connections with a trader there. Once more, the occupational
community’s leaders exerted social control to conform to predominant
group behaviour and land catches in Den Helder. In addition to all these
local organizations, the Texel firms were members of national fisheries
associations; about two-thirds were members of the Federation and a third
were members of the Union, which had three co-management groups un-
der its wing.
The Texel – and other Dutch – owner-operators of beam trawlers gener-
ally appreciate the co-governance system. It gives them a say in the man-
agement of the group and their own firm. It also increases their flexibility
because they can transfer quotas and days-at-sea. In addition, it creates the
certainty that they will catch and land their individual quotas, and do so
when they expect landings to be economically most rewarding. Further-
more, it reduces the likelihood of dodging the rules and regulations by
making the effects of overshooting quotas and other transgressions by a
single skipper-owner felt on all the other group members. Moreover, it in-
creases transparency through the system of mandatory auctioning in the
Netherlands (Davidse 1997b:270). The co-management regime has thus
enhanced resilience, security of rights, certainty, transparency, responsibil-
ity, cooperation and trust. It has also taken a lot of work out of the hands of
individual owner-operators, as the group board is pivotal in quota transfers
and takes care of the financial settlement. Perhaps most importantly of all,
the system has put an end to the race for fish and has brought peace of
mind. The fishermen value the current stability in the sector and the re-
gained control concerning their day-to-day operations. As a Texel owner-
operator remarks:
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The Biesheuvel groups work fine. The black market is gone. I purchased
extra landing rights, like many others. If we were to avoid the auction, it
would be detrimental to the prices and we would harm ourselves. If, on the
other hand, everyone sticks to the rules, prices are much better and you do
not have to go to court.
Indeed, one of the bonuses that attracted fishermen into the Biesheuvel
system was that on average prices, and therefore economic results and
profitability, would improve. The system allows for a better distribution of
flatfish landings across the year with positive effects on market prices.
Mandatory auctioning also leads to higher prices, since price-undermining
illegal landings are now a thing of the past (van der Schans 2001:344).
In general, the beam-trawl fleet’s economic performance was rather
good in the 1990s. The new governance regime’s outcomes proved to be
generally beneficial and this led to a willingness to accept and work within
the quota rules (Davidse 1998:66). The co-management regime reportedly
brought about complete compliance with quota regulations, a drastic re-
duction of other offences and therefore administrative and political stabi-
lity in the fishing industry (van Vliet 1998b:72). Consequently, enforce-
ment officers met with significantly less resistance than previously and
could do their job under less inimical circumstances. They did not need to
board vessels and could monitor catches in the auction. This alleviated
tensions, as fishermen perceived shipboard inspections as an invasion of
their private domain (see Chapter 5). It also led to a substantial reduction
of control and enforcement costs (van der Schans 2001:358, 371ff.). From
having a reputation within the European Union of being completely un-
able to enforce quota regulations, the Netherlands was ‘being widely re-
garded as a model of good landings enforcement, even if individual viola-
tions still occur’ (Valatin 2000:300). Symes regards the Biesheuvel system
as coming ‘close to providing a template for group management’
(1997b:113).
Having reviewed the governance system in 1996, the government
decided to continue it, mainly because the problems with exceeding the
national quotas had ended and the number of violations of the rules had
decreased spectacularly. Thus, both owner-operators and the authorities
seem to be satisfied with the outcome of the co-management process
(Hoefnagel and Smit 1997b:175). Having experienced several benefits of
the co-management system, the fishermen are generally content with the
way it functions and feel relieved that the ‘wild west’ era of rule beating
and quota busting is over. Other factors that have undoubtedly contributed
to the Biesheuvel system’s success are that the flatfish sector is relatively
homogeneous and that it is entitled to a large chunk of the European total
allowable catches for sole and plaice. The fish-processing industry and fish
traders are also happy with the devolved management regime, since they
can be sure of a steady supply of fish throughout the year. The Dutch
beam-trawl fishermen even take pride in ‘their’ co-governance mode of
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operation. They boast about their ‘good behaviour’ and point to the fishing
industries of other European Union member states where, in their opin-
ion, illicit practices and lack of enforcement continue to be the order of the
day. Generally, the fishing industry, the state, and the researchers herald
the Biesheuvel system as a successful example of fisheries governance.2
To be sure, the Biesheuvel regime has not solved all the fishing indus-
try’s problems. Violations of rules still occur, albeit to a much lesser extent
than prior to its implementation. The majority of the Dutch fishermen
argue for stricter monitoring and enforcement to stop these illicit prac-
tices, so that they can be certain that gear and engine-power regulations
are complied with more. They are of the opinion that rules and regulations
ought to apply equally to all owner-operators. Therefore, they deem state
coercion necessary, even though they are ambivalent about specific rules
they view as ‘unworkable’, ‘bureaucratic’ or simply ‘silly’. More impor-
tantly, many owner-operators feel that state institutions do not take them
seriously enough, consult them insufficiently, and that their involvement
and participation in fisheries matters are haphazard. In their view, groups
and Producer Organizations should have more influence on the policy-
making process (Hoefnagel and Smit 1997b:172). They contend that the
state should listen to them and heed their advice. Although the Biesheuvel
regime has delegated considerable responsibility to fishermen for quota
management, government control with respect to the fishing industry as a
whole is still great. In effect, the Fisheries Directorate ‘determines the con-
ditions under which the groups are allowed to manage their own affairs’
(van Vliet 1998b:72). In addition, the government remains strongly in-
volved in enforcement through its General Inspection Service (Berg
1999b:152). Indeed, participatory governance is extremely limited and pri-
marily directed at group quota management. Through their national orga-
nizations, the Fish Board, Producer Organizations and national and local
voluntary associations, fishermen attempt to exert some influence on the
policy and management process, but in general the national organizations’
rank-and-file members are not usually very pleased with what their leaders
have been able to accomplish in their interests. The fact that there are two
such organizations is generally perceived to be an obstacle in gaining poli-
tical influence, especially now that the fishing industry is becoming smal-
ler and smaller. The organizations’ leaders maintain that the distance be-
tween them and the Ministry is considerable because they see new faces
continually, and fishermen state that they do not have a say at all and are
not listened to (Hoefnagel, Visser and de Vos 2004:36-37, 41, 44, 46).
However, at the individual level, owner-operators of beam trawlers have
had some leeway to steer their own course.
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Rights Accumulators, Slipper Skippers and Quota Hoppers
Under the system of individual transferable quotas, many Dutch skipper-
owners invested in landing rights (see also Chapter 5). Several did so with
alacrity. The utilitarian logic of fishermen as economic actors resulted in a
gradual concentration of fishing allowances in the hands of fewer skipper-
owners. Those who were in a position to acquire additional entitlements
from owner-operators exiting the Dutch fishing industry did so. The con-
centration trend slackened somewhat after 1994. There was less trade in
quotas. The number of titleholders remained stable and quota prices con-
tinued to be high. However, to reduce the number of both vessels and
quota holders, the state introduced the measure that entitlements were
transferable only to vessels that already had landing rights for that specific
species. As of the late 1990s, decommissioning of vessels again led to
some concentration, since quota entitlements changed hands or were re-
gistered on one vessel instead of two or more boats. By then, the owners of
big beamers of 1,500 h.p. and over possessed about eighty per cent of the
national flatfish quotas (Davidse 1999, 2000). In 2002, due to low quotas
and high fuel prices, the owners of eight big beamers applied for the de-
commissioning programme. It was the first time in all the years of fleet
reductions that vessels of this size were decommissioned. More decom-
missioning rounds would follow (see below). They facilitated exit deci-
sions, since boat owners were able to collect compensation and sell their
vessel and quotas. With more landing rights entering the market, prices
fell to a considerable extent, making it easier for those who hung on to
accumulate additional entitlements. Investments in quotas partly absorbed
the depreciation for new vessels. Consequently, the fishing fleet began age-
ing. In 1990, forty-three per cent of the cutters were less than ten years
old, while fifteen years later this applied to less than a fifth. Currently, the
launch of a new cutter is rare. With older boats, major breakdowns – for
instance engine failures – become more likely. In crisis conditions, this
could mean the end of many a weaker firm.
The vast majority of Texel skipper-owners also opted for investment in
additional landing entitlements. They hoped that doing so would provide
certainty about fishing opportunities. They therefore ardently advocated
strict enforcement of quota regimes, this being in their direct economic
interest. At the same time, Texel owner-operators doubted and feared the
European authorities’ trustworthiness. In their view, the certainty of exer-
cising their rights was – and still is – lacking and they felt they could not
depend on future policies. For this reason, some skipper-owners were re-
luctant to invest considerable sums of money in landing rights. They pre-
ferred renting rather than buying quotas, fearing Europe’s unpredictable
fisheries policy. It gave them the additional benefit of being able to wait
for the right moment for leasing quotas: when they began running out of
fishing opportunities and/or when prices were at a low. Often, this also
proved to be a gamble. However, most of those who hung on have heavily
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invested in additional quota entitlements. Generally, they believe that only
those who tenaciously cling on will economically survive in the end. With
fewer units on the Fishery Register, there will be some room to breathe.
With their relatively small fishing fleet, comprising seventeen North Sea
cutters (August 2006) that represent only five per cent of the North Sea
cutter fleet, Texel skipper-owners hold approximately ten per cent of the
national plaice quotas and about twelve per cent of the national sole quo-
tas. There is a catch, however. The relative shares may be secure; the actual
quantities of fish fishermen are allowed to land are not, because they de-
pend on the annual establishment of total allowable catches. Fishermen
therefore deem wildly fluctuating quotas a serious threat to their economic
existence.
Dramatic cuts of the plaice quotas in 1995 and 1996 (see Appendix D)
caused turmoil in the flatfish fishery sector. The fact that plaice prices were
on average seventeen per cent higher than in previous years due to the
diminished supply alleviated some of the pressure. Usually, rising market
prices for sole and plaice because of scarcity compensate for lower quotas.
The fishermen are keenly aware of the fact that there is a ceiling to this
compensation. Cheaper species of fish or pork, beef and poultry may pro-
vide alternatives that lessen demand for flatfish. In addition, quota cuts
may be out of kilter with their actual experience. Abundant plaice catches
in 1996 made for speedy quota uptake in the first few months of the year,
even though effort was at a low. Many beamers remained in port in order
not to exhaust quotas too soon. Sole catches were also extremely good. The
fishermen argued that the North Sea was teeming with flatfish and that the
biologists’ advice to cut back on total allowable catches had been comple-
tely mistaken. They demanded an interim increase of the quotas, to no
avail. Conversely, quotas may be too high. The very same year that the
catchability of flatfish was beyond expectation, the European Commission
took a drastic measure: mid-year, it reduced the herring TAC by half. This
meant that Dutch herring fishermen faced sudden thirty to forty per cent
reductions of their landing entitlements. Nineteen Dutch family firms still
pair trawled for herring. They were outraged and protested. Seven of them
hailed from Texel, where herring fishing in combination with beam trawl-
ing was still important in the annual fisheries cycle. The fishermen be-
lieved the measure to be illegal because no compensation had been of-
fered. Understandably, they deemed it unfair that the European Union
could subtract from their individual quotas, part of which they had ac-
quired at great expense. Such ad-interim adjustments also thwarted their
initial fishing plans. Despite being rights holders, there are no constitu-
tional guarantees against changes in the system. This was a decisive mo-
ment for the co-management system’s resilience, for chances of non-com-
pliance were considerable. However, the Dutch flatfish and herring
fishermen perforce and grudgingly adapted to the circumstances, although
the herring-cum-flatfish fishermen subsequently began selling their her-
ring entitlements. Soon after the millennium, not a single Texel owner-
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operator had any herring quota left. The offshore fishermen became
increasingly dependent on flatfish entitlements, and there were more de-
merits.
Although related to individual transferable quotas, and not specifically
to the Biesheuvel regime per se, the co-management groups tend to look
after the interests of their present members who are likely to resist any
change that would diminish the value of their property rights. They do not
hesitate to go to court to seek compensation if new measures threaten to
reduce the value of their assets. The state automatically renews their enti-
tlements and as long as they retain their value, the rights holders will re-
main satisfied. Due to the owners’ ‘campaigning skills and ability to mount
legal challenges’ (Valatin 2000:306), there is little room for change. To
become a group member, a fisherman must already possess an individual
transferable quota, a fishing licence and a vessel. Starting a firm from
scratch is nearly impossible, since outsiders cannot obtain a licence and
quotas unless they buy a firm. The value of entitlements makes the costs
prohibitively high. Therefore, aspiring newcomers are effectively barred
from entry to the fishing industry, as access boundaries prove to be insu-
perable, while the initial introduction of individual quotas has unintention-
ally created a ‘millionaires’ club’.
The common pattern of fissions of family firms is also nearly impossi-
ble. Dividing entitlements would jeopardize maintaining an economically
viable firm. Even continuing a family firm is extremely difficult because
high prices have to be paid (Dubbink, van der Schans and van Vliet
1994:33; Hoefnagel 1996:68). The value of quotas usually exceeds the ves-
sel’s value. It used to be possible to bequeath these allowances, but when
tax inspectors started to take into account their value, succession duties
and other taxes rose phenomenally. The same applied when a retiring co-
owner transferred rights to his agnates. Even if a brother or another co-
owning relative was prepared to sell his share at a reasonable price, the tax
collector still demanded the percentage of the estimated value, not the per-
centage of the actual price paid. Consequently, it became increasingly diffi-
cult to continue a family firm. Since the sense of continuity linking gen-
erations of fishermen is so pervasive, this situation has created
exasperation, as the traditional pattern of succession and inheritance is no
longer a matter of course. Many owner-operators have changed the juridi-
cal form of their firms into limited liability companies, in order, among
other things, to make succession of ownership easier (Davidse and de
Wilde 2001:33). Special tax arrangements have meanwhile made succes-
sion from father to son easier. It is now possible to bequeath rights without
duties. However, if a co-owning brother who does not have a successor
wants to pass on tangible and intangible assets to a nephew, there is still a
heavy tax burden. In several instances, it has forced siblings to continue
operating a firm together much longer than they would have done pre-
viously. Heirs who inherit quotas face the need to take out loans to buy out
those heirs who do not fish. Thus, a new generation of skipper-owners has
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to produce at higher costs than the previous one (Davidse 1997b:107, 217).
The organizational character and legal structure of the family firm have
also changed in other respects. Along with the increasing value of assets
in fishing firms, most spouses have opted for a marriage settlement in-
stead of community of property, as used to be commonplace until the
1980s. If married in community of property, a spouse is liable to an equal
portion of the joint property. If her husband predeceases or divorces her,
she can demand her share of the assets tied up in the firm, making it
extremely difficult to continue it (Hoefnagel 1996:68).
Whereas management decisions used to be relatively simple and were
made with short time horizons, with the introduction of individual trans-
ferable quotas the fishermen increasingly need the knowledge and skills of
external specialists who can advise them on administrative, legal and fiscal
matters related to landing rights. Acquiring additional quotas also means
that skipper-owners have to adopt a long-term perspective, since it may
take several years to get returns on these investments. On the other hand,
several so-called ‘sofa fishermen’ or ‘slipper skippers’ did manage to live
comfortably by leasing out their entitlements without ever fishing. If own-
er-operators sold or decommissioned their boat, they could officially hold
on to their quota entitlements for a two-year term. However, many circum-
vented this rule by keeping their vessel without actually operating it or by
transferring landing allowances to tiny boats listed on the Fishery Register.
They then leased the rights to other fishermen, cashing the money as a
kind of old-age pension. Young skipper-owners had to buy or lease quotas
at disproportionate prices, and so the younger generation was being pitted
against the older. Many argued that beneficiaries of quota entitlements
who were not actively fishing should give up their rights in favour of active
owner-operators. Several loopholes enabled slipper skippers to continue
their practice, however. They operated according to the letter, but not the
spirit of the law. To tackle the problem of slipper skippers, the 2005 de-
commissioning details stipulated that quota entitlements should be either
used on new vessels or sold within a three-year term.
Many flatfish fishermen who could not buy or lease quotas to match
vessel capacity were ousted from the business. There was an escape route,
however. Along with the tightened enforcement of quota restrictions and
the soaring prices of landing entitlements, many Dutch owner-operators
began developing an appetite for foreign fishing opportunities, especially
upon discovering that some European countries did not take up their total
allowable catch shares of sole and plaice and had a national rather than an
individual quota system. Enabled by the European Union rules of freedom
of establishment and free movement of capital, scores of flatfish fisher-
men bought vessels and purchased licences and fishing entitlements or
re-registered abroad. Since 1990, approximately a hundred Dutch-owned
flagships have reregistered in other European countries, predominantly in
the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium.3 The re-flagged vessels fish
against other countries’ shares of total allowable catches. The number of
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Texel quota and flag hoppers has been small, however. During the past
three decades, only four firms re-flagged vessels or acquired foreign fish-
ing rights. Today, one Texel family firm operates a Scottish-registered twin-
rig vessel in addition to a Texel-registered beamer, while in the course of
my second stint of fieldwork another firm, which also operates two vessels,
bought a German-flagged Euro-cutter after decommissioning a big beam-
er. Flying a foreign flag has not been popular with Texel skipper-owners,
who prefer accumulating quotas. Urk owner-operators, in particular, have
used the re-flagging strategy to acquire sufficient landing entitlements to
match a vessel’s capacity or set up a son with a business of his own. Over
half of the Dutch units that fly flags of convenience originate in this fish-
ing town. Thus, re-flagging and ‘quota hopping’ has enlarged the room to
manoeuvre in a situation of national limitations (Hoefnagel 1998:82; Da-
vidse and de Wilde 2001:8). In 1998, the re-flagged fleet accounted for
approximately twenty per cent of Dutch North Sea flatfish fishing in terms
of vessel number, engine power, crew, fishing effort and gross revenues
(Davidse 2000).
Their compatriots at home do not always view quota hoppers favourably.
The reason is that some fishermen had their vessels decommissioned and
were compensated in part with financial contributions levied from the
fishing industry. With this money, they bought a fishing licence abroad
and in so doing remained competitors fishing for the same species in the
same European pond. Some owner-operators opine that there are too
many foreign-flagged units that specifically target plaice, making for pres-
sure on the resource. Understandably, fishermen in the host countries
were not amused by the ‘invasion’ of Dutch interests either. In the United
Kingdom, especially, there was fierce opposition and resentment against
the re-flagged fleet. Dutch vessels fishing under UK registry landed over
sixty per cent of plaice and approximately eighteen per cent of sole from
the UK quotas in the Netherlands. The vessels remained Dutch-owned,
skippered and crewed, and in addition to landing their fish at Dutch ports,
they usually bought fuel and fishing equipment at home. Potential eco-
nomic benefits were consequently lost to British regions. Forgetting that it
was their compatriots who had voluntarily sold their vessels and licences
for handsome prices in the first place, UK fishermen accused quota hop-
pers of undermining their national fisheries’ interests and depriving them
of their ‘birthright’. When the Grimsby-based North Sea Fishermen’s Or-
ganization – a Producer Organization with a small majority of re-flagged
Dutch vessel owners – sought to join the national Association of Fish Pro-
ducer Organizations, heated discussions ensued and several POs resigned
their membership. Confronted with the fishermen’s hostile response and
the political mobilization of their national organizations, the UK govern-
ment started supporting them and sought ways of curbing quota hopping
and subjecting re-flagged vessel owners to a criterion of nationality. The
measure unequivocally aimed at protecting national interests. However,
referring to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice over-
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ruled the measure, although it legally allowed a ‘real economic link’ de-
mand between the host state and the re-flagged vessels. From January
1999 onward, Dutch owner-operators who re-flagged their boats had to
meet several criteria to prove that they lived up to the ‘economic link’ re-
quirements. These included rules pertaining to landing part of the catch in
Britain, employing UK residents, and purchasing goods and services in
the UK. In fulfilment of these requirements, Dutch quota hoppers re-
turned a part of the quotas they had not used in the North Sea to British
Producer Organizations in 1999. Following the British example, the Bel-
gian government also introduced ‘real economic link’ requirements (Le-
quesne 2000). At least half the crew should hold Belgian passports and
the vessels should land a minimum of fifty per cent of the catches at auc-
tions in Belgium. In 2005, the Flemish government sought ways of con-
fining quota entitlements to Belgian nationals (read Flemish owner-opera-
tors) – deliberately risking a reprimand by the European Court of Justice.
The quota-hopping controversies cast light on the inherent contradic-
tions of European Union policies. The point of allocating quotas according
to the principle of relative stability is to give member states their ‘fair’
share based on an implicit criterion of nationality. Quota hopping under-
mines this system, and leads to resentment and mistrust. However, quota
hopping is legal under EU law. Consequently, there is ‘the territorial logic
of an economic sector’ (Lequesne 2000:779), embedded in and protected
by the nation state, while at the same time there is the contradictory pro-
cess of building a European common market and the – unofficial – cross-
member-state trade in quotas (see also Lequesne 2004). As economic ac-
tors, the quota-hopping fishermen did little else than use European rules
of law to bypass protective national policies in order to extend their fishing
capacity and maximize their individual profit (Lequesne 2000:780). The
same tensions between national and supranational interests surface in
conflicts between fishermen from different member states concerning
fishing in territorial waters. These have occasionally given rise to fierce
confrontations. For instance, French and Belgian inshore fishermen hate
to see Dutch Euro-cutters fishing inside the 12 nm zone, even though their
skippers act in conformity with European rules and regulations. Conver-
sely, Dutch inshore beam-trawl fishermen sometimes clash with Danish
set-net fishermen fishing for sole in the Dutch 12 nm zone – a mobile
versus stationary gear conflict that has strong undertones of national terri-
torialism, based on the belief that geographic proximity and historical use
lend a right to preferential access. The myriad rules and regulations are
often inconsistent or contradictory because they depart from conflicting
objectives, for example (subsidized) structural growth and conservation
policies. So, let us shift our attention to Brussels.
Commissioned Cooperation: Plentiful and Lean Years 257
Square Pegs and Round Holes: In the Throes of ‘Brussels’
National fisheries regulations must adjust to the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy. However, Dutch fishermen are less than satisfied with some of its as-
pects and its demerits for the Dutch co-management regime, primarily
uncertainties caused by sudden policy changes. Although fishermen gen-
erally appreciate the national governance system, discontentment with bu-
reaucrats and regulators continues to be widespread, as they are the mes-
sengers and intermediaries of what is concocted in the European Union’s
Brussels headquarters. Dutch fishermen are in favour of fewer, and more
workable and uniform regulations within the Common Fisheries Policy
framework that should be monitored and enforced in equal measure
across all member states: the so-called ‘level playing field’ in the European
Union rhetoric. What owner-operators desire is assurance: the certainty
that rules apply to each and all equally and are enforced in equal measure.
As it stands, they have the feeling that they are the ‘most virtuous pupil in
school’, in that they feel they have turned into the most law-abiding fisher-
men and – at the same time – the ones most targeted by the authorities in
the European Union, while fishermen abroad are cut considerably more
slack.4 As important stakeholders, the Dutch flatfish fishermen also feel
utterly disempowered concerning the manner in which their landing al-
lowances come about.
Each year in December, the European Council of Fisheries Ministers
indulges in the lengthy political ritual of establishing total allowable
catches for the upcoming year. It usually is an inscrutable payoff between
biological assessments and the horse-trading of national fisheries and
other economic interests. Dutch flatfish fishermen anxiously await the out-
come. In addition to uncertainties about catches and market prices, they
have to cope with the incertitude of how much fish they will be entitled to
land and how many sea days the Dutch fisheries regulators will allocate.
Substantial fluctuations of national quotas and sea days make it extremely
difficult to develop long-term investment plans and lead to a sceptical view
regarding the fisheries’ future and the role of biologists in assessing fish
stocks. Uncertainty and inaccuracy characterize most stock assessments
(Sinclair 1996). As in the 1980s, the flatfish fishermen continue to be
sceptical about and frustrated by the biologists’ guesstimates and the short
notice at which quota measures are given, while they are often disap-
pointed with what the Dutch Fisheries Minister has accomplished in their
interests at the negotiation table. From one year to the next, the sole and
plaice quotas often vary considerably (see Appendix D). It is easy to ima-
gine that this gives rise to a state of apprehension. In the fishermen’s view,
such fluctuations now largely determine the outcome of their enterprise,
instead of the hard work, stamina, nerve, knowledge, prowess and dexter-
ity that used to be the core values of their métier (see Chapter 5). Today,
nightmares about catastrophic bureaucratic caboodle probably match their
dreams of bumper catches. Brussels currently pervades their thoughts and
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conversations. Regulations, and shifts in them, largely determine work.
Since the practice of fishing is pervasive and existential, they have wider
implications for experiences, social relationships and knowledge.
The fixing of total allowable catches often leads to communication prob-
lems between managers and scientists on the one hand and fishermen on
the other. For example, I often heard fishermen exclaiming that the North
Sea was teeming with plaice and sole, and that biologists just used the
wrong methods to assess flatfish stocks. It annoys them that biologists will
never apologize for getting it wrong. The owner-operators prefer multi-
species, multi-annual and more stable total allowable catches that would
provide for long-term planning instead of being continually yo-yoed. ‘This
would bring more peace and stability and we would get rid of the annual
circus,’ Fishermen’s Union leader Johan Nooitgedagt maintains, referring
to the mid-December haggling about and issuing of total allowable catches.
Uncertainties pertaining to stock levels hinder not only biological manage-
ment but also economic management at the industry and individual firm
level. Fishermen deem annual quota allocations volatile and utterly unsui-
table to the running of a business. Reductions in allowable catches poten-
tially endanger the economic viability of firms – which happens for exam-
ple when a firm’s sole quota is around thirty metric tonnes (van Wijk and
de Wilde 2004:63). Given the dominance of the biologists’ input in the EU
policymaking process, the socio-economic consequences of the occasion-
ally heavily fluctuating total allowable catch levels are usually insufficiently
included in the implementation process. To circumvent the problem of
receiving the same percentage of the total allowable catch for sole and
plaice, a consequence of the Common Fisheries Policy’s principle of rela-
tive stability, Dutch flatfish fishermen and their organizations also prefer
freely transferable quotas across member states. This would give them the
opportunity to buy or lease sole and plaice quotas abroad. However, this is
not legally allowed, although in fact quota hopping and re-flagging prac-
tices amount to much the same. Lastly, they are in favour of having some
role in fixing total allowable catch levels. This is linked to the fact that ‘fish-
ermen often do not trust the assessments of crisis on which state action is
based, and also lack faith in the effectiveness of the measures taken’ (Ba-
vinck and Hoefnagel 2004:41). The data biologists come up with often
hold little water with fishermen. The latter usually refer to their ‘experien-
tial knowledge’ with respect to stock levels and have little confidence in the
biological analysis of fish stocks because they do not match with what the
fishermen believe to be right. ‘They’re behind a computer screen all day,
while we are men of practice who are at sea day and night,’ says a Texel
owner-operator. Power issues are inherent in knowledge claims and biolo-
gists would seem to have the greater authority and credibility in the ranks
of fisheries policymakers and regulators. The fishermen’s epistemology of
practice is usually bluntly ignored.
Biologists, on their part, distrust the Dutch flatfish fisheries governance
system. They maintain that its efficacy is mainly because fishermen simply
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cannot take up the national quotas for sole and plaice. In some years, the
exhaustion percentage has indeed been below a hundred per cent. Some
‘cynically suggest that compliance and the political-administrative rest are
bought off with far too lenient TACs’ (Dubbink and van Vliet 1997:192). In
their reports to the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas,
biologists adhere to the objective of what they perceive as rational exploita-
tion: maximum sustainable yields, instead of the minimal biologically ac-
ceptable level of exploitation that was the state’s point of departure. In their
view, this would require a drastic reduction of fishing effort. The biologists
felt frustrated by the national states’ attempts to obtain the maximum for
fishermen in negotiations on total allowable catches and quota allocations,
which would potentially lead to irresponsible exploitation levels. Fisheries
biologist Ad Corten expressly mentioned the Dutch co-management policy,
‘in which the objective of rational exploitation was explicitly abandoned...
The new policy would aim … merely at maintaining stocks above a mini-
mum biologically acceptable level … Ministers and administrators increas-
ingly consider quotas as amounts of “paper fish”, which should be large
enough to avoid any inconvenience to the national industry’ (1996:5). In
addition, biologists contend that the individual transferable quota system
leads to the wasteful practice of high grading and discarding of low-value
fish or species for which quotas are lacking or exhausted. In the 1990s,
biologists and fishermen strongly contested each other’s views in the
weekly Visserijnieuws (Fishery News) and occasionally owner-operators
have stopped cooperating with the Netherlands Institute for Fisheries Re-
search’s biologists.
Earlier, fishermen were more accommodative. For example, in 1989 the
Dutch fishing industry fully cooperated in establishing the Plaice Box, an
area of about 40,000 square kilometres of shallow coastal waters extend-
ing across the coasts of the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. To pro-
tect important plaice nursery areas, fishing with vessels exceeding 300 h.p.
was seasonally restricted there. As of 1995, it was banned altogether. How-
ever, despite a ninety-five per cent fishing-effort reduction relative to the
original level, yield, recruitment and spawning stock biomass in the Plaice
Box have decreased (Pastoors, Rijnsdorp and van Beek 2000:1021; Grift et
al. 2004:6). When the measure proved to be a failure, the fishermen were
very disappointed that the authorities refrained from repealing it. In an
attempt to counter eco-political claims to establish more marine protected
areas, beam-trawl fishermen often allude to the Plaice Box example. They
contend that the seabed needs to be ‘ploughed’ with tickler chains. In their
view, sole and plaice stocks will thrive when they do so: ‘Where people fish
you catch fish.’ A Texel skipper-owner, born in 1914, says, ‘We used to fish
the grounds off Terschelling. We call it The Ridge. The grounds are hard
there and you never caught sole. Currently, with tickler chains, you always
catch sole there.’ Beam trawling, the fishermen claim, enhances the
growth and reproduction of flatfish. Indeed, empirical evidence substanti-
ates this ‘fishermen’s lore’: flatfish feed on crushed benthic organisms in
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the trawl path made by another trawler a short time earlier (de Groot
1984:180; Rijnsdorp and van Leeuwen 1996:1199). Fishermen say that
using too heavy chains should be avoided and that there should be inter-
vals between tows to allow time for the sole and plaice to return. They
therefore keep away from positions that other vessels have trawled a few
minutes earlier.
Marine biologists and ecologists would seem to agree that beam trawl-
ing is not necessarily detrimental to flatfish stock reproduction per se, but
they argue that it does lead to a loss of biodiversity. They claim that the
beam’s shoes and tickler chains destroy seabed life (benthos) and that only
opportunistic species thrive (de Groot and Lindeboom 1994; Lindeboom
and de Groot 1998). Beam trawling would therefore create ‘fishing fields’
(visakkers). They further deem it a wasteful and bulldozer-like fishing
method, since tickler chains allegedly penetrate as deep as ten centimetres
into the seabed and ‘plough marks’ remain for many years. Therefore,
marine biologists and ecologists – and their close allies the environmental-
ists – have attempted to reduce beam-trawling effort in the North Sea. In
1991, the Texel-based Netherlands Institute for Sea Research proposed in-
troducing a 10,000 square-km no-take marine protected area in the North
Sea in addition to the ‘boxes’ that the European Union had designated ear-
lier (Bergman et al. 1991). The Dutch Fishermen’s Union responded fur-
iously, stating that fishing was already prohibited in vast zones and that the
socio-economic consequences of additional closures would be devastating
(Vissersbond 1991). Fishermen apprehend that once no-take zones have
been established they will be there permanently, whatever the ecological
effects. They point out that offshore windmill parks, land reclamations,
sand and gravel extraction, chemical dumping sites, communication and
energy cables, gas and oil pipes and platforms, marine reserves and ship-
ping lanes already take up much of the space, in some cases in their fa-
vourite fishing areas. Ecologists and environmental NGOs, persistently
promoting their viewpoint, nonetheless continued to emphasize the need
for area closures. Yet area closures may be counterproductive in a literal
sense.
Being ousted from the 12 nm zone and the ‘boxes’, bigger beamers faced
more steaming time and thus higher fuel costs. Locations outside the
Plaice Box and the 12 nm zone were subsequently heavily fished, particu-
larly in the winter when sole are less scattered than in the summer. This
congestion led to ‘crowding externalities’ as it resulted ‘in the productivity
of each trawl being reduced as the ground has already been partially
“worked” by another boat’ (Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde 2001:202).
Thus, closed areas have the disadvantage that owner-operators relocate
fishing effort to other areas, intensifying exploitation there. The growing
importance of the Dutch fishing fleet’s Euro-cutter section is also an un-
foreseen consequence of this element of fisheries policy. Many vessels
have been upgraded to 300 h.p., while others have been purpose-built.
Several owners whose vessels were more powerful, but whose quotas were
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relatively small, decided to downscale their business and to use their quo-
tas for a Euro-cutter. In 1983, Euro-cutters made up thirteen per cent of the
fishing fleet, in 1998 thirty-five per cent, and currently forty-six per cent. A
considerable part of these Euro-cutters fished sole and plaice as the main
target species. During the same span of time, mid-size vessels (301-1,500
h.p.) almost disappeared (see Appendix C). Big beam trawlers of over 1,500
h.p. constituted almost fourteen per cent of the cutter fleet in 1983, and
more than thirty-seven per cent in 1998, afterwards gradually declining to
twenty-nine per cent at present. Consequently, the fishing fleet’s structure
became skewed towards beamers of around 300 h.p. and 2,000 h.p., the
maximum engine capacities legally allowed for the two categories of ves-
sels.
The environmentalists’ opinion regarding beam trawling can be cap-
tured in two words: beaming stinks. In their view, it is an energy-consum-
ing, indiscriminate and ecologically damaging fishing method. The fisher-
men are keenly aware of the ecologists’ and environmentalists’ criticism.
They are of the opinion that information is often twisted. ‘If tickler chains
really went down ten centimetres into the seafloor, we would need 10,000
h.p. engines in order to tow the gear,’ a Texel skipper-owner explained,
‘otherwise you wouldn’t move an inch.’ ‘And look at those chains: you can
see that the wear is on one side only,’ he continued, implying that the
chains stay on top of the seabed. Unsurprisingly, fisherfolk resent the
‘green mafia’ and ecologists, whom they suspect to be political activists
instead of ‘value-free’ scientists. They have good reasons for being suspi-
cious. The fishermen’s public image has gradually changed from hard-
working people earning an honest livelihood to plunderers of the sea’s re-
sources who do not shy away from using ecologically damaging and illegal
fishing methods. They are believed to pillage and rob. The pressure is on
them and environmental organizations who lobby national and suprana-
tional governments increasingly have public opinion on their side. With
the media exposure environmentalists and ecologists usually get, it does
not even matter if their information is inaccurate. For instance, the Nether-
lands Institute for Sea Research ecologist Han Lindeboom (1995:593)
claimed that beam trawlers were fishing the entire North Sea intensively –
once to twice a year – and that for every kilo of marketable sole, five kilos of
fish were discarded that would die and a kilo of benthos was killed. His
alarming view was widely publicized. Subsequent detailed research by
fisheries biologists showed that a large part of the by-catch was marketed
and that the discards survival rate had not been taken into account. The
Dutch flatfish fleet covered only forty per cent of the North Sea and seventy
per cent of beam trawling took place in a fifth of this area (Rijnsdorp et al.
1998; Piet et al. 2000). Beam trawling was highly patchy. Seventy per cent
of the fished area was visited less than once a year, and less than thirty per
cent was swept more than twice a year. In conclusion, ‘Individual vessels
tend to concentrate their effort in a relatively small part of the potentially
available area’ (Rijnsdorp et al. 1998:409). This should not come as a sur-
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prise. Apart from avoiding rocks, rigs, wrecks and the like (see Chapter 5),
skippers know from experience that not all positions are equally produc-
tive. The detailed information that countered the claim that the entire
North Sea was fished did not receive significant media attention: the med-
ia would appear to be interested in headlines, not nuances. Nonetheless, in
interviews and Op-Ed articles Lindeboom continued arguing that beam
trawlers fished every inch of the North Sea and that closed areas were nec-
essary (Lindeboom 2000). In claiming that the fisheries disturbed the
seabed 1,000 times more than sand and gravel extraction and a 100,000
times more than gas and oil exploitation, he directly blamed fishermen for
inflicting irreversible damage on the marine ecosystem.
The fishing industry is thus increasingly subject to the interrogation of
ecologists and environmentalists who have influenced public opinion and
manoeuvred themselves into the position of stakeholders in fishing poli-
tics. Greenpeace activists protested the European fisheries policy in gener-
al and beam trawling in particular through provocative actions at sea. The
Dutch Fish Board responded to the plea for area closures in the North Sea
by launching a brochure entitled Fishing on a Square Inch, pointing out that
fishermen ‘are finding themselves boxed in on all sides’ (Productschap Vis
2004). The flatfish fishermen are meanwhile up against formidable
forces. From once being ardent supporters of the fishing industry’s moder-
nization, European institutions began heeding the advice of biologists,
ecologists, environmentalists and the public at large. A case in point is the
inshore cockle fishing industry. The small Dutch cockle sector had its own
co-management regime that worked rather well (Steins 1999:125ff.). De-
spite several self-limiting measures, cockle fishing with suction dredges
met with vehement opposition from and litigation by environmental orga-
nizations. Environmentalists and biologists referred to ‘plundering of con-
quered territory’, ‘systematic destruction’, ‘scene of battle’, ‘robbery’, ‘cata-
strophic ecological disaster’, and – referring to seabirds that were allegedly
deprived of food – ‘slaughter’, ‘starvation’, and so on (van Ginkel
2007a:136). Mechanical cockle fishing in the Wadden Sea was banned in
2004 following a Supreme Court decision based on a European Court of
Justice ruling. A large company based in Harlingen owned two Texel-regis-
tered cockle cutters. Two brothers, their father and a non-related crew-
member, all from Texel, operated the boat and subsequently became un-
employed. Environmentalists and fishermen cast each other as the villain.
In the Texel fishing communities, there is little sympathy for environmen-
talists. The fishermen consider them to be a threat to their livelihoods.
They feel that, whatever they do, they are bound to get it in the neck from
environmentalists and ecologists. In addition, Brussels is stifling their op-
erations. Whereas European institutions had initially stimulated the fish-
ing fleet’s growth – leading to overcapacity – they began taking measures
to contain its size and capacity.
In addition to the uncertainties that went along with determining total
allowable catch levels, a system that continues to thwart the fishermen’s
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comprehension and acceptance of broader policy and management frame-
works, they experienced contradictions between this aspect of the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy and its other backbone, the Multi-Annual Guidance
Programme (MAGP), which was introduced in 1983. Before 1992, its aim
was largely to contain fleet capacity and prevent effort from expanding, but
subsequently its goal changed to reducing aggregate engine power and
gross tonnage to ensure that fleet size and catching effort were commen-
surate with fishing stocks (Pascoe, Andersen and de Wilde 2001:192). In
the Netherlands, the preference has been for days-at-sea regulations and
voluntary decommissioning schemes. These were socially more acceptable
than a mandatory reduction of fleet capacity. The administration left to the
owner-operators’ discretion whether they preferred to fish with powerful
vessels or not, as long as they did not overshoot their quotas, engine power
limits and – since 1998 – gross register tonnage restrictions. Fully imple-
menting MAGP targets, for example by lowering the number of days fish-
ermen were allowed to be at sea, would jeopardize the uptake of individual
fishing rights and national quotas and this could sap the Biesheuvel sys-
tem and enforcement of legal landings (Valatin 2000:301). The centralized
EU target of reducing capacity was increasingly at odds with the decentral-
ized quota management responsibilities (Davidse 2000). As Fish Board
chairman Dick Langstraat related, ‘the MAGP straitjacket threatens to un-
dermine the fishermen’s support for our co-management system’ (Lang-
straat 1998:12). In 1998, cuts on the number of days-at-sea led to commo-
tion. First, members of the co-management groups no longer received ten
per cent extra sea days compared with non-members. Second, the MAGP
reductions were much larger than expected, in some cases amounting to a
twenty-five per cent cut.
According to Johan Nooitgedagt, it was nothing less than ‘a disaster’.
His colleague Ben Daalder, who had succeeded Klaas Kramer as chairman
of the Federation in 1997 (and van der Beek as chairman of Progress
through Unity a year earlier), was of the same opinion. Fishing industry
leaders argued that it was agreed under the co-management arrangement
that fishermen should be allowed to take their rightful share of the na-
tional quotas, and that this right should prevail over the days-at-sea regula-
tions. In late 1999, this led to tense relations with the Deputy Minister of
Fisheries, Geke Faber, who wanted to cut sea days drastically to meet
MAGP targets so that the Netherlands would not miss EU structural funds
for the fisheries. The fishermen were outraged and felt punished for good
behaviour. Faber was not very popular with the fishermen and gained the
reputation of being a weak negotiator in Brussels. When it transpired in
2000 that senior fisheries officials proposed in an internal confidential
report to close several important fishing areas so that Faber could ‘score’
politically with environmentalists and parliamentarians, the fishermen re-
sponded furiously, demanding that the civil servant responsible should be
sacked. They deemed it a ‘straight declaration of war on the fishing indus-
try’, as Ben Daalder said in an interview (Trouw, 13 July 2000). The respon-
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sible Minister reprimanded Daalder, but this could not prevent the fisher-
men from being completely fed up with her. The worst was yet to come,
however.
Thursday, 1 March 2001. Early in the morning, angry Dutch flatfish fisher-
men in a concerted protest action block a number of important waterways,
including the ones leading to the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. They
are extremely dissatisfied with the sudden and panic-stricken cod-recovery
measures of European Union Fisheries Commissioner Franz Fischler,
which consist of a temporary cod-fishing moratorium and the closure for
the duration of ten weeks of fishing areas in the southern and north-eastern
parts of the North Sea as of 14 February. These are important sole and
plaice-fishing grounds and the flatfish fishermen’s by-catches of cod
amount to less than three per cent. They are of the opinion that they are
blamed and have to bleed for problems caused by UK, Irish and Danish
cod fishermen. In the Netherlands, the number of fishermen specializing
in cod fishing is only small. The vast majority of Dutch cod fishermen were
ousted from the fishing industry in the 1980s and 1990s. What aggravates
the fishermen is the fact that on top of the closure, sole and plaice quotas
for 2001 are reduced considerably, while at €0.23 per litre, fuel prices are
rather high. With nearby fishing areas closed, the fishermen are forced to
steam further from home, increasing fuel consumption and expenses. It
also means that precious fishing time is lost. A week before the blockade,
fishing industry leaders negotiate with Faber to obtain financial compensa-
tion. Much to the organizations’ leaders’ chagrin, the Deputy Minister does
not give in. She refuses to call on the European Commission for matching
funds in spite of the fact that the House of Representatives moved a motion
to do so. Ben Daalder is outraged: ‘This has yielded zilch and zero. Terrible!
Dead loss! It remains to be seen whether we can control the fleet now. Faber
has turned her back on the fishermen. I am so angry with her.’ Daalder
fears that the closure will lead to a concentration of fishing in areas where
it is still permitted. ‘They will turn into graveyards,’ he says, referring to the
likelihood that catching effort will greatly intensify in the accessible areas.
Faber leaves the fishing industry empty-handed again on Wednesday after-
noon 28 February. Whilst on the fishing grounds, the fishermen learn the
news about the breakdown of negotiations. Their mood is grim. They con-
tact each other, decide on the blockade and begin steaming to the target
ports with more than a hundred big beamers – including nearly all Texel-
registered vessels. By eight o’clock on Thursday morning they effectively
seal off the ports, paralyzing shipping. Other cutters leave the fishing
grounds and return to their homeports in solidarity. It is the day’s headline
news. The fishermen regard the EU measure as a raid on the flatfish-fish-
ing industry and point out that their by-catches of cod are minimal. Lacking
Faber’s support, they fear for their livelihoods and they are outraged that no
one has ever consulted them. Dutch Members of Parliament and fisheries
biologists also contest the EU measure. The politicians think that the mea-
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sure will hit the Dutch fishing industry disproportionately hard, whereas
the biologists doubt the efficacy of the closure that comes after the cod
spawning-season, is not targeted at the main cod-fishing grounds and in
their view – shared by the fishermen – will merely lead to a concentration
of fishing effort elsewhere in the North Sea. Even Dutch environmental
organizations regard the measure as a useless flexing of muscles. Earlier
on, the fishermen had proposed to voluntarily refrain from sailing for four
weeks, but this tie-up proposal was rejected. With the closure pending and
Faber refusing to compensate the fishermen, they have ‘spontaneously’
decided on the wildcat action that is subsequently backed by the national
fishermen’s organizations. Later that day, the fishermen dissolve the block-
ade. Under threat of being held accountable for the damages and having to
pay recognizance, they capitulate and return to sea.
Soaring fuel prices compounded the cod-recovery plan and its ten-week
tie-up scheme. Although by the end of the year economic returns proved
less disastrous than the owner-operators had feared, the crews of big
beamers faced a twenty per cent gross income reduction in 2001. Rising
social security fees, which were linked with scale problems due to the de-
clining number of fishermen (see below), meant diminishing net in-
comes. Much to the bewilderment and chagrin of Dutch fishermen, the
European Union increased the 2002 total allowable catch for cod by two
per cent. Understandably, they deemed supranational policies simply in-
comprehensible. Another instance is that the European Commission in
2001 decided that the system of mandatory auctioning, which the co-gov-
ernance groups had agreed upon, was incompatible with European rules
pertaining to the common market. The Commission argued that it de-
prived fishermen of the opportunity to freely land their catches at the port
and auction of their choice. However, mandatory auctioning had greatly
facilitated transparency and monitoring in the particular Dutch situation.
There were more demerits to Europe’s fickle fisheries policy. In the
wake of the cod-recovery programme, the EU implemented the days-at-sea
system – which the Netherlands, as the only member state, had been using
for quite some time to restrict effort – in the European Union as a whole.
Subsequently, however, it severed the link between landing rights and sea
days, which had negative consequences for the Dutch owner-operators
who had previously matched vessel capacity with entitlements. Generic re-
ductions of precious fishing time obstructed the opportunities of complete
quota uptake for large rights holders. By the end of 2002, Fischler planned
a forty per cent cut of days-at-sea for the Dutch flatfish fleet. The national
fishermen’s associations deemed this ‘utterly unacceptable’. ‘It really
would deal the deathblow to the Dutch fishermen,’ Fishermen’s Union
figurehead Johan Nooitgedagt exclaimed to a news reporter (NRC Handels-
blad, 29 November 2002). By that time, Dutch fishermen hardly caught
cod at all – not even as a by-catch. The expensive acquisition of additional
entitlements to match vessel capacity – the preferred strategy of Texel own-
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er-operators – proved to be insecure because rights holders had insuffi-
cient time to catch what they were entitled to land. ‘What do landing rights
mean if you cannot catch your quotas because there is insufficient time in
which to do so?’ they asked rhetorically. They loathed the fact that skipper-
owners from other fishing ports who had refrained from acquiring quotas
to match their vessel capacity could stay in business. ‘It is just not fair. We
have invested millions but we’re the laughing stock of those who still in-
dulge in illegal practices,’ was the islanders’ dominant opinion. The only
Texel fishing firm that still specialized in round-fish fishing faced dramatic
cuts of cod and whiting quotas for 2003. ‘Three years ago,’ related one of
its co-owners, ‘we still had a cod quota of 160 tonnes, but last year we only
had 53 tonnes left and we have to hand in 45 per cent of that this year. Our
whiting quota will also be reduced by 60 per cent.’ Although the family
firm had been investing heavily to accumulate additional landing entitle-
ments, this was too much to cope with. Later that year, the four owner-
operators – three siblings and the son of one of the brothers – decided to
decommission their boat. ‘There’s simply no way you can run a business
under these conditions.’ Although less dramatic, quota reductions also
profoundly affected what flatfish fishermen could land. An owner-operator
related, ‘In 1990 we were still entitled to land 650 tonnes of plaice and 193
tonnes of sole. This year [2006], it amounts to only 195 tonnes of plaice
and 130 tonnes of sole, even though we acquired additional landing rights
in the meantime.’ It is just a sample of why, in the Netherlands, fisher-
men’s support for the Common Fisheries Policy is lacking, intervening as
it does with the rather well-adapted Dutch co-management regime that
fishermen have come to consider as legitimate and just. They consider
Brussels to be utterly unreliable.
One may even wonder whether there have been any enthusiasts at all for
the Common Fisheries Policy. Its record of accomplishment has been ex-
cruciatingly poor, as Europe’s fishermen readily acknowledge (Rossiter and
Stead 2003:282; Connolly 1997). However, many ecologists, biologists,
economists and social scientists also consider it a complete failure, albeit
for quite different reasons (Cooper 1999; Symes 1997a:152; Gray and
Hatchard 2003; Daw and Gray 2005; Rijnsdorp, Daan and Dekker 2006;
Rijnsdorp et al. 2007). The CFP had myriad perverse effects. From an eco-
logical viewpoint, the system of total allowable catches and quotas was
counterproductive. It created more problems than it solved and the entire
management system could easily collapse like a house of cards (Daan
1997:335). Although landing figures – which are often inaccurate – ended
up in statistics, they did not represent actual catches. The negotiators did
not digest the discrepancies as input for deliberations about new alloca-
tions. Increased enforcement led to high grading and, especially in the
mixed fisheries, to discarding of over-quota catches and catches of species
for which landing rights were lacking (Daan 2000; Pascoe, Andersen and
de Wilde 2001:192). As we have seen, such wasteful practices did not sit
well with the fishermen either. Economically, the CFP is said to be ‘a scan-
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dalous waste of public resources’ (Valatin 2001:11) in that resource rents
have been dissipated or capitalized in individual quotas. Politically, it
amounted to obscure interstate bargains. The policy is also a social disaster
in that it protects vested interests while potential newcomers discover that
the barriers of entering the fishing industry are insurmountable. Although
partly designed to maintain the social peace in the European fishing indus-
try through the principle of relative stability, its inconsistencies have led to
many a conflict and nationally protective response. At the member-state
level, the Common Fisheries Policy and its translation into a national reg-
ulatory framework has been socially divisive, creating wealth inequalities
and impinging upon some of the core cultural values of fishermen, who
now have to behave as calculating businessmen in an environment of ex-
treme uncertainty and rigidity.
Whatever its merits in other domains of life, Brussels did a very poor job
in the field of fisheries. Even European Union politicians and administra-
tors began expressing doubts about the Common Fisheries Policy. It finally
dawned upon them that they were trying to fit square pegs into round
holes. The European Commission Green Paper on the CFP’s future (Euro-
pean Commission 2001a) admitted that much had gone wrong and that
more stakeholders should be involved in the policymaking process. To this
end, it proposed to establish several regional advisory committees and de-
volve certain management responsibilities. It also called upon the national
fishing industries and individual operators to submit their views on poten-
tial change. The Texel fishermen took this call extremely seriously. They
believed that they would finally have the opportunity to have some input at
the European level. They immediately set up a working group of seven
young owner-operators, who enthusiastically drafted a proposal. After sev-
eral rounds of talks, they produced a document. A Progress through Unity
meeting discussed and accepted it in late July 2001. It contained a list of
points elaborating the measures that the Texel skipper-owners would like
the European Union to implement. They sent the document to the Fish
Board, so that it could be used as input for discussion of the Dutch view-
points on the CFP’s future. It was the only document submitted to the Fish
Board. The Texel proposal therefore constituted the basis of deliberations
during a meeting with fishing industry representatives, held under the ae-
gis of the Fish Board on 1 September 2001. With a few minor amend-
ments, the Fish Board submitted the Texel response to the Green Paper to
the European bureaucracy, officially as a national fishing industry re-
sponse. The Texel owner-operators anxiously awaited the Common Fish-
eries Policy’s reform, expecting to see at least some of their ideas acknowl-
edged.
In the ‘Roadmap’ on the Common Fisheries Policy’s reform (European
Commission 2002), the European Commission openly admitted the pol-
icy’s failure, a confession that amounted to a sort of covert mea culpa. The
debate on its future had clearly revealed ‘the shortcomings and internal
systemic weaknesses of the Common Fisheries Policy, such as poor enfor-
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cement, the lack of a multi-annual management perspective, fleet over-ca-
pacity and insufficient stakeholder involvement’ (ibid.:4). The lack of sta-
keholder participation and the unequal control and enforcement arrange-
ments had undermined support for the policy and sapped its credibility
and legitimacy. The debate also showed that ‘the current policy is incapable
of reversing the increasing threats to important fish stocks and of provid-
ing economic sustainability to the fisheries sector’ (ibid.). The Commis-
sion believed that a future policy would succeed only ‘if environmental,
economic and social sustainability are put at the heart of its objectives and
if good governance principles such as openness, participation, accountabil-
ity, effectiveness and coherence are fully implemented’ (ibid.). These prin-
ciples were Brussels’, new mantra following publication of a White Paper
on governance (European Commission 2001b). The Commission pro-
posed a host of new measures that should improve the situation. Predicta-
bly, the Texel fishermen found not one of their proposals incorporated.
Their efforts of formulating ideas proved to have been a waste of time and
energy. Deeply disappointed, the skipper-owners had their prejudices con-
firmed: Brussels does not care. The exalted Brussels rhetoric of openness,
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence did not sit well
with the fishermen, who continued to be confronted with measures that
did not make sense to them.
The Texel fishing fleet’s inshore segment also had its share of incompre-
hensible measures. Although inshore fishermen were not directly affected
by the Common Fisheries Policy, European policies did impinge upon
their métier. The only category of skipper-owners who did not seem to
suffer a crisis were the operators of the three boats that take tourists on
shrimp-fishing and seal-watching trips. Full-time shrimpers were less well
off. Six Texel shrimp-fishing firms sold their boats and licences in the
years following my first stint of fieldwork. With fierce competition and no
catch limitations, shrimp prices were so low that owner-operators were
hardly able to run a cost-effective enterprise. In the early 1990s, a major
step ahead was made when Dutch, German and Danish Producer Organi-
zations of shrimp fishermen agreed to a voluntary scheme of catch restric-
tions and minimum prices to regulate the market. Hereafter, their situa-
tion improved considerably. However, the Dutch antitrust authority
deemed the system to be incompatible with EU common market regula-
tions and in January 2003 heavily fined shrimp traders and Producer Or-
ganizations for price setting. The fines amounted to almost fourteen mil-
lion euros. Dutch shrimp-fishing industry representatives argued that the
owner-operators had acted in line with the Common Fisheries Policy and
with PO responsibilities concerning market regulations. In addition, the
scheme avoided shrimps having to be dispensed of for fishmeal reduction.
In protest, shrimp fishermen blocked entry to the port of Lauwersoog. Fol-
lowing litigation, the fine was reduced to slightly over six million euros
and then to approximately 2.2 million euros. The case is still pending, but
it clearly brings to light the contradictions of European policies that may be
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interpreted differently. The intervention by the antitrust agency internally
divided the shrimp sector. Shrimp prices plummeted due to increased
landings, but consumers have not benefited from lower retail prices at all.
Even extremely sensible self-imposed measures, as in the shrimp case, be-
came a target for bureaucratic intervention.
European interference also undercut an important aspect of the Bies-
heuvel co-management regime. At the 2003 annual meeting of Progress
through Unity, chairman and national fishing industry leader Ben Daalder
pointed out that due to the cod-recovery plan, Dutch beam-trawl fishermen
had been allocated fewer days-at-sea, even though their cod by-catches
were low. Under the Dutch co-management regime, the allocation of days-
at-sea was based on individual landing rights, while the European Union
allocated sea days based on fishing gear, regardless of entitlements. For
fishermen using beam trawls, fishing time was severely restricted. Daalder
feared that this would sap the legitimacy of and support for the reformed
Common Fisheries Policy. He made a dramatic plea to the European Com-
mission:
European Commission, for once please listen to the fishermen’s informed
arguments. We face measures that are at loggerheads with practice and that
confront the fisherman with the impossible task of living up to measures
such as the one-net rule,5 an impracticable measure that increasingly
widens the distance between the policymaker and the fisherman. It is a
generic measure that puts all European fishermen on the same footing, as
if all European fishermen work and fish in a similar way. This does not
stimulate a factual dialogue to really tackle the problems. … European Com-
mission, why don’t you listen to the fishermen’s arguments?
Instead of bridging the gap, the Texel fishermen felt that the European
Commission and the European policymakers were widening it. In subse-
quent years, Daalder frequently repeated his message that quotas should
prevail over days-at-sea. Whereas in the late 1980s and the early 1990s
there was a mismatch between fishing capacity and landing allowances,
with the European Union days-at-sea measures a serious mismatch be-
tween landing rights and fishing days surfaced. It just does not make
sense to the owner-operators to have a two-tiered, yet internally contradic-
tory system of controlling effort. This inconsistency undermines the sys-
tem’s credibility, because it fails to meet the commitment that rights
holders ‘may take the full extent of their allocated quotas at times of their
choosing’ (Copes 2000:6). Moreover, apart from thwarting large rights
holders from exercising their rights, there are certain negative conse-
quences linked with reducing the number of sea days. Owner-operators
tend to cut steaming time to allow for more fishing time and hence there
is a further congestion of fleets and intensification of exploitation of parti-
cular locations just outside the 12 nm zone where young flatfish concen-
trate. High fuel prices exacerbate the problem, which is an additional rea-
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son for diminishing steaming time and avoiding the risk of fishing diffi-
cult grounds.
The manner in which the European Commission communicates is awk-
ward and does not seem to be in line with the ‘good governance principles’
it so ardently claims to have embraced. Take for example the following. By
mid-December 2005, the Texel owner-operators were rather concerned
about the quantities of sole and the number of days-at-sea that the EU
would set for the next year. There was a sigh of relief when the Council of
Ministers announced its decisions. These included relatively small de-
clines of the national quotas for sole and plaice and, initially at least, a
number of sea days that seemed acceptable (although it would take
months to establish the exact number, which fell five days short of what
the skipper-owners had expected). Therefore, the tension that had been
building up relaxed: the fishermen thought they would be left in peace –
or at least relatively in peace – until the following December. However, in
January, the European Commission launched a plan that the fishermen
regarded as a disaster for the Dutch flatfish fishing industry. It proposed
that sole and plaice TACs would be fifteen per cent up or down each year to
arrive at a recovery of the stocks and to achieve maximum sustainable
yields (European Commission 2006). In itself, this would have been disas-
trous enough for the Texel owner-operators, but what particularly aggra-
vated them was the message’s timing: just a fortnight after they had
learned what the 2006 quotas would be. Moreover, they deemed the an-
nouncement premature. They believed that scientific evidence proving the
need for such a drastic measure was lacking. It takes no more than a smat-
tering of empathy to comprehend why fishermen resent everything that
sprouts from Brussels.
Despite vehement contestations of European Union regulations that
they consider useless, unfair or unacceptable, Dutch flatfish fishermen
have become increasingly aware of ecological problems. This is partly
linked with the opposition they encounter from environmentalists, but
more so with the public image of fishermen as the archetypical ‘Very Hun-
gry Caterpillar’, as Ben Daalder expressed it. We have already seen that
they were prepared to restrict fishing effort to contribute to the recovery of
cod stocks – even though their catches of cod were insignificant. The EU
cod-recovery measures crosscut this proposal. In 2002, the owner-opera-
tors voluntarily agreed to restrict plaice fishing during the spawning sea-
son. The same year they held a symposium and discussed among them-
selves the question of how to arrive at sustainable fisheries, leading to the
establishment of a Task Force Sustainable North Sea Fisheries, which has
recently presented its ambitious recommendations (Task Force 2006).
Moreover, of late owner-operators have begun to seek alternatives for the
energy-consuming and controversial beam trawls. The efforts of finding
alternatives are indicative of an altered state of mind. This also applies to
the issue of self-monitoring. When the Dutch co-management system was
up for review in 2003, the evaluation committee could not duly agree on a
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final report. The reason was that an extension of group responsibilities to
monitor engine power and the use of illegal net provisions was deemed
unacceptable as long as a level playing field in the EU was lacking. Dutch
fishermen felt that in other member states monitoring and enforcement
were suboptimal, to say the least. Nonetheless, the report appeared in
2005 and fishing industry leaders signed an agreement with the fisheries
Minister, Cees Veerman, stating that the fisheries sector would fully com-
ply with the rules pertaining to engine power and gear by disseminating
norms and values through the groups and tackling and correcting each
other (Stuurgroep Nijpels 2005). Although it was the Shipping Inspector-
ate that subsequently thoroughly checked, adjusted and sealed engines,
the measure boiled down to fishermen becoming their own policemen
through their co-management groups. In return for the fishing industry’s
cooperative stand, the Minister promised to cut the number of rules and
regulations (which was in line with an EU intention of simplifying the
CFP; see European Commission 2005). This show of mutual goodwill not-
withstanding, the fishermen, or their leaders at any rate, believe that this is
a nice gesture that will eventually amount to little or nothing: fisheries
policy is, and will be, largely determined in Brussels. They are also rather
cynical about all the good intentions that the European Commission an-
nounced in its ‘Roadmap’. Their reality is that they feel they are being
ousted from the North Sea.
Generally, fishermen continue to be dissatisfied with stock management
measures and regulatory regimes. Their involvement through the co-gov-
ernance system does not encompass policy design. Decisions are still top-
down, as shown by the European Commission’s recent proposal to intro-
duce a plaice and sole management plan. In a press release, the Commis-
sion claimed to have extensively consulted stakeholders (meaning the
North Sea Regional Advisory Council), but the fishermen do not think
their voice has been represented. Even the Dutch fisheries Minister, Cees
Veerman, was unhappy with the announcement as he felt that it would
possibly frustrate the owner-operators’ willingness to fully cooperate with
the ongoing restructuring of the fishing industry. This does not mean that
fishermen – as in the past – obstinately disobey the regulations; quite the
contrary. However, they do generally regard them with suspicion, and with
good reason. After concluding that the governance regime in the Dutch
flatfish fishing industry seems to be ‘proficient though not completely ro-
bust’, fisheries economist Luc van Hoof points out that ‘new EU regula-
tions affect this segment in a non-coherent way’ and that ‘the rather well
adapted system to the specific Dutch situation may become lopsided’ (van
Hoof 2005). Nonetheless, under the co-management regime the flatfish
fishermen sought their own ways of adjusting to the problems they en-
countered. They committed themselves to a tie-up scheme of four weeks
in 2004 and of eight weeks in 2005, a self-regulatory scheme implemen-
ted through the co-management groups and monitored by the national
authorities. In the latter year, this measure was undercut in two ways.
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Firstly, the uptake of sole quotas proved to be difficult so that the fisher-
men needed more time and, secondly, owner-operators from some fishing
ports initially did not honour the agreement, creating a free-rider problem
and undercutting the willingness of others to continue their participation.
For example, the Texel fishermen – who had collectively respected the
measure – announced that they would not voluntarily stay in port in 2006.
The eroding willingness of restricting effort originated in a rapid dete-
rioration of the flatfish fishing industry’s economic situation. Following
the implementation of the co-management regime, it had experienced se-
ven plentiful years. Seven biblically lean years would follow. Initially, the
decline did not give rise to great worries. Fishermen were used to the vicis-
situdes of conjunctures and fluctuating revenues. However, owners began
encountering difficulties in breaking even. Net results became increas-
ingly negative. Quota reductions, less-than-average plaice and particularly
sole catches, occasionally low market prices and higher costs – particularly
of fuel – were the chief reasons. The owner-operators used their time-hon-
oured strategy of cutting back on incomes, postponing investments and
eating into their capital. The solvency of owner-operators declined from
forty-four per cent in 2001 to zero three years later, meaning that they
were dependent on credit and loans from financial institutions. This un-
dermined the financial elasticity and the economic resilience of many
firms. As a board member of the fishermen’s association, a retired skipper,
said in a March 2005 presentation: ‘The mood is grim, the reserve-capital
has been exhausted and there is no meat on the bones.’ But the worst was
yet to come.
Fuel prices had been high throughout the early 2000s, but they began
soaring in the course of 2005. In January, the price of red diesel was still
€0.23 per litre, but it had almost doubled by September. From then on, it
would remain high. With a weekly consumption of around 30,000 to
35,000 litres for the beam trawlers’ 2,000 h.p. segment and approximately
7,000 to 10,000 litres for the Euro-cutters, this implied staggering fuel
bills, in many cases subtracting forty per cent and over from the gross
proceeds. When in August 2005 the government announced that thirty-
eight million euros would be available for voluntary decommissioning of
fishing vessels, the enthusiasm to apply was substantial, even though it
prohibited any commercial use of decommissioned vessels. A few months
later, no less than twenty-eight cutters were decommissioned. Three of
them were Texel-registered beamers. One Texel owner-operator downsized
his family firm and bought a Euro-cutter. The other two family firms
owned and operated two boats each. Given the high operating costs and
the uncertainties regarding future fishing opportunities, they deemed it
wise to concentrate their quotas on one vessel. To add to the misery, the
catchability of sole had been poor, and with the number of days-at-sea re-
stricted, uptake was well below targets (it dwindled from ninety-five per
cent in 2004, via seventy-nine per cent in 2005 to only sixty-five per cent
in 2006, rising again to eighty-seven per cent in 2007). It is important to
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mention in this respect that around the millennium, in the mixed flatfish
fisheries sole landings on average accounted for half of the gross revenues
with full quota uptake (with plaice bringing in a quarter). The situation
also had implications for the value of quotas, which had been decreasing
considerably on both the sales and the rental market. For example, in May
2006 the lease of the landing rights for a kilo of sole was €0.80, a quarter
of the price paid twelve months earlier. Over the past five years, the Dutch
fishing fleet’s cutter segment has faced negative net results, amounting to
as much as eleven million euros in 2005. The owner-operators’ equity
capital has vanished completely. Fishing industry pleas for yet another
round of decommissioning were getting louder and louder, and in early
2008 another twenty-three big beamers were decommissioned, although
this time none hailed from Texel. The successive decommissioning
rounds have cut overcapacity to a considerable extent, but many fishermen
fear that a substantial part of the Dutch fishing fleet will nonetheless go
bankrupt. Although banks are likely to accept a brief postponement of re-
deeming loans and paying interest, their patience will not extend beyond a
year or so. Moreover, they will hesitate to furnish skipper-owners with new
loans. The depression also affects the crewmembers because they are co-
adventurers. Apart from that, they have been facing their own particular
difficulties for quite some time.
The Deckhands’ Bones of Contention
On the island of Texel, it became increasingly difficult to recruit crew in
the course of the 1990s. As long as revenues were good and non-proper-
tied fishermen benefited, the partnership contract and the share system of
remuneration worked well. However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, follow-
ing the oil crisis, the North Sea fleet’s skipper-owners changed the share
convention. They argued that the increasing costs of a vessel and equip-
ment had altered the balance of risks and necessitated a greater boat share.
This meant a shift away from the fifty–fifty arrangement that had been
common for decades in the offshore fleet to a fifty-five per cent vessel
share as of the mid-1970s. The figure allocated to the crew has thus be-
come smaller. The unilateral decision went against the grain for the deck-
hands, who felt the old convention to be a moral duty. Although they op-
posed the change, they were powerless. Compared with onshore jobs, the
remuneration was still good although work hours were long. Deckhands
obtained excellent incomes. As there was no shortage of hands, boat own-
ers tended to tell protesting crewmembers: ‘If you don’t like it, just leave’.
They could pick other crewmembers from among a pool of stand-in deck-
hands who were willing to work for lower shares and still earn good
money. These events affected the mutual relationships between skipper-
owners and deckhands and the social distance between them increased.
Although many crewmembers deemed a temporary change of the share
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division acceptable to enable owners to weather the depression, what ag-
gravated them was the fact that the latter did not redress it when in the late
1970s things started to improve. On the contrary, renewed discussions per-
taining to a revised partnership contract came about, with skipper-owners
arguing that their capital input had increased following the introduction of
quotas. Deckhands distrusted it and many initially refused to sign the con-
tract. One-sidedly changing the share convention was indicative of asym-
metric relationships. The egalitarian rhetoric notwithstanding, the power
balance was clearly lopsided in the owner-operators’ favour. Even trivial
signs of hierarchical relationships sometimes gave rise to cantankerous re-
marks. During a fishing trip, a twenty-eight-year-old crewman-cum-cook
told me of his ‘old-style’ skipper: ‘He never clears away his plate and cut-
lery or banana peel and things like that. He expects you, as the cook, to
clear the table, but other skippers do it themselves.’ On the other hand, it
was no exception that deckhands remained loyal to a firm for twenty or
more years and appreciated relations aboard.
If mutual trust suffered from the bickering regarding the partnership
contract and the share system, it received another blow when the boat own-
ers changed the percentages once again in the 1980s. The acquisition of
more powerful vessels and additional quota entitlements required consid-
erable sums of money. Therefore, most owners demanded a fifty-eight per
cent vessel share. Officially, the partnership contract gives joint responsi-
bility to skipper-owners and deckhands when it comes to fishing, but in
practice the former usually decide on when, where and how to fish. Deck-
hands have no influence in the running of the business such as decisions
on investments and quota transactions. The skipper-owners argued that
with the altered share division the net incomes of crewmembers would
still be high since increased landing entitlements would imply greater
revenues. Even though elsewhere in the Netherlands an even worse sixty–
forty arrangement became common, the Texel deckhands were not
amused. For them, it felt like déjà vu, leading to a further deterioration of
their trust in and respect for the skipper-owners. A conflict was smoulder-
ing. The deckhands perceived it as a grave injustice that they were ‘part-
ners’, yet had no say whatsoever when an owner changed the share con-
vention. Many believed it unfair that owners and not vessels received
quotas. This way, owner-operators became ‘quota millionaires’ while deck-
hands – who contributed their labour, knowledge and assiduity and thus
were co-responsible for the results on which entitlement allocations were
based – stood empty-handed. Although the share convention changed,
they had to pay their part of the costs that were subtracted from the gross
proceeds. Part of the crewmembers’ dissatisfaction was also linked with
the partnership contract’s terms that specified that the rent of additional
quotas and fines for rule beating would be subtracted from the revenues
and hence partly from the crew share. Fines were tax deductible for own-
ers, but the deckhands paid their relative share without having the tax-de-
duction opportunity. There were also instances of abuse by skipper-own-
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ers. Some of them first rented out a part of their entitlements – cashing the
money without any redistribution to the crew – and then later had to lease
additional quotas for which crewmembers had to pay part of the bill. One
of the skipper-owners transferred part of his quotas to a small boat and
then rented it back to the beamer (see below). He deducted the rent from
the crew share, in fact making the deckhands pay for quotas he already
owned. Two other skipper-owners sought to subtract the costs of quota
entitlements they purchased from the crew share. It must be emphasized,
however, that the vast majority of skipper-owners and the local fishermen’s
association’s board unequivocally condemned such practices.
Another bone of contention was that the item ‘costs’, subtracted from
the gross revenues, often tended to be rather diffuse and varied from cut-
ter to cutter. Some skipper-owners were transparent and put bills on the
table so that the crew could check them. ‘You need each other, so if the
deckhands complain about the net proceeds, you have to show them the
bills. You should pay attention to their grievances,’ explained a skipper-
owner. Others, however, were less clear and subtracted standard sums of
money. This gave rise to quay talk and gossip. The deckhands demanded
more clarity and more uniformity. Progress through Unity chairman Bas
van der Beek warned: ‘One could almost forget that the partnership is a
cooperative venture and start thinking in terms of a boss-servant relation-
ship, with all consequences this entails.’ Keeping the troops united and
closing ranks was his aim. He cherished the cooperative ideology: all
should work together. In order to subdue the deckhands’ mounting discon-
tent, in 1995 the fishermen’s association’s board began working on a new
partnership contract that would be supported by owners and crew alike.
The revised contract stipulated that owners should use up their entitle-
ments before leasing additional landing allowances and could not subtract
costs for the acquisition of additional quotas. In addition, the association
provided for an arbitration by-law and an arbitration committee with repre-
sentatives from both parties. The committee almost immediately had to
address some moot points following complaints by a few deckhands. It
referred some cases to the Federation for arbitration. The Progress
through Unity board also commissioned an investigation into the issue of
cost subtractions on the settlement. Accountants compared the ways in
which owners handled the settlements, but found no irregularities.
A conflict between a deckhand (‘Jan’) and his skipper (‘Dirk’) would
cause considerable turmoil in the occupational community. For a number
of weeks, Dirk had been subtracting the rent for leased quotas from the
gross revenues without deliberating with the crew. It amounted to a con-
siderable sum of money. When it transpired that he had transferred part of
his own quotas to a small boat and then ‘rented’ it back, a conflict was
born. Jan set himself up as the spokesperson for the crew. He wrote a letter
of protest, had the boat’s entire crew sign it, and handed it over to the
skipper. The latter responded angrily and threatened to sack the lot. Conse-
quently, all deckhands apart from Jan dropped the complaint. According to
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Jan, feelings of fear and guilt underlay their submissive behaviour. They
even chose the skipper’s side when Jan sent a letter to the editor of the
national fishery weekly, Visserijnieuws, in which he expounded his view on
what had been going on. Most fishermen considered washing one’s dirty
linen in public as treason, and Jan was more or less socially ostracized.
Dirk sacked him. With his sense of justice breached, Jan continued fight-
ing for justice to be done. He contacted a solicitor, wrote letters to the Pro-
gress through Unity board, phoned its chairman, Ben Daalder, and during
the association’s 1997 annual meeting, took the floor. The mood grew
tense. He explained that he took pride in the fishing fleet, the growth of
which the partnership contract had helped accomplish. However, the con-
tract should be based on mutual trust and unity, but this was obviously
lacking in the case at hand. Daalder replied that he agreed that the dubious
practice of hiring back one’s own quotas was wrong but that this practice
had since stopped. Two skipper-owners exclaimed that ‘it is all in the past
now’. A board member, one of the deckhands’ representatives, supported
Jan and said that the crew should protest in unison if things like that hap-
pened again. After having crewed on another boat for a while, Jan even-
tually left the fishing industry, deeply disappointed and empty-handed.
The Federation’s appeals committee turned down his case. Although very
few deckhands supported him in public, they often discussed his case on
the quay and aboard the beamers. The crewmembers had a sneaking sym-
pathy for Jan and their view of the skippers’ attitude and mentality was
changing.
With the local partnership contract revised and the association’s consen-
sus opinion of ending questionable cost subtractions, it would seem to be
a case of all’s well that ends well. However, the events had driven a wedge
in the ranks of Texel’s occupational community of fishermen. Owner-op-
erators and deckhands began drifting more and more apart. The latter re-
mained disgruntled for various reasons. When they asked to set a mini-
mum crew percentage of forty-two per cent in the contract, the owner-
operators refused, arguing that the acquisition of additional quotas meant
higher exploitation costs. They also had to mind their competitive edge,
since in other fishing ports the boat share was sixty per cent while on Texel
it was fifty-eight per cent. They felt they had no financial slack and could
therefore not contractually guarantee the fifty-eight–forty-two deal. Crew-
members further pointed out that contractual certainty was lacking. Skip-
pers could sack them without much ado. It only took a four-week’s term of
notice to fire a deckhand, who then became unemployed without any kind
of benefits. A particular case in point was when boat owners decided to sell
or decommission their vessel. What bothered the deckhands was that an
owner usually did not inform them about his plans until the notice term.
The skipper knew that the deckhands would probably attempt to find a
berth on another beamer long before this date if he told them any earlier.
He therefore used the deadline of telling his crew in order to be able to
continue operating the boat until the very last day. Although there were
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compensation measures for young crew of boats that were decommis-
sioned, usually consisting of money for vocational training, it was yet an-
other reason for growing mistrust and grumbling.
The state of affairs had a negative effect on the outlook of crewmembers
on their occupation. Their pride in being a fisherman began withering
away and they mentally dissociated from the occupation. Whereas in the
past they identified with the boat they worked on and the skipper-owner
they crewed with, they currently consider themselves to be working for a
skipper-owner. They no longer perceive fishing as a way of life but simply
regard it as backbreaking work to earn a living. The partnership contract
stipulates that crew can also leave a boat after a four-week’s notice and of
late, many a skipper-owner has faced the problem of finding sufficient
deckhands. The pool of stand-ins, which still numbered twenty to twenty-
five men in 1992, declined to a handful. It has subsequently vanished.
Whereas in the early 1990s most beamers were overstaffed: instead of the
legally required crew of six they often had seven or eight men who all
shared in the gross revenues, by the end of the decade this was no longer
the case. Job satisfaction diminished when the deckhands saw their in-
comes declining and their labour hours increasing. To ensure their quota
uptake, most skippers began sailing on Sunday evenings at around 10 p.m.
instead of Monday mornings at 8 a.m., which ate into the crew’s weekend
leave. Upon their return on Friday, small repairs and preparations for the
upcoming fishing week would last for the remainder of the day. Having
had few opportunities to get sufficient sleep aboard, the crewmembers re-
turned home exhausted and had hardly recuperated before sailing again.
In 1998, several young Texel deckhands protested against sailing on Sun-
day evenings. They considered it ‘socially unacceptable’ and demanded ‘a
real weekend’. Some said they were beginning to watch the clock by Sun-
day afternoon. The issue remained under discussion during subsequent
years, but the skipper-owners did not budge. They argued that the deck-
hands benefited financially through the share system and were compen-
sated with extra time at home through the days-at-sea regime that re-
stricted fishing time. However, some of that time went to maintaining the
boat, an unpaid chore the deckhands were contractually obliged to per-
form. Deckhands began voting with their feet and fewer and fewer new-
comers joined fishing crews.
Research into the ‘crew problem’ indicated that of fifty-seven Texel re-
spondents more than half had difficulties with the time spent away from
home, while over a quarter stated that (fluctuating) incomes were a prob-
lem (Productschap Vis 2001:13). The latter may come as a surprise. At the
time of the investigation, many deckhands of offshore boats were earning
annual gross incomes in excess of 100,000 guilders, which skilled la-
bourers would consider an extremely good remuneration. However, as
self-employed entrepreneurs the crew had to pay a considerable sum of
money in taxes and social security and other types of insurance, leaving
them with a rather modest net income relative to work hours and com-
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pared with what they had received in previous years. Other reasons for
deteriorating job satisfaction and recruitment problems were the deterior-
ating mood aboard and the uncertainties inherent in the annual delimita-
tion of national and thus individual quotas, with all the concomitant finan-
cial insecurities entailed, and the bad public image of fishing as an
occupation. The fishermen resent being stereotyped as brigands of the
sea. As an experienced deckhand in his fifties intimates:
I used to take pride in being a fisherman. On the island, there was public
esteem if you told people you were working on a North Sea cutter. You
really were someone then. Now people consider you a pariah and blame
you for over-fishing, for using six litres of fuel to catch a kilo of fish. I do
not know how to say this. Perhaps it is because I am getting a bit older now
and it changes your view, but in my experience, the image has become
more and more negative. Today I can no longer say that I take pride in
being a fisherman.
For some, the impossibility of upward mobility – that is, becoming a skip-
per-owner – was also a cause for diminished job satisfaction. Last but cer-
tainly not least, net incomes declined due to rising social security and addi-
tional insurance fees. Largely, this was a scale problem. With the fishing
industry becoming smaller and the crewmembers older, the risks for the
Social Fund for the Share Fishery increased. Older crewmembers are more
susceptible to health troubles and more frequently fail to obtain medical
approval to sail. With fewer fishermen contributing to the Social Fund for
the Share Fishery and the insurants’ mean age rising, insurance claims
swiftly sapped the fund’s resources. It was and is internally weak and vul-
nerable because of its small and homogeneous membership and accumu-
lation of risks (de Swaan 1988:145-146). To enable the fund to survive de-
spite the problems of scale, insurance fees had to rise considerably, further
deducting from the crews’ incomes.
The recruitment problems were not restricted to Texel. Dutch fishery
schools faced declining numbers of enrolling students and several boat
owners had difficulties finding replacements for deckhands who left their
vessel. This happened despite the fact that the number of vessels and
hence employment on the fishing fleet declined considerably in the
1990s. For those who left the fishing industry, the booming Dutch econo-
my created many alternative job opportunities. Almost a quarter of the
Dutch crewmembers turned their backs on fishing in 1998 and 1999
alone (Productschap Vis 2001). Many were younger than thirty-six. Some
vessel owners began hiring Polish crewmembers to cope with the shortage
of hands. Pessimism about the fishing industry’s future was clearly on the
rise. By the millennium, even owners and their wives allegedly encouraged
their sons ‘to learn a trade’ instead of following in their fathers’ footsteps.
Occupational inheritance was no longer a matter of course. The difficulties
pertaining to recruiting crew were evidence that the owners’ power was
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limited. They depended on the labour provided by non-related share fish-
ermen – at least more so than in the past, when nuclear families were
much larger and crews composed largely of agnatic kin and in-laws were
more common. The post-war demographic transition towards smaller nu-
clear families implied that in most cases this was no longer feasible,
although on Texel it was rare to find a beamer that did not have any rela-
tives at all aboard.6 Still, such examples existed. Being a sole owner with-
out any kinsfolk crewing, one young skipper-owner decommissioned his
beamer in 2002 for want of a motivated crew. He also found it difficult to
cope with the anxiety of running the business alone and his health suf-
fered.
There was one potential solution: to solve the crew problem by attempt-
ing to interest women – daughters of owner-operators in particular – in a
fishing career. However, both fishermen and fisherwomen simply dis-
missed it as being unfeasible. They said it would be physically ‘too de-
manding’ and shipboard life was ‘a men’s world’ where a ‘male culture’
was dominant. Only two women have crewed on a Texel beamer for a sub-
stantial period of time: one in the 1980s and the other in the 2000s. They
had their skipper certificates, but crewed as cooks-cum-deckhands. In gen-
eral, cultural constructions and constrictions made for disapproval by both
men and women of female crewmembers working on fishing vessels. The
gendered division of labour is therefore still firmly in place. This does not
mean that women’s roles are insignificant: on the contrary. They contrib-
ute to the family firm in many respects, but going to sea is not one of
them. Owner-operators with daughters but not sons even prefer to sell
their boat, rather than having their female offspring skipper or crew. This
is so even if a girl expresses an interest in assuming responsibility at the
helm, as was the case in a Texel family firm. ‘She’s capable enough, but it’s
just too difficult to handle with all the men,’ said the owner-operator in
1990. Ten years later, he sold his beamer. At least one other Texel skipper-
owner sold his boat in the early 2000s for want of blood-related male suc-
cessors. So, with the gender boundary deemed insurmountable, and in-
laws being considered second-best successors and then only in exceptional
cases, the dependency on non-related crewmembers continued to be a
given.
Some Texel owner-operators regarded deckhands who left their boat as
‘defectors’, considering it a personal affront when one of ‘their’ crewmem-
bers opted for another career or – worse yet – another fishing boat. They
also resented the deckhands’ criticism about the share division and the
personal incomes of owners and quickly dismissed it as slander or ‘quay
talk’. Other owner-operators seemed indifferent. For example, a skipper
who saw five experienced crewmembers in their thirties leave in the span
of half a year just shrugged his shoulders when I asked him about whether
he was worried about this phenomenon. ‘I cannot force them to stay,’ he
replied in a rather down-to-earth and resigned tone, ‘they are free to go.’
Once a crew starts dissolving, it may create a ‘flywheel effect’. Deckhands
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who have been crewing together for a number of years often enjoy the
camaraderie of each other’s company. They get to know each other thor-
oughly and spend more time with each other than with their spouses. If,
for any reason, someone leaves the crew, this occasionally detracts from
the pleasure the remaining crewmembers derive from their work. The
fifth crewmember to leave in the example just given, a thirty-two-year-old
engineer, related:
We had a golden team. We could trust each other blindly, but when Jan left
and then Peter left as well, I did not enjoy [being on the crew] so much
anymore. That is when I began to think of leaving also. I really liked them
a lot and we got along wonderfully.
The Texel deckhands continued to air their grievances in front of the skip-
per-owners, and especially among themselves, concerning the share divi-
sion’s alteration. Some skippers still allocated smaller shares to the crew
than others. The issue of cost subtractions would also stay on the Progress
through Unity agenda. A new investigation in 2001 disclosed that some
skipper-owners subtracted considerably more than others did. For the big
beamer category, the sums of money ranged from 1,900 guilders to 4,230
guilders per week (excluding fuel). Again, the matter was discussed in the
local fishermen’s association, but the owner-operators still argued that they
did not have the financial slack to do something for the deckhands. They
only agreed that crewmembers should receive a weekly overview of the
gross proceeds and the costs. Although this increased transparency, it of
course did not alleviate the pain. With revenues declining, the crewmem-
bers’ incomes fell, while social security, health and additional insurance
fees continued to rise sharply. On top of these problems, tax inspectors –
again – began to reject tax deductions of share fishermen who as self-em-
ployed entrepreneurs should be entitled to them. It took years of litigation
to redress this change of affairs, but in the meantime the fishermen stood
empty-handed. The crewmembers had grown used to good remunerations
in the 1990s and had adjusted their spending patterns to them. Many had
bought a luxurious house and other expensive items. Despite declining
incomes, they had to pay off mortgages and meet the costs of living. This
proved to be increasingly difficult after the millennium. With operating
costs rocketing due to high fuel prices, the deckhands sometimes returned
home after a week’s hard work with ridiculously low remunerations. Dur-
ing the summer of 2005, when sole catches were well below average,
scores of crewmembers earned a gross income of less than €150 per week.
In many cases, spouses had to find a job to meet financial commitments.
Later that year, results improved considerably, but in many nuclear fami-
lies wives put pressure on their husbands to find other employment, if
they had not themselves already decided to do just that. Twenty-five young
deckhands switched careers in 2005 alone, forcing some skipper-owners
to work with understaffed beamers: instead of the obligatory crew of six,
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they sailed with a crew of five. They risked a fine, but it also enabled divid-
ing the crew share with five rather than six crewmembers, improving their
incomes somewhat.
Deckhands of fifty-five and over could use a state arrangement that
aimed at facilitating early retirement. Several older Texel crewmembers
used this option. Many continued to crew, however, and, if need be, they
ate into the savings they had intended for a rainy day. As one of them, a
fifty-six-year old deckhand, told me:
I have requested those papers to apply for the retirement allowance, but it
just did not appeal to me to stay home. I would be bored stiff and I really
like fishing. […] At the moment, we are eating into our capital. We are living
a rather frugal life and we cleared the mortgage, so we can make do with
what I am earning without my wife having to find a job. I do not desire to
have a yacht in the harbour. Mind you, we have had golden years. Take
1992. That was a top year. I earned 165,000 guilders then. There was one
week when I brought home 17,000 guilders. S-e-v-e-n-t-e-e-n-t-h-o-u-s-a-n-d
guilders! We were catching so much that we were on our feet nearly all the
time. They had to pull my gumboots off when I got home. Those young
lads, they do not even stand a chance of saving up for the future. That is
why they leave. In Fishery School, they take extra courses so that they can
switch jobs if they want or need to.
His wife added, passionately:
For those young share fishermen, these are really hard times. I feel sorry
for them. Their wives just have to take on a job. It is impossible to make a
living without. They cannot save up for a pension and things like that, while
they should. By the time you leave the cutter, you should have paid off the
mortgage on your house. That is impossible now. So many costs subtract
from your income. It is difficult, particularly if you cannot buy anything at
all for your kids.
Whilst interviewing this couple, their son – pushing thirty – entered the
living room. Having been a deckhand for seven years himself, he immedi-
ately joined the conversation. He said he was glad to have left the fisheries
for a steady job with the oceanographic institute. Father and son argued
that the owner-operators have an awkward way of dealing with the deck-
hands. The latter elucidated, ‘When they decommission their vessel,
you’re kicked out just like that. That’s impossible anywhere else in the
Netherlands save for the fishing industry.’ His parents simply nodded in
agreement. In their view, the times have clearly changed.
Although there are no capitalist relations of production in the share-
based fisheries – wage labour not being part of the deal – the deckhands
currently do feel exploited. They are simultaneously workers and self-em-
ployed entrepreneurs, but under the extant conditions, they believe the
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weight of the partnership contract and the share convention rests on their
shoulders. The share system has always been important for the resilience
of family firms. Today, crewmembers feel that with fluctuating quotas and
soaring expenses, they bear the brunt of entrepreneurial risks. They are of
the opinion that as rights holders, the owner-operators sit in a compara-
tively comfortable position. Selling the firm with its quotas will yield them
a considerable sum of money, none of which will accrue to the crewmem-
bers. The social and mental distance between skipper-owners and non-
propertied deckhands has increased tremendously. On board beamers or
at the quay, some deckhands are quick to volunteer their profound disap-
pointment in and dissatisfaction with the share system. With windfalls
rarely coming their way these days, they indubitably experience the draw-
backs of co-venturing. They are well aware that many an owner-operator is
up to his neck in debt, but this offers no comfort. Nor does it lead to pity.
The solidarity and the mutual empathy – once important aspects of the
share system of remuneration – seem to have evanesced over the past
three decades. This does not mean, of course, that affectionate bonds be-
tween individual owner-operators and crewmembers do not exist. For ex-
ample, the deckhand just quoted has been with the firm of his skipper for
nearly thirty years and he holds him in high regard. At a general level,
however, the crewmembers’ esteem for owners has been withering away.
From Entrepreneurial Skippers to Skippering Entrepreneurs
To sum up, following the severe compliance problems of the 1980s and
the lack of legitimacy of the extant fisheries management regimes, the
Dutch state created incentives and coercive measures in order to ensure
that fishermen would cooperate in co-management groups and comply
with rules and regulations. This commissioned cooperation brought back
peace and stability in the fishing industry, which finally returned to calmer
waters. It also led to changes in the occupational practice and culture of
fishermen, particularly owner-operators. Entrepreneurial skippers have
turned into skippering entrepreneurs. Modern-day owners of beam trawl-
ers have to be businessmen and managers, who invest in fishing opportu-
nities, draft fishing plans, and cooperate with colleagues in co-manage-
ment groups and Producer Organizations. Skipper-owners now have to
plan their fishing year thoroughly. Obviously, based on their personal ex-
periences, they will try to use their tie-up weeks when they expect catches
to be below average or the market to be at a low and their days-at-sea when
catches and prices should be good. However, they can gamble wrongly, and
there is always the risk that engine trouble or other such mishaps will pre-
vent them from fishing. In addition, renting out part of one’s quotas may
yield nice revenues or, conversely, turn out to be unwise because fish
prices are soaring or there is no demand for additional landing allowances.
Investment decisions are also precarious. Many skipper-owners have in-
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vested large sums of capital in acquiring landing rights. If the next year,
the EU reduces the quotas by, say, twenty per cent, the value of their invest-
ments is written off. Alternatively, entitlements may also increase if quotas
are set higher – but since 1993, this has hardly ever happened (see Appen-
dix D). In addition, quota values fluctuate. Operators may have garnered
them at high costs while their current value is much lower. Therefore, the
co-management system has led to more certainty when it comes to quota
uptake and being able to fish out the year, but there are still many uncer-
tainties. These new realities of the trade have affected some of the occupa-
tional culture’s key values. For example, the enjoyable competition for
recognition as a top skipper has made way for less exciting managing and
harvesting of quotas. To be a catch king today, a skipper-owner needs to be
a ‘calculating quota-manager’ (Davidse, McEwan and Vestergaard
1999:543) – although many fishermen would add that ‘you still have to
catch the fish’. To be a quota baron means complying with the state’s reg-
ulatory regime and with the rules of the group, whose social control is
tight. Unlike two decades ago, today Dutch sole and plaice fishermen gen-
erally seem to acquiesce in European Union and national quota rules and
regulations, which is in large measure due to the co-management of indi-
vidual transferable quotas.
Nevertheless, the Biesheuvel regime is certainly not a panacea. The eco-
nomic and political advantages sought with the co-management regime
have largely been fulfilled, but at considerable ecological and social costs.
The public-private governance system is not about managing fish stocks,
since this is done at the supranational level, but primarily designed to
maintain the social peace. It solved the quota-busting problem through a
mixture of input, output and technical measures and devolved manage-
ment tasks. This brought an end to political turmoil and fishermen’s overt
resistance to the rules and their enforcement. Rights holders can be rela-
tively sure of catching what they are legally entitled to, while fishing plans
have led to more continuity in landings and higher prices. There are years
when national quotas for sole and plaice are even under-utilized. However,
there is still fishing industry pressure to set total allowable catches above
maximum sustainable yield levels, while the rights-based beam-trawl fish-
ery leads to a degree of ecologically undesirable discarding and high grad-
ing. Alternatively, landing allowances may be out of kilter with the fisher-
men’s experience, in that catchability is much better than was to be
expected on the basis of the quotas that were allocated. We also have seen
that engine power limits have led to particular structural changes in the
fishing fleet’s composition, with strong concentrations of boats with either
300 h.p. or 2,000 h.p. engines. Fishing within the 12 nm zone with Euro-
cutters has increased considerably, leading to pressure on inshore sole and
plaice stocks, while bigger beamers tend to concentrate in fishing areas
just outside the limits of this zone, especially when facing high fuel prices.
Such congestion leads to intensive trawling in particular locations.
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The individual transferable quota system, the Biesheuvel regime and
other national and European fisheries policies also have had a number of
– partly unplanned, unanticipated and unintended – economic and social
consequences (see also Venema 2001:149). There has been a concentra-
tion of quota entitlements in fewer hands and it has become virtually im-
possible for newcomers to join the fishing industry. There are even consid-
erable problems with occupational succession within family firms. Young
fishermen, especially, experience difficulties, while older slipper skippers
use their entitlements as an old-age pension. Some have used the escape
route of re-flagging and quota hopping, but they are up against the Euro-
pean integration project’s contradictory tenets. With individual transfer-
able quotas firmly in place, it will be difficult to alter the management
system’s nature. Many fishermen – the Texel owner-operators being a
prime example – have developed a businesslike attitude and accumulated
rights, precisely as neoclassical economists said would happen under an
ITQ regime. They will defend these rights if confronted with alternative
management options. Overall, the introduction of individual transferable
quotas has been socially divisive in that the balance of power between skip-
per-owners and deckhands has become more skewed towards the former,
as they are the rights holders. Non-propertied crewmembers face the new
regime’s consequences in that owner-operators have altered the division
between the vessel share and the crew share, lowering the percentages gi-
ven to deckhands. In addition, owner-operators subtract new costs from
the gross revenues: the rent of quotas and fines. The shift in the balance
of power between skipper-owners and deckhands has made recruiting
crew increasingly difficult. Having little bargaining power, crewmembers
can only vote with their feet. With the turning of the economic tide, many
have done so.
It is uncertain whether the co-management system can withstand the
major shocks that may assail the flatfish fishing industry: ‘Resilience of
management systems, including their flexibility and adaptability in the
face of uncertain and changing social, economic and ecological conditions,
is critical’ (McCay 1995:18). In the 1990s, the conditions for the Dutch co-
governance regime’s economic and political success were extraordinarily
favourable, in spite of occasional problems and setbacks. This could
change if persistent storms undermine its legitimacy among the fisher-
men. These storms might come in the form of a stock collapse, additional
reductions of quotas and days-at-sea, area or seasonal closures, mandatory
decommissioning, or structurally high fuel prices. Susan Hanna hypothe-
sises, ‘even against a background of ongoing industry participation, parti-
cipatory management processes increase in difficulty as resource scarcity
increases’ (1995:42). Indeed, a group-board administrator recently re-
marked that with the extant depression the group members are much
more inclined to go their own individual ways and to neglect agreements.
‘The tolerance has declined,’ he says. Another weakness is unequal enfor-
cement and inequity of inspections across member states. Despite the
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European Union’s promise pertaining to a level playing field, Dutch fisher-
men are of the opinion that enforcement is much tighter in the Nether-
lands than in other member states. They believe and often contend that
Dutch regulators and inspectors want to be ‘top of the class’. The weak
point of co-governance – or any management regime for that matter – is
that under duress, the temptation of cheating becomes more attractive. I
do not have a shred of evidence, however, that this is currently the case.
The fishermen are still highly satisfied with the co-management system,
although they feel that their involvement in governance matters is extre-
mely limited. They do perceive their relationship with the regulatory sys-
tem as antagonistic, and they are experiencing difficulties in coping with
the precariousness these institutions have created for the fishing indus-
try’s future. They believe themselves to be at the mercy of bureaucrats and
regulators, over whom they have no control whatsoever. They view state
and European Union authorities with extreme suspicion and consider
them ignorant or ill informed, influenced by political considerations, and
generally uninterested. The fisheries bureaucrats issue new rules and reg-
ulations continually, making for much uncertainty and anxiety in the fish-
ing industry. These measures are often ill adapted to the realities of fish-
ing, but strongly impact upon the livelihoods of fishermen. Total allowable
catch and quota reductions may make their firms economically unviable.
The owner-operators deem fisheries policy haphazard and inconsistent,
which makes medium- and long-term business planning rather precar-
ious. They believe the biologists’ stock assessments to be often flawed and
underestimated, and yet the biologists have a disproportionate influence
on the fixing of total allowable catches, whereas the fishermen – the ex-
perts par excellence – have an extremely limited say in the framing of pol-
icy. Only recently, some fisheries biologists have admitted that they fo-
cused too narrowly on biological processes and that this ‘narrow focus has
led to management strategies that ignore the dynamic response of fisher-
men to developments in the stock and to management regulations itself’
(Rijnsdorp et al. 2000b:927). Skipper-owners feel policymakers should at
least consult them, but the authorities tend to ignore their views and ex-
periences. In general, the fishermen resent being haughtily treated as pu-
tative ignoramuses. They are convinced that the fishing industry would be
better off if their voices were heard and their advice were heeded. They
hate being patronized and stress the fact that they have sensible things to
say. As proof of this, they often refer to the 1960s and 1970s horsepower
race, when their opinion obviously did not count. The result was overcapa-
city, with all the accompanying difficulties that would subsequently assail
the fish stocks and the fishermen.
Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the individual transferable
quota and co-management regime have meant an important improvement
in comparison with the preceding governance system, in that compliance
with quota regulations has improved tremendously. Fishermen generally
acknowledge this benefit. Group management of quotas also gave them a
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say in governing the sea’s resources, although their influence is extremely
limited. Individual transferable quotas would seem to provide precisely the
benefits that advocates of this management system usually point out: on
the face of it, rights – or rather, the relative shares of national entitlements
– were exclusive, permanent, secure and transferable (Brubaker 1997:161-
162). The alleged additional benefit is that owners have a strong incentive
to take better care of resources. Fishermen would therefore internalize
considerations to operate in an ecologically sustainable way. With the
Dutch near monopoly on the European flatfish production and market
chain, this should apply even more. One would be inclined to attribute the
exceptionally good results in the Dutch flatfish fishing industry of the
1990s to these professed benefits. However, there were many imperfec-
tions and things changed dramatically in the new millennium, when
rights proved to be less permanent and less secure than everyone – includ-
ing in particular the owner-operators – had hoped and expected them to
be. The Dutch sole and plaice fishermen’s strong position in Europe’s flat-
fish fishing industry is simultaneously their weak point: being almost en-
tirely dependent on flatfish species for which they have acquired quotas,
they have little room to manoeuvre. It is telling that the Dutch flatfish
fleet’s owner-operators currently feel ‘imprisoned’ in the ITQ system (Task
Force 2006:22). For all the politicians’ rhetoric, the responsibilities de-
volved to fishermen are actually few and limited, so that participatory man-
agement is a grand designation for what essentially remains a command-
and-control type of regulatory regime: Brussels rules. The technocratic ap-
proach’s hubris entirely ignores metis: ‘the indispensable role of practical
knowledge, informal processes, and improvisation in the face of unpre-
dictability’ (J.C. Scott 1998:6), seriously impeding the fishermen’s adap-
tive performance.
When I joined the Monday morning meetings of Texel shore captains
again after more than fifteen years, it struck me how deeply pessimistic
the skipper-owners are about the future. During my first stint of fieldwork,
they had been prone to lamentation, but it was moaning with a militant
fighting spirit in conditions of prosperity. Today, the mood is much more
resigned. At times, there is a sense of despondency. The owner-operators
feel they are up against the wall. They seem to think that their way of life is
doomed, although they refrain from saying so in public. Primarily, the
high fuel prices are a thorn in the side of the entrepreneurs and the deck-
hands. It has become increasingly difficult to break even. ‘We are taking
our money to the oil mafia,’ is one of the frequently volunteered views.
‘The greater part of our gross revenues disappears straight into the fuel
tank.’ But that is not all. The fishermen are still bitter about the cascade of
petty regulations and the fault-finding inspectors and police and customs
officials, who seem to take pleasure in trying to fine them for trivial techni-
calities. ‘They are nitpicking and always find something that is an infrac-
tion,’many say. The fishermen opine that they have not been rewarded for
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their good behaviour over the past dozen odd years. They feel forsaken.
Acquiring additional landing rights has proven to be an extremely risky
investment, because quota cuts and fishing-time restrictions are the order
of the day. Between 1998 and 2005, fishing time has been reduced by
thirty per cent (Task Force 2006:14). There is unprecedented demoraliza-
tion in the local fishing industry, and this goes for skipper-owners as well
as deckhands. On a Saturday in March 2006, the Protestant church orga-
nized a meeting to discuss the deteriorating situation in the fisheries and
in the fishing communities. More than a hundred people – predominantly
owner-operators, deckhands and their spouses – attended the event. The
intention was to address issues including the financial problems of family
firms and fisher families, solidarity, pastoral care and so on. However, sev-
eral Netherlands Institute of Sea Research biologists who were in the audi-
ence diverted attention away from social issues to ecological ones, forcing
the fishermen onto the defensive, instead of giving them an opportunity to
exchange views amongst themselves. The following Monday, several shore
skippers gave voice to their disappointment about the meeting. Again, they
came under fire, and with a World Wildlife Fund anti-fisheries campaign
being broadcast at the same time, they felt unduly targeted once more.
‘When will they leave us in peace?’ a skipper-owner wondered. ‘We have
already given up so much, but it never seems to be enough.’ The owner-
operators continued contemplating ways of getting out of the crisis, but
the atmosphere turned increasingly bitter. A few weeks after the March
2006 event, Progress through Unity leader Ben Daalder postponed the
informal Monday morning meetings. A grumpy shore skipper’s remark
triggered his decision: ‘If everything has to go to hell, we’ll make sure it’ll
go to hell.’ Daalder was fed up with the negativism, which he deemed det-
rimental to finding solutions for the extant problems. The meetings were
only resumed after four months. Many skipper-owners fear that they will
go bankrupt if fuel prices continue to stay high and the state does not
come up with support measures. They attempt to cut down on fuel con-
sumption through all sorts of technical inventions, by reducing steaming
and fishing speed, by using lighter or alternative gear, by making efficient
use of tidal currents and so on, but such measures only lead to relatively
marginal advantages. Put simply, the beamers’ engines are too powerful to
make substantial gains with current fuel prices, and switching to smaller
boats – which many expect will be a future development – is not a transi-
tion that can be materialized overnight. The problem is also that the sole
fishery requires using rather heavy gear and horsepower. ‘The bank still
allows us to put fuel in the tank each week,’ says a shore skipper in his
early sixties, ‘but it cannot go on this way much longer.’ Some owner-op-
erators have even taken additional mortgages on their property to cover for
losses and stay in business. They realize that they are entrepreneurs who
cannot just sit still to weather the depression. However, their room for
manoeuvre is severely restricted. Although their dexterity and resilience in
navigating regulations have been remarkable, they have gradually and un-
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wittingly been funnelled into a trap from which there would seem to be no
escape. They now feel indissolubly entangled in the nets of the national
and particularly the European bureaucracies. They attempt to ‘muddle
through’, as there are few alternatives. They are well aware that should
they decide to sell their firm and its entitlements, this will yield only a tiny
fraction of their initial investments. Nowadays, vessels sell for scrap prices
and landing rights have saturated the market, diminishing their value sig-
nificantly. Even more importantly, perhaps, for many owner-operators giv-
ing up as a fisherman would mean giving up their dignity and pride.
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Conclusions: Seas of Trouble
I ended the previous chapter on a rather pessimistic note. Currently, the
local fishing industry is in jeopardy, the owner-operators are exasperated;
the deckhands have their own particular causes of disagreement, the fish-
ing communities are in decline and more generally, the meaning of what it
is to be a fisherman has changed profoundly. Just days after I wrote the
chapter’s concluding remarks, the Fishery Cooperative celebrated its sev-
enty-fifth anniversary – a remarkable age for a voluntary association in an
occupational world in which independence and individualism are impor-
tant self-referents and factionalism and schisms are rife. Given the bad
economic situation, the Co-op board had not initially planned for any fes-
tive celebration. They did eventually decide that this milestone should be
marked symbolically and they organized a range of activities for Saturday 9
September 2006. The day attracted hundreds of fisher families, islanders
and holidaymakers and was a huge success. There were official speeches,
video presentations, photo galleries of boats and crews past and present,
net-mending, fish-cooking and sole-smoking demonstrations, a Fisher-
men’s Choir performance and various other events. The zenith came in
the afternoon, when fishing-boat crews competed in a ‘bathtub race’ in the
harbour. It involved the most curiously constructed craft, manned by stur-
dy deckhands in even more curious attire, including miniskirts, ‘sexy’
stockings, oversized bras, pink stoles and colourful wigs. This show of
travesty met with great enthusiasm, roars of laughter and several rounds
of applause from the crowd that had gathered at the quay to watch the
event. The men in their makeshift boats doubtlessly had the most fun. In
the evening, there was a plenteous barbecue for the families of owner-op-
erators, deckhands, retired fishermen and others involved in the local fish-
eries arena. The following Monday, the mood at the fishermen’s informal
meeting was exceptionally cheerful. With smiley faces, the shore skippers
rehashed the events, agreeing that it had been a perfect day that had con-
tributed to bringing the occupational community closer together again and
presenting a favourable image of the fishing industry. On a less functional
level, the feast reasserted that there is a special meaning to ‘being a fisher-
man’. It was a brief moment of relief in the midst of a formidable crisis.
I will not attempt to summarize here what has been going on in the
local fishing industry over the past three centuries. I would simply fail to
do justice to all the complexities, heterogeneities and dynamics that I have
tried to unpack in the preceding chapters. Moreover, each chapter contains
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a final section that is more or less a conclusion in its own right, concerning
a specific span of time. However, I would like to return briefly to a number
of issues and quandaries for further scrutiny. These concern the dilemmas
and paradoxes of independence, rivalry and competition on the one hand
and collective action, social cohesion and cooperation on the other; the
logic and dynamic of the kin- and share-based family firm versus the ra-
tional logic of capitalism; the adaptive performance of fishermen; and the
unforeseen and counterproductive effects or ‘pathologies’ of regulatory re-
gimes. Although unique in their specific configuration, the processes and
events in the occupational community of Texel fishermen have a broader
significance. Analyzing these processes and events can shed light upon
fishing as an adaptive and evolving regime that is embedded in and af-
fected by wider societal systems and dynamics. On an abstract plane, we
can come across the resultant modes of response and patterns of beha-
viour in many regionally distinct settings. At the same time, we also need
to do justice to the perceptions, experiences and practices of local fisher-
folk, and carefully balance empirical precision and generalization.
Cooperating Competitors and Other Oxymorons
‘It is easier to teach a cow how to pray than a fisherman how to listen,’
Dutch Fishermen’s Union leader Johan Nooitgedagt exclaimed in an inter-
view, referring to the problem of cooperation among Dutch fishermen. ‘It
is frustrating. They fail to take up so many opportunities. […] Fishermen
remain first and foremost individualists.’ As if to somewhat mitigate his
harsh judgment, he added, ‘Despite the individualism it is an occupational
community close to my heart. They work hard and are honest. You can
sympathize with them’ (Leeuwarder Courant, 7 May 2005). For everyone
who is even slightly familiar with what has been achieved in the Dutch
fishing industry since 1993, Nooitgedagt’s remarks must come as a sur-
prise. Fishermen would seem to have learned how to cooperate in groups
and how to manage their own affairs when it comes to quota transactions
and uptake, compliance with the rules and so on. The fishermen entertain
self-images of individualism that are, however, belied by their actual con-
duct, which proves to be deeply social.
More generally, there is an apparent paradox in many descriptions of
occupational communities of fishermen. They are often portrayed as
rugged independent and secretive individualists who compete ferociously
with each other but whose shipboard relations are characterized by an
ethos of egalitarianism and close cooperation and who live in densely knit
communities of place (Löfgren 1977:234; see also Pollnac 1991:265). More-
over, in adjusting to ecological, economic, social and political perturba-
tions, fishermen would seem to face perennial problems that structurally
pit the individual entrepreneur against the collective of marine resource
users, and the self-serving maximizer versus the public good. At face value,
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this seems to be true of the adaptive strategies of Texel fishermen as much
as those of their colleagues elsewhere. There appears to be an ‘inescapable
tension … between the desire of parties to maximize their own advantages
and/or seek cooperative solutions to mutual problems’ (Jentoft, McCay and
Wilson 1998:431; also see Löfgren 1977:235). Still, there is no need for bi-
nary reasoning in the sense that fishermen are either competitive or coop-
erative. Competition and cooperation are not incompatible and mutually
exclusive activities (Hanna and Jentoft 1996:47-48). Rather, there is no
competition without cooperation and no cooperation without competition:
they presuppose each other and they are interdependent, albeit different,
ways of handling problems that arise with any change in the encompass-
ing social system or mode of production. Fishermen must continually
solve dilemmas that are, ipso facto, of a social nature: ‘[t]he critical point
about “the fisherman’s problem” … is that it is by its very nature a social
problem and thus beyond the control of individuals qua individuals’ (McE-
voy 1986:xii).
This is so on a number of levels. Firstly, fishermen rarely operate a boat
alone. Even if they skipper a vessel single-handedly, they usually compete
and cooperate with other owner-operators for resources and markets, mak-
ing fishing a deeply social endeavour. Secondly, finding and capturing fish
is a highly competitive game that is often characterized by a climate of
secrecy, avoidance, opportunism, distortion of information and deceit.1
Again, such stratagems of guarding one’s own information, while attempt-
ing to discover that of others, make sense only if fishing is a socially mean-
ingful venture. Moreover, the management of information is hedged in by
economic considerations, social duties and moral restrictions. Wilson hy-
pothesizes that ‘fishermen can be expected to resort to small numbers co-
operative arrangements in order to obtain the benefits of coordination
without the high costs of opportunism. The hazards and costs of coopera-
tion in the face of potentially opportunistic behavior tend to be mitigated
by repetitious, reciprocal exchanges’ (1990:21). Refraining from the ex-
change of information may mean being barred from networks that share
knowledge and eventually being socially ostracized from the occupational
community of fishermen: ‘To guard a secret is to withdraw from social
exchange. The guardian of secrets and treasures becomes asocial […]
Long-term secrecy is neither socially or economically advantageous [and]
the unwillingness to exchange information results in loss of social esteem
which has also economic consequences’ (T. Vestergaard 1992:172). In this
connection, McGoodwin points out that there is a ‘skipper’s paradox’: skip-
pers must maximize their gains of valuable information and minimize
their loss of it. At the same time, they must be ‘socially participant coopera-
tors and competitors’ (1990:137). In other words, they have to balance the
dilemma of being competitive and secretive on the one hand, and being –
or appearing to be – helpful and cooperative to peers on the other hand. As
Pálsson maintains, ‘One way to solve the tricky problem of co-operating
under conditions of competition is to participate in an informal club of
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skippers, a network with relatively stable membership, thereby exchanging
information on a regular and reciprocal basis’ (1994:914; see also Gate-
wood 1984; Wilson 1990). In this respect, Barth (1966) refers to ‘clusters’
or reference groups, in which information regarding the proper ways of
fishing, the location of species and markets, and technological and eco-
nomic innovations is exchanged in the hope that there will be reciproca-
tion in the future. Should reciprocity fail to come, then cooperation will be
short-lived. Crosscutting social ties at the community level also to some
extent mitigates inter-crew rivalry (Byron 1986:102; LiPuma 1992:57).
Competitive interaction is thus contained within the rules of the encom-
passing community or society and may therefore not cause disruption and
disorder (Hanna and Jentoft 1996:47-48).
We have seen that Texel fishermen past and present have also attempted
to strike a balance between competition and cooperation. Being each
other’s competitors, there seems to be a ‘subjective independence’, but
this has been coupled with an ‘objective interdependence’ as they have
many interests in common (Bowman 1982:575). They have usually dealt
with the dilemma through the formation of informal clubs, which have
often been long-lived and based on the reciprocal barter of information.
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been considerable continuity
in this mode of solving the ‘skipper’s paradox’, although there has been
some variation across particular types of fishery and with the emergence
of new technologies such as navigation and communication devices and
scramblers. Even the commended cooperation under the co-management
regime has not brought about a major change in this regard. Importantly,
the occupational community of Texel fishermen is rather small and, more-
over, to a considerable extent crosscut by relations of kinship and affinity.
Clubs based on such multiple local and kin ties have certain advantages, as
the accounts in reciprocal barter need not always be in perfect balance. Nor
do skills have to be strictly equal to allow for information exchange. At the
same time, though, club memberships sometimes overlap and their
boundaries are consequently permeable, making for eventual seepage of
knowledge. Since the most valuable information is highly ephemeral – for
the simple fact that fish are mobile – the selective dispersal of idiosyncratic
knowledge is able to maintain the club of cooperating fishermen through
the system of proximate reciprocity unless free riding and opportunism
undercut its raison d’être.
Although not entirely unproblematic, there has also been sustained co-
operation in larger and formalized social formations. From the history of
Texel’s fishing industry, it is evident that prior to the establishment of offi-
cial fishermen’s associations, Texel fishermen cooperated informally in
various ways. In addition to supporting each other in emergencies, they
banded together when they collectively faced a problem. They would deter-
mine a strategy of action, which usually consisted of addressing the appro-
priate authorities. Such interest coalitions had a single short-term purpose
and did not formalize, and they dissolved once the problem had been dealt
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with. Local attempts at formal organization emerged from the second half
of the 19th century onwards. Repeatedly, however, voluntary associations
were quickly established but were also swiftly liquidated, while institution-
alized cooperation between Oudeschild and Oosterend fishermen did not
come about until the 1970s. In the Texel fishermen’s rhetoric and folk
myth, problems pertaining to sustained collective action were and are of-
ten ‘explained’ by pointing to their independence and individualism, traits
that seem ingrained in their self-image. As I have shown in Chapter 3,
some social scientists also use such tautological arguments of ‘a psychol-
ogy of autonomy’ that allegedly inhibits cooperation, but rather than hav-
ing psychological reasons, problems of cooperation emanate from socio-
economic and cultural diversities. What often impedes formalizing coop-
eration into voluntary associations and other organizations is the fact that
locally, regionally or nationally, fishermen are a heterogeneous grouping
expressive of contrasting and sometimes conflicting ideologies, interests
and behaviours (see also Jentoft and Davis 1993). To understand (the lack
of) cooperation, especially at the national level, the wider socio-economic
and political contexts and dynamics must therefore be taken into consid-
eration. It is not sufficient to reduce organizational problems to the struc-
tural characteristics of an economic system or to an alleged collective beha-
vioural disposition leading to social atomism. Shared interests have often
brought fishermen together, although there appear to be fundamental am-
biguities in individual actors’ choices based on costs-benefits considera-
tions, while opportunism and free riding may undercut sustained solidar-
ity. In this respect, small social formations stand the best chance of
achieving long-term cooperation. Face-to-face interactions and multi-
stranded relations create social pressure to participate in voluntary associa-
tions and social-control mechanisms to maintain cooperation.
The Texel Fishery Cooperative, Progress through Unity and several
other voluntary associations evidence the willingness of cooperating at lo-
cal level. In response to growing external interference that affected the
fishing industry, Texel owner-operators have organized more tightly and
the number of local organizations has even multiplied in an attempt to
regain some control over their occupational world. In addition, there is the
commissioned cooperation in a group following the introduction of the
early 1990s co-management regime. A well-seasoned Texel administrator
of local and national voluntary organizations remarks that at local level,
things work out fine. This is, however, not the case at national level:
It is very hard to strike agreements. You make a deal, go home and then
they seem to have forgotten all about it. It is part of the culture. In addition
to being board members, they are also entrepreneurs. They strike a com-
promise deal in the national organizations, but their grassroots simply will
not buy it. The entire administration [of voluntary associations] in the fish-
eries is unprofessional. You ought to have autonomous administrators.
With the kind of financial capital you are dealing with, it should definitely
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be more professional. As it stands, they only mind the interests of their own
individual firm.
This is the crux of many problems. The larger and the more heteroge-
neous the social configuration, the harder it is to bring diverging interests
together under a common denominator. Consequently, the small co-man-
agement groups in the Dutch fishing industry tend to work better than
national interest associations. The fact that there are two such national
organizations of course only exacerbates the situation, and seriously un-
dermines the fishermen’s political power. Although talks about reuniting
began soon after the Federation’s fission from the Dutch Fishermen’s
Union, economic and ideological differences continue to thwart any at-
tempt at a merger. With the current crisis deepening, many an owner-op-
erator would like the fishing industry’s leadership to be more militant:
Our leaders ought to put up a much fiercer fight. There is no unity among
the fishermen. They blame each other and they are individualists. As if
things weren’t bad enough already. We have to work together, we need each
other, particularly so in the current crisis. We have to tell each other the
truth, and we should fight. It seems, however, that everyone is acquiescing.
Fishing industry leaders are in a difficult position. They have to weigh the
interests of the various fishing communities and fleet segments. Ben
Daalder intimates:
We have to knit a sweater together, but everyone says ‘In my opinion.’Mind
you, tempers are fraught. Therefore, I have to perform a balancing act and
phrase things slightly differently for each audience while still communicat-
ing the same message.
In a progressively complex world, with shifting power and dependency re-
lationships and growing state intervention, organization and political parti-
cipation would offer fishermen a counterbalance to developments that
threaten to push them into a position of increasing powerlessness and
marginalization. Yet it proves to be hard to heal still-oozing sores and to
overcome old differences of opinion. However, under certain circum-
stances enduring institutionalized cooperation of fishermen is likely. In
general, this is the case if problems of scale create strong incentives to
work together; an organization receives the (tacit) support of most fisher-
men in an area and the membership is relatively small and homogeneous
in a socio-cultural sense (although in the case of mutual-aid funds this
harbours the danger of a concentration of risks). Other prerequisites for
successful cooperation are: mutual trust, confidence, social solidarity, loy-
alty, shared economic interests and goals (for example, product and produ-
cer homogeneity), limited competition from outsiders, difficult access to
the industry and few product alternatives. Corporate results or operating
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and managerial successes have to be sufficient to satisfy the expectations
of the organization’s members (conversely, dissatisfaction will lead to re-
duced loyalty, intolerance and increasing detachment) and it must be pos-
sible to sanction uncooperative behaviour in order to avoid free-rider prob-
lems. If all or most of these terms apply, independent fishermen and other
petty capitalists will often be cooperating competitors. Arguably, these con-
ditions are easier to accomplish at local level in small and homogenous
groupings than at higher levels of integration with large heterogeneous
social formations (Olson 1971[1965]:61-62).
The Logic and Dynamic of the Share-Based Family Firm
The myriad management measures have impinged upon the family firm’s
importance. The involvement of kin and family in fishing has been a com-
mon pattern for many decades. Some prominent Texel family firms can
even trace their roots back to the 18th century. However, the current invol-
vement of kinsfolk in fishing crews should not be regarded as a relic of an
ancient mode of production. Newcomers to the 1960s and 1970s local
fishing arena were generally more successful if they worked with agnatic
relatives, suggesting that the family firm is not an archaic form of social
organization, but a well-adapted institution in the days of high capitalism.
Rules of inheritance insufficiently explain the preference for relatives:
‘Among kinsmen, membership of the crew is a complex relationship of
interwoven strands of economic interest and social obligation within and
across the generations’ (Byron 1994:287). Pooling economic, social, cultur-
al and cognitive resources provides a common fund to cope with risks and
to accommodate to shifting conditions. The family firm is a relatively fluid
and flexible unit, which is highly adaptive under circumstances of uncer-
tainty (Durrenberger and Pálsson 1985:114ff.). Relatives are prepared to
postpone (returns on) investments, work longer hours, defer gratification,
cut remuneration, adjust household budgets and eat into their capital in
times of duress or to speed up the redemption of debts and intensify in-
vestments in times of prosperity. They can do so because the family firm is
at the same time a unit of (re)production, consumption and (re)distribu-
tion, providing the family firm with an adaptability not usually found in
company-owned firms that operate under the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. The ‘family firm logic’ also enables accumulating capital that owners
reinvest in the family firm to allow for expansion. Furthermore, a perva-
sive labour ethos where work permeates the entire existence of fishing
households greatly enhances adaptive performance.
Through their contributions to running the firm and their specific pat-
terns of expenditures, skipper-owners’ wives have usually played an impor-
tant role in materializing the family firm’s ideals and objectives. This is
still the case today. Many skipper-owners’ wives take part in decisions con-
cerning how a firm is managed financially: such as, for example, whether
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or not to invest in additional landing rights. They also take on various tasks
and chores linked with the firm, including bookkeeping and settling ac-
counts, ordering spare parts and provisions, doing the ship’s laundry or
cleaning the vessel’s galley and dwelling quarters. They feel committed to
and emotionally involved in the firm and appreciate their contribution. For
some small firms, the unpaid work is important in keeping them finan-
cially afloat. The wives’ organizational, economic and emotional contribu-
tion to the fishing household and their accommodating role can be crucial
for a firm’s flexibility, versatility and resilience (Hoefnagel and Smits
2000). Husbands still appreciate their wife’s contribution. ‘She’s my main
sounding-board, we even discuss details about the rigging of the nets,’ re-
lates a Texel owner-operator. Some women I interviewed denigrated their
own roles, in saying that earlier generations of fishermen’s wives had to be
even more independent as there were no means of ship-to-shore commu-
nication. Telecommunication (mobile phone, e-mail and particularly fax)
has facilitated contact with a vessel’s skipper and crew and, consequently,
has alleviated fears and worries at home. ‘We are always in touch at least
once a week,’ says a spouse of an owner-operator. ‘Still, the week can be
long when the kids are ill or when there is some other crisis at home.’ The
very same means of communication are probably also important in put-
ting additional workloads on women’s shoulders. As a skipper’s wife told:
‘I always get a fax on Thursday with information on whether I need to call
mechanics, the auction, the GIS and so on.’
The family firm is a system of self-motivated labour and a form of self
exploitation (Thompson et al. 1983:156; Jorion 1983:10) characterized by an
ethic of deferred gratification. For close agnatic kin, the share system
usually works well, although it is not necessarily devoid of conflict. Agnatic
kinsmen who are co-owners often accept receiving a fixed sum of money
out of the revenues while keeping the rest of their share in the firm. There-
fore, having sons makes for an important socio-economic asset and the
preferred social organization aboard ship usually hinges on a core of
father-sons or brothers. Ideal-typically, fissions are common in the stage
when brothers have adult sons (patrilateral cross cousins) who are gener-
ally reluctant to work for their uncles. This is inextricably connected with
the fact that part of their shares remain in the firm. Deferred gratification
is based on mutual trust in achieving a future goal, including, for example,
reinvestment, expansion and, eventually, succession. This gives family
firms a resilience that would be unthinkable for profit-oriented capitalist
businesses. The ethic of cooperation for the common purpose of maintain-
ing and continuing the family firm lends it a rationale that deviates from
the goals of business units working under capitalist relations of produc-
tion, where wages and profits are the main aim of labour and capital, re-
spectively. The predominant goal of (prospective) co-owners of a family
firm, on the other hand, is to keep the firm afloat even in the face of for-
midable and enduring adversities. This is so because the firm is much
more than a vehicle to earn an income. It is at the same time a source of
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pride and identity, intrinsically a raison d’être. It is for this reason that own-
er-operators often tenaciously hang on to continuing the firm so that they
can hand it on to the next generation.
The partnership contract and the share system of remuneration tie non-
propertied fishermen to the family firm, and they benefit directly from the
proceeds of the owner-operators’ capital assets. Skipper-owners, in turn,
have highly motivated and dedicated crewmen in whose self-interest it is
to work relentlessly and put in long hours, to maximize the gross proceeds
and minimize the costs, and to keep the boat and the equipment in good
repair. An additional advantage for owners is that they do not have to pay
fixed wages and can distribute risks to the crew as a whole, which provides
the firm with considerable flexibility in times of meagre revenues. How-
ever, under prolonged duress, non-propertied share fishermen tend to exit
the fishing industry for more secure jobs. This is the share system’s funda-
mental weakness: it only loosely ties co-venturing labour to a firm. Ever
since the share system turned into common practice on Texel, skipper-
owners have faced problems in keeping or recruiting crewmembers in
times of depression, regardless of the share division’s exact details. For the
former, fishing is an existential matter that goes beyond a simple account-
book reckoning of proceeds and profits. Even though share fishermen may
be considered independent petty entrepreneurs before the law, their ‘inde-
pendence’ is in fact limited to their supply of labour. Through the share
system, they are directly linked with and vulnerable to ecological shifts,
economic cycles and political interventions. There may be windfalls, but
also hardship. During crises, share fishermen feel they carry the brunt of
the fishing venture’s risks. This is profoundly evident at present. There is a
reluctance to join fishing crews and even owners allegedly encourage their
sons ‘to learn a trade’.
In general, however, owner-operators still highly appreciate it if their
male offspring continue a firm. When an owner’s son is old enough to
join the crew, one of the deckhands usually has to leave the vessel to make
way for the newcomer. Similarly, an owner’s son will eventually skipper.
This pattern of preferring to work with one’s kin is a time-honoured prac-
tice. Owners prefer working with ‘one’s own folk’ because they believe this
automatically means a maximum job effort and commitment to the firm.
In addition, the family boat means more to them than a material vehicle to
earning an income; it is also a patrimonial source of pride and social and
individual identity. Until the early 1980s, the ideal of owners was to set up
each son with his own vessel. Due to the recent developments in the in-
dustry, this ideal of succession and expansion is no longer feasible. Supra-
national and national policies aim at reducing the number of vessels and
aggregate engine power in an attempt to tackle overcapacity. In addition,
due to the high costs involved it is currently almost impossible to take over
a firm, let alone begin one. The fishing industry has faced a process of
unprecedented capital intensification. Today, a vessel including landing
rights costs many millions of euros. The introduction of transferable fish-
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ing rights has created enormous barriers for potential newcomers. Even
continuing a family firm is extremely difficult due to the high prices and
succession duties that have to be paid (Dubbink, van der Schans and van
Vliet 1994:33). Moreover, there are additional uncertainties concerning the
allocation of landing rights in terms of the real quantities of fish quota
holders are entitled to land. Along with the congeries of restrictions that
fishermen have to live up to, over the past decade this has affected the
enthusiasm to enrol in the fishing industry even among members of the
local fishing elite. Whether occupational inheritance will be dominant in
future is questionable. The continuity of many family firms is at stake. In
part, it is also connected with demographic developments that tend to un-
dermine the social asset of having several sons from among whom skip-
pers can recruit crew and successors. However, many owner-operators ob-
stinately adhere to their occupation even when facing declining stocks and
catches, and substandard incomes. This has a lot to do with the fact that
fishing is not just a job but an all-pervasive métier and a matter of identity.
In the Final Analysis…
Fishermen generally acknowledge that without any regulation whatsoever,
tragedy is imminent, though they find it difficult to grapple with the un-
certainties external authorities have created for the fishing industry’s fu-
ture. They have always adapted to the vicissitudes of the ecosystem and
markets, but currently many are up against erratic powers beyond their
adaptive capabilities. Usually, fishermen have short-time horizons. Due to
high levels of uncertainty, they prefer short-term planning. The incentives
to adopt a new mode of production are inextricably intertwined with oppor-
tunities for change and perceived costs and benefits. At face value, fisher-
men seem to be conservative. They often stubbornly resist change in re-
source management regimes, and over time they have occasionally given
vent to their discontent through strikes, protests, blockades, non-compli-
ance and confrontations with (foreign) competitors and external author-
ities. From the fishermen’s point of view, they usually have good reasons
to behave like this. This book has shown several contradictions of policy
and management regimes, the fishermen’s ambivalent coping responses,
and the unplanned for and perverse outcomes of the process. Between in-
tended policy goals and desired results there seems to be a yawning gap.
New management regimes often impede time-honoured fishing strate-
gies, adaptive performance, flexibility and switching behaviour. Due to the
cultural emphasis on independence and individualism, fishermen are of-
ten suspicious of and resent interference from fisheries policymakers and
regulators, especially if measures are believed to be flawed or unjust: ‘The
motivations of actors in the fisheries and the moral legitimacy of manage-
ment measures are closely linked with meaning and values’ (T. Vester-
gaard 1996:87). At best, they are ambivalent about external interventions.
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However, it would be erroneous to assume that fishermen are merely
powerless victims of state intervention. They try to make the best of a
world full of structures and strictures and they navigate seas that are trea-
cherous in a real and metaphorical sense. Despite the fact that fishermen
can hardly be called autonomous actors – being embedded as they are in
wider social configurations – there is agency. They plan, scheme, plot, and
adjust their lives to the new realities of encompassing management re-
gimes, seeking to find the loopholes, contravening the rules if they deem
so fit or complying and cooperating if they perceive benefits in such beha-
viour. Not all fishermen merely react to ‘the rules of the game’; there are
also active innovators who attempt to stay at least one step ahead of state-
induced constraints to remain in control. In both cases, fishermen con-
front national and supranational governments with new situations to
which the authorities subsequently have to respond. This two-way dy-
namic has seriously affected the nature of the policymaking process. A
case in point is the state’s policy concerning the fishing fleet’s develop-
ment and modernization. Ironically, it first used subsidies to fund overca-
pacity and then used public resources to reduce excess capacity, putting a
double tax burden on its citizens. Understandably, such dialectic often
holds little water with fishermen who first received incentives to invest
and next were severely restricted in their operations. Adding insult to in-
jury, they were blamed for over-fishing, while in the early 1970s they
begged the state to cap engine power. The dialectic is also evident at a high-
er level of integration.
In the European Union, ‘both governments and non-governmental ac-
tors no longer have a monopoly over the policy agenda. They define public
policies through permanent interactions, negotiations and compromises’
(Lequesne 2000:791). Although fishermen resent the myriad of rules and
regulations that Brussels imposes on them, it is ironically to a considerable
extent their own call for exemptions, clarifications and specifications that
has led to a reactive multiplication of bureaucratic procedures and rules.
This is because changes in regulatory regimes and property rights often
have profound distributive effects and may therefore meet with vehement
opposition. Such shifts do not emerge in an institutional vacuum, but in-
volve political bargaining and manoeuvring by individuals and groups with
varying resources of power who seek to influence the rules of the game
and attempt to control, negotiate or contest the system’s definition, legiti-
mization and enforcement (Jentoft, McCay and Wilson 1998:431; see also
Libecap 1989). The actors may do so through strategies of deliberation and
cooperation or, alternatively, evasion, violation, litigation and/or other
forms of rule beating and resistance. Processes of interest group media-
tion often interfere with policy objectives and the outcomes of policymak-
ing are susceptible to manipulation by powerful stakes (Symes 1999:142).
Mediation of conflicting interests and the resulting compromises might
lead to suboptimal ‘solutions’, perpetuating or even deepening fisheries
crises. The ‘winners’ support extant management regimes and attempt to
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ensure that they continue to sustain their benefits, rendering internal re-
form difficult (Jentoft 2006). There may also be the phenomenon of
‘agency capture’, where powerful individual actors and groups seem to be
determining the definition of the rules, as regulators become inclined to
completely identify with their interests (Singleton 2000:7). Due to these
political processes, the rather straightforward means-to-an-end approach
creates complexities of its own. Rather than being implemented, European
Union policies are ‘translated by a range of national and local actors who
remain constrained at the state level by specific arrangements between so-
cieties, markets and governments’ (Lequesne 2000:785, emphasis in origi-
nal). Any blueprint management regime therefore inexorably creates con-
tradictions and unanticipated outcomes.
Successive management regimes eventually leading to the late 20th-cen-
tury rights-based co-governance system in the Dutch flatfish fishing indus-
try have increasingly stymied the fishermen’s key adaptive feature: their
polyvalent short-term switching behaviour. In the face of declining re-
source abundance or fluctuating markets, fishermen have for centuries
been able to cope with these ecological and economic vicissitudes by tar-
geting different species, diversifying or specializing, pluralizing activities,
or temporarily abandoning fishing, with permanent exit usually providing
a strategy of last resort. However, with the allocation of individual transfer-
able quotas, their freedom to do so has been stifled to a considerable ex-
tent, which has forced them to develop a long-term perspective on their
business. The upshot is that they find themselves in a situation in which
specialization and intensification have become of paramount importance
to their economic survival. According to the logic of the ‘economics of flex-
ibility’, ‘intensification requires greater investments and can lock people
and their organizations into particular, “deeper” modes of response, be-
coming nearly irreversible’ (McCay 2002:377). Investment in quota entitle-
ments certainly leads to a commitment to exploit specific resources that is
hardly reversible. At the same time, it has made quota holders profoundly
susceptible to top-down interventions. Since the national offshore fishing
industry – including the Dutch-owned re-flagged fleet – has come to de-
pend on sole and plaice to such a vast extent that it virtually ‘owns’ the
European total allowable catch for these species, it is extremely vulnerable
to the fickle horse-trading of national and supranational interests in Brus-
sels. ‘We have no friends in Europe,’ sighed Dutch fishing industry leader
Ben Daalder, following more bad news for the Dutch flatfish fishermen in
the summer of 2006. The Dutch fisheries negotiators in the European
headquarters do not seem to have sufficient change for barter in their
pockets to successfully participate in the tit-for-tat negotiations that spring
from the contradictions between national fisheries interests and interna-
tional and supranational rules aimed at regulating fishing effort in connec-
tion with biological and environmental concerns. Such bargains still char-
acterize the Council of Ministers’ decision-making. The ‘weak
“transnationality”’ of European fisheries policy explains why many fisher-
302 Braving Troubled Waters
men still regard the Common Fisheries Policy ‘as an interstate bargain and
do not consider that their occupation takes place in the context of a Euro-
pean public space’ (Lequesne 2000:783).
The bureaucratic process that aimed at producing solutions for prob-
lems of overcapacity and overexploitation has instead become part of the
problem. Formalized private property regimes may sever the resource
from its socio-cultural context, ‘reducing the social capital and ecological
flexibility needed for effective management’ (Jentoft, McCay and Wilson
1998:432). Imposing a rights-based fishery in the Netherlands has indeed
resulted in rigidity and a loss of resilience. More generally, this is an out-
come inherent in the command-and-control approach to natural resource
management, which:
implicitly assumes that the problem is well-bounded, clearly defined, rela-
tively simple, and generally linear with respect to cause and effect. But
when these same methods of control are applied to a complex, nonlinear,
and poorly understood natural world, and when the same predictable out-
comes are expected but rarely obtained, severe ecological, social, and eco-
nomic repercussions result (Holling and Meffe 1996:329).
The unforeseen and undesirable consequences that arise from such top-
down interventions seeking variance reduction and standardization are
‘less resilient and more vulnerable ecosystems, more myopic and rigid in-
stitutions, and more dependent and selfish economic interests all attempt-
ing to maintain short-term success’ (ibid.:331). This is what Holling and
Meffe term the ‘pathology of natural resource management’, a pathology
that deepens if states respond to failures of command and control by yet
tighter regulations and prohibitions. Clearly, the way in which the Dutch
flatfish fishing industry was managed during the 1970s until the early
1990s was ailing from this pathology, and despite the state’s devolvement
of some responsibilities to owner-operators under the extant co-manage-
ment regime, the European command-and-control management regime is
still firmly in place. So is the pathology. For all the supra-state’s rhetoric of
the ‘good-governance’ principles of openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence, in fact its Common Fisheries Policy remains
top-down with in camera decision-making, token fishermen involvement,
obscure responsibilities, grave inefficacies, and many incoherent and ad
hoc adjustments. It is clearly pervasive, but does not take into account the
fishermen’s motives, interests, opinions and values.
What is even worse from the fishermen’s point of view is that entitle-
ments are utterly insecure. This has been true from the onset of the quota
system. Initially, the state withdrew landing privileges once the national
share of the total allowable catches was exhausted. This implied that, de
facto, individual transferable quotas did not amount to a secure property
right, since owner-operators could not be certain of taking up the amounts
of fish to which they were entitled. In fact, under these conditions ITQs
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exacerbated rather than countered the ‘race for fish’, particularly because
enforcement was haphazard. Fishermen who held sufficient quota rights
called for tighter supervision, but as long as it paid to circumvent the law
they opted for illegal fishing and landing. Their definition of the situation
was that since they could not trust the state to enforce its rules, they simply
had no alternative but to behave as maximizers. The underlying social dy-
namic was that in order to secure as much as possible of its rights, each
firm had to land as great a portion of the national TAC as possible in the
shortest time possible, regardless of its individual limits. With tightened
enforcement, and particularly following the introduction of co-manage-
ment groups, this type of behaviour changed. However, it took consider-
able effort to bring the fishermen into the fold of fisheries politics. Legiti-
macy and transparency have been the basis of the relatively large measure
of success of recent governance regimes. The state also encouraged owner-
operators to invest in acquiring additional landing rights. Most Texel own-
er-operators have done so with alacrity, behaving in precisely the way neo-
classical economists predicted the stronger and more efficient fishermen
would do because accruing landing entitlements was in their ‘enlightened
self-interest’. The Texel skipper-owners now have a considerable portion of
the national share of total allowable catches for sole and plaice at their dis-
posal. They generally equate these entitlements to land a specified amount
of fish as ownership of that amount of fish still swimming in the sea. Their
catching efforts obviously tend to focus on the species they have ‘bought’.
If they were to refrain from doing so, their expenditures to purchase quo-
tas would be wasted and thus be highly inefficient costs – a loss. Rights-to-
land therefore tend to turn into duties-to-catch, with potentially detrimental
ecological effects. In addition to profoundly thwarting switching behaviour
and thus flexibility and resilience, the quota regime means that absolute
quantities of fish that rights holders are entitled to land fluctuate from
year to year, sometimes quite sharply. This makes purchasing additional
landing rights a precarious investment that also lends itself to a consider-
able degree of speculation: ‘a percentage-based right … offers less security
and marketability to the holders’ (Rose 2002:242). Moreover, days-at-sea
regulations contravene opportunities for quota uptake, which interferes
with the market of transfers because if there is under-use, quota offers in
the market outweigh demand and prices drop. Still, a major fear of the
owner-operators is that the stroke of a Brussels’s pen might replace their
landing rights with a days-at-sea regime.
Many problems emanate from the EU’s penchant for regulatory unifor-
mity across member states. These rules and regulations do not always
make sense for specific fisheries and they may create ‘perverse incentives’
and produce ‘deleterious effects’ (Acheson 2006:125-126). The point is that
generic and homogenizing ‘state simplifications’ (J.C. Scott 1998) aimed at
technocratic engineering of natural and social environments usually fail
because they are at loggerheads with practical and situated knowledge and
contextual skills that can be acquired only through local practice and ex-
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perience. Composite, dynamic and discrete situations are manipulated
into simplified, static, aggregated and standardized data for purposes of
management and control. However, such grand planning designs usually
fail because they ignore what James Scott dubs metis, ‘a wide array of prac-
tical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly chang-
ing natural human environment’ (ibid.:313). Against this background, it
may be a reasonable strategy for management goals to devote closer atten-
tion to fishermen’s knowledge, ‘allowing for extreme fluctuations in the
ecosystem, relaxing at the same time the modernist assumption of predict-
ability associated with the ecological project of sustainability’ (Pálsson
1996:75; also see Hornborg 1996:54). These knowledge systems need to
be re-contextualized in policy and management frameworks, and ideally,
resource users should be closely involved in the process because they have
special stakes in the outcome. To be optimally adaptive, these strategies
should provide for flexibility, since contingent and capricious remote
forces make for uncertainties and risks that affect local resources and their
users. We should bear in mind, however, that all governance structures
‘involve tradeoffs between stability and flexibility, authority and representa-
tion, social and individual’ (Hanna 1999:280), while their outcomes are
hard to predict and control. Therefore, actors and communities will con-
tinue to depend on social resilience: their ability to cope with perturbations
because of social, political and environmental change (Adger 2000:347).
Currently, however, the Texel fisherfolk’s greatest economic concern is
how to survive the present depression caused mainly by unprecedented
fuel prices. With no signs whatsoever of the crisis abating, the owner-op-
erators just attempt to do what many of their predecessors have done in
the past: brave troubled waters for love of their way of life.
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Appendix A
Main Species Pursued by Texel Fishermen (1700-2008)
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Appendix B
Development of the Texel Fishing Fleet, 1970-2006
Source: Adapted from the Fishery Register.
Note: Development of the Texel fishing fleet in horsepower categories and aggre-
gate engine power (x 1,000 h.p.). The figure pertains to all vessels on the Fishery
Register, including shrimp-cum-tourist boats not used for commercial fishing.
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Appendix C
Development of the Dutch Cutter Fleet, 1973-2007
Source: Adapted from LEI’s annual fishery statistics Visserij in Cijfers.
Note: Development of the cutter segment of the Dutch fishing fleet in horsepower
categories and aggregate engine power (x 1,000 h.p.). The figure is slightly dis-
torted because several firms operated second-hand side and stern trawlers in the
1970s. Statistically, these vessels were included in the distant-water-fisheries seg-
ment.
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Appendix D
Dutch Sole and Plaice Quotas (x 1,000 metric tonnes), 1975-
2008
Source: LEI annual reports Visserij in cijfers.
Note: excluding additional quotas obtained through bilateral quota swaps.
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Notes
Note to Introduction
1. I will refrain from using the gender-neutral word ‘fisher’, which is currently
popular among social scientists. I deem it a more obfuscating than clarifying
term, and prefer to use fisherman or fishermen when referring to male produ-
cers in the fishing industry. It was and is highly exceptional to find women
among the crewmembers of Dutch fishing vessels.
Notes to Chapter 2
1. Except when quoting, I have refrained from referring to archival sources as they
are all in Dutch. For fuller reports that include comprehensive references and
sources, see van Ginkel (1993 and 1995a – in Dutch). For extensive articles in
English on Texel oyster fishing, eelgrass harvesting, and fishermen cooperation,
see van Ginkel (1996a, 1996b, 1997).
2. Municipal annual report 1814 (Texel archives, no. K-410).
3. Letter to the governor, dated 24 June 1841 (Texel archives, no. K 853).
4. ‘Beschrijving van de oestervisscherij zoo als die op het Eiland Texel wordt uit-
geoefend’ [‘Description of the oyster fishery as it is practised on the island of
Texel’] (Texel archives, no. K 853).
5. Petition of Oosterend oyster fishermen to the King, dated 12 March 1839 (Na-
tional archives, The Hague, RWS 2.04.07.02, no. 409-412).
6. At the same time, the number of fishing vessels hailing from other locales that
exploited oysters in the northern Zuider Sea declined. By about 1850, only
thirty-three vessels pursued oysters as opposed to eighty-five a century earlier.
7. Municipal annual report 1864 (Texel archives, no. K-412).
8. Appendix to a letter, dated 23 January 1859, from the Board of Sea Fisheries to
the mayor and councillors of Texel concerning the cultivation of oysters (Texel
archives, no. K 853).
9. Letter of Texel’s mayor to the King’s Commissioner in North Holland, dated 6
September 1852 (North Holland state archives, PB 1851 1943 werkdossiers, no.
46).
10. Request by the mayors of Wieringen and Texel to the King’s Commissioner of
North Holland, dated 18 and 19 August 1867 (North Holland state archives, PB
1851 1943, werkdossiers, no. 46).
11. Eelgrass workers’ petition to the council of Texel, September 1882 (Texel ar-
chives, no. K 1120).
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12. In the entire North Atlantic region, fish merchants and processors have domi-
nated and sometimes exploited fishermen (Smith 1977:4; Andersen 1979:21;
Acheson 1981:282). The latter often responded by establishing cooperatives to
further their position in trade networks, gain leverage vis-à-vis fish merchants
and processors, and circumvent as many middlemen as possible (Orbach 1980;
Pollnac 1991:284ff; Jentoft 1986:199-200; Prattis 1987; Davis and Jentoft
1989:195; Magnússon 1990:73; Durrenberger 1992a:77ff.).
13. Letter to the mayor of Texel, dated 8 August 1922 (Texel archives, no. K-864).
14. Letter of K. Vink to the local administration, 29 January 1921 (Texel archives, no.
K-861).
15. See, for example, McCay and Acheson 1987a, 1987b; McEvoy 1988; Acheson
1989; Berkes et al. 1989; Pinkerton 1989; van Ginkel 1989; McGoodwin 1990;
Ostrom 1990, 1999; Pálsson 1991; Bromley 1992; McKean 1992; Feeny, Hanna
and McEvoy 1996; Agrawal 2003.
16. See, for instance, Gordon 1954; Agnello and Donnelley 1976; Anderson 1976;
Santopietro and Shabman 1992; Mace 1993; Ajuzie and Altobello 1997; de Ales-
si 1997; Jones and Walker 1997; Grafton, Squires and Fox 2000. I will return to
the neoclassical viewpoint when dealing with individual transferable quotas in
Chapters 5 and 6.
Notes to Chapter 3
1. Measures were also taken with regard to mussel fishing. Texel fishermen had
not been fishing mussels from 1 June 1934 to 1 June 1935. The Mussel Crisis
Decree stipulated that, in order to get a mussel fishing licence, this should be
the case. For this reason, the Texelians did not get licences to fish mussels,
despite their requests in 1936 (see below).
2. Petition of Texel’s mayor and aldermen to the House of Representatives, 12 Feb-
ruary 1938 (Texel archives, no. P-747).
3. On sailing vessels with auxiliary engines, which usually had a crew of two, the
division was forty per cent for the vessel share and sixty per cent for the crew
share. The skipper and the deckhand would each get thirty per cent. On sailing
vessels without an engine, the share division was a third for the vessel, a third
for the skipper and a third for the deckhand.
4. ‘Head teacher Daalder’ was the local secular school’s principal, and was pivotal
in various voluntary associations, including fishermen’s organizations. He was
the father of the author whom I quote here, Dirk Daalder (born in 1887), who
was born and bred in Oosterend.
5. Second World War explosive devices would remain a fishermen’s hazard for
decades. A Texel cutter was damaged beyond repair in 1971 when a bomb that
was caught and returned to the sea exploded underneath the hull. No one was
injured. As late as 2005, three fishermen working aboard an Ouddorp beam
trawler died when they netted a bomb that exploded on deck. It is not unusual
for explosive devices to end up in the nets of fishermen, as I witnessed when
joining the crew of a beam trawler in 1990. One of my interlocutors told me
that fishermen had unwillingly been ‘the best minesweepers of the post-war
era’.
6. It is a tenacious stereotype. Later, several authors referred to the fishermen’s
‘deep-seated individualism and local chauvinism’ (Schaper 1962:148), their
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‘weak organization’ and ‘individualistic attitude’ (Bossaers 1987:63) or their
‘fragmentation, and not organization’ (Kerkhoven 1986:55). Kranenburg
(1980:12) suggests that all Dutch fishermen behaved and thought individualisti-
cally.
7. In 1967, the auction finally closed down. Only two petty fish merchants were
still active then. In the previous six years, the annual turnover had never sur-
passed 50,000 guilders.
8. See, for example, M.E. Smith 1977:5; Poggie 1980:21; Knipe 1984:98; Pollnac
1991:284; McGoodwin 1990:127; Valdés-Pizzini 1990:165; Pollnac and Poggie
1991:44; Thomas, Johnson and Riordan 1995:150-151.
Notes to Chapter 4
1. The EEC structural policy demanded an end to subsidies. Dutch fishermen be-
lieved that the Dutch state complied with the rules, but other member states did
not, while Germany also provided low-interest loans. The conviction that Euro-
pean rules did not apply equally to fishermen from all member states would
become deeply seated, in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere.
2. Their favourite auction was still IJmuiden, where they grossed 13.3 million
guilders in 1972. This accounted for seventeen per cent of IJmuiden’s turnover.
In nearby Den Helder, they grossed 6.5 million guilders, accounting for nine-
teen per cent of the turnover (Anonymous 1973:14-15).
3. On the important role of women in fishing economies, see P. Thompson 1985;
Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988; Cole 1991; Davis and Nadel-Klein 1992; Thiessen,
Davis and Jentoft 1992; Jentoft 1993; Meltzoff 1995; Munk-Madsen 2000; Bink-
ley 2002; Nadel-Klein 2003; Neis et al. 2005.
4. The partnership contract or maatschapscontract was officially recognized in 1923
(de Bruyn 2001). However, the share system as such is considerably older. In
this section, I will use the present tense as much of what I write still applies. I
will use the past tense only when referring to specific historic events and situa-
tions.
Notes to Chapter 5
1. See, for example, Grafton 1996; Jones and Walker 1997; Shotton 2000; Pascoe,
Andersen and de Wilde 2001. For a critical economist’s view, see Copes 1986,
1997.
2. In 1977, due to widespread dissatisfaction, the allocation rule was altered, giv-
ing equal weight to the basis of the historical catch record and a vessel’s engine
power. The implicit understanding was that these individual quotas – relative
shares of the national part of the total allowable catch – were assigned to firms
in perpetuity.
3. On ‘luck’ in fishing, see for example Tunstall 1962; Orbach 1977; Zulaika 1981;
Lummis 1983; Byron 1986, 1988; McGoodwin 1990.
4. See Andersen 1973; Löfgren 1977; Acheson 1981; Knipe 1984; Cohen 1987;
McGoodwin 1990; Pollnac 1991; Peace 1991; LiPuma 1992; T. Vestergaard
1992; Pálsson 1994; Hanna and Jentoft 1996.
5. The names are pseudonyms.
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6. While some anthropologists attribute success to the leadership role and perso-
nal skills of skippers (Byron 1980; Thorlindsson 1988), others point to a combi-
nation of engine power, equipment, skipper performance and skipper-crew in-
teractions (Barth 1966; Baks and Postel-Coster 1977). The issue has kindled
debate about the so-called ‘skipper effect’, which has been critically assessed by
Pálsson and Durrenberger for the Icelandic fishing industry. They consider it a
folk myth that serves social functions (see, for example, Pálsson and Durrenber-
ger 1990; Durrenberger and Pálsson 1986). In their view, success mainly de-
pends on fishing effort, that is, boat size and number of trips.
7. See, for example, Pálsson and Helgason 1995; Symes and Crean 1995; McCay
1995, 2000; McCay et al. 1995; Wiber 2000; Shotton 2000.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, auctioning was mandatory between 1959 and
1975, but had to be abolished to meet Community rules. In 1982, these rules
changed. There were calls to reintroduce mandatory auctioning, but initially the
House of Representatives rejected a proposal to do so, with the argument that
the system should be effective in the European Community as a whole. In 2001,
the EU again changed its stance concerning mandatory auctioning (see below).
2. See, for example, Dubbink, van der Schans and van Vliet 1994; Directie Visserij
1995; Hoefnagel and Smit 1997b:175; Symes 1997b:111-113; Berg 1999b:159;
Langstraat 1999; van der Burg 2000:48; van Geffen et al. 2002; Symes, Steins
and Alegret 2003:124-126; Bavinck and Hoefnagel 2004:43; Hoefnagel, Visser
and de Vos 2004:45-46.
3. On Dutch quota hoppers, see also Davidse 1998; Hoefnagel 1998; Lequesne
2000; Valatin 2000 and Hatcher et al. 2002. Between 1996 and 2003, thirty-
three to forty Dutch-owned vessels were on the UK register, approximately
twenty-four to thirty-three flew German flags and between twenty-two and
twenty-nine were registered in Belgium. A handful of Dutch fishermen re-
flagged their boats to Denmark, Norway, France and Ireland. If we were to in-
clude the landing rights of the re-flagged Dutch-owned fishing vessels, Dutch
owner-operators currently have more than ninety per cent of the European sole
TAC and sixty per cent of the plaice TAC at their disposal (Task Force 2006:14).
4. UK and Irish fishermen also endorse this ‘powerful and deeply embedded’ be-
lief (E. Bennett 1999:10; see also Connolly 1997; Rossiter and Stead 2003:282;
Daw and Gray 2005:190). They feel picked on by the authorities and are con-
vinced that they cannot win in a system they consider unfair and biased because
of unequal enforcement. More generally, there is a climate of mutual suspicion
concerning proper enforcement of fisheries regulations across member states.
5. The one-net rule, introduced in 2002 to enable linking days-at-sea allocations
with gear type used, stipulates that only one set of gear is allowed aboard. It
obstructs flexibility at sea, since boats must return to their homeport to fetch
another net should a skipper decide to switch to another kind of fishery.
6. In early 2005, twelve out of nineteen Texel North Sea cutters had at least two
relatives who crewed. Six of these boats had three crewing relatives and in-laws
and one vessel had four crewing relatives and in-laws. Kin involvement is con-
siderably greater if one considers shore-based co-owners.
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Note to Conclusions
1. See, among others, Löfgren 1972:87ff.; Andersen 1973:159; Byron 1975,
1986:101ff.; Acheson 1981; Moustgaard 1984:345-347; T. Vestergaard 1990;
Pálsson 1991:122ff.; Peace 1996:88.
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